area handbook series 

Chad 

a country study 




i 



Chad 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Thomas Collelo 
Research Completed 
December 1988 




On the cover: Two children help their father lift water from a 
well near Lake Chad. 



Second Edition, 1990; First Printing, 1990. 

Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Chad: A Country Study. 

Area handbook series, DA Pam 550-159 
Research completed December 1988. 
Bibliography: pp. 223-234. 
Includes index. 

1. Chad. I. Collelo, Thomas, 1948- . II. Area handbook of 
Chad. III. Federal Research Division. Library of Congress. 
IV. DA Pam 550-159. 

DT546.422.C48 1990 916.743— dc20 89-600373 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-159 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to thank individuals and private institutions 
who gave their time, research materials, and expertise to the produc- 
tion of this book. The authors are also grateful to members of the 
Federal Research Division staff who contributed directly to the 
preparation of the manuscript. These people include Richard F. 
Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the spon- 
soring agency; Martha E. Hopkins, who managed editing and 
production; Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who provided 
word-processing support; and Helen C. Metz, who reviewed the 
text's French terminology. 

Marilyn L. Majeska, Sharon Costello, Richard Kollodge, Lea 
Knott, and Michael Pleasants edited the manuscript; prepublica- 
tion editorial review was performed by Beverly Wolpert; Shirley 
Kessell compiled the index. Diann J. Johnson of the Library of 
Congress Composing Unit prepared the camera- ready copy, under 
the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Inestimable graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto, 
assisted by Sandra K. Ferrell and Kimberly A. Lord; Ms. Lord 
also designed the cover artwork and the illustrations on the title 
page of each chapter. In addition, thanks are owed to Carolina 
E. Forrester, who reviewed the map drafts, and Harriett R. Blood, 
who prepared the topography and drainage map. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the many in- 
dividuals and public and private agencies who allowed their photo- 
graphs to be used in this study. They are indebted especially to 
those who contributed original work not previously published. 



v 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile , xiii 

Introduction xix 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

John L. Collier 

PREHISTORY 4 

ERA OF EMPIRES, A.D. 900-1900 5 

Kanem-Borno 5 

Bagirmi and Wadai 10 

ARRIVAL OF THE FRENCH AND COLONIAL 

ADMINISTRATION 11 

DECOLONIZATION POLITICS 14 

TOMBALBAYE ERA, 1960-75 17 

Tombalbaye's Governance: Policies and Methods .... 17 

Rebellion in Eastern and Northern Chad 20 

Fall of the Tombalbaye Government 22 

CIVIL WAR AND NORTHERN DOMINANCE, 1975-82 . . 24 

Malloum's Military Government, 1975-78 24 

Civil War and Multilateral Mediation, 1979-82 27 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 33 

Dennis D. Cordell 

PHYSICAL SETTING 35 

The Land 36 

Water Systems 37 

Climate 39 

POPULATION 42 

LANGUAGES AND ETHNIC GROUPS 45 

Nilo-Saharan Languages 48 

Afro-Asiatic Languages 54 

Congo-Kordofanian Languages 58 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 60 

Toubou and Daza: Nomads of the Sahara 61 

Arabs: Semisedentary Peoples of the Sahel 63 

Sara: Sedentary Peoples of the Soudanian Zone 65 



vii 



RELIGION 66 

Classical African Religions 67 

Islam 70 

Christianity 73 

EDUCATION 76 

Primary Education 79 

Secondary Education 80 

Higher Education 81 

Vocational Education 82 

HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES 83 

Chapter 3. The Economy 87 

Peter D. Coats 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 89 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 92 

AGRICULTURE 92 

Cotton 95 

Subsistence Farming 102 

Livestock 106 

Fishing 107 

Forestry 108 

MANUFACTURING, MINING, AND UTILITIES 109 

Manufacturing 109 

Mining Ill 

Water and Electricity 112 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 113 

Land Transport 115 

Air Transport 118 

Communications 119 

TRADE AND COMMERCE 120 

Exports 120 

Imports 121 

Direction of Trade 121 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FINANCE 122 

Balance of Payments 122 

Banking and Finance 124 

Government Finances 126 

THE NATIONAL DEBT AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE . . 129 

National Debt 129 

Foreign Assistance 130 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 135 

Rita M. Byrnes 

POLITICAL BACKGROUND 139 

Preindependence Factions 139 



viii 



Southern Dominance, 1960-78 140 

Transition to Northern Rule 142 

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 145 

Constitutional System 145 

Regional Government 148 

Judicial System 149 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 150 

Factionalism 150 

National Union for Independence and Revolution ... 154 

Political Style 155 

Mass Media 158 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 158 

Relations with France 160 

Relations with Libya 160 

Relations with Nigeria and Sudan 162 

Relations with Other African States 163 

Relations with the United States 166 

Relations with Arab States 167 

Chapter 5. National Security 169 

Jean R. Tartter 

EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC SECURITY 

CONCERNS 172 

THE ARMED FORCES 175 

Origins and Early Development 175 

Organization of the National Security 

Establishment 178 

The Chadian National Armed Forces 179 

The Air Force 186 

Defense Expenditures 187 

CIVIL CONFLICT AND LIBYAN INTERVENTION 188 

The FROLINAT Rebellion, 1965-79 188 

First Libyan Intervention, 1980-81 190 

Habre's Return to Power and Second Libyan 

Intervention, 1982-84 192 

Repelling Libya's Occupying Force, 1985-87 194 

FOREIGN MILITARY COOPERATION 198 

The French Military Role in Chad 198 

United States Military Aid 200 

INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER 201 

Police Services 201 

The Criminal Justice System 202 

Internal Security Conditions 204 



Appendix A. Tables 209 

Appendix B. Principal Armed Factions, 1975-87 . . 219 

Jean R. Tartter 

Bibliography 223 

Glossary 235 

Index 239 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Chad, 1988 xviii 

2 Empires of the Chad Region 6 

3 Topography and Drainage 38 

4 Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 1982 46 

5 Ethnolinguistic Map 50 

6 Ownership of Chad's Major Industries, 1987 104 

7 Economic Activity, 1987 114 

8 Transportation System, 1988 116 

9 Organization of Chadian National Armed Forces, 

Late 1985 180 

10 Areas of Fighting, 1980-87 194 



x 



Preface 



Since the publication of the Area Handbook for Chad in 1972, Chad- 
ian society has experienced almost uninterrupted turmoil. The 
government in power in 1972, which was dominated by southern 
ethnic groups, fell to a military coup d'etat in 1975. By 1978 an 
insurgent group, composed mosdy of northerners, had displaced 
the military regime, and in 1982 a different rebel organization came 
to power. These years also saw the coming and going of foreign 
troops, most notably those of France and Libya. Adding to these 
politico-military machinations was a several-year-long drought that 
produced famine and a flow of refugees and rendered the econ- 
omy dependent on the generosity of France and the international 
donor community. 

Although Chad: A Country Study contains some material from the 
1972 edition, it is basically a new book. Like its predecessor, this 
volume is an attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner 
the dominant social, political, economic, and military aspects of 
contemporary Chadian society. Sources of information included 
scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of governments 
and international organizations, foreign and domestic newspapers, 
and numerous periodicals. The authors have emphasized the use 
of foreign -language sources to a greater extent than in the past. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the warfare during the 1980s, up-to- 
date information on social and economic issues was scarce; little 
fieldwork had been done, and few government reports had been 
published. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book, and a brief 
annotated bibliographic note on sources recommended for further 
reading appears at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given 
in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist read- 
ers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix 
A). A glossary is included, and, to help readers identify numerous 
armies and militias, Appendix B, Principal Armed Factions, 
1975-87, is provided. 

To the extent possible, place-names follow the system adopted 
by the United States Board on Geographic Names; often these vary 
from conventional French usage. Because there is no standard to 
guide the spelling of proper names, the most common journalistic 
usages have been followed. 



xi 



Country Profile 



Formal Name: Republic of Chad. 
Short Form: Chad. 
Term for Citizens: Chadian(s). 
Capital: N'Djamena. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 1,284,000 square kilometers. 

Topography: Northern third desert, with mountains in north and 
plateaus in northeast; central third broad, arid savanna with Lake 
Chad in west, massif in center, and highlands in east; southern 
third wooded and humid lowlands, intersected by rivers. 

Climate: Northern Saharan zone generally hot and dry; central 
sahelian zone mostly dry with rainy season from June to early Sep- 
tember; southern soudanian zone tropical with rainy season lasting 
from April to October. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 5 million to 5.2 million in 1985, most 
of which concentrated in capital and southern third of country. 

Education and Literacy: Education compulsory until age twelve, 
but only about 40 percent of primary- school-aged children attended 
in late 1980s. Overall literacy rate about 15 percent in 1982. 

Health and Welfare: Years of civil strife, drought, and overall 
impoverishment have kept health care at low level. Few existing 
medical facilities concentrated in capital and major cities in south. 
Life expectancy in late 1970s about forty-three years for women 
and thirty-nine years for men. 

Languages: French and Arabic official languages, Sara common 
in south, more than 100 others spoken. 

Ethnic Groups: More than 200 distinct ethnic groups; Toubou 
common in north, Arabs in sahelian zone, Sara in soudanian zone. 

Religion: More than half of population Muslim; rest adhere to 
traditional African religions or Christianity. 



xiii 



Economy 



Gross Domestic Product (GDP): About US$817 million in 1986; 
US$160 per capita. In mid-1980s war, drought, famine, and low 
prices for cotton made Chad one of five poorest countries in world. 

Agriculture: Contributed about 46 percent of GDP in 1986. Domi- 
nated by cotton grown in south. Approximately 83 percent of eco- 
nomically active population farmers or herders. Sorghum and millet 
major food crops. 

Industry: Not well developed but contributed almost 18 percent 
of GDP in 1986. Employed only 5 percent of work force. Sector 
dominated by agribusiness. Mining, especially oil extraction, held 
some promise of development. 

Imports: US$206.1 million in 1986, mainly manufactured goods 
and food, mostly from France and United States. 

Exports: US$98.6 million in 1986, of which cotton constituted 43 
percent. Remainder meat, fish, and animal products. Most exports 
went to other parts of Africa and Western Europe. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Currency: African Financial Community (Communaute Finan- 
cier Africaine) franc (CFA F), used by fourteen nations and freely 
convertible to French francs (FF). In December 1988, CFA F298 
equaled US$1. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: None. Closest rail terminals Ngaoundere (Cameroon) 
and Maiduguri (Nigeria). 

Roads: About 7,300 kilometers of partially maintained roads, of 
which 1 ,260 kilometers considered all-weather roads; no paved roads 
in 1987. About 24,000 kilometers of unimproved tracks. 

Inland Waterways: Chari and Logone rivers principal branches 
of approximately 2,000-kilometer-long navigable system. 

Ports: None. Closest port at Douala, Cameroon. 

Airports: International airport at N'Djamena; smaller airfields at 
Abeche, Moundou, and Sarh; small dirt strips scattered through- 
out country. 

Telecommunications: One of least developed systems in Africa. 
All international telecommunications passed through Paris. 



xiv 



Government and Politics 



Government: Governmental system based on Fundamental Law 
of October 18, 1982, which served as interim constitution. Fun- 
damental Law promulgated after Armed Forces of the North (Forces 
Armees du Nord — FAN) wrested control from incumbent govern- 
ment; in late 1980s, former FAN leaders still held many important 
positions. Fundamental Law gives president overriding authority 
for controlling all aspects of government. New constitution being 
drafted in 1989. In 1988 presidentially appointed Council of Min- 
isters served as cabinet. No elected legislative body, but thirty- 
member National Advisory Council provided forum for limited 
debate. Judicial system based on French civil law but modified to 
include variety of customary and Islamic legal interpretations. In 
late 1980s, civil and military courts sometimes had overlapping 
jurisdictions. 

Politics: Chadian Civil War and factionalism have dominated po- 
litical events since mid-1960s. After its victory in 1982, Command 
Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de Commande- 
ment des Forces Armees du Nord — CCFAN) was dissolved and 
in June 1984 replaced by sole political party, National Union for 
Independence and Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'lndepen- 
dance et la Revolution — UNIR). UNIR, led by president, had 
fourteen-member Executive Bureau and eighty-member Central 
Committee. Party used mainly to integrate former government op- 
ponents into new regime. No elections planned as of late 1988. 

Foreign Affairs: Since independence, external affairs governed by 
France, Chad's colonizer, and Libya, aggressive neighbor to north. 
Relations with France have wavered, but in late 1980s France 
provided some of Chad's air defense and other security needs, and 
French financial interests helped sustain economy. Libya has 
claimed and occupied Aozou Strip (see Glossary), aided several 
antigovernment rebel factions, and intervened militarily. In late 
1988, relations with Libya were restored, so that Chad had amicable 
relations with all its neighbors. United States supported govern- 
ment and provided military and humanitarian assistance. 

International Organizations: Member of African Development 
Bank, West African Economic Community, Conference of East 
and Central African States, European Community, Group of 77, 
World Bank, International Cotton Advisory Committee, Islamic 
Development Bank, International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization, Interpol, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Nonaligned 
Movement, Organization of African Unity, Afro-Malagasy and 



xv 



Mauritian Common Organization, Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, United Nations. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1987 consisted of army of 28,000, air force of 
fewer than 200, and Presidential Guard of 3,600. Conscription for 
periods of one year or longer imposed erratically. 

Military Units: Main army units included 3 operational infantry 
battalions and 127 infantry companies, with roughly 400 soldiers 
in each battalion and 100 to 150 in each company. Armored fight- 
ing vehicles organized into separate squadrons. Air force had no 
combat aircraft. Small inventory of aircraft provided marginal trans- 
port, reconnaissance, and counterinsurgency capabilities. Coun- 
try divided into twelve military zones, plus separate military region 
in north. 

Foreign Military Assistance: France traditional supplier of arms, 
materiel, and training. Since 1983 French aid supplemented by 
materiel and equipment from United States. Vast quantities of 
Libyan weaponry, aircraft, and vehicles — mostly of Soviet manu- 
facture — captured in battle during 1987, some of which incorpo- 
rated into Chadian stocks. 

Defense Expenditures: According to Chadian government figures, 
defense costs were CFA F8.4 billion in 1986, or about 35 percent 
of annual government budget. Actual spending believed to be much 
higher, and official figure did not include all French contributions 
toward military expenses. 

Internal Security Forces: National Security Police, known as 
Surete, served as national police force and municipal police in major 
towns. Security in rural areas performed by Territorial Military 
Police. Regular military police functions and rear area and route 
security carried out by National Military Police. Presidential Guard 
also assumed many internal security responsibilities. 



xvi 



1 




Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Chad, 1988 



xvni 



Introduction 



AN ARRAY OF MISFORTUNES has visited African states since 
the beginnings of the independence movement in the late 1950s. 
Of the many political ills, a few of the most traumatic have been 
neocolonialism, coups d'etat, civil wars, governmental instability, 
and large-scale armed invasions. Some of the most egregious social 
afflictions have been poverty, illiteracy, ethnic and regional ani- 
mosities, high mortality rates, and imbalanced population distribu- 
tion. Dominant economic woes have included famine, drought, 
economic dependency, and overreliance on a single crop. Many 
African nations have experienced more than one of these troubles 
periodically. Few countries, however, have undergone all of them 
as extensively or as often as has Chad. In spite of its misfortunes, 
by the late 1980s Chad was exhibiting signs of stability that provided 
hope for some form of political, social, and economic recovery. 

Landlocked in Africa's center, Chad has been simultaneously 
at the core of the region's evolution and in a zone dividing two 
geographic areas and cultural heritages. On the one hand, a great 
inland sea, of which Lake Chad is but a remnant, once supported 
a diversity of animal life and vegetation. In ancient times, people 
speaking three of Africa's four major language groups lived near 
its shores; some migrated to other regions of the continent while 
others remained. In more recent times, Chad has become a tran- 
sition zone dividing the arid north from the tropical south. This 
geographic division coincides with social and cultural dichotomies. 

As a result of years of voluntary or forced migrations, the peo- 
ple of Chad speak more than 100 distinct languages and comprise 
many different ethnic groups. Such diversity has enriched Chad's 
culture, permitting the admixture of traditions and life- styles. At 
the same time, it has promoted inter- and intraethnic strife, resulting 
in levels of violence ranging from clan feuds to full-scale civil war. 
Factionalism has become a keynote of Chad's recent history and 
has unquestionably impeded nation building. 

Because of the area's centrality, Chad's history has been heav- 
ily influenced by the influx of foreigners. Some came for economic 
reasons, for example, to travel the trans-Saharan trade routes or 
to search for natural resources. Others came teaching the religion 
of Muhammad or of Christ. But some had more nefarious goals 
and invaded the region to capture slaves or to plunder weaker states. 

Little is known about Chad before the beginning of the second 
millennium A.D. At about that time, the region gave birth to one 



xix 



of the great societies of Central Africa — the Kanem Empire, formed 
from a confederation of nomadic peoples. During the tenth cen- 
tury, Islam penetrated the empire, and later the king, or mat, be- 
came a Muslim. Kanem benefited from the rule of several effective 
mats. The most significant of these was Mai Dunama Dabbalemi, 
who reigned from about 1221 to 1259. By the end of the fourteenth 
century, internal struggles and external attacks had weakened the 
empire and forced it to uproot and move to Borno, an area to the 
southwest. The combined Kanem-Borno Empire peaked during 
the reign of Mai Idris Aluma, who ruled from about 1571 to 1603 
and who is noted for his diplomatic, military, and administrative 
skills. By the early nineteenth century, unable to defend against 
Fulani invaders, Kanem-Borno was in decline, and by the end of 
the century it was overtaken by Arab invaders. 

Another great empire was the kingdom of Bagirmi, which arose 
to the southeast of Kanem-Borno in the sixteenth century. This 
Islamic kingdom experienced periods of strength and weakness; 
when strong it aggressively expanded its territory, but when weak 
it was subjugated temporarily by neighboring states. 

Wadai was a non-Muslim sultanate (or kingdom) that emerged 
to the northeast of Bagirmi in the sixteenth century as an offshoot 
of Darfur (Darfur Province in present-day Sudan). By the seven- 
teenth century, it had converted to Islam, and around 1800 it began 
to expand under its sultan, Sabun. A later ruler, Muhammad 
Sharif, attacked Borno and eventually established Wadai 's hege- 
mony over Bagirmi. By the end of the nineteenth century, most 
of the great empires had been destroyed or were in eclipse. 

The arrival of the French in the late 1800s had benefits and dis- 
advantages for the indigenous population. By the early twentieth 
century, the French had stopped northern groups from slave raid- 
ing in the south, established a few schools, and initiated some de- 
velopment projects. The colonial administration, however, also 
dislocated villages and instituted mandatory cotton production 
quotas for farmers. Moreover, the French administration of Chad 
was conducted from faraway Brazzaville (in present-day Congo), 
and its efforts were concentrated in the south; throughout the colo- 
nial period, France's control of the central and northern areas was 
nominal. 

This north- south distinction created a preindependence political 
system dominated by southerners, who were exposed more to French 
education and culture than were northerners. Following indepen- 
dence in 1960, this dominance persisted and created considerable 
resentment among central and northern groups, who felt that their 
interests were not adequately represented by the new government. 



xx 



In the late 1980s, social differences based on region persisted. 
The sparsely populated, desert north was peopled mainly by 
Toubou, many of whom were nomadic. Semisedentary groups, 
several of which were of Arab descent, inhabited the semiarid central 
areas (called the Sahel — see Glossary). Islam was the major religion 
in these areas. The tropical south, also called the soudanian zone, 
was the most densely populated region and was home to darker 
skinned peoples, especially the Sara ethnic group. Here, agricul- 
ture was the principal means of livelihood, particularly the culti- 
vation of cotton, although there was also some small-scale industry. 
Traditional African religions were prevalent in the south, but, be- 
cause of earlier missionary efforts, so too were several Christian 
denominations. Termed Le Tchad Utile (Useful Chad) by the French, 
the south contained a disproportionate share of the educational 
and health facilities, as well as the majority of the development 
projects. 

Throughout the colonial era and after independence, the Chad- 
ian economy has been based on agriculture. As such, it has been 
driven by the south, the only region with a climate suitable for the 
wide- scale production of cotton and foodstuffs (although livestock 
raising in the Sahel has also had some importance). At indepen- 
dence France left the colony with an economy retarded by exploita- 
tive policies. It was marked by insufficient development of 
infrastructure, overreliance on cotton and the whims of the inter- 
national markets, and dependence on imports for industrial and 
consumer goods. By the late 1980s, warfare, drought, and famine 
had combined to keep the economy depressed, and international 
development organizations generally maintained that Chad was 
one of the poorest nations in the world. Indicative of this impoverish- 
ment was the fact that in 1988 Chad had a gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) per capita of only US$160 and no paved 
roads. According to some observers, Chad had become a ward of 
the international donor community. 

The nation has been subjected to the machinations of a vast num- 
ber of groups and organizations. Politically, Chadians have endured 
a series of authoritarian regimes, none of which has successfully 
limited factionalism. From 1960 until 1975, Francois Tombalbaye, 
a civilian, led the nation. His regime was characterized by southern 
domination of the administrative structure, although he made 
modest attempts at placating northern and central interests. As dis- 
affection in these regions increased, in the late 1960s dissident 
groups formed an antigovernment coalition, the National Libera- 
tion Front of Chad (Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad — 
FROLINAT). Although never fully unified, this group or associated 



xxi 



elements of it led the fight for greater northern and central represen- 
tation in government. 

By the early 1970s, Tombalbaye had alienated not only these 
groups but also even much of the south. Although he was wary 
of a French military presence after independence, the president 
readily embraced France's support in stemming violent discontent. 
Nonetheless, opposition grew, and in 1975 Tombalaye was killed 
in a military coup d'etat. Another southerner, Felix Malloum, as- 
sumed power, but he had no more success than his predecessor 
in suppressing the burgeoning insurgencies and demands for greater 
regional participation. International intervention resulted in a peace 
accord between the government and the rebels and the formation 
of the Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement 
d' Union Nationale de Transition — GUNT). For many observers, 
the establishment of GUNT was a watershed, marking the end of 
southern political domination. It did not, however, bring an end 
to strife. 

The traditional north- and- central versus south split was trans- 
formed into an internecine argument among former opposition fac- 
tions. GUNT's most important leaders were northerners Goukouni 
Oueddei and Hissein Habre, erstwhile allies in FROLINAT's 
Second Liberation Army. In command of separate factions, they 
battled one another for control of the capital, N'Djamena (see Civil 
Conflict and Libyan Intervention, ch. 5). With Libyan armed sup- 
port, Goukouni evicted Habre' s forces at the end of 1980. Under 
pressure from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other 
nations, in 1981 Goukouni asked the Libyan troops to leave; in 
their place, security was to be maintained by an OAU peacekeep- 
ing unit, the Inter- African Force (IAF). Seizing the initiative, 
Habre 's regrouped and resupplied forces attacked from the north- 
east, and by 1982 his Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees 
du Nord — FAN) had entered the capital, without any IAF inter- 
ference, and sent Goukouni into exile. 

Goukouni' s defeat was only temporary. With massive Libyan 
military aid, by mid- 1983 he was attacking from northern strong- 
holds Habre 's newly formed Chadian National Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Nationales Tchadiennes — FANT). Concerned 
about Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafl's intentions, France 
responded by dispatching a large force of troops and advisers. It 
also began a round-the-clock airlift of military supplies and estab- 
lished forward positions roughly along 16° north latitude. As a result 
of negotiations with Libya that required a mutual withdrawal of 
forces, French units were recalled in November 1984. Libya, 



xxn 



however, failed to comply with these terms and reinforced its 
presence, especially in the Aozou Strip (see Glossary). 

In 1986 the French redeployed to Chad. Habre's forces, which 
had also benefited since 1983 from weaponry provided by the United 
States, launched an offensive against the Libyan positions in late 
1986 and early 1987 that resulted in the routing of Libyan troops 
and the capture of large amounts of Libyan military equipment. 

By late 1988, a measure of calm had been restored to Chadian 
political life. Habre was attempting to consolidate his authority, 
but at the same time, he was mending some of the divisiveness that 
has hampered nation building (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4). He 
weathered a rebellion in the south in the late 1980s and brought 
many former opponents into high-ranking governmental positions. 
He sought to extend his regime through the National Union for 
Independence and Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'lndepen- 
dance et la Revolution — UNIR) and hoped to mobilize Chadians 
in rural areas. 

These good intentions notwithstanding, the overwhelming 
majority of Chadians did not participate in the political process. 
The Fundamental Law of 1982, an interim constitution, vested 
paramount power in the president, who ruled almost without 
challenge. Although a committee was appointed to draft a perma- 
nent constitution, as of late 1988 there were no elected bodies, nor 
were any elections planned. 

The evolution of Chad's armed forces mirrors the country's po- 
litical transformation. Like the governmental structure of the 1960s, 
the army that was created after independence was dominated by 
southern groups. This fledgling force relied heavily on French 
materiel and — until Tombalbaye reconsidered this dependence — 
French military advisers. But neither the southern-dominated 
Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armees Tchadiennes — FAT) nor 
the French units could deter the determined insurgents from the 
northern and central regions, most of whom fought under the 
FROLINAT banner. By 1978 FAT was in disarray, and it even- 
tually splintered into minor factions. 

Habre's FANT, formed in 1983, continued to provide national 
security in 1988, along with several French units. FANT was a 
conglomeration of FAN and smaller rebel armies that rallied to 
Habre's side in the 1980s (see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). Many 
former opposition leaders held positions of authority in the FANT 
organizational structure. In addition to 3 operational battalions and 
127 infantry companies, FANT had a small air force. 

Chad's internal security requirements were provided by the well- 
trained Presidential Guard and by several national and territorial 



xxm 



elements of it led the fight for greater northern and central represen- 
tation in government. 

By the early 1970s, Tombalbaye had alienated not only these 
groups but also even much of the south. Although he was wary 
of a French military presence after independence, the president 
readily embraced France's support in stemming violent discontent. 
Nonetheless, opposition grew, and in 1975 Tombalaye was killed 
in a military coup d'etat. Another southerner, Felix Malloum, as- 
sumed power, but he had no more success than his predecessor 
in suppressing the burgeoning insurgencies and demands for greater 
regional participation. International intervention resulted in a peace 
accord between the government and the rebels and the formation 
of the Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement 
d' Union Nationale de Transition — GUNT). For many observers, 
the establishment of GUNT was a watershed, marking the end of 
southern political domination. It did not, however, bring an end 
to strife. 

The traditional north-and-central versus south split was trans- 
formed into an internecine argument among former opposition fac- 
tions. GUNT's most important leaders were northerners Goukouni 
Oueddei and Hissein Habre, erstwhile allies in FROLINAT's 
Second Liberation Army. In command of separate factions, they 
battled one another for control of the capital, N'Djamena (see Civil 
Conflict and Libyan Intervention, ch. 5). With Libyan armed sup- 
port, Goukouni evicted Habre 's forces at the end of 1980. Under 
pressure from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other 
nations, in 1981 Goukouni asked the Libyan troops to leave; in 
their place, security was to be maintained by an OAU peacekeep- 
ing unit, the Inter- African Force (IAF). Seizing the initiative, 
Habre 's regrouped and resupplied forces attacked from the north- 
east, and by 1982 his Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees 
du Nord — FAN) had entered the capital, without any IAF inter- 
ference, and sent Goukouni into exile. 

Goukouni 's defeat was only temporary. With massive Libyan 
military aid, by mid- 1983 he was attacking from northern strong- 
holds Habre 's newly formed Chadian National Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Nationales Tchadiennes — FANT). Concerned 
about Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi's intentions, France 
responded by dispatching a large force of troops and advisers. It 
also began a round-the-clock airlift of military supplies and estab- 
lished forward positions roughly along 16° north latitude. As a result 
of negotiations with Libya that required a mutual withdrawal of 
forces, French units were recalled in November 1984. Libya, 



xxn 



however, failed to comply with these terms and reinforced its 
presence, especially in the Aozou Strip (see Glossary). 

In 1986 the French redeployed to Chad. Habre's forces, which 
had also benefited since 1983 from weaponry provided by the United 
States, launched an offensive against the Libyan positions in late 
1986 and early 1987 that resulted in the routing of Libyan troops 
and the capture of large amounts of Libyan military equipment. 

By late 1988, a measure of calm had been restored to Chadian 
political life. Habre was attempting to consolidate his authority, 
but at the same time, he was mending some of the divisiveness that 
has hampered nation building (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4). He 
weathered a rebellion in the south in the late 1980s and brought 
many former opponents into high-ranking governmental positions. 
He sought to extend his regime through the National Union for 
Independence and Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'lndepen- 
dance et la Revolution — UNIR) and hoped to mobilize Chadians 
in rural areas. 

These good intentions notwithstanding, the overwhelming 
majority of Chadians did not participate in the political process. 
The Fundamental Law of 1982, an interim constitution, vested 
paramount power in the president, who ruled almost without 
challenge. Although a committee was appointed to draft a perma- 
nent constitution, as of late 1988 there were no elected bodies, nor 
were any elections planned. 

The evolution of Chad's armed forces mirrors the country's po- 
litical transformation. Like the governmental structure of the 1960s, 
the army that was created after independence was dominated by 
southern groups. This fledgling force relied heavily on French 
materiel and — until Tombalbaye reconsidered this dependence — 
French military advisers. But neither the southern-dominated 
Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armees Tchadiennes — FAT) nor 
the French units could deter the determined insurgents from the 
northern and central regions, most of whom fought under the 
FROLINAT banner. By 1978 FAT was in disarray, and it even- 
tually splintered into minor factions. 

Habre's FANT, formed in 1983, continued to provide national 
security in 1988, along with several French units. FANT was a 
conglomeration of FAN and smaller rebel armies that rallied to 
Habre's side in the 1980s (see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). Many 
former opposition leaders held positions of authority in the FANT 
organizational structure. In addition to 3 operational battalions and 
127 infantry companies, FANT had a small air force. 

Chad's internal security requirements were provided by the well- 
trained Presidential Guard and by several national and territorial 



xxm 



police forces (see Internal Security and Public Order, ch. 5). Fol- 
lowing the defection of many of Goukouni's followers to FANT in 
the late 1980s, the group that presented the most serious threat to 
Chad's security was the Democratic Revolutionary Council (Conseil 
Democratique Revolutionnaire — CDR), which, under Libyan patron- 
age, was active in the north. But Qadhafi's stated desire to normal- 
ize relations with Chad, enunciated in April 1988, inspired hopes 
that a period of genuine peace — a circumstance that the nation had 
not enjoyed during the previous two decades — might finally ensue. 

December 13, 1988 

* * * 

After the research for this book was completed, several events 
occurred that greatly affected Chadian affairs. In November 1988, 
Habre convinced Acheikh ibn Oumar, the leader of the CDR, to 
join the government. In accordance with his policy of reconcilia- 
tion with opponents, in March 1989 Habre appointed Oumar as 
minister of foreign affairs. Three high-ranking officials, reportedly 
members of the Zaghawa ethnic group who resented the large num- 
ber of former regime opponents named to influential positions, un- 
successfully collaborated to assassinate Habre on the night of 
April 1, 1989. The three plotters were Minister of Interior Ibra- 
him Mahamat Itno, FANT commander in chief Hassane Dja- 
mouss, and Idris Deby, a high-ranking FANT officer; at one time, 
all of them had been very close advisers to the president. 

According to one report, another grievance of the plotters was 
that Habre had been persecuting the Zaghawa while promoting 
the interests of the Daza, his own ethnic group. Indeed, a Novem- 
ber 1988 report issued by the human rights organization Amnesty 
International criticized the government for arbitrary arrests and 
unreasonable detentions, lending credence to the plotters' claims. 

In mid-June 1989, the fate of those involved in the coup attempt 
was unclear. Most accounts claimed that Itno had been arrested 
and that Djamouss and Deby had escaped capture; their where- 
abouts, however, were unknown, although some sources reported 
them to be in Sudan organizing an opposition army. Regardless 
of their circumstances, it was apparent in mid- 1989 that Habre 's 
policy of national reconciliation was not being carried out to the 
satisfaction of all of the factions in Chad, and the stability of the 
government remained uncertain. 



June 16, 1989 Thomas Collelo 



XXIV 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



A bronze bracelet, believed to be from the Sao period 



THE CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES, institutions, and prob- 
lems of Chad are the outgrowth of historical traditions and tenden- 
cies that have evolved over more than 1,000 years. The country 
is populated by diverse, yet in many cases, interrelated peoples 
whose evolution was characterized by intersecting migrations, splin- 
terings, and regroupings. Most of the country's population groups 
originated in areas generally north and east of Chad's present-day 
boundaries. 

Chad's geographic position along major trans-Saharan trade 
routes has also affected its historical development. In early times, 
trade consisted of goods and slaves seized in raids on groups in 
the south. Consolidations of small chiefdoms led to the evolution 
of a series of kingdoms and empires in the central region, of which 
the most important were Kanem-Borno, Bagirmi, and Wadai. The 
kingdoms and empires based their power on, and were ultimately 
subjected to, raids or the payment of tribute. Although there were 
early communities in both northern and southern Chad, most of 
the country's known history is focused on the Muslim peoples of 
the central region. 

The political fortunes of the various kingdoms and empires were 
constantiy affected by internal factionalism and external invasion — 
factors that still influenced political affairs in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Political disintegration was evident in both Borno and Bagirmi when 
the French arrived in the late nineteenth century. The rulers of 
Wadai resisted the French advance. The leaders of Borno and 
Bagirmi, however, regarded the French less as conquerors than 
as a counterbalance to the ascendant Wadai. 

The French declared the central portion of the country officially 
pacified in 1924 and had begun administering much of the non- 
Muslim south before that. In many respects, the nomadic north- 
ern groups have never been subjugated, and turmoil in the north 
persisted in the 1980s. 

After 1905 the central and northern areas were administered as 
a territory in the federation of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique 
Equatoriale Francaise — AEF; see Glossary). French interest, 
however, focused on other territories in the federation, and until 
after World War II, the French presence had little impact on the 
life of the average inhabitant. The French limited implementation 
of their administrative policy primarily to urban areas and their 
compulsory agricultural programs to what constitutes the south of 



3 



Chad: A Country Study 

present-day Chad. Participation by the local population in the 
colonial administration was marginal, and until the mid-1950s the 
educational opportunities prerequisite for such participation were 
practically nonexistent. 

After World War II, representative institutions were introduced, 
and the growth of party politics began. Political groupings reflected 
domestic political developments in France and traditional ethnic 
factionalism in Chad. Short-lived political coalitions and party splin- 
terings were commonplace. When Chad achieved independence 
in 1960, southerners — the group most exposed to the French admin- 
istrators — dominated political life. These southerners were led by 
President Francois Tombalbaye, who made only halfhearted efforts 
at regional integration in government and who generally repressed 
opposition. Within five years of having taken office, Tombalbaye 's 
heavy-handed approach had alienated a large segment of the popu- 
lation, especially northerners and easterners, and had spurred 
rebellions. The most prominent of the northern rebel groups was 
the National Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Liberation 
Nationale du Tchad — FROLINAT), an umbrella organization 
formed in 1966. Over the years, FROLINAT went through a series 
of transformations and fragmentations. Nonetheless, by the mid- 
1970s rebel activity, in conjunction with Tombalbaye' s political 
ineptitude, helped bring about the government's downfall. Tom- 
balbaye was killed in 1975 during a military coup d'etat led by 
Felix Malloum. 

The new government, however, had no more success than its 
predecessor in halting rebel activity. In 1979 Hissein Habre, a 
northern rebel leader, ousted Malloum. Throughout the 1980s, the 
quest for political control changed from a north-south struggle to 
a primarily northern intraregional conflict. The turmoil of the late 
1970s and 1980s had international and domestic aspects, as Libya, 
France, the United States, and many African nations became 
involved in the Chadian imbroglio. By early 1988, stability had 
been restored, but inter- and intraethnic differences, as well as 
regional divisions, continued to threaten Chad's progress toward 
national integration. 

Prehistory 

The territory now known as Chad possesses some of the richest 
archaeological sites in Africa. During the seventh millennium B.C., 
the northern half of Chad was part of a broad expanse of land, 
stretching from the Indus River in the east to the Atiantic Ocean 
in the west, in which ecological conditions favored early human 
settlement. Rock art of the ''Round Head" style, found in the 



4 



Historical Setting 



Ennedi region, has been dated to before the seventh millennium 
B.C. and, because of the tools with which the rocks were carved 
and the scenes they depict, may represent the oldest evidence in 
the Sahara of Neolithic industries. Many of the pottery-making 
and Neolithic activities in Ennedi date back further than any of 
those of the Nile Valley to the east. 

In the prehistoric period, Chad was much wetter than it is today, 
as evidenced by large game animals depicted in rock paintings in 
the Tibesti and Borkou regions. Recent linguistic research suggests 
that all of Africa's languages south of the Sahara Desert (except 
Khoisan) originated in prehistoric times in a narrow band between 
Lake Chad and the Nile Valley (see Languages and Ethnic Groups, 
ch. 2). The origins of Chad's peoples, however, remain unclear. 
Several of the proven archaeological sites have been only partially 
studied, and other sites of great potential have yet to be mapped. 

Era of Empires, A.D. 900-1900 

Toward the end of the first millennium A.D., the formation of 
states began across central Chad in the sahelian zone between the 
desert and the savanna. For almost the next 1,000 years, these 
states, their relations with each other, and their effects on the peo- 
ples who lived in "stateless" societies along their peripheries domi- 
nated Chad's political history. Recent research suggests that 
indigenous Africans founded most of these states, not migrating 
Arabic- speaking groups, as was believed previously. Nonetheless, 
immigrants, Arabic-speaking or otherwise, played a significant role, 
along with Islam, in the formation and early evolution of these states 
(see Islam, ch. 2). 

Most states began as kingdoms, in which the king was considered 
divine and endowed with temporal and spiritual powers. All states 
were militaristic (or they did not survive long), but none was able 
to expand far into southern Chad, where forests and the tsetse fly 
complicated the use of cavalry. Control over the trans-Saharan trade 
routes that passed through the region formed the economic basis 
of these kingdoms. Although many states rose and fell, the most 
important and durable of the empires were Kanem-Borno, Bagirmi, 
and Wadai, according to most written sources (mainly court chroni- 
cles and writings of Arab traders and travelers). 

Kanem-Borno 

The Kanem Empire originated in the ninth century A.D. to the 
northeast of Lake Chad (see fig. 2). It was formed from a confedera- 
tion of nomadic peoples who spoke languages of the Teda-Daza 
(Toubou) group (see Languages and Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). One 



5 



Chad: A Country Study 



14 18 

To Fezzan 
and Mediterranean Sea 




Source: Based on information from Anders J. Bjorkelo, State and Society in Three Sudanic 
Kingdoms, Bergen, Norway, 1976, 5. 



Figure 2. Empires of the Chad Region 

theory, based on early Arabic sources, suggests that the dominance 
of the Zaghawa people bound the confederation together. But local 
oral traditions omit the Zaghawa and refer instead to a legendary 
Arab, Sayf ibn Dhi Yazan — believed by some to have been a 
Yemeni — who assumed leadership of the Magoumi clan and began 
the Sayfawa dynastic lineage. Historians agree that the leaders of 
the new state were ancestors of the Kanembu people. The leaders 
adopted the title mai, or king, and their subjects regarded them 
as divine. 

One factor that influenced the formation of states in Chad was 
the penetration of Islam during the tenth century. Arabs migrat- 
ing from the north and east brought the new religion. Toward the 
end of the eleventh century, the Sayfawa king, Mai Humai, con- 
verted to Islam. (Some historians believe that it was Humai rather 
than Sayf ibn Dhi Yazan who established the Sayfawa lineage as 
the ruling dynasty of Kanem.) Islam offered the Sayfawa rulers 
the advantages of new ideas from Arabia and the Mediterranean 
world, as well as literacy in administration. But many people resisted 
the new religion in favor of traditional beliefs and practices. When 



6 



Historical Setting 



Humai converted, for example, it is believed that the Zaghawa 
broke from the empire and moved east. This pattern of conflict 
and compromise with Islam occurs repeatedly in Chadian history. 

Prior to the twelfth century, the nomadic Sayfawa confedera- 
tion expanded southward into Kanem (the word for "south" in 
the Teda language). By the thirteenth century, Kanem 's rule 
expanded. At the same time, the Kanembu people became more 
sedentary and established a capital at Njimi, northeast of Lake 
Chad. Even though the Kanembu were becoming more sedentary, 
Kanem 's rulers continued to travel frequendy throughout the king- 
dom to remind the herders and farmers of the government's power 
and to allow them to demonstrate their allegiance by paying tribute. 

Kanem 's expansion peaked during the long and energetic reign 
of Mai Dunama Dabbalemi (ca. 1221-59). Dabbalemi initiated 
diplomatic exchanges with sultans in North Africa and apparently 
arranged for the establishment of a special hostel in Cairo to facilitate 
pilgrimages to Mecca. During Dabbalemi' s reign, the Fezzan region 
(in present-day Libya) fell under Kanem' s authority, and the 
empire's influence extended westward to Kano, eastward to Wadai, 
and southward to the Adamawa grasslands (in present-day Cam- 
eroon). Portraying these boundaries on maps can be misleading, 
however, because the degree of control extended in ever- weakening 
gradations from the core of the empire around Njimi to remote 
peripheries, from which allegiance and tribute were usually only 
symbolic. Moreover, cartographic lines are static and misrepresent 
the mobility inherent in nomadism and migration, which were com- 
mon. The loyalty of peoples and their leaders was more important 
in governance than the physical control of territory. 

Dabbalemi devised a system to reward military commanders with 
authority over the people they conquered. This system, however, 
tempted military officers to pass their positions to their sons, thus 
transforming the office from one based on achievement and loyalty 
to the mai into one based on hereditary nobility. Dabbalemi was 
able to suppress this tendency, but after his death, dissension among 
his sons weakened the Sayfawa Dynasty. Dynastic feuds degener- 
ated into civil war, and Kanem 's outiying peoples soon ceased pay- 
ing tribute. 

By the end of the fourteenth century, internal struggles and exter- 
nal attacks had torn Kanem apart. Between 1376 and 1400, six 
mais reigned, but Bulala invaders (from the area around Lake Fitri 
to the east) killed five of them. This proliferation of mais resulted 
in numerous claimants to the throne and led to a series of inter- 
necine wars. Finally, around 1396 the Bulala forced Mai Umar 
Idrismi to abandon Njimi and move the Kanembu people to Borno 



7 



Chad: A Country Study 

on the western edge of Lake Chad. Over time, the intermarriage 
of the Kanembu and Borno peoples created a new people and lan- 
guage, the Kanuri. 

But even in Borno, the Sayfawa Dynasty's troubles persisted. 
During the first three-quarters of the fifteenth century, for exam- 
ple, fifteen mais occupied the throne. Then, around 1472 Mai Ali 
Dunamami defeated his rivals and began the consolidation of Borno. 
He built a fortified capital at Ngazargamu, to the west of Lake 
Chad (in present-day Niger), the first permanent home a Sayfawa 
mai had enjoyed in a century. So successful was the Sayfawa 
rejuvenation that by the early sixteenth century the Bulala were 
defeated and Njimi retaken. The empire's leaders, however, 
remained at Ngazargamu because its lands were more productive 
agriculturally and better suited to the raising of catde. 

Kanem-Borno peaked during the reign of the outstanding 
statesman Mai Idris Aluma (ca. 1571-1603). Aluma (also spelled 
Alooma) is remembered for his military skills, administrative 
reforms, and Islamic piety. His main adversaries were the Hausa 
to the west, the Tuareg and Toubou to the north, and the Bulala 
to the east. One epic poem extols his victories in 330 wars and more 
than 1,000 battles. His innovations included the employment of 
fixed military camps (with walls); permanent sieges and " scorched 
earth" tactics, where soldiers burned everything in their path; 
armored horses and riders; and the use of Berber camelry, Kotoko 
boatmen, and iron-helmeted musketeers trained by Turkish mili- 
tary advisers. His active diplomacy featured relations with Tripoli, 
Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire, which sent a 200-member ambas- 
sadorial party across the desert to Aluma' s court at Ngazargamu. 
Aluma also signed what was probably the first written treaty or 
cease-fire in Chadian history. (Like many cease-fires negotiated 
in the 1970s and 1980s, it was promptly broken.) 

Aluma introduced a number of legal and administrative reforms 
based on his religious beliefs and Islamic law (sharia). He spon- 
sored the construction of numerous mosques and made a pilgrimage 
to Mecca, where he arranged for the establishment of a hostel to 
be used by pilgrims from his empire. As with other dynamic poli- 
ticians, Aluma' s reformist goals led him to seek loyal and compe- 
tent advisers and allies, and he frequently relied on slaves who had 
been educated in noble homes. Aluma regularly sought advice from 
a council composed of heads of the most important clans. He 
required major political figures to live at the court, and he rein- 
forced political alliances through appropriate marriages (Aluma 
himself was the son of a Kanuri father and a Bulala mother). 



8 



Historical Setting 



Kanem-Borno under Aluma was strong and wealthy. Govern- 
ment revenue came from tribute (or booty, if the recalcitrant peo- 
ple had to be conquered), sales of slaves, and duties on and 
participation in trans-Saharan trade. Unlike West Africa, the 
Chadian region did not have gold. Still, it was central to one of 
the most convenient trans-Saharan routes. Between Lake Chad and 
Fezzan lay a sequence of well-spaced wells and oases, and from 
Fezzan there were easy connections to North Africa and the 
Mediterranean Sea. Many products were sent north, including 
natron (sodium carbonate), cotton, kola nuts, ivory, ostrich feathers, 
perfume, wax, and hides, but the most important of all were slaves. 
Imports included salt, horses, silks, glass, muskets, and copper. 

Aluma took a keen interest in trade and other economic mat- 
ters. He is credited with having the roads cleared, designing bet- 
ter boats for Lake Chad, introducing standard units of measure 
for grain, and moving farmers into new lands. In addition, he 
improved the ease and security of transit through the empire with 
the goal of making it so safe that "a lone woman clad in gold might 
walk with none to fear but God." 

The administrative reforms and military brilliance of Aluma sus- 
tained the empire until the mid- 1600s, when its power began to 
fade. By the late 1700s, Borno rule extended only westward, into 
the land of the Hausa. Around that time, Fulani people, invading 
from the west, were able to make major inroads into Borno. By 
the early nineteenth century, Kanem-Borno was clearly an empire 
in decline, and in 1808 Fulani warriors conquered Ngazargamu. 
Usman dan Fodio led the Fulani thrust and proclaimed a jihad (holy 
war) on the irreligious Muslims of the area. His campaign even- 
tually affected Kanem-Borno and inspired a trend toward Islamic 
orthodoxy. But Muhammad al Kanem contested the Fulani 
advance. Kanem was a Muslim scholar and non-Sayfawa warlord 
who had put together an alliance of Shuwa Arabs, Kanembu, and 
other seminomadic peoples. He eventually built a capital at Kukawa 
(in present-day Nigeria). Sayfawa mais remained titular monarchs 
until 1846. In that year, the last mai, in league with Wadai tribes- 
men, precipitated a civil war. It was at that point that Kanem 's 
son, Umar, became king, thus ending one of the longest dynastic 
reigns in regional history. 

Although the dynasty ended, the kingdom of Kanem-Borno sur- 
vived. But Umar, who eschewed the title mai for the simpler desig- 
nation shehu (from the Arabic "shaykh"), could not match his 
father's vitality and gradually allowed the kingdom to be ruled by 
advisers (wazirs). Borno began to decline, as a result of adminis- 
trative disorganization, regional particularism, and attacks by the 



9 



Chad: A Country Study 



militant Wadai Empire to the east. The decline continued under 
Umar's sons, and in 1893 Rabih Fadlallah, leading an invading 
army from eastern Sudan, conquered Borno. 

Bagirmi and Wadai 

In addition to Kanem-Borno, two other states in the region, 
Bagirmi and Wadai, achieved historical prominence. The king- 
dom of Bagirmi emerged to the southeast of Kanem-Borno in the 
sixteenth century. Under the reign of Abdullah IV (1568-98), Islam 
was adopted, and the state became a sultanate, using Islamic judi- 
cial and administrative procedures. Later, a palace and court were 
constructed in the capital city of Massenya. 

Bagirmi 's political history was a function of its strength and unity 
in relation to its larger neighbors. Absorbed into Kanem-Borno 
during the reign of Aluma, Bagirmi broke free later in the 1600s, 
only to be returned to tributary status in the mid- 1700s. During 
periods of strength, the sultanate became imperialistic. It estab- 
lished control over small feudal kingdoms on its peripheries and 
entered into alliances with nearby nomadic peoples. Early in the 
nineteenth century, Bagirmi fell into decay and was threatened 
militarily by the nearby kingdom of Wadai. Although Bagirmi 
resisted, it accepted tributary status in order to obtain help from 
Wadai in putting down internal dissension. When Rabih Fadlal- 
lah 's forces burned Massenya in 1893, the twenty-fifth sultan, Abd 
ar Rahman Gwaranga, sought and received protectorate status from 
the French. 

Located northeast of Bagirmi, Wadai was a non-Muslim king- 
dom that emerged in the sixteenth century as an offshoot of the 
state of Darfur (in present-day Sudan). Early in the seventeenth 
century, the Maba and other small groups in the region rallied to 
the Islamic banner of Abd al Karim, who led an invasion from 
the east and overthrew the ruling Tunjur group. Abd al Karim 
established a dynasty and sultanate that lasted until the arrival of 
the French. During much of the eighteenth century, Wadai resisted 
reincorporation into Darfur. 

In about 1800, during the reign of Sabun, the sultanate of Wadai 
began to expand its power. A new trade route north — via Ennedi, 
Al Kufrah, and Benghazi — was discovered, and Sabun outfitted 
royal caravans to take advantage of it. He began minting his own 
coinage and imported chain mail, firearms, and military advisers 
from North Africa. Sabun' s successors were less able than he, and 
Darfur took advantage of a disputed political succession in 1838 
to put its own candidate in power in Wara, the capital of Wadai. 
This tactic backfired, however, when Darfur' s choice, Muhammad 



10 



Historical Setting 



Sharif, rejected Darfur's meddling and asserted his own authority. 
In doing so, he gained acceptance from Wadai's various factions 
and went on to become Wadai's ablest ruler. 

Sharif conducted military campaigns as far west as Borno and 
eventually established Wadai's hegemony over Bagirmi and king- 
doms as far away as the Chari River. In Mecca, Sharif had met 
the founder of the Sanusiyya Islamic brotherhood, a movement 
that was strong among the inhabitants of Cyrenaica (in present- 
day Libya) and that was to become a dominant political force and 
source of resistance to French colonization (see Islam, ch. 2). 
Indeed, the militaristic Wadai opposed French domination until 
well into the twentieth century. 

Arrival of the French and Colonial Administration 

European interest in Africa generally grew during the nineteenth 
century. By 1887 France, motivated by the search for wealth, had 
driven inland from its settlements on central Africa's west coast 
to claim the territory of Ubangi-Chari (present-day Central Afri- 
can Republic). It claimed this area as a zone of French influence, 
and within two years it occupied part of what is now southern Chad. 
In the early 1890s, French military expeditions sent to Chad encoun- 
tered the forces of Rabih Fadlallah, who had been conducting slave 
raids {razzias) in southern Chad throughout the 1890s and had 
sacked the settlements of Kanem-Borno, Bagirmi, and Wadai. After 
years of indecisive engagements, French forces finally defeated 
Rabih Fadlallah at the Battle of Kousseri in 1900. 

Two fundamental themes dominated Chad's colonial experience 
with the French: an absence of policies designed to unify the terri- 
tory and an exceptionally slow pace of modernization. In the French 
scale of priorities, the colony of Chad ranked near the bottom; it 
was less important than non- African territories, North Africa, West 
Africa, or even the other French possessions in Central Africa. The 
French came to perceive Chad primarily as a source of raw cotton 
and untrained labor to be used in the more productive colonies 
to the south. Within Chad there was neither the will nor the 
resources to do much more than maintain a semblance of law and 
order. In fact, even this basic function of governance was often 
neglected; throughout the colonial period, large areas of Chad were 
never governed effectively from N'Djamena (called Fort-Lamy prior 
to September 1973). 

Chad was linked in 1905 with three French colonies to the south — 
Ubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo (present-day Congo), and Gabon. 
But Chad did not receive separate colony status or a unified admin- 
istrative policy until 1920. The four colonies were administered 



11 



Chad: A Country Study 



together as French Equatorial Africa under the direction of a gover- 
nor general stationed in Brazzaville. The governor general had 
broad administrative control over the federation, including exter- 
nal and internal security, economic and financial affairs, and all 
communications with the French minister of the colonies. Lieu- 
tenant governors, also appointed by the French government, were 
expected to implement in each colony the orders of the governor 
general. The central administration in Brazzaville tighdy controlled 
the lieutenant governors despite reformist efforts toward decentrali- 
zation between 1910 and 1946. Chad's lieutenant governor had 
greater autonomy because of the distance from Brazzaville and 
because of France's much greater interest in the other three colonies. 

The lines of control from Brazzaville, feeble as they may have 
been, were still stronger than those from N'Djamena to its hinter- 
land. In the huge Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, the handful 
of French military administrators soon reached a tacit agreement 
with the inhabitants of the desert; as long as caravan trails remained 
relatively secure and minimal levels of law and order were met, 
the military administration (headquartered in Faya Largeau) usually 
left the people alone (see fig. 1). In central Chad, French rule was 
only slighdy more substantive. In Ouaddai and Biltine prefectures, 
endemic resistance continued against the French and, in some cases, 
against any authority that attempted to suppress banditry and 
brigandage. The thinly staffed colonial administration provided only 
weak supervision over arid Kanem Prefecture and the sparsely 
populated areas of Guera and Salamat prefectures. Old-fashioned 
razzias continued in the 1920s, and it was reported in 1923 that 
a group of Senegalese Muslims on their way to Mecca had been 
seized and sold into slavery. Unwilling to expend the resources 
required for effective administration, the French government 
responded with sporadic coercion and a growing reliance on indirect 
rule through the sultanates. 

France managed to govern effectively only the south, but until 
1946 administrative direction came from Bangui in Ubangi-Chari 
rather than N'Djamena. Unlike northern and central Chad, a 
French colonial system of direct civilian administration was set up 
among the Sara, a southern ethnic group, and their neighbors. Also, 
unlike the rest of Chad, a modest level of economic development 
occurred in the south because of the introduction in 1929 of large- 
scale cotton production (see Cotton, ch. 3). Remittances and pen- 
sions to southerners who served in the French military also enhanced 
economic well-being. 

But even the advantages of more income, schools, and roads 
failed to win popular support for the French in the south. In addition 



12 



A view of Faya Largeau, a former French outpost 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 

to earlier grievances, such as forced porterage (which claimed thou- 
sands of lives) and village relocation, southern farmers resented 
the mandatory quotas for the production of cotton, which France 
purchased at artificially low prices. Government-protected chiefs 
further abused this situation. The chiefs were resented all the more 
because they were generally the artificial creations of the French 
in a region of previously stateless societies. This commonality of 
treatment and the colonial organizational framework began to create 
during this period a sense of Sara ethnicity among persons whose 
collective identities had previously been limited to small kinship 
groups. 

Although France had put forth considerable effort during the 
conquest of Chad, the ensuing administration of the territory was 
halfhearted. Officials in the French colonial service resisted assign- 
ments to Chad, so posts often went to novices or to out-of-favor 
officials. One historian of France's empire has concluded that it 
was almost impossible to be too demented or depraved to be con- 
sidered unfit for duty in Chad. Still, major scandals occurred peri- 
odically, and many of the posts remained vacant. In 1928, for 
example, 42 percent of the Chadian subdivisions lacked official 
administrators .- 

An event occurred in 1935 that was to have far-reaching conse- 
quences throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In that year, the French 



13 



Chad: A Country Study 



colonial administration negotiated a border adjustment with Italy, 
Libya's colonial master. The adjustment would have relocated the 
Libyan-Chad boundary about 100 kilometers south across the 
Aozou Strip (see Glossary). Although the French legislature never 
ratified the agreement, the negotiations formed part of the basis 
of Libya's claim to the area decades later. 

Decolonization Politics 

In 1940 Chad became internationally prominent when its lieu- 
tenant governor, Felix Eboue, led the rest of the AEF federation 
to support the Free French under Charles de Gaulle rather than 
the government of Vichy France. Chad became the base for Colonel 
Jacques Leclerc's conquest of the Fezzan (1940-43), and the entire 
episode became the basis of an enduring sentimental bond between 
the France of de Gaulle's generation and Chad. More funds and 
attention flowed to Chad than ever before, and Eboue became the 
governor general of the entire AEF in November 1941. 

Born in French Guiana of mixed African and European parent- 
age, Eboue was keenly interested in the problems of cultural dis- 
location resulting from unchecked modernization in Africa. He 
worked to return authority to authentic traditional leaders while 
training them in modern administrative techniques. He recognized 
a place for African middle-class professionals in cities, but he 
opposed the migration of workers to cities, supporting instead the 
creation of integrated rural industries where workers could remain 
with their families. When Eboue died in 1944, the AEF lost a major 
source of progressive ideas, and Chad lost a leader with consider- 
able influence in France. 

French voters rejected many of the progressive ideas of Eboue 
and others after the war ended. Nevertheless, the constitution that 
was approved in 1946 granted Chad and other African colonies 
the right to elect a territorial assembly with limited powers. The 
Assembly in turn elected delegates to the French General Council 
of all the AEF (see Preindependence Factions, ch. 4). The posi- 
tion of governor general was redesignated high commissioner, and 
each territory gained the right to elect representatives to French 
parliamentary bodies, including the National Assembly, the Council 
of the Republic, and the Assembly of the French Union. The Afri- 
can peoples became French citizens, and the colonies were desig- 
nated overseas territories of France. But the real locus of authority 
remained in Paris, and French personnel continued to dominate 
the AEF's administration. No formal attempt was made to train 
Chadian Africans for civil service positions before 1955. 



14 



Historical Setting 



Until the early 1950s, political forces originating in France domi- 
nated the development of politics in Chad. Local elections were 
won largely by members of the Chadian Democratic Union (Union 
Democratique Tchadienne — UDT), which was associated with a 
political party in France, the Assembly of French People. The UDT 
represented French commercial interests and a bloc of traditional 
leaders composed primarily of Muslim and Ouaddaian nobility. 
Chad's European community initiated the practice of using the civil 
service for partisan political ends; African civil servants who were 
identified with organizations opposed to the UDT soon found them- 
selves dismissed or transferred to distant posts. For example, Fran- 
cois Tombalbaye (later to become president) lost his job as a teacher 
and ended up making bricks by hand because of his union activi- 
ties and his role in the opposition Chadian Progressive Party (Parti 
Progressiste Tchadien — PPT). 

Nonetheless, by 1953 politics were becoming less European domi- 
nated, and the PPT was emerging as the major rival of the UDT. 
The leader of the PPT was Gabriel Lisette, a black colonial admin- 
istrator born in Panama and posted to Chad in 1946. Elected as 
a deputy to the French National Assembly, Lisette was later chosen 
as secretary general of the African Democratic Assembly (Rassem- 
blement Democratique Africain — RDA), an interterritorial, Marxist- 
oriented party considered quite radical at the time. The PPT 
originated as a territorial branch of the RDA and rapidly became 
the political vehicle of the country's non-Muslim intellectuals. 
Traditional rulers perceived the PPT to be antithetical to their 
interests and recognized that the local territorial assembly could 
adversely affect their revenue and power. These factors persuaded 
traditional rulers to become more active in the UDT, which, 
because of internal divisions, had changed its name in the late 1950s 
to the Chadian Social Action (Action Sociale Tchadienne — AST). 

Although party names changed frequentiy and dramatic factional 
schisms occurred throughout the 1950s, electoral competition was 
essentially between three political blocs: the UDT [AST], the PPT, 
and the allies of Ahmed Koulamallah from Chari-Baguirmi and 
Kanem prefectures. A clever politician and charismatic leader of 
the Tijaniyya Islamic brotherhood in Chad, Koulamallah cam- 
paigned in different times and places as a member of the Bagirmi 
nobility (he was an estranged son of the sultan), a radical socialist 
leader, or a militant Muslim fundamentalist. As a result, politics 
in the 1950s was a struggle between the south, which mostly sup- 
ported the PPT, and the Muslim sahelian belt, which favored the 
UDT [AST]. Koulamallah played a generally disruptive role in 
the middle. 



15 



Chad: A Country Study 



In 1956 the French National Assembly passed the lot cadre 
(enabling act), which resulted in greater self-rule for Chad and other 
African territories. Electoral reforms expanded the pool of eligible 
voters, and power began to shift from the sparsely settled north- 
ern and central Chadian regions toward the more densely popu- 
lated south. The PPT had become less militant, winning the support 
of chiefs in the south and members of the French colonial adminis- 
tration, but not that of private French commercial interests. The 
PPT and allied parties won forty-seven of the sixty-five seats in 
the 1957 elections, and Lisette formed the first African government 
in Chad. He maintained a majority for only about a year, however, 
before factions representing traditional chiefs withdrew their sup- 
port from his coalition government. 

In September 1958, voters in all of Africa's French territories 
took part in a referendum on the Fifth Republic's constitution, 
drawn up under de Gaulle. For a variety of political and economic 
reasons, most of Chad's political groups supported the new con- 
stitution, and all voted for a resolution calling for Chad to become 
an autonomous republic within the French community. The three 
other AEF territories voted similarly, and in November 1958 the 
AEF was officially terminated. Coordination on such issues as cus- 
toms and currency continued among the four territories through 
written agreements or on an ad hoc basis. Nonetheless, some 
Chadians supported the creation of an even stronger French federa- 
tion, rather than independence. The leading proponent of this 
proposal was Barthelemy Boganda of Ubangi-Chari, but his death 
in 1959 and the vigorous opposition of Gabon resulted in political 
independence on a separate basis for all four republics. 

After Lisette 's coalition crumbled in early 1959, two other alli- 
ances governed briefly. Then in March the PPT returned to power, 
this time under the leadership of Tombalbaye, a union leader and 
representative from Moyen-Chari Prefecture. Lisette, whose power 
was undermined because of his non- African origins, became deputy 
prime minister in charge of economic coordination and foreign 
affairs. Tombalbaye soon consolidated enough political support 
from the south and north to isolate the opposition into a collection 
of conservative Muslim leaders from central Chad. The latter group 
formed a political party in January 1960, but its parliamentary 
representation steadily dropped as Tombalbaye wooed individual 
members to the PPT. By independence in August 1960, the PPT 
and the south had clearly achieved dominance, but Tombalbaye 's 
political skills made it possible for observers to talk optimistically 
about the possibility of building a broad-based coalition of politi- 
cal forces. 



16 



A monument to Colonel Jacques Leclerc, a French war hero, and 

Emil Gentil, founder of Fort-Lamy 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 

Tombalbaye Era, 1960-75 

Tombalbaye faced a task of considerable magnitude when Chad 
became a sovereign state. His challenge was to build a nation out 
of a vast and diverse territory that had poor communications, few 
known resources, a tiny market, and a collection of impoverished 
people with sharply differing political traditions, ethnic and regional 
loyalties, and sociocultural patterns. The colonial powers that had 
created the country's boundaries had done little to promote eco- 
nomic interdependence, political cooperation, or cross-cultural 
understanding. Chadians who had hoped that the country's first 
president might turn out to be a state builder like the thirteenth 
century's Dabbalemi or the sixteenth century's Aluma were soon 
disappointed. During its first fifteen years, Chad under Tombal- 
baye experienced worsening economic conditions, eventual aliena- 
tion of the most patient of foreign allies, exacerbation of ethnic and 
regional conflict, and grave weakening of the state as an instrument 
of governance. 

Tombalbaye's Governance: Policies and Methods 

At the outset, Tombalbaye demonstrated an autocratic style along 
with a distrust of the institutions of democracy. One week before 



17 



Chad: A Country Study 



the country gained independence, Tombalbaye purged Lisette from 
his own party, declared Lisette a noncitizen while he was travel- 
ing abroad, and barred him from returning to Chad. This "coup 
by telegram" was the first in an extensive series of Tombalbaye 's 
increasingly authoritarian actions to eliminate or neutralize 
opponents. 

To increase his power and freedom of action, Tombalbaye 
declared a ban on all political parties except the PPT in January 
1962, and in April he established a presidential form of govern- 
ment. When serious rioting occurred in 1963 in N'Djamena and 
Am Timan, the government declared a state of emergency and dis- 
solved the National Assembly. And, as part of a major campaign 
against real and imagined political opponents, Tombalbaye cre- 
ated a special criminal court. By the end of the year, the country's 
prisons contained a virtual "who's who" of Chadian politicians. 
In June 1964, a new National Assembly granted Tombalbaye com- 
plete control over all appointments to the Political Bureau of the 
PPT, which by then was the sole source of political authority. With 
the PPT, government, and upper echelons of the civil service 
stocked with loyalists, and with opposition leaders in prison, exile, 
or completely co-opted, Tombalbaye was in full command of the 
country. 

An effort to Africanize the civil service and security forces as 
rapidly as possible complemented Tombalbaye 's drive for personal 
power. Between 1960 and 1963, the number of French officials in 
the central government administration declined from ninety-five 
to thirty (although the total number of French personnel increased 
as technical advisers were hired for development programs), and 
by the end of 1962 the entire territorial administrative structure 
was in Chadian hands. In addition, units of Chad's national 
army replaced French military forces in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti 
Prefecture and in Abeche, a process formally completed on Janu- 
ary 23, 1965. 

Africanization was not entirely popular among Chad's farmers 
and herders, despite their deep resentment of French colonial rule. 
A decline in the quality of government service was immediately 
apparent, in part because of the usual difficulties of transition, but 
also because many of the newly hired and promoted Chadians were 
less experienced and less adequately trained than their departing 
French counterparts. Increasing the discontent, Tombalbaye 
imposed an additional tax in 1964, under the euphemism of a 
"national loan." On top of that action, some government adminis- 
trators were allegedly forcing citizens in rural areas to make pay- 
ments at three times the official taxation rates. Reports of corruption 



18 



Historical Setting 



and other abuses of authority grew as Chad's new officials became 
aware of both the increased pressures and the decreased constraints 
on public servants. 

Because the great majority of the country's Western-educated 
and French-speaking citizens were southerners, the policy of Afri- 
canization often represented a "southernization" of the Chadian 
government. What appeared to some Western observers to be 
progress in African self-government was perceived by those from 
the northern and central areas to be an increasingly blatant sei- 
zure of power by southerners. To many in northern and central 
Chad, the southern Chadians were simply another set of foreign- 
ers, almost as alien and arrogant as the departing French. Tom- 
balbaye's failure to establish hiring and training policies geared 
to achieving greater ethnic and regional balance in public adminis- 
tration was one of his most serious shortcomings. Another was his 
lack of success — or lack of interest — in reaching power-sharing 
agreements with key leaders in the Saharan and sahelian regions. 

Dissatisfaction with these failures was expressed violently, and 
the government response was just as violent. When Muslims rioted 
in N'Djamena in September 1963 following the arbitrary arrests 
of three Muslim leaders, the government reacted swifdy and repres- 
sively. A little more than a year later, an altercation at a public 
dance in the northern town of Bardai prompted a Sara deputy 
prefect to order the inhabitants of an entire village to march to 
prison, where many were stripped and all were insulted. Many were 
arbitrarily fined for such offenses as wearing beards or turbans. 
Included among the targets of abuse was Oueddei Kichidemi, the 
derde, or spiritual head, of the Teda people, a Toubou group. 
Explosive confrontations such as this occurred repeatedly as the 
inexperienced southerners, who understood litde and cared less for 
the customs of the peoples they governed, replaced experienced 
French administrators. 

By this time, just five years after independence, the possibility 
of armed conflict was growing. Politicians throughout Chad 
increasingly used traditional loyalties and enmities to decry oppo- 
sition and solidify popular support for their positions. In view of 
Chad's historical legacy of conflict, some historians have argued 
that even the most competent leader with the most enlightened set 
of policies would have eventually faced secessionist movements or 
armed opposition. Tombalbaye, however, hastened the onset of 
civil conflict by quickly squandering his legitimacy through repres- 
sive tactics and regional favoritism. 



19 



Chad: A Country Study 

Rebellion in Eastern and Northern Chad 

On November 1, 1965, frustration with what was perceived as 
government mismanagement and tax collection abuses erupted in 
riots in the town of Mangalme in Guera Prefecture. Five hundred 
persons died, including the local deputy to the National Assembly 
and nine other government officials. From Mangalme and nearby 
Batha Prefecture, the rebellion spread to Ouaddai and Salamat 
prefectures, where in February 1967 the prefect and deputy prefect 
were killed. In August 1968, a major mutiny in Aozou among the 
Toubou-dominated National and Nomad Guard highlighted the 
continuing unrest in the north (see Origins and Early Develop- 
ment, ch. 5). In the same year, antigovernment activities and tracts 
began to appear in Chari-Baguirmi Prefecture, only about 100 
kilometers from N'Djamena. Travel became unsafe in much of cen- 
tral Chad, . and governmental authority in the north was reduced 
by 1969 to the garrison towns of Faya Largeau, Fada, Bardai, and 
Ounianga Kebir. 

In addition to historical causes and what Tombalbaye himself 
was later to call * 'maladministration," the country's Arabic- 
speaking neighbors abetted rebellion in the northern and central 
regions of Chad. In Sudan and Libya, numerous self-styled "libera- 
tion fronts" appeared in the mid-1960s, printing manifestos and 
claiming leadership over rebellious groups inside Chad. The most 
prominent of these fronts, the National Liberation Front of Chad 
(Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad — FROLINAT), was 
formed in June 1966 in Nyala in southwestern Sudan. Personality, 
philosophical, and ethnic differences soon led to the front's frag- 
mentation, with one group moving to Khartoum and another, 
which retained the FROLINAT designation, establishing offices 
in Algiers and Tripoli. 

The influence of external assistance to the rebels during this 
period was minimal. Prior to 1976, Chad's uprisings were disor- 
ganized and uncoordinated among dissident groups. Most observers 
attribute the rebels' success more to the ineptitude of Chad's govern- 
ment and national army than to outside assistance. 

After FROLINAT' s eastern region field commander, Ibrahim 
Abatcha, died in combat in February 1968, four contenders for 
leadership emerged. Within two years, two of them reportedly had 
been assassinated and one had fled to Sudan; the fourth, Abba Sid- 
dick, became FROLINAT' s new secretary general in 1970. But 
in 1971, when Siddick called for greater cooperation among vari- 
ous groups under the FROLINAT banner, he encountered vigorous 
opposition in the north from Goukouni Oueddei, son of Oueddei 



20 



Historical Setting 



Kichidemi, and Hissein Habre, one of the leaders of the Armed 
Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord — FAN). Goukouni 
and Habre broke with Siddick, who managed to retain only nominal 
control over FROLINAT's First Liberation Army in east-central 
Chad (see Appendix B). 

Tombalbaye's initial response to the increasing antigovernment 
activities was to attempt to crush them. When the government's 
forces proved woefully inadequate for the task, Tombalbaye swal- 
lowed his pride and called in the French under provisions of mili- 
tary treaties signed in 1960. 

Confronted by the unpopularity of such a step, the French 
government joined many Chadian intellectuals in calling for a broad 
range of economic and political reforms by Chad's government. 
Desperate for French assistance, Tombalbaye reluctantly accepted 
the thirty-three member Administrative Reform Mission (Mission 
de Reforme Administrative — MRA), which arrived in 1969 with 
authority to retrain the army, reorganize the civil service, and 
recommend the abolition of unpopular laws and taxes. The most 
significant political reform was the full restoration to Chad's major 
sultans of their previous judicial authority. The government also 
allowed them to resume their function as tax collectors in exchange 
for 10 percent of the revenue. This action, which Tombalbaye 
implemented grudgingly, temporarily undermined rebel activities 
across central Chad. 

Liberalization continued in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Fol- 
lowing the 1969 presidential elections, in which Tombalbaye ran 
unopposed, some 600 political prisoners were released, including 
a number of prominent Muslims. In April 1971, Tombalbaye, 
addressing the Seventh Congress of the PPT, admitted for the first 
time that he had made mistakes and that there were some short- 
comings associated with his policies. He promised a campaign of 
national reconciliation, and a few weeks later he formed a govern- 
ment that included a greater proportion of Muslims and north- 
erners. In June Tombalbaye freed another 1,500 political prisoners 
and toured rebel regions in the north, where he promised, among 
other things, government-subsidized salt and sugar for the nomads 
of Zouar and Bardai. 

These reforms and French assistance contributed to the relative 
calm of 1970 and 1971. French military forces provided extensive 
and effective assistance in containing rebellious activities in cen- 
tral Chad. By June 1971 , overt rebellion had been reduced for the 
most part to isolated pockets in the Tibesti region. The French 
government, under domestic pressure, began to withdraw its forces 
from Chad. 



21 



Chad: A Country Study 



Fall of the Tombalbaye Government 

Tombalbaye's reform efforts ceased abruptly in August 1971. 
In that month, he claimed to have quashed a coup involving some 
recently amnestied Chadians who allegedly received support from 
Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi. Tombalbaye severed rela- 
tions with Libya and invited anti-Qadhafi elements to establish bases 
in Chad. In retaliation, Qadhafi recognized FROLINAT, offered 
(for the first time formally) an operational base in Tripoli to Sid- 
dick, and increased the flow of supplies to the Chadian rebels. 

Domestic calm deteriorated further when students conducted a 
strike in N'Djamena in November 1971 . Although easily contained, 
the strike demonstrated the growing politicization and disaffection 
of young members of the southern elite and reflected their increased 
awareness of the army's political potential. Tombalbaye then 
replaced the chief of staff, General Jacques Doumro, who was a 
favorite of the students, with Colonel Felix Malloum. 

In June 1972, a band of Libyan-trained saboteurs was captured 
while attempting to smuggle guns and explosives into the capital. 
These arrests coincided with a serious financial crisis, a worsening 
drought, bitter government infighting, and civil unrest in the capi- 
tal. These events convinced Tombalbaye to abandon his policy of 
national reconciliation. He incarcerated more than 1 ,000 real or 
suspected * 'enemies of the state." In an indication of his growing 
distrust of the previously secure south, Tombalbaye detained 
hundreds of southerners and removed two key southern cabinet 
ministers. He also effected a dramatic diplomatic about-face 
designed to obtain economic assistance from the Arab world while 
undermining FROLINAT. To enhance ties to the Arab world, 
Tombalbaye broke Chad's relations with Israel in September 
1972. A few months later, Tombalbaye secured an initial pledge 
of CFA F23 billion (for value of the CFA franc — see Glossary) from 
Libya. In 1973 other Arab capitals promised aid. In addition, Chad 
withdrew from the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organi- 
zation (Organisation Commune Africaine, Malgache, et Mauri- 
cienne — OCAMM) a moderate alliance of French-speaking African 
states. 

Tombalbaye's strategy to create difficulties for FROLINAT was 
successful. When Qadhafi began restricting deliveries of military 
supplies and food to the rebels, fighting for the limited supplies 
erupted between FROLINAT' s First Liberation Army and FAN 
(at that time also called the Second Liberation Army). The Second 
Liberation Army lost control of Ennedi and retreated into north- 
ern Borkou and Tibesti. In April 1974, however, it struck back 



22 



Historical Setting 



by seizing three European hostages, including a French archaeol- 
ogist at Bardai. 

By this time, the Tombalbaye presidency was rapidly unravel- 
ing, as greater attention focused on the real and suspected threats 
from within the government. In June 1973, Tombalbaye arrested 
Malloum, the head of the women's wing of the PPT, and a score 
of other party officials, mostly from the south. These individuals 
were held on charges of " political sorcery" in what came to be 
known as the "Black Sheep Plot" because of their alleged involve- 
ment in animal sacrifices. Moreover, when Outel Bono, a widely 
admired liberal politician, was assassinated in Paris while organizing 
a new political party in August, many believed that Tombalbaye' s 
government was behind the murder. Also that month, Tombal- 
baye decided to replace the PPT with a new party, the National 
Movement for the Cultural and Social Revolution (Mouvement 
National pour la Revolution Culturelle et Sociale — MNRCS). 

To deflect domestic criticism, Tombalbaye embarked on a cam- 
paign to promote authenticite, or "Chaditude." This effort was aimed 
at expunging foreign practices and influences. To shore up his sup- 
port from Chad's expanding urban elite, Tombalbaye Africanized 
the names of several places (Fort-Lamy and Fort-Archambault 
became N'Djamena and Sarh, respectively) and ordered civil ser- 
vants to use indigenous names in place of their European ones; 
he changed his first name to Ngarta. In addition, his policies 
induced many foreign missionaries to repatriate. His strident attacks 
on the French government were also popular. Tombalbaye lashed 
out specifically at Jacques Foccart, the powerful secretary general 
to the French Presidency for African Affairs, who was labeled an 
"evil genius" and formally condemned in a National Assembly 
resolution as the source of some "fourteen plots" against the govern- 
ment of Chad. 

To restore his sagging support among Sara traditionalists in the 
rural south, Tombalbaye came out in favor of the harsh physical 
and psychological^^ initiation rites for all southern males between 
sixteen and fifty, making them compulsory for any non-Muslim 
seeking admission to the civil service, government, and higher ranks 
of the military (see Classical African Religions, ch. 2). From 
mid- 1973 to April 1974, an estimated 3,000 southern civil servants, 
including two cabinet ministers and one colonel, went through the 
yondo ordeal. Because the rites were perceived as anti-Christian and 
essentially borrowed from one Sara subgroup, resistance to the 
process exacerbated antagonisms along clan and religious lines. 
Therefore, rather than encouraging greater southern support, 



23 



Chad: A Country Study 

Tombalbaye's action created disaffection among civil servants, army 
officers, and students. 

The worsening drought in the early 1970s also affected Chad's 
degenerating political situation. Throughout 1974 international 
criticism of Chad's handling of drought-relief efforts reached a new 
peak, as government insensitivity and overt profiteering became 
obvious. 

In response to its economic crisis, the government launched 
Operation Agriculture, which involved a massive volunteer cotton- 
planting effort on virgin lands. The project increased production 
somewhat, but at the expense of major economic dislocations and 
greater southern resentment, particularly from people in cities and 
towns who were rounded up by the military to ''volunteer" for 
agricultural labor. 

By early 1975, many observers believed that Tombalbaye had 
eroded his two main bases of support — the south and the armed 
forces. Only intra- Sara divisions and concern over the possible loss 
of southern influence in government had prevented any well- 
organized anti-Tombalbaye movement. In addition, throughout 
the early 1970s Tombalbaye's criticism of the army's mediocre per- 
formance in the field had angered the officer corps and dissipated 
its loyalty. Other military grievances included frequent purges and 
reshufflings of the top ranks. In March 1975, Tombalbaye ordered 
the arrest of several senior military officers as suspects in yet another 
plot. On April 13, 1975, several units of N'Djamena's gendarmerie, 
acting under the initial direction of junior military officers, killed 
Tombalbaye during a mutiny. 

Civil War and Northern Dominance, 1975-82 
Malloum's Military Government, 1975-78 

The coup d'etat that terminated Tombalbaye's government 
received an enthusiastic response in N'Djamena. Malloum emerged 
as the chairman of the new Supreme Military Council (Conseil 
Superieur Militaire — CSM). His government contained more Mus- 
lims from northern and eastern Chad, but ethnic and regional 
dominance still remained very much in the hands of southerners. 
The successor government soon overturned many of Tombalbaye's 
more odious policies. For example, the CSM attempted to distribute 
external drought-relief assistance more equitably and efficiendy and 
devised plans to develop numerous economic reforms, including 
reductions in taxes and government expenditures. 

Neither reformers nor skilled administrators, the new military 
leaders were unable to retain for long the modicum of authority, 



24 



President Tombalbaye marching in a parade celebrating the tenth 

anniversary of independence 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 
Fountain in Sultan Kasser Plaza in N'Djamena 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 



25 



Chad: A Country Study 

legitimacy, and popularity that they had gained through their over- 
throw of the unpopular Tombalbaye. The expectations of most 
urban Chadians far exceeded the capacity of the new government — 
or possibly any government — to satisfy them. It soon became clear, 
moreover, that the new leaders (mostly southern military officers) 
saw themselves as caretakers rather than innovators, and few of 
Tombalbaye' s close associates were punished. Throughout its 
tenure, the CSM was unable to win the support of the capital's 
increasingly radicalized unions, students, and urban dwellers. The 
government suspended the National Union of Chadian Workers 
(Union Nationale de Travailleurs du Tchad — UNTT) and pro- 
hibited strikes, but labor and urban unrest continued from 1975 
through 1978. On the first anniversary of the formation of the CSM, 
Malloum was the target of a grenade attack that injured several 
top officials and spectators. A year after that, in March 1977, the 
CSM executed summarily the leaders of a short-lived mutiny by 
several military units in N'Djamena. 

The fundamental failures of Malloum' s government, however, 
were most evident in its interactions with France, Libya, and 
FROLINAT. In his first few months in office, Malloum persuaded 
a few eastern rebel elements to join the new government. In the 
north, the derde (Oueddei Kichidemi) returned from exile in Libya 
in August 1975. But his son, Goukouni Oueddei, refused to respond 
to his entreaties or those of the government and remained in opposi- 
tion. When the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the 
North (Conseil de Commandement des Forces Armees du Nord — 
CCFAN), a structure set up in 1972 by Habre and Goukouni to 
represent northern elements in FROLINAT, continued to refuse 
negotiations with the CSM over the release of the hostage French 
archaeologist, France began dealing directly with the rebels. Mal- 
loum 's government reacted to this embarrassment by demanding 
the departure of 1,500 French troops, at a time in late 1975 when 
Chad's military situation was beginning to worsen. Throughout 
1976 and 1977, the military balance of power shifted in favor of 
FROLINAT as Libya provided the rebels with substantially more 
weaponry and logistical support than ever before. Faya Largeau 
was placed under siege twice in 1976, and then in June 1977 Bardai 
fell to the CCFAN. 

The sharp increase in Libyan activity also brought to a head the 
power struggle within the CCFAN between Goukouni and Habre. 
In 1971 Habre had left his position as a deputy prefect in the Tom- 
balbaye government to join Goukouni 's rebels. Goukouni and 
Habre, ambitious Toubou leaders from two different and competing 
clans, became bitter rivals, first within the CCFAN and later 



26 



Historical Setting 



within all of Chad. In the CCFAN, the key issues dividing the men 
were relations with Libya and the handling of the hostage affair. 
Habre opposed vigorously all Libyan designs on the Aozou Strip 
and favored retaining the French hostage even after most of the 
ransom demands had been met. Goukouni felt that priority should 
go to the conflict with the CSM, for which Libyan assistance could 
be decisive, and that the kidnapping had already achieved more 
than enough. Habre finally split with him in 1976, taking a few 
hundred followers to fight in Batha and Biltine prefectures and 
retaining for his group the name FAN (see Appendix B). Goukouni 
and his followers prevailed (the CCFAN released the hostage to 
French authorities in January 1977). 

As the military position of the CSM continued to decline in 1977, 
Malloum's political overtures to the rebel groups and leaders 
became increasingly flexible. In September Malloum and Habre 
met in Khartoum to begin negotiations on a formal alliance. Their 
efforts culminated in a carefully drafted agreement, the Fundamen- 
tal Charter, which formed the basis of the National Union Govern- 
ment of August 1978. Malloum was named president of the new 
government, while Habre, as prime minister, became the first sig- 
nificant insurgent figure to hold an executive position in a post- 
colonial government. 

Habre's ascension to power in N'Djamena was intended to sig- 
nal to Goukouni and other rebel leaders the government's willing- 
ness to negotiate seriously following its reversals on the battlefield 
in 1978. In February Faya Largeau fell to FROLINAT, and with 
it roughly half the country's territory. Shordy thereafter, Malloum 
flew to Sabha in southern Libya to negotiate a cease-fire, but even 
as it was being codified in March, FROLINAT 's position was 
hardening. Goukouni claimed that all three liberation armies were 
now united under his leadership in the new People's Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Populaires — FAP) and that their objective remained 
the overthrow of the "dictatorial neocolonial regime imposed by 
France on Chad since August 1 1 , 1960. ' ' FAP continued to advance 
toward the capital until it was halted near Ati in major battles with 
French military forces and units of the Chadian Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Tchadiennes — FAT; see Appendix B). It was Mal- 
loum's hope that the FROLINAT leadership would soften its terms, 
or possibly undergo renewed fragmentation. 

Civil War and Multilateral Mediation, 1979-82 

From 1979 to 1982, Chad experienced unprecedented change 
and spiraling violence. Southerners finally lost control of what 
remained of the Chadian government, while civil conflicts became 



27 



Chad: A Country Study 

significantly more internationalized. In early 1979, the fragile 
Malloum- Habre alliance collapsed after months of aggressive actions 
by Habre, including demands that more northerners be appointed 
to high government offices and that Arabic be used in place of 
French in broadcasting. Appealing for support among the large 
communities of Muslims and Arabs in N'Djamena, Habre 
unleashed his FAN on February 12. With the French garrison 
remaining uninvolved, FAN sent Malloum into retirement (under 
French protection) and drove the remnants of FAT toward the 
south. On February 22, Goukouni and FAP entered the capital. 
By this time, most of the city's Sara population had fled to the south, 
where attacks against Muslims and nonsoutherners erupted, par- 
ticularly in Sarh, Moundou, and throughout Moyen-Chari Prefec- 
ture. By mid-March more than 10,000 were said to have died as 
a result of violence throughout the south. 

In early 1979, Chad became an open arena of unrestrained fac- 
tional politics. Opportunistic power seekers sought to gather fol- 
lowers (often using sectarian appeals) and to win support from 
Chad's African neighbors. Between March 10 and August 21, four 
separate conferences took place in the Nigerian cities of Kano and 
Lagos, during which Chad's neighbors attempted to establish a 
political framework acceptable to the warring factions. Chad's 
neighbors, however, also used the meetings to pursue interests of 
their own, resulting in numerous externally generated complications 
and a growing number of factions brought into the process. For 
example, at one point, Qadhafl became so angry with Habre that 
the Libyan sent arms to Colonel Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue's 
anti-Habre faction in the south, even though Kamougue was also 
anti- Libyan. At the second conference in Kano, both Habre and 
Goukouni were placed under what amounted to house arrest so 
Nigeria could promote the chances of a Kanembu leader, Mahmat 
Shawa Lol. In fact, Nigerian support made Lol the Chadian titular 
head of state for a few weeks, even though his Third Liberation 
Army was only a phantom force, and his domestic political sup- 
port was insignificant. Within Chad the warring parties used the 
conferences and their associated truces to recover from one round 
of fighting and prepare for the next. 

The final conference culminated in the Lagos Accord of August 
21, 1979, which representatives of eleven Chadian factions signed 
and the foreign ministers of nine other African states witnessed. 
The Lagos Accord established the procedures for setting up the 
Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement 
d' Union Nationale de Transition — GUNT), which was sworn into 
office in November. By mutual agreement, Goukouni was named 



28 



Historical Setting 



president, Kamougue was appointed vice-president, and Habre was 
named minister of national defense, veterans, and war victims. The 
distribution of cabinet positions was balanced between south (eleven 
portfolios), north, center, and east (thirteen), and among proteges 
of neighboring states. A peacekeeping mission of the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity (OAU), to be drawn from troops from Congo, 
Guinea, and Benin, was to replace the French. This force never 
materialized in any effective sense, but the OAU was committed 
to GUNT under the presidency of Goukouni. 

GUNT, however, failed. Its major participants deeply mistrusted 
each other, and they never achieved a sense of coherence. As a 
result, the various factional militias remained armed. By January 
1980, a unit of Habre' s army was attacking the forces of one of 
the constituent groups of GUNT in Ouaddai Prefecture. Shortly 
thereafter, N'Djamena plunged into another cycle of violence, and 
by the end of March 1980 Habre was openly defying the govern- 
ment, having taken control of a section of the capital. The 600 Con- 
golese troops of the OAU peacekeeping force remained out of the 
fray, as did the French, while units of five separate Chadian armies 
prowled the streets of N'Djamena. The battles continued through- 
out the summer, punctuated by more OAU mediation efforts and 
five formal cease-fires. 

It became evident that the profound rivalry between Goukouni 
and Habre was at the core of the conflict. By mid- 1980 the south — 
cut off from communication and trade with N'Djamena and 
defended by a regrouped, southern army — had become a state 
within a state. Colonel Kamougue, the strongman of the south, 
remained a prudent distance away from the capital and waited to 
negotiate with whichever northerner emerged as the winner. 

In 1980 the beleaguered Goukouni turned to Libya, much as 
he had done four years earlier. With the French forces having 
departed in mid-May 1980, Goukouni signed a military coopera- 
tion treaty with Libya in June (without prior approval of the all- 
but-defunct GUNT). In October he requested direct military 
assistance from Qadhafi, and by December Libyan forces had firm 
control of the capital and most other urban centers outside the south. 
Habre fled to Sudan, vowing to resume the struggle. 

Although Libyan intervention enabled Goukouni to win mili- 
tarily, the association with Qadhafi created diplomatic problems 
for GUNT. In January 1981, when Goukouni and Qadhafi issued 
a joint communique stating that Chad and Libya had agreed to 
"work for the realization of complete unity between the two coun- 
tries," an international uproar ensued. Although both leaders later 



29 



Chad: A Country Study 

denied any intention to merge their states politically, the diplomatic 
damage had been done. 

Throughout 1981 most of the members of the OAU, along with 
France and the United States, encouraged Libyan troops to with- 
draw from Chad. One week after the "unity communique," the 
OAU's committee on Chad met in Togo to assess the situation. 
In a surprisingly blunt resolution, the twelve states on the com- 
mittee denounced the union goal as a violation of the 1979 Lagos 
Accord, called for Libya to withdraw its troops, and promised to 
provide a peacekeeping unit, the Inter- African Force (IAF). 
Goukouni was skeptical of OAU promises, but in September he 
received a French pledge of support for his government and the IAF. 

But as Goukouni 's relations with the OAU and France improved, 
his ties with Libya deteriorated. One reason for this deterioration 
was that the economic assistance that Libya had promised never 
materialized. Another, and perhaps more significant, factor was 
that Qadhafi was strongly suspected of helping Goukouni' s rival 
within GUNT, Acyl Ahmat, leader of the Democratic Revolution- 
ary Council (Conseil Democratique Revolutionnaire — CDR). Both 
Habre and Goukouni feared Acyl because he and many of the mem- 
bers of the CDR were Arabs of the Awlad Sulayman tribe. About 
150 years earlier, this group had migrated from Libya to Chad and 
thus represented the historical and cultural basis of Libyan claims 
in Chad (see Languages and Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). 

As a consequence of the Libya-Chad rift, Goukouni asked the 
Libyan forces in late October 1981 to leave, and by mid-November 
they had complied. Their departure, however, allowed Habre' s 
FAN — reconstituted in eastern Chad with Egyptian, Sudanese, and, 
reportedly, significant United States assistance — to win key posi- 
tions along the highway from Abeche to N'Djamena. Habre was 
restrained only by the arrival and deployment in December 1981 
of some 4,800 IAF troops from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire. 

In February 1982, a special OAU meeting in Nairobi resulted 
in a plan that called for a cease-fire, negotiations among all parties, 
elections, and the departure of the IAF; all terms were to be car- 
ried out within six months. Habre accepted the plan, but Goukouni 
rejected it, asserting that Habre had lost any claim to legitimacy 
when he broke with GUNT. When Habre renewed his military 
advance toward N'Djamena, the IAF remained essentially neu- 
tral, just as the French had done when FROLINAT marched on 
Malloum three years earlier. FAN secured control of the capital 
on June 7. Goukouni and other members of GUNT fled to Cam- 
eroon and eventually reappeared in Libya. For the remainder of 
the year, Habre consolidated his power in much of war- weary Chad 



30 



Historical Setting 



and worked to secure international recognition for his govern- 
ment. 

* * * 

Little research material was available in English on the histori- 
cal background of Chad or the central Sudanic region. For earlier 
historical periods, The Cambridge History of Africa offers a compre- 
hensive survey, along with maps and bibliographic references. Prin- 
cipal sources include the contributions of Nehemia Levtzion in 
Volume 2 of the Cambridge series and H.J. Fisher in Volumes 
3 and 4, as well as African History by Philip Curtin and others, for 
nineteenth-century material in particular. The published thesis State 
and Society in Three Central Sudanic Kingdoms by Anders J. Bjorkelo, 
although not widely available, contains extensive analysis and 
interpretation. A detailed examination of Kanem-Borno is presented 
in Pages d'histoire du Kanem, by Jean-Claude Zeltner. 

Dennis D. Cordell's Dar al-Kuti and the Last Years of the Trans - 
Saharan Slave Trade, although not specifically about Chad, is 
especially useful for its regional perspective and its analysis of 
nineteenth-century developments. Cordell also provides useful per- 
spectives on the culture of the Sara people. 

No standard English work on the colonial experience in Chad 
is readily available, and the most frequently cited French source, 
Jacques Le Cornec's Histoire politique du Tchad de 1900 a 1962, is 
dated. Brian Weinstein's biography of Felix Eboue surveys the 
human dimension of the colonial era. Samuel Decalo's Historical 
Dictionary of Chad is also a valuable reference work. 

Chad's recent history is analyzed in the works of Decalo, Rene 
Lemarchand, and William J. Foltz. Other important references 
include Conflict in Chad by Virginia M. Thompson and Richard 
Adloff and A State in Disarray, by Michael P. Kelley. French works 
on recent history include Le Frolinat et les revokes populaires du Tchad, 
1965-1976 by Robert Buijtenhuijs and Tchad-Libye: La querelle des 
frontieres by Bernard Lanne. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



31 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




A bee-hived shaped mud hut, sometimes found in areas of Mayo-Kebbi 
Prefecture 



GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION, ETHNIC and linguistic diver- 
sity, and religious differences have presented serious obstacles to 
nation building in Chad. A range of environments has contributed 
to the evolution of a variety of life- styles and social structures, 
including nomadic societies in the Sahara Desert in the north, semi- 
nomadic (or semisedentary) peoples in the Sahel (see Glossary) in 
the center, and agricultural communities in the soudanian south. 
With three of Africa's four major language families represented 
within its borders, Chad's peoples do not share broad cultural 
characteristics, as do, for example, the Bantu peoples of countries 
in central, eastern, and southern Africa. Religion also divides 
Chad's people among followers of classical African religions, Islam, 
and Christianity. Ethnic differences often overlay and intensify these 
divisions. 

Preoccupied with assuring the country's survival, successive 
Chadian governments have had little motivation or resources to 
deal with urgent social and economic problems. Up-to-date popu- 
lation data — necessary for reliable development planning — are lack- 
ing; however, a census scheduled for 1989 promised to remedy this 
problem partially. 

Other challenges include providing adequate education and 
health care. Starting in the mid-1960s, civil strife has undermined 
the Chadian goal of universal primary school education. It has also 
brought the exile of much of the country's intellectual community 
and the flight of foreign personnel who had staffed institutions of 
higher learning. Health care has fared even more poorly than has 
education. Although the number of medical facilities of all kinds 
seems to have grown between the early 1970s and the early 1980s, 
the number of trained personnel has not kept pace. And once again, 
the violence of war and discontent with the government in rural 
areas have provoked the closing of many facilities and the flight 
of their staffs. 

Physical Setting 

Located in north-central Africa, Chad stretches for about 1 ,800 
kilometers from its northernmost point to its southern boundary. 
Except in the far northwest and south, where its borders converge, 
Chad's average width is about 800 kilometers. Its area of 1 ,284,000 
square kilometers is roughly equal to the combined areas of Idaho, 
Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, and Arizona. Chad's neighbors include 



35 



Chad: A Country Study 

Libya to the north, Niger and Nigeria to the west, Sudan to the 
east, Central African Republic to the south, and Cameroon to the 
southwest. 

Chad exhibits two striking geographical characteristics. First, 
the country is landlocked. N'Djamena, the capital, is located more 
than 1,100 kilometers northeast of the Adantic Ocean; Abeche, 
a major city in the east, lies 2,650 kilometers from the Red Sea; 
and Faya Largeau, a much smaller but strategically important 
center in the north, is in the middle of the Sahara Desert, 1,550 
kilometers from the Mediterranean Sea. These vast distances from 
the sea have had a profound impact on Chad's historical and con- 
temporary development. The second noteworthy characteristic is 
that the country borders on very different parts of the African con- 
tinent: North Africa, with its Islamic culture and economic orien- 
tation toward the Mediterranean Basin; West Africa, with its diverse 
religions and cultures and its history of highly developed states and 
regional economies; Northeast Africa, oriented toward the Nile 
Valley and Red Sea region; and Central or Equatorial Africa, some 
of whose people have retained classical African religions while others 
have adopted Christianity, and whose economies were part of the 
great Zaire River system. Although much of Chad's distinctive- 
ness comes from this diversity of influences, since independence 
the diversity has also been an obstacle to the creation of a national 
identity. 

The Land 

Although Chadian society is economically, socially, and cultur- 
ally fragmented, the country's geography is unified by the Lake 
Chad Basin (see fig. 3). Once a huge inland sea (the Paleochadian 
Sea) whose only remnant is shallow Lake Chad, this vast depression 
extends west into Nigeria and Niger. The larger, northern portion 
of the basin is bounded within Chad by the Tibesti Mountains in 
the northwest, the Ennedi Plateau in the northeast, the Ouaddai 
Highlands in the east along the border with Sudan, the Guera 
Massif in central Chad, and the Mandara Mountains along Chad's 
southwestern border with Cameroon. The smaller, southern part 
of the basin falls almost exclusively in Chad. It is delimited in the 
north by the Guera Massif, in the south by highlands 250 kilometers 
south of the border with Central African Republic, and in the south- 
west by the Mandara Mountains. 

Lake Chad, located in the southwestern part of the basin at an 
altitude of 282 meters, surprisingly does not mark the basin's lowest 
point; instead, this is found in the Bodele and Djourab regions in 
the north-central and northeastern parts of the country, respectively. 



36 



The Society and Its Environment 



This oddity arises because the great stationary dunes (ergs) of the 
Kanem region create a dam, preventing lake waters from flowing 
to the basin's lowest point. At various times in the past, and as 
late as the 1870s, the Bahr el Ghazal Depression, which extends 
from the northeastern part of the lake to the Djourab, acted as an 
overflow canal; since independence, climatic conditions have made 
overflows impossible. 

North and northeast of Lake Chad, the basin extends for more 
than 800 kilometers, passing through regions characterized by great 
rolling dunes separated by very deep depressions. Although vege- 
tation holds the dunes in place in the Kanem region, farther north 
they are bare and have a fluid, rippling character. From its low 
point in the Djourab, the basin then rises to the plateaus and peaks 
of the Tibesti Mountains in the north. The summit of this 
formation — as well as the highest point in the Sahara Desert — is 
Emi Koussi, a dormant volcano that reaches 3,414 meters above 
sea level. The basin's northeastern limit is the Ennedi Plateau, 
whose limestone bed rises in steps etched by erosion. 

East of the lake, the basin rises gradually to the Ouaddai High- 
lands, which mark Chad's eastern border and also divide the Chad 
and Nile watersheds. Southeast of Lake Chad, the regular con- 
tours of the terrain are broken by the Guera Massif, which divides 
the basin into its northern and southern parts. 

South of the lake lie the floodplains of the Chari and Logone 
rivers, much of which are inundated during the rainy season. Far- 
ther south, the basin floor slopes upward, forming a series of low 
sand and clay plateaus, called koros, which eventually climb to 615 
meters above sea level. South of the Chadian border, the koros divide 
the Lake Chad Basin from the Ubangi-Zaire river system. 

Water Systems 

Permanent streams do not exist in northern or central Chad. 
Following infrequent rains in the Ennedi Plateau and Ouaddai 
Highlands, water may flow through depressions called enneris and 
wadis. Often the result of flash floods, such streams usually dry 
out within a few days as the remaining puddles seep into the sandy 
clay soil. The most important of these streams is the Batha, which 
in the rainy season carries water west from the Ouaddai Highlands 
and the Guera Massif to Lake Fitri. 

Chad's major rivers are the Chari and the Logone and their trib- 
utaries, which flow from the southeast into Lake Chad. Both river 
systems rise in the highlands of Central African Republic and 
Cameroon, regions that receive more than 1,250 millimeters of rain- 
fall annually. Fed by rivers of Central African Republic, as well 



37 



Chad: A Country Study 



1 8 Boundary representation not 22 
necessarily authoritative 



LIBYA 



IN 

A 



NIGER 



SUDAN 




CENTRAL \ 10 
AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC ^ 

h 



Figure 3. Topography and Drainage 



as by the Bahr Salamat, Bahr Aouk, and Bahr Sara rivers of 
southeastern Chad, the Chari River is about 1 ,200 kilometers long. 



38 



The Society and Its Environment 



From its origins near the city of Sarh, the middle course of the 
Chari makes its way through swampy terrain; the lower Chari is 
joined by the Logone River near N'Djamena. The Chari' s volume 
varies greatly, from 17 cubic meters per second during the dry 
season to 340 cubic meters per second during the wettest part of 
the year. 

The Logone River is formed by tributaries flowing from Camer- 
oon and Central African Republic. Both shorter and smaller in 
volume than the Chari, it flows northeast for 960 kilometers; its 
volume ranges from five to eighty-five cubic meters per second. 
At N'Djamena the Logone empties into the Chari, and the com- 
bined rivers flow together for thirty kilometers through a large delta 
and into Lake Chad. At the end of the rainy season in the fall, 
the river overflows its banks and creates a huge floodplain in the 
delta. 

The seventh largest lake in the world (and the fourth largest in 
Africa), Lake Chad is located in the sahelian zone, a region just 
south of the Sahara Desert. The Chari River contributes 95 per- 
cent of Lake Chad's water, an average annual volume of 40 billion 
cubic meters, 95 percent of which is lost to evaporation. The size 
of the lake is determined by rains in the southern highlands bor- 
dering the basin and by temperatures in the Sahel. Fluctuations 
in both cause the lake to change dramatically in size, from 9,800 
square kilometers in the dry season to 25,500 at the end of the rainy 
season. Lake Chad also changes greatly in size from one year to 
another. In 1870 its maximum area was 28,000 square kilometers. 
The measurement dropped to 12,700 in 1908. In the 1940s and 
1950s, the lake remained small, but it grew again to 26,000 square 
kilometers in 1963. The droughts of the late 1960s, early 1970s, 
and mid-1980s caused Lake Chad to shrink once again, however. 
The only other lakes of importance in Chad are Lake Fitri, in Batha 
Prefecture, and Lake Iro, in the marshy southeast. 

Climate 

The Lake Chad Basin embraces a great range of tropical climates 
from north to south, although most of these climates tend to be 
dry. Apart from the far north, most regions are characterized by 
a cycle of alternating rainy and dry seasons. In any given year, 
the duration of each season is determined largely by the positions 
of two great air masses — a maritime mass over the Atlantic Ocean 
to the southwest and a much drier continental mass. During the 
rainy season, winds from the southwest push the moister maritime 
system north over the African continent where it meets and slips 
under the continental mass along a front called the " intertropical 



39 



Chad: A Country Study 



convergence zone." At the height of the rainy season, the front 
may reach as far as Kanem Prefecture. By the middle of the dry 
season, the intertropical convergence zone moves south of Chad, 
taking the rain with it. This weather system contributes to the for- 
mation of three major regions of climate and vegetation. 

Saharan Region 

The Saharan region covers roughly the northern third of the 
country, including Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture along with 
the northern parts of Kanem, Batha, and Biltine prefectures (see 
fig. 1). Much of this area receives only traces of rain during the 
entire year; at Faya Largeau, for example, annual rainfall aver- 
ages less than thirty millimeters. Scattered small oases and occa- 
sional wells provide water for a few date palms or small plots of 
millet and garden crops. In much of the north, the average daily 
maximum temperature is about 32°C during January, the coolest 
month of the year, and about 45 °C during May, the hottest month. 
On occasion, strong winds from the northeast produce violent sand- 
storms. In northern Biltine Prefecture, a region called the Mortcha 
plays a major role in animal husbandry. Dry for nine months of 
the year, it receives 350 millimeters or more of rain, mostly dur- 
ing July and August. A carpet of green springs from the desert 
during this brief wet season, attracting herders from throughout 
the region who come to pasture their cattle and camels. Because 
very few wells and springs have water throughout the year, the 
herders leave with the end of the rains, turning over the land to 
the antelopes, gazelles, and ostriches that can survive with little 
groundwater. 

Sahelian Region 

The semiarid sahelian zone, or Sahel, forms a belt about 500 
kilometers wide that runs from Lac and Chari-Baguirmi prefec- 
tures eastward through Guera, Ouaddai, and northern Salamat 
prefectures to the Sudanese frontier. The climate in this transition 
zone between the desert and the southern soudanian zone is divided 
into a rainy season (from June to early September) and a dry period 
(from October to May). In the northern Sahel, thorny shrubs and 
acacia trees grow wild, while date palms, cereals, and garden crops 
are raised in scattered oases. Outside these settlements, nomads 
tend their flocks during the rainy season, moving southward as 
forage and surface water disappear with the onset of the dry part 
of the year. The central Sahel is characterized by drought-resistant 
grasses and small woods. Rainfall is more abundant there than in 
the Saharan region. For example, N'Djamena records a maximum 



40 



Villagers drawing water from a wood-lined well 
Courtesy United Nations (Uri Golani) 



41 



Chad: A Country Study 

annual average rainfall of 580 millimeters, while Ouaddai Prefec- 
ture receives just a bit less. During the hot season, in April and 
May, maximum temperatures frequently rise above 40°C. In the 
southern part of the Sahel, rainfall is sufficient to permit crop 
production on unirrigated land, and millet and sorghum are grown 
(see Agriculture, ch. 3). Agriculture is also common in the marsh- 
lands east of Lake Chad and near swamps or wells. Many farmers 
in the region combine subsistence agriculture with the raising of 
cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry. 

Soudanian Region 

The humid soudanian zone includes the southern prefectures of 
Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjile, Logone Occidental, Logone Oriental, 
Moyen-Chari, and southern Salamat. Between April and October, 
the rainy season brings between 750 and 1,250 millimeters of 
precipitation. Temperatures are high throughout the year. Day- 
time readings in Moundou, the major city in the southwest, range 
from 27°C in the middle of the cool season in January to about 
40°C in the hot months of March, April, and May. 

The soudanian region is predominantiy savanna, or plains covered 
with a mixture of tropical or subtropical grasses and woodlands. 
The growth is lush during the rainy season but turns brown and 
dormant during the five-month dry season between November and 
March. Over a large part of the region, however, natural vegeta- 
tion has yielded to agriculture. 

Population 

In the late 1980s, demographic data for Chad were very incom- 
plete. One of the most important demographic techniques is projec- 
tion from one set of data to anticipate the evolution of the 
population, but the lack of a national census in Chad has made 
applying such a technique difficult. In addition, population projec- 
tions assume that the population has evolved with regularity since 
the last collection of data. In Chad, domestic conflict, foreign mili- 
tary occupation of part of its territory, and serious famines, from 
1968 through 1973 and in the early 1980s, have disrupted the regu- 
lar change of the population. As a result, many population esti- 
mates were probably inaccurate. In 1988 most population estimates 
continued to be based on projections from partial studies made 
in 1964 and 1968 by the National Institute of Economic and 
Statistical Studies (Institut National des Etudes Statistiques et 
Economiques — INSEE) in France and by the Chadian government. 
These survey data, projected forward, were the major reference 
sources for the Chadian government and for many international 



42 



The Society and Its Environment 



agencies and foreign governments. Two organizations, the Sahel 
Institute (Institut du Sahel — INSAH) and the Population Refer- 
ence Bureau (PRB), gave different figures for Chad's population 
in 1985. The first organization estimated the population at almost 
5 million; the second, at 5.2 million. In the late 1980s, cognizant 
of the need for demographic data for planning, the Ministry of Plan- 
ning and Reconstruction and the United Nations Economic Com- 
mission for Africa began planning the first national census for 1989. 

Estimates of total population acquire greater meaning when the 
processes behind them are examined more closely. Population 
change is the sum of two sets of additions and two sets of subtrac- 
tions. First, there are additions through births. In mid- 1987 the 
PRB estimated Chad's birthrate at 43 live births per 1 ,000 inhabi- 
tants annually (the world average was 28 in 1987). The same organ- 
ization suggested that, on average, Chadian women gave birth to 
5.9 children over their reproductive years, a slightly lower num- 
ber than the 6.3 average for Africa women as a whole. 

Second, there are additions through immigration. Although eth- 
nic, political, and economic ties connect most regions of Chad with 
neighboring states, such links probably have not brought a large 
number of permanent immigrants. By the late 1980s, Chadians 
who had fled the civil strife in the southern and central parts of 
the country during the late 1970s and early 1980s apparently had 
returned in large numbers. Nonetheless, overall immigration prob- 
ably has not exceeded emigration. 

Subtractions for population decrease also are calculated for two 
sets of events. First, there are subtractions through deaths. In the 
mid-1980s, the PRB estimated Chad's mortality rate at 23 deaths 
annually per 1 ,000 inhabitants — one of the highest mortality rates 
in the world (the global average stood at 10 in 1987). Civilian and 
military deaths, resulting from warfare, poor health conditions, and 
drought undoubtedly have contributed to this high mortality rate. 
The yearly infant mortality rate (the number of children per 1 ,000 
births who die before age one) was also extremely high in Chad, 
estimated by INSAH and the PRB at 155 and 143, respectively. 
Among children, a second peak in mortality occurs after weaning 
(from about one and one-half to two years of age), when they are 
deprived of their mothers' natural immunities. High mortality rates 
are indicative of short life expectancies. In Chad, INSAH estimated 
the life expectancy for a female born in the period 1975-80 at 43.4 
years; for a male, it was even lower — 38.5 years. 

Emigration is the second form of subtraction. Although the data 
for Chad were partial, labor migration and refugee flight were the 
two major types of emigration. In recent decades, some of the old 



43 



Chad: A Country Study 



labor migration streams have continued, such as that to Sudan, 
and newer ones have joined them, such as those to Nigeria and 
the oil-rich countries of the Middle East during the petroleum boom 
of the 1970s and early 1980s. 

Since independence, refugee flight has been a major component 
of emigration. In the late 1960s, troubles in eastern and southeastern 
Chad provoked emigration to Sudan. Patterns of flight have shifted 
with shifts in the theater of conflict. Following the battles of 
N'Djamena in 1979 and 1980, many residents sought refuge across 
the Chari River in neighboring Cameroon. Violence against 
southerners in N'Djamena brought further emigration, and the 
de facto partitioning of the country during the early 1980s brought 
retribution against northern merchants living in the southern cities 
of Moundou and Sarh. Although some of these people later returned 
to their homes within Chad, others sought refuge in Cameroon, 
Nigeria, and Central African Republic; some members of the bour- 
geoisie and intelligentsia fled to Western Europe. In the 1980s, the 
conflict shifted north, where the Chadian and Libyan armies clashed 
repeatedly. These campaigns marked a major escalation in vio- 
lence and probably provoked flight as well (see Civil Conflict and 
Libyan Intervention, ch. 5). 

As a population, Chadians were quite young (see fig. 4). The 
PRB estimated that 44 percent of the population was younger than 
fifteen in 1987. Only 2 percent of the population was older than 
sixty-four. These percentages are best appreciated as components 
of what is called the dependency ratio — the combined percentage 
of people less than fifteen and more than sixty-four, who, because 
they are considered only marginally productive, must be supported 
by the remainder of the population. Although some social scien- 
tists and development analysts challenge this conventional defini- 
tion, pointing out that in rural Africa and urban shanty towns 
children may indeed add to the household income, most demog- 
raphers agree that the measure is nonetheless a good general indi- 
cator of the dependency burden. In Chad, then, the 46 percent 
of the population less than fifteen and more than sixty-four essen- 
tially had to be supported by the other 54 percent. Although this 
ratio was not the highest in Africa, the level of dependency was 
difficult for Chadian society to bear, in part because poor health 
and inadequate nutrition already took such a high toll among the 
working population, and because mechanization had not raised 
productivity. 

In terms of the sex structure of the population, the 1964 INS AH 
survey calculated that there were 90 males for every 100 females; 
in urban centers, the male percentage of the population rose slightiy, 



44 



The Society and Its Environment 



to 96 for every 100 women. A small part of this imbalance may 
be attributed to higher male mortality rates, but male labor migra- 
tion is probably a much more important factor. The absence of 
a census or more recent demographic surveys made it impossible 
to determine if the Chadian Civil War had affected the sex ratio. 

In the late 1980s, Chad had a low population density of about 
3.8 people per square kilometer. The population was also very 
unevenly distributed because of contrasts in climate and physical 
environment. The Saharan zone was the least densely populated. 
In 1982 it was estimated to have a population density of 0.15 per 
square kilometer. Most inhabitants of the region lived in its southern 
reaches, south of 16° north latitude. 

The sahelian zone had a population density of seven persons per 
square kilometer in 1971. Within the region, broad spectrums of 
rainfall and environment and the diverse life-styles that accompany 
them have resulted in widely varying population densities, from 
very low among the nomads in the northern regions to much higher 
among the agricultural populations in the south. 

The highest population densities — about thirteen people per 
square kilometer — occurred in the soudanian zone. In 1971 almost 
45 percent of the total Chadian population lived in this region. 

Chad was quite rural. The PRB placed the urban population 
of Africa at 31 percent in 1985, whereas Chad's urban population 
was estimated at only 22 percent. Although the urban population 
remained relatively small, urbanization accelerated in the 1980s. 
Whereas in 1971 only seven centers had more than 10,000 inhabit- 
ants, INS AH estimated that by 1978 nine cities had populations 
of more than 20,000. From a total of 132,502 enumerated in the 
urban census of 1968, N'Djamena's population grew to 150,000 
in 1971, nearly doubling to 280,000 in 1978. Although much of 
the population abandoned the city during the battles of 1979 and 
1980, most people returned over the next several years. In 1983 
the Chadian government predicted that urban growth would con- 
tinue at an annual rate of 7.8 percent for the capital and 4.6 per- 
cent for secondary cities such as Moundou, Sarh, and Abeche. 

Languages and Ethnic Groups 

The people of Chad speak more than 100 different languages 
and divide themselves into many ethnic groups. It is important to 
note, however, that language and ethnicity are not the same. 
Moreover, neither element can be tied to a particular physical type. 
The commonly held image that Africa is populated by discrete eth- 
nic groups (or "tribes") who live isolated from each other, guard- 
ing their languages and customs jealously and intermarrying only 



45 



Chad: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 




400 



300 



200 



100 100 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



200 



300 



400 



Source: Based on information from Chad, Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction, Tchad: 
Relance economique en chiffres, N'Djamena, Chad, 1983, 15. 



Figure 4. Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 1982 

with each other, is a stereotype that hinders understanding of the 
dynamics of African societies. In Chad, European conquest and 
administration intensified feelings of ethnic separateness by draw- 
ing local boundaries along perceived ethnic lines. The Europeans 
also appointed chiefs and other local African authorities who had 
little legitimacy over the groups they were to lead. In general, the 
French favored southerners over northerners and settled popula- 
tions over nomads. This bias continued after independence and 
has been an important element in internecine conflict. 

Although the possession of a common language shows that its 
speakers have lived together and have a common history, peoples 
also change languages. This is particularly so in Chad, where the 
openness of the terrain, marginal rainfall, frequent drought and 
famine, and low population densities have encouraged physical and 
linguistic mobility. Slave raids among non-Muslim peoples, internal 
slave trade, and exports of captives northward from the ninth to 
the twentieth centuries also have resulted in language changes. 

Anthropologists view ethnicity as being more than genetics. Like 
language, ethnicity implies a shared heritage, partly economic, 
where people of the same ethnic group may share a livelihood, and 
partly social, taking the form of shared ways of doing things and 



46 



A seminomadic family of the Daza ethnic group 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray -Lee) 

organizing relations among individuals and groups. Ethnicity also 
involves a cultural component made up of shared values and a com- 
mon worldview. Like language, ethnicity is not immutable. Shared 
ways of doing things change over time and alter a group's percep- 
tion of its own identity. 

Not only do the social aspects of ethnic identity change but the 
biological composition (or gene pool) also may change over time. 
Although most ethnic groups emphasize intermarriage, people are 
often proscribed from seeking partners among close relatives — a 
prohibition that promotes biological variation. In all groups, the 
departure of some individuals or groups and the integration of others 
also changes the biological component. 

The Chadian government has avoided official recognition of eth- 
nicity. With the exception of a few surveys conducted shortly after 
independence, little data were available on this important aspect 
of Chadian society. Nonetheless, ethnic identity was a significant 
component of life in Chad. 

Chad's languages fall into ten major groups, each of which 
belongs to either the Nilo-Saharan, Afro-Asiatic, or Congo- 
Kordofanian language family. These represent three of the four 
major language families in Africa; only the Khoisan languages of 
southern Africa are not represented. The presence of such different 



47 



Chad: A Country Study 

languages suggests that the Lake Chad Basin may have been an 
important point of dispersal in ancient times. 

Nilo-Saharan Languages 

Similarities of language do not imply other congruences. Nilo- 
Saharan language speakers, for example, display a variety of life- 
styles. Nomads in the Sahara, semisedentary and sedentary peoples 
in the Sahel, and sedentary populations in the soudanian zone all 
may speak Nilo-Saharan languages. 

Central Saharan Languages 

The distribution and numbers of Central Saharan language 
speakers probably have changed dramatically since independence. 
The Chadian Civil War and the Chadian- Libyan conflict have dis- 
rupted life in the northern part of the country. Also, the rise to 
power of two heads of state from the far north, Goukouni Oued- 
dei and Hissein Habre, may have inspired the migration of north- 
erners to the national capital and a greater integration of the region 
into the life of the country. 

Teda and Daza are related languages in the Central Saharan 
group. Teda is spoken by the Toubou people of the Tibesti Moun- 
tains and by some inhabitants of nearby oases in northeastern Niger 
and southwestern Libya. Daza speakers live south of the Toubou 
in Borkou Subprefecture and Kanem Prefecture, between the 
Tibesti Mountains and Lake Chad (see fig. 5). 

Despite their shared linguistic heritage, the Toubou and the Daza 
do not think of themselves as belonging to a common group. More- 
over, each is further divided into subgroups identified with particu- 
lar places. Among the Toubou, the Teda of Tibesti are the largest 
subgroup. Daza speakers separate themselves into more than a 
dozen groups. The Kreda of Bahr el Ghazal are the largest. Next 
in importance are the Daza of Kanem. Smaller and more scattered 
subgroups include the Charfarda of Ouaddai; the Kecherda and 
Djagada of Kanem; the Doza, Annakaza, Kokorda, Kamadja, and 
Noarma of Borkou; and the Ounia, Gaeda, and Erdiha of Ennedi. 

About one- third of the Teda are nomads. The remainder, along 
with all of the Daza, are seminomadic, moving from pasture to 
pasture during eight or nine months each year but returning to 
permanent villages during the rains. In general, the Teda herd 
camels and live farther north, where they move from oasis to oasis. 
The Daza often herd camels, but they also raise horses, sheep, and 
goats. Their itineraries take them farther south, where some have 
acquired cattle (whose limited capacity to endure the heat and 
harsh environment of the northern regions has altered patterns of 



48 



The Society and Its Environment 



transhumance). Some cattle owners leave their animals with herders 
in the south when they return north; others choose to remain in 
the south and entrust their other animals to relatives or herders 
who take them north. 

Kanembu is the major language of Lac Prefecture and southern 
Kanem Prefecture. Although Kanuri, which derived from Kanembu, 
was the major language of the Borno Empire, in Chad it is limited 
to handfuls of speakers in urban centers. Kanuri remains a major 
language in southeastern Niger, northeastern Nigeria, and north- 
ern Cameroon. 

In the early 1980s, the Kanembu constituted the greatest part 
of the population of Lac Prefecture, but some Kanembu also lived 
in Chari-Baguirmi Prefecture. Once the core ethnic group of the 
Kanem-Borno Empire, whose territories at one time included north- 
eastern Nigeria and southern Libya, the Kanembu retain ties 
beyond the borders of Chad (see Kanem-Borno, ch. 1). For exam- 
ple, close family and commercial ties bind them with the Kanuri 
of northeastern Nigeria. Within Chad, many Kanembu of Lac and 
Kanem prefectures identify with the Alifa of Mao, the governor 
of the region in precolonial times. 

Baele (also erroneously called Bideyat) is the language of the 
Bideyat of Ennedi Subprefecture and the Zaghawa of Biltine Prefec- 
ture. Despite this similarity, the Zaghawa and the Bideyat exhibit 
diverse life-styles. Some Zaghawa live in a centralized sultanate, 
with a ruling family of Dadjo origin; these Zaghawa are semiseden- 
tary and prominent in local and regional commerce. Other 
Zaghawa, however, living primarily in the south, are nomads. The 
Bideyat also are nomadic. 

Ouaddaian Languages 

The origins of Ouaddaian languages remain obscure, although 
their distribution implies origins farther east, an interpretation sup- 
ported by oral traditions. Speakers of Ouaddaian languages may 
have moved westward to avoid Arab immigration from the east. 
Another theory suggests that speakers of Ouaddaian languages once 
were continuously distributed throughout the region but subse- 
quently lost ground as the population accepted Arabic. 

Although some authorities separate Tama, Dadjo, and Mimi, 
others consider them to be part of a larger Ouaddaian group, a 
linguistic archipelago stretching from western Sudan to central 
Chad. In Chad they are found in Biltine, Ouaddai, and Guera 
prefectures. 

Tama languages are spoken in Biltine and northern Ouaddai 
Prefectures, and include Tama, Marari (Abou Charib), Sungor, 



49 



Chad: A Country Study 



® 


National 
capital 


1 


Arab 




Sara-Bongo- 
Baguirmi 




Chadic 


1/ / 


Ouaddaian 


f= 


Mabang 




urn 


Banda-Ngbaka 






1:: 


Boua 




Moundang- 
Toupouri- 
Mboum 


50 


100 Kilometers 


50 100 Miles 



N 

A 



TEDA 



DAD JO 



N'Djamena 



NOTE- Locations of groups and languages 
are approximate. 



Source: Based on information from Jean Cabot, Atlas Practique du Tchad, Paris, 1972, 
36-37. 



Figure 5. Ethno linguistic Map 
50 



The Society and Its Environment 



Kibet, Mourro, and Dagel. The Tama speakers, who live in eastern 
Biltine Prefecture near the Sudanese border, are the largest of these 
groups. Although they live in the arid Sahel, crop rotation has 
allowed them to settle in permanent villages. The Tama live in 
cantons of several thousand people, each administered by a canton 
chief. For several centuries, central authority has been vested in 
sultans believed to be of Dadjo origin, who are enthroned in ceremo- 
nies at the ruins of Nir, the precolonial capital. 

The Marari and Abou Charib, sedentary peoples sharing a Tama 
language, live south and west, respectively, of the Tama in Ouad- 
dai Prefecture. Although they speak a Tama language, their tra- 
ditions suggest descent from the Tunjur, migrants from Sudan who 
once ruled the sultanate of Wadai (see Bagirmi and Wadai, ch. 1). 
To the west of the Tama and northwest of the Marari and Abou 
Charib are the Sungor, another sedentary population. The Sungor 
consider themselves to be of Yemeni ancestry, a popular and pres- 
tigious Islamic pedigree among Muslims of the region. Despite 
speaking a Tama language, Sungor society and customs most 
resemble those of the Maba. 

The Dadjo language has eastern and western dialects. Once the 
rulers of the sultanate of Wadai, the Dadjo people were separated 
into two groups during the fifteenth century. At that time, the 
Tunjur conquered Wadai, and some Dadjo people fled west. The 
eastern Dadjo remained in southern present-day Ouaddai Prefec- 
ture and, following defeat by the Tunjur, founded a new sultanate 
with its capital at Goz Beida. Their descendants are primarily farm- 
ers. The western Dadjo live among the Hajerai peoples of north- 
ern Guera Prefecture. Cognizant of their common origin, the 
eastern and western groups permit intermarriage. 

Mimi is the least frequently spoken Ouaddaian language. Mimi 
speakers who live in the plains use Arabic to communicate with 
their neighbors; Mimi speakers who live in the mountains gener- 
ally speak Zaghawa with other highland dwellers. 

Mabang Languages 

Mabang languages are concentrated in the highlands of Ouad- 
dai Prefecture, but they are also spoken in Biltine and Salamat 
prefectures. Maba is the major language of the group. Maba speak- 
ers are semisedentary farmers who combine millet cultivation during 
the rainy season with herding during the drier parts of the year. 
For the last several decades, many Maba laborers have migrated 
to Sudan. The core ethnic group of the sultanate of Wadai, the 
Maba played a central role in that state even after conquest by rulers 
from the east in the seventeenth century. Wadai sultans frequently 



51 



Chad: A Country Study 

took Maba women as first wives, and the first dignitary of the court 
usually was also Maba. 

Massalit, another major Mabang language, is spoken by peo- 
ple who live east of the Maba along the Sudan border. Comple- 
mented by a far larger Massalit population in Sudan, the Chadian 
Massalit are farmers who rely on passing animal herds to fertilize 
their fields. 

Massalat speakers are found farther west and are divided into 
two groups, one in eastern Batha near Ouaddai Prefecture, and 
the other in northern Guera Prefecture. Once part of the larger 
Massalit community, the Massalat have diverged from the main 
group. The two languages are sufficiently different that linguists 
classify Massalat in a separate subgroup. In addition, the Mas- 
salat physically and culturally resemble the Dadjo more closely than 
they do their relatives to the east. 

Runga is spoken over a large part of Salamat Prefecture and 
in a small part of Central African Republic. Many Runga speak- 
ers are farmers who grow millet, sorghum, peanuts, and cotton. 
In the nineteenth century, the Runga were ruled by sultans from 
a capital in the Salamat region. Herders of Wadai, the Runga also 
founded Dar al Kuti, the most important precolonial state in north- 
ern Central African Republic. Extensive slave raiding by the 
Sudanese warlord Rabih Fadlallah in the 1890s decimated the 
Runga in Chad; as late as the 1960s, they numbered only about 
12,000. 

Other Mabang languages spoken by much smaller populations 
include Marfa, Karanga, and Kashmere, found in the highlands 
north of Abeche; Koniere, spoken in a small region just east of 
Abeche; and Bakhat, a language of restricted distribution, found 
west of Abeche. 

Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi Languages 

Classified in the Chari-Nile subfamily of the Nilo-Saharan lan- 
guages, Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi languages are scattered from Lake 
Chad to the White Nile in southwestern Sudan. Unlike Central 
Saharan languages, when mapped out they form a patchwork quilt 
rather than a solid band. 

Kouka, Bilala, and Medogo, languages spoken around Lake Fitri 
in southwestern Batha Prefecture, are the northernmost members 
of this subgroup. These languages are mutually comprehensible, 
and the peoples who use them are thought to be descendants of 
the core ethnic groups of the precolonial sultanate of Yao (a state 
founded by the Bulala, who ruled a vast region extending as far 
west as Kanem in the fifteenth century). The Kouka, Bilala, and 



52 



A young woman prepares a meal in a village in Chari-Baguirmi 

Prefecture 
Courtesy Audrey Kizziar 

Medogo populations intermarry and share institutions for the 
mediation of disputes. The groups farm and raise animals, which 
they sometimes entrust to neighboring Arabs. Their similarities 
are so striking that they are sometimes classed together as the 
Lisi. 

Barma is spoken in Chari-Baguirmi Prefecture by the Baguirmi, 
the core population of another precolonial state. Today the Baguirmi 
are concentrated in and around Massenya, a city southeast of 
N'Djamena named for their precolonial capital. The Baguirmi iden- 
tify themselves as either river Barmi or land Barmi. The land Barmi 
farm millet, sorghum, beans, sesame, peanuts, and cotton. The 
river Barmi fish along carefully demarcated stretches of the Chari 
and Bahr Ergig rivers. Arabic loanwords are numerous in Barma, 
a product of the Baguirmi' s adoption of Islam and their interac- 
tion with neighboring Arab pastoralists over a long period of time. 
Long-standing economic ties with the West have also prompted 
the incorporation of a Kanuri commercial vocabulary. 

Kenga, found among the Hajerai in Guera Prefecture, is closely 
related to Barma. Although its speakers are said to have played 
a prominent role in the foundation of the Bagirmi Empire, today 
they resemble their highland neighbors more closely than their more 
distant linguistic relatives. 



53 



Chad: A Country Study 

Sara languages of southern Chad constitute the quilt's largest 
patch, stretching from Logone Occidental Prefecture to eastern 
Moyen-Chari Prefecture. Linguists divide Sara languages into five 
subgroups. Sara languages seem to have drifted into southern Chad 
from the northeast. Eventually, Sara speakers left behind the north- 
ern languages of the group as they made their way to the richer 
hunting grounds and agricultural land south of the Chari River. 
This must have occurred very long ago, however, because the Sara 
languages and those of the northern members of the group are 
mutually unintelligible. Moreover, Sara oral traditions record only 
short-range migrations of Sara speakers in the south, suggesting 
that movement from the north happened earlier. 

Boua 

Boua languages are distributed along the middle Chari River 
in Moyen-Chari Prefecture and in central Guera Prefecture. Like 
the Sara, they are divided into five subgroups: Boua proper, Neil- 
lim, Tounia, Koke, and Fanian or Mana. Only a few thousand 
people speak Boua languages, but it is believed that their ances- 
tors preceded Sara-speaking settlers in the Chari Valley. Several 
centuries ago, all the Boua subgroups may have lived farther north 
in Guera Prefecture. Under pressure from slave raiders along the 
Islamic frontier, some Boua speakers probably migrated southward. 
Although speakers of Boua proper submitted to neighboring slave 
raiders from the Bagirmi Empire, they in turn raided their Neil- 
lim neighbors to the southeast. Similarly, the Neillim attacked the 
Tounia to their southeast. The Tounia sought refuge among the 
Kaba (a Sara subgroup) on the site of the present-day city of Sarh. 

Afro-Asiatic Languages 

Two major Afro-Asiatic language are represented in Chad. 
Chadic languages stretch from the western borders of Nigeria to 
Ouaddai Prefecture, and Arabic- speaking populations are scattered 
throughout the Sahel. 

Chadic Languages 

Most speakers of Chadic languages, including the 20 million 
speakers of Hausa, the major Chadic language, live west of Chad. 
The peculiar east-west distribution of Chadic along the southern 
fringe of the Sahara from western Nigeria to eastern Chad has led 
some experts to suggest that ancestral Chadic languages were spoken 
by peoples living along the southern shores of the Paleochadian 
Sea. The first cluster of languages is closely associated with water — 
the lake, the delta, the Chari and Logone rivers, and their adjacent 



54 



The Society and Its Environment 



floodplains. Water also is important to the economies of most of 
the populations speaking these languages. In the second cluster, 
Chadic speakers are descended from refugee populations who 
perhaps sought shelter in the highlands when the contraction of 
the sea and the increased aridity of the region allowed the penetra- 
tion of more aggressive herding populations. 

Within Chad, the Chadic languages are distributed in two pat- 
terns. The first extends from Lake Chad south along the Chari 
and Logone rivers to Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture. Individual languages 
fall into five groups, arrayed from north to southeast. 

Buduma-Kouri is spoken by two groups of lake people who inter- 
marry despite some social differences. The Buduma, who believe 
that they are the original inhabitants of Lake Chad, live on its north- 
ern islands and shores. In the past, the Buduma spent much of 
their time fishing on lake islands. In recent times, however, their 
economic activities have diversified to include farming and herd- 
ing. Active in commerce between Chad and Nigeria, the Buduma 
raise cattle whose very large and hollow horns serve as flotation 
devices that permit their owners to "herd" them in the lake itself. 
The lake has long protected the Buduma, allowing them to main- 
tain a separate identity. Despite centuries of contact with Islamic 
states around the lake, for example, they maintained their own 
religion until the early twentieth century. 

The Kouri, who speak the same language, live on the shores and 
islands of the southern part of Lake Chad. Devout Muslims, the 
Kouri believe that they are descendants of Muslim migrants from 
Yemen and that they are related to the Kanembu, whose medieval 
empire sponsored the spread of Islam in the region. Kouri eco- 
nomic activities resemble those of the Buduma; however, the 
absence of polders (see Glossary) along this part of the lakeshore 
has led the Kouri to confine farming to small plots around their 
villages. Although they confine their herds to the islands during 
the dry season, they may entrust them to neighboring Kanembu 
for pasturing during the rains. 

Kotoko is spoken along the lower Chari and Logone rivers by 
peoples thought to be descendants of the legendary Sao (see Pre- 
history, ch. 1). Divided into small states with fortified cities as their 
capitals, the Kotoko consider themselves "owners of the land" by 
virtue of their long residence, and other peoples in the region recog- 
nize this claim. For example, neighboring Arabs pay tribute for 
the right to farm and herd. The Kotoko also have a monopoly over 
fishing and water transport. Rights to the waters of the Logone 
and Chari rivers are divided among the cities, each of which has 
a "chief of the waters," whose communications with the water 



55 



Chad: A Country Study 

spirits determine the opening of the fishing season. Non-Kotoko 
must pay for the right to fish. Outnumbered in their own lands 
by Bororo and Arab herders, only about 7,000 Kotoko lived in 
Chad in the late 1960s; three times as many lived across the Logone 
in Cameroon. Strife in Chad — particularly the troubles in 
N'Djamena in 1979 and 1980 — probably has accelerated the 
emigration of the Kotoko from Chad. 

Massa languages, including Massa, Moussey, Marba, and Dari, 
are centered in southern Chari-Baguirmi and Mayo-Kebbi prefec- 
tures. The Massa proper farm, herd, and fish in floodplains of the 
middle Chari. Repeatedly through their history, the Massa suffered 
raids from their Muslim neighbors — the Kanuri of the Borno 
Empire, the Barmi of the Bagirmi Empire, and the Fulani of Cam- 
eroon. The Massa survived these military onslaughts, in part 
because their villages, which crown the hills in the Chari flood- 
plain, afforded protection for much of the year. Having survived 
these threats, in recent years the Massa ironically have adopted 
Muslim dress and have superimposed some features of Fulani 
political structure on their local " chiefs of the lands." The other 
speakers of Massa languages resemble the Massa proper. Estimated 
to number 120,000 in the late 1970s, the largest group among them 
is the Moussey, who live in and around Gounou Gay a in Mayo- 
Kebbi Prefecture. 

The last cluster of Chadic languages in this first distribution 
encompasses Nachere, Lele, Gablai, and Guidar spoken primarily 
in Tandjile Prefecture and with outlying languages that include 
Gabri (in Tandjile Prefecture) and Toumak, Somrai, Ndam, 
Miltou, and Saraoua (in Moyen-Chari Prefecture). This cluster 
of languages forms a transition zone between the Massa and the 
Sara languages. The numbers of speakers of these languages are 
small, probably because their peoples have been absorbed by more 
numerous neighbors through intermarriage or emigration. 

The second Chadic language distribution comprises two clusters. 
The first brings together the languages spoken by the Hajerai, the 
mountain peoples of Guera Prefecture. These peoples are descended 
from refugees from the surrounding plains who sought shelter in 
the mountains when invaded by raiders from neighboring central- 
ized states. Despite the presence of non-Chadic languages (such 
as Kenga, which is part of the Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi group), most 
Hajerai speak Chadic languages, such as Djongor, Dangaleat, 
Bidyo, Mogoum, Sokoro, Barain, and Saba. The Hajerai groups 
share important religious institutions, such as the margai cult of place 
spirits; at the same time, they maintain separate identities and refuse 
to intermarry (see Classical African Religions, this ch.). All have 



56 



The Society and Its Environment 

traditions of fierce independence. The Hajerai were among the earli- 
est supporters of rebellion against the Chadian national govern- 
ment in the 1960s. 

Moubi languages of Ouaddai Prefecture make up the second 
cluster of this second distribution of Chadic languages. The Moubi 
are a sedentary people who live south of the Massalit. They grow 
millet, sorghum, sesame, beans, cotton, and peanuts. In recent 
years, they have also adopted cattle herding, a practice borrowed 
from the Missiriye Arab herders who regularly cross their lands 
and with whom the Moubi have long exchanged goods and ser- 
vices. Like the Hajerai, the Moubi have resisted the government 
since shortly after independence. 

Arabic 

There are about thirty different dialects of Arabic in Chad. The 
Arabs divide themselves into three major "tribes": the Juhayna, 
the Hassuna, and the Awlad Sulayman. In this context, tribe refers 
to a group claiming descent from a common ancestor. The Juhayna, 
who began arriving from Sudan in the fourteenth century, are by 
far the most important. The Hassuna, who migrated to Chad from 
Libya, live in Kanem Prefecture. The Awlad Sulayman also hail 
from Libya, but they arrived in the nineteenth century, well after 
the others. Most of the Arabs are herders or farmers. 

Among Arabic herdsmen, life-styles vary considerably. The dif- 
ferent needs of camels, cattle, goats, and sheep result in different 
patterns of setdement and movement. In addition to herding, many 
Arabic speakers earn their livelihoods as small and middle-level 
merchants. In N'Djamena and in towns such as Sarh and 
Moundou, Arabic speakers dominated local commerce up until the 
1970s; however, because of the anti-Muslim violence in the south 
in the late 1970s, many moved to central or nothern Chad. 

Despite the diversity of dialects and the scattered distribution 
of Arabic-speaking populations, the language has had a major 
impact on Chad. In the Sahel, Arab herdsmen and their wives fre- 
quent local markets to exchange their animals, butter, and milk 
for agricultural products, cloth, and crafts. Itinerant Arab traders 
and settled merchants in the towns play major roles in local and 
regional economies. As a result, Chadian Arabic (or Turku) has 
became a lingua franca, or trade language. Arabic also has been 
important because it is the language of Islam and of the Quran, 
its holy book. Quranic education has stimulated the spread of the 
language and enhanced its stature among the non-Arab Muslims 
of Chad. 



57 



Chad: A Country Study 



Not all Arabic speakers are of Arab descent. The assimilation 
of local peoples (both free and slave) into Arabic groups has affected 
both the dialects and the customs of Arabic speakers in Chad. Non- 
Arabs also have adopted the language. To cite two examples, the 
Yalna and the Bandala are of Hajerai and Ouaddaian origin, respec- 
tively, and were probably originally slaves who adopted the Arabic 
language of their masters. Among the Runga, who were not slaves, 
Arabic is also widely spoken. 

Congo-Kordofanian Languages 

Moundang- Toupouri-Mboum 

Classified as belonging to the Niger-Congo subfamily of the 
Congo-Kordofanian family, languages in the Moundang-Toupouri- 
Mboum groups are spoken by a variety of populations in Mayo- 
Kebbi and Logone Oriental prefectures. These languages may be 
divided into seven subgroups: Moundang, Toupouri, Mboum/ 
Laka, Kera, Mongbai, Kim, and Mesme. Speakers of Moundang, 
Toupouri, and Mboum/Laka are by far the most numerous of this 
group. Despite belonging to the same language group, these three 
populations have very different social structures, life-styles, and 
myths of origin. 

Moundang is spoken by more than 100,000 people in Mayo- 
Kebbi Prefecture; numerous Moundang speakers also live in 
Cameroon. The Moundang people raise millet for food and cot- 
ton for sale. They also own cattle, which are used for marriage 
payments, religious sacrifices, and payment of fines. Bororo herd- 
ers live in the same region and often take care of Moundang 
livestock. 

On the broadest level, the Moundang still belong to a kingdom 
founded two centuries ago. Although the French colonial adminis- 
tration and the independent Chadian governments undermined the 
military power of the gon lere (king), he continued to wield influence 
in the 1980s from his capital at Lere. On a smaller scale, clan 
institutions remain important. Associated with particular territor- 
ies, taboos, totem animals, and marriage rules, clan government, 
which predates the kingdom, is much less centralized. In some 
respects, the two sets of institutions act as checks on each other. 
For example, the clans allow the king to organize manhood initia- 
tion ceremonies, central to the maintenance of Moundang identity; 
however, the councils of elders of each clan may offer advice to 
the ruler. 

In the nineteenth century, the Moundang suffered frequent attacks 
by Fulani invaders from the west. They were never subjugated, 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 



but the close contact has resulted in the adoption of Fulani princi- 
ples of political organization and dress. 

Mboum/Laka speakers live in southern Logone Oriental Prefec- 
ture. About 100,000 Mboum/Laka speakers lived in Chad in the 
1980s; a larger population lived across the border in Cameroon 
and Central African Republic. Sedentary farmers, the Mboum and 
the Laka probably were pushed east and south by the expansion 
of the Fulani over the past two centuries. 

The Toupouri language and people are found in Mayo-Kebbi 
Prefecture around the town of Fianga. Almost all of their land is 
cultivated, and productivity is enhanced by the use of animal fer- 
tilizer and double cropping. During the rainy season, the Toupouri 
raise sorghum. Berebere, a kind of millet, is grown in the drier part 
of the year. Cattle and fish provide additional food resources. Num- 
bering about 100,000, the Toupouri live in the most densely popu- 
lated part of Chad; some cantons reach densities of twelve people 
per square kilometer. Overcrowding has promoted emigration, 
primarily to N'Djamena and Nigeria. 

Fulani 

Fulani speakers are not very numerous in Chad. Part of the West 
Atlantic subfamily of the Congo-Kordofanian family of languages, 
Fulani (called Peul by the French) first appeared in the Senegal 
River Valley in West Africa. Population growth and the vagaries 
of climate encouraged the eastward drift of Fulani-speaking herd- 
ers through the Sahel. Some Fulani speakers adopted Islam and 
became very important actors in the spread of the religion and the 
rise of Muslim states west of Chad. Many of these people settled, 
taking up village or urban life and abandoning nomadism. Other 
Fulani speakers, however, remained loyal to their pre-Islamic faith 
and their nomadic life- style. 

Fulani speakers arrived in Chad only in the past two centuries. 
In the mid-1960s, about 32,000 Fulani lived in Kanem, southern 
Batha, and northern Chari-Baguirmi prefectures, where they raised 
mainly catde and sheep. Many of the Fulani are fervent Muslims, 
and some are teachers of the Quran. 

Related to the Fulani ethnically and linguistically — but refus- 
ing contact — are the nomadic Bororo of western Chad. In the dry 
season, the Bororo pasture their animals around wells and pools 
in northern Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture near Bongor. After the first 
major rains, they leave for Kanem Prefecture, north of Lake Chad. 

Banda -Ngbaka 

Also members of the Niger-Congo subfamily of the Congo- 



59 



Chad: A Country Study 



Kordofanian languages, Banda-Ngbaka languages are located in 
Guera, Salamat, and Moyen-Chari prefectures. Subgroups include 
Sango, Bolgo, Goula, and Goula Iro. Although not spoken as a 
first language in Chad, Sango has been particularly important 
because it served as a trade language during the colonial era. 
Although most Banda-Ngbaka languages are found farther south 
in Central African Republic, the presence of these subgroups in 
Chad suggests that Banda-Ngbaka speakers were once much more 
numerous in Chad. Bolgo, found with Hajerai and Goula languages 
in the vicinity of Lake Iro and Lake Mamoun, is spoken by refu- 
gee populations. Populations speaking these languages are very 
diverse. Although the Goula speak a Banda-Ngbaka language, for 
example, their culture resembles that of the Sara. 

Social Structure 

The variety and number of languages in Chad are mirrored by 
the country's diversity of social structures. The colonial adminis- 
tration and independent governments have attempted to impose 
a "national" society on the citizenry, but for most Chadians the 
local or regional society remains the most important reference point 
outside the immediate family. 

This diversity of social structure has several dimensions. For 
example, some social structures are small in scale, while others are 
huge. Among the Toubou and the Daza, some clans group only 
a hundred individuals. At the other extreme are the kingdoms and 
sultanates — found among the peoples of Ouaddai Prefecture, the 
Moundang of Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture, the Barmi of Chari- 
Baguirmi Prefecture, and the Kanembu of Kanem Prefecture, 
among others — which bring together thousands or even tens of thou- 
sands of people. Although these social units have enjoyed only 
limited formal legal recognition since the colonial epoch, they 
remain important institutions whose authority is recognized by their 
people. 

Chadian social structures also differ in the way they locate peo- 
ple in their physical environment. Despite a sense of territory, even 
among such highly mobile peoples as the Toubou and Daza, the 
bond between an individual clan and its land is less specific than 
the link between the inhabitants of a densely settled farming vil- 
lage and its fields. 

Diverse social structures foster variety in the relationships among 
members of a group and between people and their territory. 
Whereas a Toubou or a Daza is aware of her or his clan identity, 
she or he often lives as an individual among people of other clans. 
Among seminomadic Arabs of the Sahel, people identify most 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



closely with the kashimbet, or "threshold of the house," a residen- 
tial unit made up of an elder male or group of males, their wives, 
and descendants. Although the kashimbet does not preclude mobility, 
people reside most of the time with their kin. 

These three diversities — scale, relationships with the environ- 
ment, and social links among group members — are highly condi- 
tioned by the environment and the way the society exploits it. 
Accordingly, the three major patterns of social structure correspond 
closely with the three major geographical regions of the country 
(see Physical Setting, this ch.). 

The remainder of this section examines a representative society 
from each region: the Toubou and Daza nomads of the Sahara, 
the Arab semisedentary herders of the sahelian zone, and the Sara 
farmers of the soudanian region. 

Toubou and Daza: Nomads of the Sahara 

Toubou and Daza life centers on their livestock (their major 
source of wealth and sustenance) and on the scattered oases where 
they or their herders cultivate dates and grain. In a few places, 
the Toubou and Daza (or more often members of the Haddad group 
who work for them) also mine salt and natron, a salt like substance 
used for medicinal purposes and for livestock (see Mining, ch. 3). 

The Toubou family is made up of parents, children, and another 
relative or two. Although the husband or father is the head of the 
household, he rarely makes decisions without consulting his wife. 
When he is absent, his wife often takes complete charge, moving 
family tents, changing pastures, and buying and selling cattle. 
Although Toubou men may have several wives, few do. Families 
gather in larger camps during the months of transhumance. Camp 
membership is fluid, sometimes changing during the season and 
almost never remaining the same from one season to the next. 

After the family, the clan is the most stable Toubou institution. 
Individuals identify with their clan, which has a reputed founder, 
a name, a symbol, and associated taboos. Clans enjoy collective 
priority use of certain palm groves, cultivable land, springs, and 
pastures; outsiders may not use these resources without clan per- 
mission. Social relations are based on reciprocity, hospitality, and 
assistance. Theft and murder within the clan are forbidden, and 
stolen animals must be returned. 

Within the overall context of clan identity, however, Toubou 
and Daza society is shaped by the individual. Jean Chapelle, a well- 
known observer of Chadian societies, notes that "it is not society 
that forms the individual, but the individual who constructs the 
society most useful" for him or her. Three features of Toubou 



61 



Chad: A Country Study 



social structure make this process possible. The first is residence. 
In general, clan members are scattered throughout a region; there- 
fore, an individual is likely to find hospitable clans people in most 
settiements or camps of any size. A second factor is the maintenance 
of ties with the maternal clan. Although the maternal clan does 
not occupy the central place of the paternal clan, it provides another 
universe of potential ties. 

Marriage creates a third set of individual options. Although rela- 
tives and the immediate family influence decisions about a mar- 
riage partner, individual preference is recognized as important. 
In addition, once a marriage is contracted between individuals of 
two clans, other clan members are forbidden to change it. The 
Toubou proscribe marriage with any blood relative less than four 
generations removed — in the words of the Toubou recorded by 
Chapelle, "when there are only three grandfathers." 

The ownership of land, animals, and resources takes several 
forms. Within an oasis or settled zone belonging to a particular 
clan, land, trees (usually date palms), and nearby wells may have 
different owners. Each family's rights to the use of particular plots 
of land are recognized by other clan members. Families also may 
have privileged access to certain wells and the right to a part of 
the harvest from the fields irrigated by their water. Within the clan 
and family contexts, individuals also may have personal claims to 
palm trees and animals. Toubou legal customs are based on resti- 
tution, indemnification, and revenge. Conflicts are resolved in 
several settings. Murder, for example, is settled directiy between 
the families of the victim and the murderer. Toubou honor requires 
that someone from the victim's family try to kill the murderer or 
a relative; such efforts eventually end with negotiations to settle 
the matter. Reconciliation follows the payment of the goroga, or 
blood price, usually in the form of camels. 

Despite shared linguistic heritage, few institutions among the 
Toubou and the Daza generate a broader sense of identity than 
the clan. Regional divisions do exist, however. Among the Toubou, 
there are four such subgroups, the Teda of Tibesti Subprefecture 
being the largest. There are more than a dozen subgroups of Daza: 
the Kreda of Bahr el Ghazal are the largest; next in importance 
are the Daza of Kanem Prefecture. During the colonial period (and 
since independence), Chadian administrations have conferred 
legality and legitimacy on these regional groupings by dividing the 
Toubou and Daza regions into corresponding territorial units called 
cantons and appointing chiefs to administer them (see Regional 
Government, ch. 4). 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



Only among the Toubou of the Tibesti region have institutions 
evolved somewhat differently. Since the end of the sixteenth cen- 
tury, the derde (spiritual head) of the Tomagra clan has exercised 
authority over part of the massif and the other clans who live there. 
He is selected by a group of electors according to strict rules. The 
derde exercises judicial rather than executive power, arbitrating con- 
flict and levying sanctions based on a code of compensations. 

Since the beginning of the civil conflict in Chad, the derde has 
come to occupy a more important position. In 1965 the Chadian 
government assumed direct authority over the Tibesti Mountains, 
sending a military garrison and administrators to Bardai, the capi- 
tal of Tibesti Subprefecture. Within a year, abuses of authority 
had roused considerable opposition among the Toubou (see Tom- 
balbaye's Governance: Policies and Methods, ch. 1). The derde, 
Oueddei Kichidemi, recognized but little respected up to that time, 
protested the excesses, went into exile in Libya, and, with the sup- 
port of Toubou students at the Islamic University of Al Bayda, 
became a symbol of opposition to the Chadian government. This 
role enhanced the position of the derde among the Toubou. After 
1967 the derde hoped to rally the Toubou to the National Libera- 
tion Front of Chad (Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad — 
FROLINAT). Moral authority became military authority shortly 
thereafter when his son, Goukouni Oueddei, became one of the 
leaders of the Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT. Goukouni 
has since become a national figure; he played an important role 
in the battles of N'Djamena in 1979 and 1980 and served as head 
of state for a time. Another northerner, Hissein Habre of the Daza 
Annakaza, replaced Goukouni in 1982. 

Arabs: Semisedentary Peoples of the Sahel 

The Arabs of Chad are semisedentary (or seminomadic) peo- 
ples who herd their camels, horses, cattle, goats, and sheep on the 
plains of the Sahel. Except in the extreme north, they live among 
sedentary peoples, and in the region around N'Djamena some 
Arabs have adopted a more setded existence. In the rainy season, 
Arab groups spread out through the region; in the dry season, they 
live a more settled existence, usually on the dormant agricultural 
lands of their sedentary neighbors. They leave the far north to the 
Toubou, avoid the mountains of Ouaddai and Guera prefectures, 
and move south of 10° north latitude only in times of extreme 
drought. 

The Arabs were not state builders in Chad, a role played instead 
by the Maba in Wadai, the Barma in Bagirmi, and the Kanembu 
in Kanem-Borno (see Era of Empires, A.D. 900-1900, ch. 1). The 



63 



Chad: A Country Study 



Arabs exercised great influence over all three empires, however, 
either by conquest (in the case of Wadai) or by converting their 
rulers to Islam (in the cases of Bagirmi and Kanem). As with 
nomads and seminomads elsewhere, the possession of camels and 
horses translated into military potential that commanded the respect 
of the settied states. For example, the Awlad Sulayman of Kanem, 
despite their small numbers, gained fame and fortune during the 
second half of the nineteenth century by playing the increasingly 
aggressive empire of Wadai against weaker Kanem-Borno. In the 
decade after 1900, they used the same tactic to enhance and enrich 
themselves at the expense of the French and the Sanusiyya, a Mus- 
lim religious order of Libyan origin with political and economic 
interests in the Lake Chad Basin. 

Chadian Arabs are divided into three "tribes": the Juhayna, 
the Hassuna, and the Awlad Sulayman. Members of each tribe 
believe themselves to be descended from a common ancestor. 
Among the smaller social units, belief in a shared genealogy (rather 
than common residence or a common faith) provides a major ideo- 
logical rationale for joint action. 

As is true for the Toubou, the basic Arab social unit is the kashim- 
bet, 2l minimal lineage made up of several generations of men, their 
wives, and children or grandchildren reckoned through the male 
line. Members of the same kashimbet live near each other and more 
or less follow the same route during migration. Each kashimbet is 
headed by an elder male, or shaykh. This aspect of the social struc- 
ture is visible in the disposition of tents (or houses among the more 
sedentary Arabs of N'Djamena). The residence of the shaykh is 
often at the center of the camp or settlement, with the woven straw 
tents or adobe houses of his relatives arrayed around it in concen- 
tric circles. The area is surrounded by a fence or some other bound- 
ary that defines the zariba, or walled camp. Within the kashimbet, 
loyalty is generally intense, institutionalized relationships being rein- 
forced by bonds of common residence and personal acquaintance. 

Kinship bonds also provide the ideological basis for broader units. 
Led by the head of the senior lineage, who is more a "first among 
equals" than a chief, the shaykhs of neighboring kashimbets some- 
times meet to decide matters of common interest, such as the date 
of the annual migration. The shaykhs' leader, or lawan, may also 
deal with outsiders on their behalf. He concludes contracts with 
farmers to allow Arabs to pass the dry season on agricultural lands 
and levies tribute on strangers who wish to use the group's pastures 
and wells. 

Unlike what is found in Toubou society, marriage among the 
Arabs strengthens kinship ties. First, marriage is more a family 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



than an individual concern; senior males from each family make 
initial contacts and eventually negotiate the marriage contract. An 
ideal union reinforces the social, moral, and material position of 
the group. Second, parallel cousin marriage (that is, union between 
the children of brothers or male relatives more removed), is 
preferred. This custom encourages the duplication of bonds within 
the group rather than the creation of a far-flung network of more 
tenuous, individual alliances, as occurs among the Toubou. Finally, 
the marriage ceremony is itself a community affair. Among the 
Toubou, marriage is associated with the feigned "stealing" of the 
bride from her family, whose members respond with grief and 
anger, but marriage among the Arabs is an expression of solidarity. 
The ceremony is celebrated by a faqih (Muslim religious leader), 
and a joyous procession of neighbors, relatives, and friends escorts 
the bride to the house of her husband. 

Despite their wide distribution and numerous contacts with 
sedentary peoples, Arabs have never played a preponderant role 
in Chadian affairs. During the colonial period, they resisted the 
French, who attempted to impose a territorially defined adminis- 
tration but who ultimately governed through the Arabs' kin-based 
social structures. This inability of the colonial authorities to pene- 
trate and change Arab social and political institutions allowed the 
Arabs to resist Western education and employment in the emerg- 
ing capitalist economy. Their pastoral life-style also saved them 
from the forced cultivation of commercial crops that so disrupted 
the societies of their sedentary neighbors. 

Since independence the Arabs have remained on the margins 
of Chadian national life. The government, dominated by southern- 
ers, suspected the Arabs of a major role in the civil strife of the 
late 1960s. In the Sahel, however, settled non-Arab peoples (such 
as the Moubi and Hajerai of Guera Prefecture) have played a much 
more important role in resisting central power. Although it is true 
that the Arabs have opposed the government at times, they also 
have rallied to it. Such a pattern suggests that the Arabs have fol- 
lowed their time-honored prescription of keeping the state off 
balance to ensure maximum freedom of action. 

Sara: Sedentary Peoples of the Soudanian Zone 

The essential social unit of Sara society is the lineage. Called 
the qir ka among the eastern Sara, qin ka among those of the center, 
and qel ka among the western subgroups, the term actually refers 
to the male ancestor from whom members of the lineage believe 
they descend. Within the context of the qir ka, an individual iden- 
tifies patrilineally. Legal identity and rights to land are determined 



65 



Chad: A Country Study 

by membership in the patrilineage. The mother's lineage, however, 
is not disregarded; it may offer shelter and support, when the 
individual is cut off from the paternal lineage, or benefit from cer- 
tain kinds of labor obligations. 

Although the basic social group is the lineage, the basic residen- 
tial unit is the village. In general, local government takes two forms. 
If the villagers all belong to the same lineage, the village is governed 
by lineage institutions whereby the elders make important deci- 
sions, preside over important cultural rites (such as manhood initia- 
tion), and play an important role in agricultural rituals. If villagers 
are divided among several lineages, however, elders from the differ- 
ent groups may meet together to resolve common problems. In 
such encounters, elders of the lineage that first settled the territory 
preside as "first among equals." 

During the colonial era, the French superimposed a territorially 
based administration over precolonial Sara social and political 
institutions. On the local level, this took the form of the canton 
(or county). The canton was headed by a chief named by the cen- 
tral government, who in turn named "village chiefs." Although 
candidates for such positions existed among the traditional Sara 
authorities, the French generally preferred to appoint collabora- 
tors who had no independent base of support. Apart from creat- 
ing new political structures, the French also sought to reorganize 
Sara society spatially. They forced people to regroup in more com- 
pact villages along roads, causing lineages to abandon traditional 
lands. Despite considerable initial resistance, the colonial adminis- 
tration eventually succeeded in imposing these new settlement pat- 
terns and new chiefs, thus undermining Sara political and social 
structures. Since independence, efforts by the Chadian government 
to centralize authority have continued. Nonetheless, Sara institu- 
tions have retained influence, and the Sara have added new struc- 
tures to reinforce Sara solidarity. 

Religion 

The separation of religion from social structure in Chad 
represents a false dichotomy, for they are perceived as two sides 
of the same coin. Three religious traditions coexist in Chad — 
classical African religions, Islam, and Christianity. None is 
monolithic. The first tradition includes a variety of ancestor and/or 
place-oriented religions whose expression is highly specific. Islam, 
although characterized by an orthodox set of beliefs and obser- 
vances, also is expressed in diverse ways. Christianity arrived in 
Chad much more recently with the arrival of Europeans. Its fol- 
lowers are divided into Roman Catholics and Protestants (including 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



several denominations); as with Chadian Islam, Chadian Chris- 
tianity retains aspects of pre-Christian religious belief. 

The number of followers of each tradition in Chad is unknown. 
Estimates made in 1962 suggested that 35 percent of Chadians prac- 
ticed classical African religions, 55 percent were Muslims, and 
10 percent were Christians. In the 1970s and 1980s, this distribu- 
tion undoubtedly changed. Observers report that Islam has spread 
among the Hajerai and among other non-Muslim populations of 
the Saharan and sahelian zones. However, the proportion of Mus- 
lims may have fallen because the birthrate among the followers of 
classical religions and Christians in southern Chad is thought to 
be higher than that among Muslims. In addition, the upheavals 
since the mid-1970s have resulted in the departure of some mis- 
sionaries; whether or not Chadian Christians have been numer- 
ous enough and organized enough to have attracted more converts 
since that time is unknown. 

Classical African Religions 

Classical African religions regard the world as a product of a 
complex system of relationships among people, living and dead, 
and animals, plants, and natural and supernatural phenomena. 
This religious tradition is often called "animism" because of its 
central premise that all things are "animated" by life forces. The 
relationships among all things are ordered and often hierarchical. 
Human societies reflect this order, and human survival and suc- 
cess require that it be maintained. Antisocial acts or bad luck sig- 
nal that this harmony has been upset, leading to efforts to restore 
it through ritual acts, such as prayers, sacrifices, libations, com- 
munions, dances, and symbolic struggles. Such intervention, it is 
believed, helps ward off the chaos that adversely affects people and 
their souls, families and communities, and crops and harvests. 

Ancestors play an important role in Chadian classical religions. 
They are thought to span the gap between the supernatural and 
natural worlds. They connect these two worlds specifically by linking 
living lineage members with their earliest forebears. Because of their 
proximity, and because they once walked among the living, ances- 
tors are prone to intervene in daily affairs. This intervention is par- 
ticularly likely in the case of the recentiy deceased, who are thought 
to spend weeks or months in limbo between the living and the dead. 
Many religious observances include special rituals to propitiate these 
spirits, encourage them to take their leave with serenity, and restore 
the social order their deaths have disrupted. 

Spirits are also numerous. These invisible beings inhabit a parallel 
world and sometimes reside in particular places or are associated 



67 



Chad: A Country Study 



with particular natural phenomena. Among the Mbaye, a Sara sub- 
group, water and lightning spirits are thought to bring violent death 
and influence other spirits to intervene in daily life. The sun spirit, 
capable of rendering service or causing harm, also must be propiti- 
ated. Spirits may live in family groups with spouses and children. 
They are also capable of taking human, animal, or plant forms 
when they appear among the living. 

The supernatural powers that control natural events are also of 
major concern. Among farming peoples, rituals to propitiate such 
powers are associated with the beginning and end of the agricul- 
tural cycle. Among the Sara, the new year begins with the appear- 
ance of the first new moon following the harvest. The next day, 
people hunt with nets and fire, offering the catch to ancestors. 
Libations are offered to ancestors, and the first meal from the new 
harvest is consumed. 

Among the more centralized societies of Chad, the ruler fre- 
quently is associated with divine power. Poised at the apex of soci- 
ety, he or (more rarely) she is responsible for good relations with 
the supernatural forces that sanction and maintain the social order. 
For example, among the Moundang, the gon lere of Lere is respon- 
sible for relations with the sky spirits. And among the Sara Madjin- 
gay, the mbang (chief) of the village of Bedaya controls religious 
rituals that preserve and renew the social order. Even after the com- 
ing of Islam, the symbols of such authority reinforced the rulers 
of nominally Islamic states such as Wadai, Kanem-Borno, and 
Bagirmi. 

Finally, most classical African religions involve belief in a 
supreme being who created the world and its inhabitants but who 
then retired from active intervention in human affairs. As a result, 
shrines to a high god are uncommon, and people tend to appeal 
to the lesser spirits; yet the notion of a supreme being may have 
helped the spread of Christianity. When missionaries arrived in 
southern Chad, they often used the local name of this high god 
to refer to the Christian supreme being. Thus, although a much 
more interventionist spirit, the Christian god was recognizable to 
the people. This recognition probably facilitated conversion, but 
it may also have ironically encouraged syncretism (the mixing of 
religious traditions), a practice disturbing to many missionaries and 
to Protestants in particular. Followers of classical African religions 
would probably not perceive any necessary contradiction between 
accepting the Christian god and continuing to believe in the spirits 
just described. 

Because order is thought to be the natural, desirable state, 
disorder is not happenstance. Classical African religions devote 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



considerable energy to the maintenance of order and the determi- 
nation of who or what is responsible for disorder. In the case of 
illness, for example, it is of the greatest importance to ascertain 
which spirit or which person is responsible for undermining the 
natural order; only then is it possible to prescribe a remedy. In 
such circumstances, people frequently take their cases to ritual 
specialists, who divine the threats to harmony and recommend 
appropriate action. Such specialists share their knowledge only with 
peers. Indeed, they themselves have probably acquired such 
knowledge incrementally as they made their way through elaborate 
apprenticeships. 

Although classical African religions provide institutionalized ways 
of maintaining or restoring community solidarity, they also allow 
individuals to influence the cosmic order to advance their own inter- 
ests. Magic and sorcery both serve this end. From society's stand- 
point, magic is positive or neutral. On the one hand, magicians 
try to influence life forces to alter the physical world, perhaps to 
bring good fortune or a return to health. Sorcerers, on the other 
hand, are antisocial, using sorcery (or ' 'black magic") to control 
or consume the vital force of others. Unlike magicians, whose iden- 
tity is generally known, sorcerers hide their supernatural powers, 
practicing their nefarious rites in secret. When misfortune occurs, 
people often suspect that sorcery is at the root of their troubles. 
They seek counsel from diviners or magicians to identify the respon- 
sible party and ways to rectify the situation; if the disruption is 
deemed to threaten everyone, leaders may act on behalf of the com- 
munity at large. If discovered, sorcerers are punished. 

The survival of any society requires that knowledge be passed 
from one generation to another. In many Chadian societies, this 
transmission is marked by ritual. Knowledge of the world and its 
forces is limited to adults; among the predominantly patrilineal 
societies of Chad, it is further limited to men in particular. Rituals 
often mark the transition from childhood to adulthood. However, 
they actively "transform" children into adults, teaching them what 
adults must know to assume societal responsibilities. 

Although such rites differ among societies, the Sarajw/zfifo may 
serve as a model of male initiation ceremonies found in Chad. The 
yondo takes place at a limited number of sites every six or seven 
years. Boys from different villages, usually accompanied by an elder, 
gather for the rites, which, before the advent of Western educa- 
tion with its nine-month academic calendar, lasted several months. 
In recent decades, the yondo has been limited to several weeks 
between academic years. 



69 



Chad: A Country Study 

The yondo and its counterparts among other Chadian societies 
reinforce male bonds and m%e authority. Women are not allowed 
to witness the rite. Their initiated sons and brothers no longer eat 
with them and go to live in separate houses. Although rites also 
mark the transition to womanhood in many Chadian societies, such 
ceremonies are much shorter. Rather than encouraging girls to par- 
ticipate in the larger society, they stress household responsibilities 
and deference to male authority. 

Islam 

Tenets of Islam 

"Islam" means submission to the will of God, and a Muslim 
is one who submits. In A.D. 610, Muhammad, an Arabian mer- 
chant of Mecca, revealed the first in a series of revelations granted 
him by God (Allah, in Arabic) through the archangel Gabriel. Later 
known simply as the Prophet, Muhammad denounced the poly- 
theism of his fellow Meccans and preached a new order that would 
reinforce community solidarity. His censure of the emerging indi- 
vidualistic, mercantile society in Mecca eventually provoked a split 
in the community. In A.D. 622, Muhammad and his followers fled 
northwest to Yathrib, a settlement that has since come to be known 
simply as Medina, or "the city." This journey (called the hijra, 
or the flight) marks the beginning of the Islamic Era. The Muslim 
lunar calendar begins with this event, so that its year 1 corresponds 
to A.D. 622. (However, the solar and Muslim calendars are sepa- 
rated by more than 622 years; a lunar year has an average of 354 
days and thus is considerably shorter than the 365-day solar year.) 
In Medina, the Prophet continued his preaching. Eventually defeat- 
ing his detractors in battle, Muhammad became the temporal and 
spiritual leader of most of Arabia by the time of his death in 
A.D. 632. 

In the decades after his death, Muhammad's followers collected 
his revelations into a single book of recitations called the Quran. 
During the same period, some of his close associates collected and 
codified the Prophet's sayings, as well as accounts of his behavior, 
to serve as guides for future generations. These compilations are 
called the hadith, or "sayings," which, along with the Quran, are 
central to Islamic jurisprudence. 

The shahada (or profession of faith) states the central belief of 
Islam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his 
Prophet." This simple testimony is repeated on many ritual occa- 
sions. When recited with conviction, it signals conversion. 



70 



Muslim children at a Quranic school 
Courtesy United Nations 

The duties of a Muslim form the five pillars of the faith. These 
are recitation of the shahada, daily prayer (salat), almsgiving (zakat), 
fasting (sawm), and, if possible, making the pilgrimage to Mecca 
(hajj). 

Islam in Chad 

Islam became a dynamic political and military force in the Middle 
East in the decades immediately following Muhammad's death. 
By the late seventh century A.D. , Muslim conquerors had reached 
North Africa and moved south into the desert. Although it is difficult 
to date the arrival and spread of Islam in Chad, by the time Arab 
migrants began arriving from the east in the fourteenth century, 
the faith was already widespread. Instead of being the product of 
conquest or the imposition of political power, Islamization in Chad 
was gradual, the effect of the slow spread of Islamic civilization 
beyond its political frontiers. 

Islam in Chad has adapted to its local context in many ways. 
For one thing, despite the presence of a large number of Arabs, 
Arabic is not the maternal language of the majority of Chadian 
Muslims. As a result, although many Chadian Muslims have 
attended Quranic schools, they often have learned to recite Quranic 
verses without understanding their meaning. Hence, perhaps even 
more than among those who understand Arabic, the recitation of 



71 



Chad: A Country Study 

verse has taken on a mystical character among Chadian Muslims. 
Islam in Chad also is syncretic. Chadian Muslims have retained 
and combined pre-Islamic with Islamic rituals and beliefs. More- 
over, Islam in Chad was not particularly influenced by the great 
mystical movements of the Islamic Middle Ages or the fundamen- 
talist upheavals that affected the faith in the Middle East, West 
Africa, and Sudan. Beginning in the Middle East in the thirteenth 
century, Muslim mystics sought to complement the intellectual com- 
prehension of Islam with direct religious experience through prayer, 
contemplation, and action. The followers of these mystics founded 
brotherhoods (turuq; sing., tariqa), which institutionalized their 
teachers' interpretations of the faith. Such organizations stimulated 
the spread of Islam and also provided opportunities for joint action, 
for the most part, which was not the case in Chad, where only two 
brotherhoods exist. Perhaps as a result of prolonged contact with 
West African Muslim traders and pilgrims, most Chadian Mus- 
lims identify with the Tijaniyya order, but the brotherhood has 
not served as a rallying point for unified action. Similarly, the 
Sanusiyya, a brotherhood founded in Libya in the mid-nineteenth 
century, enjoyed substantial economic and political influence in 
the Lake Chad Basin around 1900. Despite French fears of an 
Islamic revival movement led by "Sanusi fanatics," Chadian 
adherents, limited to the Awlad Sulayman Arabs and the Toubou 
of eastern Tibesti, have never been numerous. 

Chapelle writes that even though Chadian Islam adheres to the 
Maliki legal school (which, like the other three accepted schools 
of Islamic jurisprudence, is based on an extensive legal literature), 
most Islamic education relies solely on the Quran. Higher Islamic 
education in Chad is all but nonexistent; thus, serious Islamic stu- 
dents and scholars must go abroad. Popular destinations include 
Khartoum and Cairo, where numerous Chadians attend Al Azhar, 
the most renowned university in the Islamic world. 

Chadian observance of the five pillars of the faith differs some- 
what from the orthodox tradition. For example, public and com- 
munal prayer occurs more often than the prescribed one time each 
week but often does not take place in a mosque. Moreover, Chadian 
Muslims probably make the pilgrimage less often than, for exam- 
ple, their Hausa counterparts in northern Nigeria. As for the 
Ramadan fast, the most fervent Muslims in Chad refuse to swal- 
low their saliva during the day, a particularly stern interpretation 
of the injunction against eating or drinking between sunrise and 
sunset. 

Finally, Chadian Islam is not particularly militant. Even if young 
Muslims in urban areas are aware of happenings in other parts 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 

of the Islamic world, they have not responded to fundamentalist 
appeals. 

Christianity 

Christianity arrived in Chad in the twentieth century, shortly 
after the colonial conquest. Contrary to the dominant pattern in 
some other parts of Africa, however, where the colonial powers 
encouraged the spread of the faith, the earliest French officials in 
Chad advised against it. This recommendation, however, proba- 
bly reflected European paternalism and favoritism toward Islam 
rather than a display of liberalism. In any case, the French mili- 
tary administration followed such counsel for the first two decades 
of the century, the time it took to conquer the new colony and estab- 
lish control over its people. Following World War I, however, offi- 
cial opposition to Christianity softened, and the government 
tolerated but did not sponsor missionaries. 

Since World War II, Chadian Christians have had a far greater 
influence on Chadian life than their limited numbers suggest. The 
missions spread the ideology of Westernization — the notion that 
progress depended on following European models of development. 
Even more specifically, Roman Catholic mission education spread 
the French language. Ironically, even though Islam spread more 
quickly and more widely than Christianity, Christians controlled 
the government that inherited power from the French. These leaders 
imparted a Western orientation that continued to dominate in the 
1980s. 

Protestantism in Chad 

The Protestants came to southern Chad in the 1920s. American 
Baptists were the first, but missionaries of other denominations and 
nationalities soon followed. Many of the American missions were 
northern offshoots of missionary networks founded farther south 
in the Ubangi-Chari colony (now Central African Republic) of 
French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Franchise — AEF; 
ses Glossary). The organizational ties between the missions in 
southern Chad and Ubangi-Chari were strengthened by France's 
decision in 1925 to transfer Logone Occidental, Tandjile, Logone 
Oriental, and Moyen-Chari prefectures to Ubangi-Chari, where 
they remained until another administrative shuffle restored them 
to Chad in 1932. 

These early Protestant establishments looked to their own 
churches for material resources and to their own countries for diplo- 
matic support. Such independence allowed them to maintain a dis- 
tance from the French colonial administration. In addition, the 



73 



Chad: A Country Study 

missionaries arrived with their wives and children, and they often 
spent their entire lives in the region. This family-based expansion 
of the missionary networks was not peculiar to Chad in the 1920s. 
Some of the missionaries who arrived at that time had grown up 
with missionary parents in missions founded earlier in the French 
colonies to the south. Some missionary children from this era later 
founded missions of their own. Many remained after independence, 
leaving only in the early and or mid-1970s when Tombalbaye's 
authenticity movement forced their departure (see Fall of the Tom- 
balbaye Government, ch. 1). 

The puritanical message preached by many Protestant mission- 
aries undermined the appeal of the faith. Rather than allowing a 
local Christian tradition to develop, the missionaries preached a 
fundamentalist doctrine native to parts of the United States. They 
inveighed against dancing, alcohol, and local customs, which they 
considered "superstitions." New converts found it almost impos- 
sible to observe Protestant teachings and remain within their com- 
munities. In the early years, Chadian Protestants often left their 
villages and settled around the missions. But abandoning village 
and family was a sacrifice that most people were reluctant to make. 

Although language and doctrine probably discouraged conver- 
sion, the educational and medical projects of the Protestant mis- 
sions probably attracted people. The missionaries set up schools, 
clinics, and hospitals long before the colonial administration did. 
In fact, the mission schools produced the first Western-educated 
Chadians in the 1940s and 1950s. In general, the Protestant mis- 
sionary effort in southern Chad has enjoyed some success. In 1980, 
after a half-century of evangelization, Protestants in southern Chad 
numbered about 80,000. 

From bases in the south, Protestants founded missions in other 
parts of Chad. For the most part, they avoided setding among Mus- 
lims, who were not responsive to their message. In the colonial capi- 
tal of Fort-Lamy (present-day N'Djamena), the missions attracted 
followers among resident southerners. The missionaries also prosely- 
tized among the non-Muslim populations of Guera, Ouaddai, and 
Biltine prefectures. Although Christianity appealed to some in the 
capital (there were estimated to be 18,000 Christians in N'Djamena 
in 1980), efforts in other parts of the Sahel were relatively unsuc- 
cessful. 

In the late 1980s, the future of the Protestant missions in Chad 
remained unclear. As noted, many Protestant missionaries were 
forced to leave the country during the cultural revolution in the 
early and mid-1970s. Outside the south, other missions have been 
caught in the cross fire of warring factions. Rebel forces have 



74 



The Roman Catholic cathedral in N'Djamena, which was rebuilt in the 

1980s following severe war damage 
Courtesy Audrey Kizziar 

pillaged mission stations, and the government has accused the mis- 
sionaries of complicity with the opposition. 

Roman Catholicism in Chad 

The Roman Catholic missions came to Chad later than their Prot- 
estant counterparts. Isolated efforts began as early as 1929 when 
The Holy Ghost Fathers from Bangui founded a mission at Kou, 
near Moundou in Logone Occidental Prefecture. In 1934, in the 
midst of the sleeping sickness epidemic, they abandoned Kou for 
Doba in Logone Oriental Prefecture. Other priests from Ubangi- 
Chari and Cameroon opened missions in Kelo and Sarh in 1935 
and 1939, respectively. 

In 1946 these autonomous missions gave way to an institution- 
alized Roman Catholic presence. This late date had more to do 
with European politics than with events in Chad. Earlier in the 
century, the Vatican had designated the Chad region to be part 
of the Italian vicarate of Khartoum. Rather than risk the implan- 
tation of Italian missionaries during the era of Italian dictator Benito 
Mussolini, the French administration discouraged all Roman 
Catholic missionary activity. For its part, the Vatican adopted the 
same tactic, not wishing to upset the Italian regime by transfer- 
ring jurisdiction of the Chad region to the French. As a consequence 



75 



Chad: A Country Study 

of their defeat in World War II, however, the Italians lost their 
African colonies. This loss cleared the way for a French Roman 
Catholic presence in Chad, which a decree from Rome formalized 
on March 22, 1946. 

This decree set up three religious jurisdictions that eventually 
became four bishoprics. The first, administered by the Jesuits, had 
its seat in N'Djamena. Although its jurisdiction included the eight 
prefectures in the northern and eastern parts of the country, almost 
all the Roman Catholics in sahelian and Saharan Chad lived in the 
capital. The diocese of N'Djamena also served as the archdiocese 
of all Chad. The second bishopric, at Sarh, also was delegated to 
the Jesuits. Its region included Salamat and Moyen-Chari prefec- 
tures. The third and fourth jurisdictions had their headquarters 
in Pala and Moundou and were delegated to the Oblats de Marie 
and Capuchin orders. The Pala bishopric served Mayo-Kebbi 
Prefecture, while the bishopric of Moundou was responsible for 
missions in Logone Occidental and Logone Oriental prefectures. 
By far the most important jurisdiction in 1970, Pala included 
116,000 of Chad's 160,000 Catholics. 

The relatively slow progress of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Chad has several causes. Although Roman Catholicism has been 
much more open to local cultures than Protestantism, the doctrine 
of celibacy probably has deterred candidates for the priesthood. 
Insistence on monogamy also has undoubtedly made the faith less 
attractive to some potential converts, particularly wealthy older men 
able to afford more than one wife. 

The social works of the Roman Catholic Church have made it 
an important institution in Chad. Like their Protestant counter- 
parts, the Roman Catholic missions have a history of social service. 
In the 1970s, along with priests, the staffs of most establishments 
included brothers and nuns who worked in the areas of health, edu- 
cation, and development. Many of the nuns were trained medical 
professionals who served on the staffs of government hospitals and 
clinics. It was estimated that 20,000 Chadians attended Roman 
Catholic schools in 1980. Adult literacy classes also reached beyond 
the traditional school-aged population. In the area of development, 
as early as the 1950s Roman Catholic missions in southern Chad 
set up rural development centers whose clientele included non- 
Christians as well as Christians. 

Education 

The establishment of Protestant mission schools in southern Chad 
in the 1920s, followed by Roman Catholic and colonial state 
establishments in later decades, marked the beginning of Western 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



education in Chad. From the outset, the colonial administration 
required that all instruction be in French, with the exception of 
religion classes, which could be taught in local languages. As early 
as 1925, the state imposed a standard curriculum on all institu- 
tions wishing official recognition and government subsidies. The 
state thus extended its influence to education, even though the 
majority of Chadian students attended private mission schools 
before World War II. 

Education in Chad has focused on primary instruction. Until 
1942 students who desired a secular secondary education had to 
go to schools in Brazzaville, the capital of the AEF. This restric- 
tion obviously limited the number of secondary- school students. 
Between World War I and World War II, only a dozen Chadians 
studied in Brazzaville. Once in Brazzaville, students received tech- 
nical instruction rather than a liberal arts education, entering three- 
year programs designed to produce medical aides, clerks, or 
low-level technicians. State secondary schools were opened in Chad 
in 1942, but recognized certificate programs did not begin until 
the mid-1950s. 

At independence in 1960, the government established a goal of 
universal primary education, and school attendance was made com- 
pulsory until age twelve. Nevertheless, the development of stan- 
dard curricula was hampered by the limited number of schools, 
the existence of two- and three-year establishments alongside the 
standard five- and seven-year colleges and lycees, and the Muslim 
preference for Quranic education. Even so, by the mid-1960s 
17 percent of students between the ages of six and eight were in 
school. This number represented a substantial increase over the 
8 percent attending school in the mid-1950s and the 1.4 percent 
immediately after World War II. Although the academic year in 
Chad parallels the French schedule, running from October to June, 
it is not particularly appropriate for a country where the hottest 
part of the April and May. 

Quranic schools throughout the Saharan and sahelian zones teach 
students to read Arabic and recite Quranic verse. Although tradi- 
tional Islamic education at the secondary level has existed since 
the nineteenth century, students seeking advanced learning gener- 
ally have studied in northern Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, or the 
Middle East. In Chad, modern Islamic secondary schools have in- 
cluded the Ecole Mohamed Illech, founded in 1918 and modeled 
after Egyptian educational institutions. Other schools included the 
Lycee Franco- Arabe, founded by the colonial administration in 
Abeche in 1952. The lycee offered a blend of Arabic, Quranic, and 
secular French education. Numerous observers believed that 



77 



Chad: A Country Study 



although the creation of a French-Islamic program of study was 
commendable, the administration's major objective was to coun- 
ter foreign Islamic influence rather than to offer a viable alterna- 
tive curriculum. 

Despite the government's efforts, overall educational levels 
remained low at the end of the first decade of independence. In 
1971 about 88 percent of men and 99 percent of women older than 
age fifteen could not read, write, or speak French, at the time the 
only official national language; literacy in Arabic stood at 7.8 per- 
cent. In 1982 the overall literacy rate stood at about 15 percent. 

Major problems have hindered the development of Chadian edu- 
cation since independence. Financing has been very limited. Pub- 
lic expenditures for education amounted to only 14 percent of the 
national budget in 1 963 . Expenditures increased over the next sev- 
eral years but declined at the end of the decade. In 1969 funding 
for education dropped to 11 percent of the budget; the next year 
it declined still further to 9 percent. In the late 1980s, the govern- 
ment allotted only about 7 percent of its budget to education, a 
figure lower than that for all but a few African countries. 

Limited facilities and personnel also have made it difficult for 
the education system to provide adequate instruction. Overcrowding 
is a major problem; some classes have up to 100 students, many 
of whom are repeaters. In the years just after independence, many 
primary- school teachers had only marginal qualifications. On the 
secondary level, the situation was even worse; at the end of the 
1960s, for example, the Lycee Ahmad Mangue in Sarh (formerly 
Fort-Archambault) had only a handful of Chadians among its sev- 
eral dozen faculty members. During these years, Chad lacked suffi- 
cient facilities for technical and vocational education to train needed 
intermediate-level technicians, and there was no university. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, Chad made considerable progress in 
dealing with problems of facilities and personnel. To improve 
instruction, review sessions and refresher programs have been 
instituted for primary- school teachers. On the secondary level, 
increasing numbers of Chadians have taken their places in the ranks 
of the faculty. Furthermore, during the 1971-72 school year, the 
Universite du Tchad opened its doors. 

Another problem at independence was that the French curricula 
of Chadian schools limited their effectiveness. Primary instruction 
was in French, although most students did not speak that language 
when they entered school, and teaching methods and materials were 
often poorly suited to the rural settings of most schools. In addi- 
tion, the academic program inherited from the French did not pre- 
pare students for employment options in Chad. Beginning in the 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



late 1960s, the government attempted to address these problems. 
A number of model schools discarded the French style of a for- 
mal, classical education in favor of a new approach that taught chil- 
dren to reinterpret and modify their social and economic 
environment. Rather than teaching French as it was taught in 
French schools to French children, the model schools taught it more 
appropriately as a foreign language. These new schools also intro- 
duced basic skills courses in the fourth year of primary school. Stu- 
dents who would probably not go on to secondary school were given 
the chance to attend agricultural training centers. 

Unfortunately, all of the preceding problems were complicated 
by a fourth difficulty: the Chadian Civil War. Little has been written 
specifically about how this conflict has disrupted education, but 
several effects can reasonably be surmised. Lack of security in vast 
parts of the country undoubtedly has made it difficult to send 
teachers to their posts and to maintain them there, which has been 
particularly problematic because as government employees, teachers 
often have been identified with government policies. In addition, 
the mobility occasioned by the war has played havoc with attempts 
to get children to attend classes regularly. The diversion of resources 
to the conflict has also prevented the government from maintain- 
ing the expenditure levels found at independence, much less aug- 
menting available funds. Finally, the violence has taken its toll 
among teachers, students, and facilities. One of the more dramatic 
instances of this was the destruction and looting of primary schools, 
lycees, and even the national archives attached to the Universite 
du Tchad during the battles of N'Djamena in 1979 and 1980. 

To its credit, the government has made major efforts to over- 
come these problems. In 1983 the Ministry of Planning and Recon- 
struction reported that the opening of the 1982-83 school year was 
the most successful since the upheavals of 1979. In 1984 the Univer- 
site du Tchad, the Ecole Nationale d' Administration, and the Ecole 
Nationale des Travaux Publics reopened their doors as well. 

In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Education had administrative 
responsibility for all formal schooling. Because of years of civil strife, 
however, local communities had assumed many of the ministry's 
functions, including the construction and maintenance of schools, 
and payment of teachers' salaries. 

Primary Education 

In the late 1980s, primary education in Chad consisted of a six- 
year program leading to an elementary school certificate. In the 
south, most students began their studies at the age of six; in the 
north, they tended to be somewhat older. With the exception of 



79 



Chad: A Country Study 



schools that followed experimental programs, the curriculum 
adhered to the French model. Courses included reading, writing, 
spelling, grammar, mathematics, history, geography, science, and 
drawing. 

Primary- school enrollment for the 1986-87 school year was more 
than 300,000 students. There were 6,203 instructors teaching in 
1,650 schools, but 10 percent of the instructors were in nonteach- 
ing positions, yielding a pupil- to- teacher ratio of about sixty to one. 
Only about 40 percent of all primary- school- aged children attended 
class, and attendance was much greater in the south than in the 
Sahel or in the northern parts of the country (see table 2, Appen- 
dix A). Approximately 2.8 percent of primary- school children were 
enrolled in private schools, and most of these were in Roman 
Catholic mission schools concentrated in the south or near the 
capital. 

Secondary Education 

In 1983 secondary education in Chad continued to follow French 
models. Primary- school graduates competed for entrance into two 
types of liberal arts institutions, the college d'enseignement general (called 
a college, or CEG) or the lycee. The college offered a four-year course 
of study, and the lycee offered a seven-year program. In both 
institutions, students took a general examination at the end of four 
years. College students who passed could be allowed to transfer to 
a lycee to complete their studies; successful lycee students continued 
at their institutions. At the end of seven years of secondary educa- 
tion, all students took comprehensive exams for the baccalaureate 
degree, called the bac, a requirement for admission to a university. 

Students with primary- school certificates interested in teaching 
careers could enroll in a college or lycee, or they could enter a teacher 
training school. The normal school program was six years long. 
The first four years were devoted to general education, much the 
same as at the college or lycee, and the last two years concentrated 
on professional training. Students finishing this course were awarded 
an elementary-level teaching certificate. In 1986-87 Chad had sixty- 
one colleges and lycees. More than half of these schools were located 
in the N'Djamena area. There were 43,357 secondary students 
enrolled in the 1986-87 school year. In the 1983-84 school year, 
5,002 college students took the exam, with a success rate of 
43.5 percent, or 2,174 students; 3,175 students took the bac, and 
36.9 percent, or 1,173 students, passed. Although still low, the num- 
bers of examination candidates suggested major improvements over 
1960, when 2,000 students attended general secondary schools, and 
over 1968-69, when enrollment stood at 8,724. Finally, during the 



80 



A primary school in a 
bombed-out building in 
Kanem Prefecture 
Courtesy UNICEF 
(Maggie Murray-Lee) 




1986-87 school year, Chad had five institutions for training 
primary- school teachers, with a enrollment of 1,020 students. 

Higher Education 

When the country became independent in 1960, Chad had no 
university. For the first decade of the nation's life, students who 
wished to study beyond the secondary level had to go abroad. In 
the 1966-67 school year, eighty-three Chadians were studying out- 
side the country; the following year, this number rose to 200. In 
the early years, almost all students seeking advanced education were 
male. The largest number went to France (30 percent in the 
academic year 1966-67, for example), but some Chadians studied 
in Belgium, Senegal, Cote d'lvoire, and Congo. At that time, most 
students were pursuing degrees in education, liberal arts, agricul- 
ture, and medicine. 

Pursuant to an agreement with France, the Universite du Tchad 
opened in the 1971-72 academic year. Financed almost entirely 
through French assistance, the faculty of 25 welcomed 200 students 
the first year. By the 1974-75 academic year, enrollment had 
climbed to 500, and the university graduated its first class of 45. 
The imposition of compulsory yondo rites greatly disrupted the fol- 
lowing school year, but after the overthrow of Tombalbaye and 
the end of the authenticity movement, the university continued to 
grow (see Classical African Religions, this ch.). Enrollment rose 



81 



Chad: A Country Study 



from 639 in 1976-77 to a high of 1,046 in 1977-78. Enrollment 
then dropped slightly to 974 in 1978-79. Unfortunately, the Chad- 
ian Civil War curtailed university activities in 1979 and 1980, when 
the first and second battles of N'Djamena threatened facilities and 
students alike. With the return of relative calm in the early 1980s, 
the university reopened. In 1983-84 the university had 141 teachers 
and 1,643 students. 

In addition to the university, higher learning in Chad included 
one advanced teacher-training institution, the Ecole Normale 
Superieure, which trained secondary- school instructors. Enrollment 
in the 1982-83 and 1983-84 school years came to about 200 stu- 
dents. Degree programs included history-geography, modern litera- 
ture, English and French, Arabic and French, mathematics and 
physics, and biology- geology-chemistry. 

Vocational Education 

In 1983 vocational education was offered at three lycees techniques 
industriels (in Sarh, N'Djamena, and Moundou), and the College 
d'Enseignement Technique in Sarh. Enrollment figures for three 
of the four technical schools stood at 1,490 in 1983. 

Primary- school graduates interested in technical or vocational 
training could follow two courses. They either could enter a first- 
level, three-year program {premier cycle) at a college (after which they 
could transfer to one of the four technical schools) or they could 
enroll directly in one of the lycees for a six-year program. Students 
completing the three-year premier cycle received professional apti- 
tude certificates; those finishing the entire six-year course were 
awarded diplomas. 

Apart from the lycees techniques, several other institutions offered 
vocational training in Chad in the early 1980s. These included the 
Ecole Nationale d 'Administration, which opened in 1963 in 
N'Djamena; a postal and telecommunications school in Sarh; a 
school for technical education related to public works; and the Ba-Illi 
agricultural school. Other Chadians studied at technical training 
centers abroad. 

In the late 1980s, advanced medical education was not avail- 
able in Chad. The only medical training institution was the National 
School of Public Health and Social Work (Ecole Nationale de Sante 
Publique et de Service Social — ENSPSS) in N'Djamena. Its enroll- 
ment, however, has been very limited; in 1982 there were only 
twenty-eight students in nursing, three in social work, and thirty- 
three in public health. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



Health and Medical Services 

A range of diseases afflicts the populace of Chad. In 1983 infec- 
tious and parasitic diseases were the most prevalent ailments, fol- 
lowed by respiratory afflictions and nervous disorders. In 1988 a 
severe epidemic of meningitis affected N'Djamena, in particular. 
By 1987 only one case of acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) had been reported to the World Health Organization; 
however, it was likely that incidence of the disease was many times 
higher, especially in the southern areas near Cameroon and Cen- 
tral African Republic. 

By the early 1960s, the government made a substantial effort to 
extend the country's limited health infrastructure. Despite the ensu- 
ing civil conflict, the government has attempted to maintain and 
expand health services. Foreign assistance has allowed the construc- 
tion of new buildings and the renovation of existing facilities, as well 
as the laying of groundwork for training health care professionals. 

By the early 1980s, health facilities included five hospitals (at 
N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, Abeche, and a locality in Mayo-Kebbi 
Prefecture). Two polyclinics served the population of the capital 
region. Medical centers numbered 18, and there were 20 infirmaries 
and 127 dispensaries. Private medical facilities numbered seventy- 
five, and twenty social centers administered to the needs of Chadians 
in all prefectures except Biltine and Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti. 

Despite apparent progress in health care delivery, it is difficult 
to determine if growth in the number of facilities represented an 
increased capacity or merely a reorganization and reclassification 
of health establishments. The only data available in 1988, for 
example, showed that despite the increase in numbers of units, the 
hospitals, medical centers, and infirmaries increased the number of 
beds by only 238 more than the number recorded in 1971 . Modern 
health care was also very unevenly distributed. Such facilities in Chad 
have long been concentrated in the south and remained so in 1983. 
For example, eleven of the eighteen medical centers were found there, 
along with three of the five hospitals, and private care followed the 
same pattern, with sixty-four of seventy-five centers in the southern 
prefectures. In theory, therefore, people in the less populated sahelian 
and Saharan regions had to travel very long distances for modern 
medical care. In fact, distance, lack of transportation, and civil con- 
flict probably discouraged most people from making the effort. 

A continuing shortage of trained medical personnel has com- 
pounded the difficulty of providing adequate, accessible health 
facilities. In 1983 Chad's medical system employed 42 Chadian doc- 
tors, 8 pharmacists, a biologist, 87 registered nurses, 583 practical 



83 



Chad: A Country Study 

nurses, 59 nurses specializing in childbirth, 22 midwives, 19 health 
inspectors, and 99 public health agents. Foreign assistance provided 
another 41 doctors, 103 nurses, and 2 midwives. 

More detailed information concerning health care in Chad was 
unavailable in the late 1980s, largely because of the Chadian Civil 
War, which had disrupted government services for many years. 
As a result of this conflict, there were probably fewer health per- 
sonnel in the late 1980s than earlier in the decade, particularly in 
the sahelian and Saharan zones, where nurses abandoned rural 
infirmaries. Mortality levels in Chad have been high for a long 
time, but the war may have reversed the limited progress made 
in the 1960s in dealing with the country's many health problems. 
Although the conflict was far from resolved in the late 1980s, the 
Habre government had been much more successful than its prede- 
cessors in consolidating control over the sahelian and Saharan regions 
of the country where modern health care has been the least avail- 
able. Although resources remained scarce, greater international 
attention to Chad's plight produced more foreign assistance than 
in the past. 

* * * 

In the late 1980s, reliable studies on Chad in English remained 
scarce. For a useful general study of Chad, the reader should con- 
sult Jean Chapelle's Le peuple tchadien: ses racines et sa vie quotidienne. 
A slightly more recent study, Tchad: la genese d'un conflit by Christian 
Bouquet, covers some of the same ground but focuses on the con- 
text of Chadian underdevelopment and civil conflict. The much 
drier volume, Le Tchad by Jean Cabot and Christian Bouquet, offers 
a more detailed survey of the physical environment. In English, 
Dennis D. Cordell's Daral-Kuti and the Last Years of the Trans-Saharan 
Slave Trade analyzes Chad's role in Saharan commerce, the Mus- 
lim slave trade, and the expanding Islamic world of the nineteenth 
century. Finally, Samuel Decalo's Historical Dictionary of Chad is one 
of the very few general references to the country in English. 

There are a number of good regional studies of Chadian society 
and religion. Basic literature on the Sara of the soudanian zone 
includes Robert J aulin's controversial La mort sara, a study of the 
yondo; Jean-Pierre Magnant's important La terre sara, terre tchadienne; 
and Francoise Dumas-Champion's Les Masa du Tchad. Annie M.D. 
Lebeufs Les principautes Kotoko remains the essential study of the 
Kotoko. Albert Le Rouvreur's Saheliens et sahariens du Tchad sur- 
veys the northern two-thirds of the country. Within this region, 
basic reading should include Jean Chapelle's now-classic Nomads 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



noirs du Sahara, a. study of the Teda and Daza; Jean-Claude Zelt- 
ner's Les Arabes dans la region du Lac Tchad; and Dennis D. Cor- 
dell's 4 'The Awlad Sulayman of Libya and Chad," in Canadian 
Journal of African Studies. In Survivances pre-islamiques en pays zaghawa, 
Marie-Jose Tubiana analyzes the retention of pre-Islamic beliefs 
and practices in eastern Chad. In Pilgrims in a Strange Land, John 
A. Works, Jr. has written a good study of Hausa communities in 
Chad and their role in the spread of Islam. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



85 



Typical Chadian village, with grass huts and large earthen pots for storing grain 



When France granted independence to chad in 

I960, it left the new government with an essentially traditional econ- 
omy, having a small industrial sector, an agricultural sector domi- 
nated by cotton, and an inadequate transportation sector. 
Moreover, the country had few trained technicians or capable 
administrators. In spite of well-intentioned efforts by a series of 
civilian and military governments, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
the combination of prolonged civil strife, chronic drought, and 
political uncertainty aborted most progress. 

By the late 1980s, even though there had been a lull in the fight- 
ing, better rains, and a modicum of political stability, Chad was 
still one of the poorest countries on earth and one of the least 
endowed with resources. The economy had not improved apprecia- 
bly since independence and, by some measurements, was proba- 
bly worse than in 1960. Reliant on foreign aid and vulnerable to 
the uncontrollable forces of the international cotton market, Chad 
could hope to make only incremental gains in its quest to achieve 
a viable, self-sustaining economy. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

Chad's remoteness, its inadequate infrastructure, its recent his- 
tory of war, drought, and famine, and its dependency on a single 
cash crop — cotton — for export earnings made it one of the poorest 
nations of the world. In the mid-1980s, Chad's gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary) per capita was only US$160, which 
clearly reflected the extent of the nation's impoverishment. In the 
mid-1980s, Chad ranked among the five poorest nations of the world 
according to World Bank (see Glossary) statistics. 

Chad's economy was based almost entirely on agriculture and 
pastoralism. In 1986 the World Bank estimated that approximately 
83 percent of the country's economically active population worked 
in agriculture, 5 percent worked in industry, and 12 percent were 
engaged in services, including government employment, trade, and 
other service activities. Cotton processing, which includes ginning 
raw cotton into fiber for export, some spinning and weaving, and 
producing edible oil from cotton seed for local consumption, domi- 
nated industry. 

Figures for the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) also 
reflected agriculture's importance. In 1986 the World Bank esti- 
mated that 46.3 percent of Chad's GDP came from agriculture and 



89 



Chad: A Country Study 

pastoralism. Industry and manufacturing accounted for only 
17.9 percent of GDP, while services represented 35.7 percent of 
GDP. 

Geography and climate played an influential role in Chad's econ- 
omy. The country is divided into three major climatic zones — 
Saharan, sahelian, and soudanian — which are distinguished by the 
level of annual average rainfall. There are only two productive 
zones — the soudanian cotton-producing zone of the south, sometimes 
called Le Tchad Utile (Useful Chad), and the central sahelian cattle- 
herding region. The northern Saharan region produces little. 

In 1987 Chad's economy was dependent on a single cash crop — 
cotton. Like most other single-crop economies in the Third World, 
when world commodity prices were high, conditions improved. 
When those prices fell, conditions worsened. Despite several impor- 
tant swings, during the 1970s and particularly in the early 1980s, 
cotton prices were good. Chad's cotton revenues peaked in 1983 
and 1984, but in 1985 world cotton prices fell steeply, nearly crip- 
pling the cotton industry. This decline forced a major economic 
restructuring under the auspices of the World Bank and foreign 
donors. To revive the cotton industry, a 1986 restructuring pro- 
gram curtailed all cotton-derived revenues to the government until 
world prices rebounded. This program forced cutbacks on the 
production of raw cotton and limited the level of government sup- 
port to producers for improved cropping methods, ginning, and 
other related industrial operations. 

Cattle and beef exports followed cotton in economic importance. 
Estimates of the value of these exports varied greatly because large 
numbers of livestock left the country ' 'on the hoof," totally out- 
side the control of customs officials. Nevertheless, cattle and beef 
exports accounted for 30 to 60 percent of all exports from 1975 
through 1 985 , depending on the value of the cotton crop in a given 
year. Approximately 29 percent of Chadians depended almost 
entirely on livestock for their livelihood in the early 1980s, and 
livestock and their by-products represented around 26 percent of 
GNP. 

Chad's lack of resources limited the exploitation of mineral 
deposits. There were known deposits of bauxite in the southern 
regions, and reports indicated deposits of uranium and some other 
minerals in the Tibesti Mountains and Aozou Strip (see Glossary). 
Even in late 1987, however, no bauxite was being mined, and 
because of hostilities in the northern zones, claims of mineral 
deposits there had not been verified. Chad's only mining industry 
was the traditional exploitation of sodium carbonate (natron) in 
dried beds around Lake Chad. 



90 



The Economy 



Oil offered one of the few reasons for economic optimism. In 
1974 a consortium of companies led by Conoco discovered oil near 
Rig Rig, north of Lake Chad. Plans to exploit these reserves, 
estimated at 438 million barrels, and to build a small refinery to 
serve Chad's domestic needs were delayed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s because of the Chadian Civil War. In 1986 the 
government — with World Bank support — revived the idea, and 
plans called for operations to begin in the early 1990s. Nonethe- 
less, these deposits would ensure only Chad's domestic needs, and 
no oil would be exported. In 1985 Exxon, which had become the 
leader of the exploratory consortium, discovered oil in southern 
Chad, near Doba. The size of the reserves was not known, although 
it was believed to be large. Exxon, however, suspended drilling 
in 1986 when world oil prices fell. 

Remoteness and distance are prime features of economic life in 
Chad. Transportation and communications are difficult, both 
internally and externally. Douala, Cameroon, the nearest port from 
N'Djamena, is 1,700 kilometers away. By the mid-1980s, the only 
paved roads linking the capital to the interior, some 250 kilometers 
of hardtop, had disappeared because of insufficient maintenance. 
Of the estimated 31,000 kilometers of dirt roads and tracks, only 
1,260 kilometers were all-weather roads. The remainder became 
impassable during the rainy season. There were no railroads in 
Chad. 

Since independence, Chad has relied on outside donors and 
regional institutions for economic survival and development. Chad's 
principal sponsor has been France, which has subsidized the budget. 
Through the mechanisms of the Lome Convention (see Glossary) 
between the members of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the 
Pacific (ACP), France has also subsidized Chad's cotton produc- 
tion and exports. French companies have dominated trade, and 
French banks have controlled Chad's finances. 

Information on Chadian government finances was fragmentary 
and inconsistent. The political instability from 1976 to 1982 left 
large sections of the country beyond any form of central control, 
and during this period the state had very few finances. After 1982, 
however, fragmentary estimates indicated a growing importance 
of donor finances and a decline in internally generated revenues. 
In addition, during the 1980s military spending was high. Although 
the proportion of real government expenditures for defense was 
difficult to assess, it could have represented as much as 70 percent 
of government spending. Despite a measure of political stability 
after 1982, the situation worsened in 1985 with the collapse of 



91 



Chad: A Country Study 

cotton revenues. In 1986 the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) joined in efforts by other 
donors, including France, the EEC, and the United States, to stabi- 
lize Chad's financial and budget difficulties. 

Role of Government 

Both before and after the Chadian Civil War, the government 
participated actively in the economy and fostered a liberal economic 
development policy. It encouraged foreign investment, both pub- 
lic and private, and in 1987 had under review the Investment Code 
of 1963. The objective was to minimize regulations for the private 
manufacturing sector and particularly for small- and medium- sized 
enterprises. 

The government considered the public sector a complement to, 
and not a substitute for, the private sector. Even so, because of 
the country's narrow productive base and limited cash economy, 
the government was forced to play an active role in the economy. 
This participation primarily took the form of mixed public and pri- 
vate marketing enterprises, called parastatals. As a partner in these 
ventures, the government participated in the planning and con- 
trolling of the economy and became a key actor in the service sec- 
tor through the parastatals, which employed thousands of 
individuals (see Manufacturing, Mining, and Utilities, this ch.; 
Government Finances, this ch.). 

Agriculture 

In 1986 approximately 83 percent of the active population were 
farmers or herders. This sector of the economy accounted for almost 
half of GDP. With the exception of cotton, some small-scale sugar 
production, and a portion of the peanut crop, Chad's agriculture 
consisted of subsistence food production. The types of crops that 
were grown and the locations of herds were determined by con- 
siderable variations in Chad's climate (see Physical Setting, ch. 2). 

The soudanian zone comprises those areas with an average annual 
rainfall of 800 millimeters or more. This region, which accounts 
for about 10 percent of the total land area, contains the nation's 
most fertile croplands. Settled agricultural communities growing 
a wide variety of food crops are its main features. Fishing is impor- 
tant in the rivers, and families raise goats, chickens, and, in some 
cases, oxen for plowing. In 1983 about 72 percent of all land under 
cultivation in Chad was in the soudanian region. 

The central zone, the sahelian region, comprises the area with 
average annual rainfall of between 350 and 800 millimeters. The 
minimum rainfall needed for the hardiest of Chad's varieties of 



92 



A livestock market in Massakoury 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 



millet, called berebere, is 350 millimeters. The western area of the 
zone is dominated by the Chari and Logone rivers, which flow north 
from their sources in southern Chad and neighboring countries (see 
fig. 3). The courses of these rivers, joining at N'Djamena to flow 
on to Lake Chad, create an ecological subregion. Fishing is important 
for the peoples along the rivers and along the shores of Lake Chad. 
Flood recession cropping is practiced along the edges of the riverbeds 
and lakeshore, areas that have held the most promise for irrigation 
in the zone. International donor attention focused on this potential 
beginning in the mid-1960s. Particular attention has been paid to 
the traditional construction of polders (see Glossary) along the shores 
of Lake Chad. Land reclaimed by the use of such methods is ex- 
tremely fertile. Chad's only wheat crop is cultivated in these polders. 

In the rest of the sahelian region, the hardier varieties of millet, 
along with peanuts and dry beans, are grown. Crop yields are far 
lower than they are in the south or near rivers and lakes. Farmers 
take every advantage of seasonal flooding to grow recession crops 
before the waters dry away, a practice particularly popular around 
Lake Fitri. The sahelian region is ideal for pasturage. Herding 
includes large cattle herds for commercial sale, and goats, sheep, 
donkeys, and some horses are common in all villages. 

The Saharan zone encompasses roughly the northern one-third 
of Chad. Except for some dates and legumes grown in the scattered 



93 



Chad: A Country Study 

oases, the area is not productive. Annual rainfall averages less than 
350 millimeters, and the land is sparsely populated by nomadic 
tribes. Many of Chad's camel herds are found in the region, but 
there are few cattle or horses. 

Chad's subsistence farmers practice traditional slash-and-burn 
agriculture in tandem with crop rotation, which is typical through- 
out much of Africa. Sorghum is the most important food crop, fol- 
lowed by millet and berebere. Less prevalent grains are corn, rice, 
and wheat. Other secondary crops include peanuts, sesame, 
legumes, and tubers, as well as a variety of garden vegetables. 

Crop rotation in the soudanian zone traditionally begins with 
sorghum or millet in the first year. Mixed crops of sorghum and/or 
millet, with peanuts, legumes, or tubers, are then cultivated for 
approximately three years. Farmers then return the land to fallow 
for periods up to fifteen years, turning to different fields for the 
next cycle. Preparation of a field begins with cutting heavy brush 
and unwanted low trees or branches that are then laid on the 
ground. Collectively owned lands are parceled out during the dry 
season, and the fields are burned just before the onset of the first 
rains, usually around March. Farmers work most intensively dur- 
ing the rains between May and October, planting, weeding and 
protecting the crops from birds and animals. Harvesting begins 
in September and October with the early varieties of sorghum. The 
main harvest occurs in November and December. Farmers harvest 
crops of rice and berebere, grown along receding water courses, as 
late as February. 

The cropping cycle for most of the sahelian zone is similar, 
although the variety of crops planted is more limited because of 
dryness. In the polders of Lake Chad, farmers grow a wide range 
of crops; two harvests per year for corn, sorghum, and legumes 
are possible from February or March to September. Rice ripens 
in February, and wheat ripens in May. 

As with most Third World countries, control of the land deter- 
mines agricultural practices. There are three basic types of land 
tenure in Chad. The first is collective ownership by villages of 
croplands in their environs. In principle, such lands belong to a 
village collectively under the management of the village chief or 
the traditional chef des terres (chief of the lands) . Individual farmers 
hold inalienable and transmittable use rights to village lands, so 
long as they, their heirs, or recognized representatives cultivate 
the land. Outsiders can farm village lands only with the authori- 
zation of the village chief or chef des terres. Renting village farm- 
lands is possible in some local areas but is not traditional practice. 
Private ownership is the second type of tenure, applied traditionally 



94 



The Economy 



to the small plots cultivated in wadis or oases. Wells belong to 
individuals or groups with rights to the land. Ownership of fruit 
trees and date palms in the oases is often separate from ownership 
of the land; those farmers who plant and care for trees own them. 
State ownership is the third type, primarily for large enterprises 
such as irrigation projects. Under the management of parastatal 
or government employees, farmers enter into contractual arrange- 
ments, including paying fees, for the use of state lands and the 
benefits of improved farming methods. 

Detailed and reliable statistical information on Chad's agricul- 
ture was scarce in the late 1980s; most researchers viewed availa- 
ble statistics only as indicators of general trends. The one region 
for which figures were kept was the soudanian zone through survey 
coverage by officials of the National Office of Rural Development 
(Office National de Developpement Rural — ONDR), who moni- 
tored cotton production. These officials also gathered information 
on food production, but this effort was not carried out systemati- 
cally. Survey coverage of the sahelian zone was first hampered, then 
prevented, by civil conflict from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. 

Moreover, figures from international and regional organizations 
often conflicted or differed in formulation. For example, total area 
devoted to food production was difficult to estimate because sources 
combined the area of fields in production with those lying fallow 
to give a total for arable lands. The arable land figure has shown 
a gradual increase since 1961. Estimated then at 2.9 million 
hectares, it rose to almost 3.2 million hectares in 1984. In 1983 
there were about 1.2 million hectares in food production and in 
1984 slighdy more than 900,000 hectares. Therefore, perhaps a 
third of Chad's farmlands were in production in a given year, with 
the balance lying fallow. 

Cotton 

Background of Cotton Cultivation 

Cotton is an indigenous crop to southern Chad. In 1910 the 
French colonial administration organized market production on 
a limited scale under the direction of the military governor. By 1920 
the colonial administration was promoting the large-scale produc- 
tion of cotton for export. The French saw cotton as the only 
exploitable resource for the colony and as an effective means of 
introducing a cash economy into the area. Indeed, the elaboration 
of colonial administration went hand in hand with the extension 
of cotton production throughout the region. 



95 



Chad: A Country Study 



France's motives were clear: it sought to ensure a source of raw 
materials for its home industries and a protected market for its 
exports abroad. France also intended that taxes derived from com- 
mercial ventures within the colonies would offset the expenses of 
the colonial administration. Therefore, customs duties on cotton 
exports from Chad, then a part of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique 
Equatoriale Francaise — AEF; see Glossary), were paid to the gover- 
nor general at Brazzaville (in contemporary Congo), as were duties 
on exports from other colonies under regional administration. 
Revenues from a head tax were paid in cash locally and went direcdy 
to the lieutenant governor of the colony. Not surprisingly, virtually 
the only means of earning the money to pay the tax was by the 
sale of cotton to the French. 

In 1928 exploitation of cotton within the colony was placed in 
the hands of Cotonfran, a private company. Under the terms of 
the contract between the colonial administration and Cotonfran, 
the administration maintained a certain quantity of production by 
the villages, and Cotonfran bought at least 80 percent of that 
production. The cotton was ginned locally, but no further trans- 
formation was permitted; all the cotton fiber was then exported 
to France. 

The colonial administration fixed the quantity of cotton produced 
and the price paid to the peasant producer on the basis of calcula- 
tions furnished by Cotonfran of costs and expectations for the price 
of cotton on the world market. France reorganized village adminis- 
tration by replacing traditional chiefs with individuals more amena- 
ble to the colonial power, which assured the proper cultivation of 
the cotton crop and the collection of taxes. This system included 
forced labor and the subordination of growing food crops to cotton. 

Production Factors 

In 1988 the entirety of Chad's cotton was produced in the five 
soudanian prefectures of Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjile, Logone Occiden- 
tal, Logone Oriental, and Moyen-Chari, plus the Bousso region 
of Chari-Baguirmi Prefecture, which juts down into the soudanian 
zone (see fig. 1). Few regions outside these prefectures offered suffi- 
cient water and population to sustain cotton production. Moreover, 
in this land of difficult transport, areas producing a cash crop also 
needed to be able to grow enough food for their people. Typically, 
the cultivation of cotton and food crops was carried on side by side. 
Efforts to extend the cultivation of cotton to the neighboring sahelian 
prefectures of Salamat and Guera have had little success. In 1983 
and 1984, with production at its highest in a decade, these two 
prefectures represented only .5 percent of total production. 



96 



Cotton being unloaded from a truck in Pala, Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture 

Courtesy Michael R. Saks 

Suggestions also have been made from time to time to bring cot- 
ton production to the fertile borders of Lake Chad. Trials have 
shown the high yields possible there, estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 
kilograms per hectare. As of 1987, however, farmers in the Lake 
Chad area had not taken voluntarily to cotton production. Tradi- 
tionally, farmers have resisted government efforts to control local 
production of such crops as wheat, and the history of coercion and 
government intervention associated with cotton was no inducement. 

The government has introduced methods to increase crop yield, 
which include the expanded use of fertilizers and insecticides. Even 
so, compared with crop yields of more than 1,000 kilograms per 
hectare for other francophone West African states (such as Came- 
roon, Mali, and Cote dTvoire), until 1982 Chad's crop yields did 
not significantly exceed 500 kilograms per hectare; from 1983 to 
1987, yields averaged almost 750 kilograms per hectare. 

Area under cotton cultivation reached a peak in 1963 of 338,900 
hectares. From 1963 until the end of the 1970s, the area under cot- 
ton cultivation averaged 275,000 hectares. In the 1980s, however, 
the area has been consistently less than 200,000 hectares. By 1983 
the area of land under cotton cultivation had dropped by 36 per- 
cent from the average during the 1960s and 1970s. Several sources 
estimated the area in southern Chad under cotton cultivation at 
30 to 40 percent of all land in cultivation, and in some areas of 



97 



Chad: A Country Study 



Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture, it may have been higher (see table 3, 
Appendix A). 

Cotton production has exhibited wide swings. Factors such as 
climatic conditions, production prices, and civil strife have 
influenced production. The first crop to exceed 100,000 tons came 
in 1963, but the 1970s were the best years for production, which 
from 1971 to 1978 remained well above 100,000 tons per year. Chad 
reached its all-time record production in 1975. Production suffered 
from 1979 to 1982 because of the Chadian Civil War and hit a 
twenty-year low in 1981. In 1983, with the return of some politi- 
cal stability and higher market prices, production improved but 
then fell from 1984 to 1987, a reflection of declining world cotton 
prices. 

Once the crop is harvested, the producers must sort the cotton 
to separate lower quality yellow cotton from higher quality white 
cotton. Since the late 1970s, the proportion of white cotton gener- 
ally has been 90 percent or more of total production. Going back 
to the 1960s, the quality of Chadian cotton had been consistently 
high, except for 1972 and 1973, when the proportion of yellow cot- 
ton rose to 18 percent. Since 1980 the quality has remained high 
at initial sorting, with white cotton representing more than 95 per- 
cent of the crop and accounting for 98 percent of production in 1984. 

Administrative Structure 

In 1 989 the official structure responsible for the production and 
marketing of cotton was composed of the ONDR under the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development, of Cotontchad, and of the 
Cotton Price Stabilization Board (Caisse de Stabilisation des Prix 
du Coton— CSPC). Founded in 1965, the ONDR was originally 
given responsibility to monitor, improve, and assist all agricultural 
production. By the mid-1980s, however, the government's emphasis 
on cotton production made the ONDR an important factor for the 
cotton industry only. Cotontchad, successor to Cotonfran, was 
founded as a parastatal company in 1971 to collect, buy, gin, trans- 
port, and export the cotton crop. The company also had responsi- 
bility for elements of the small national textile, soap, and edible 
oil industries. The CSPC's task was to stabilize prices paid to 
peasant producers by funding operating losses incurred by Coton- 
tchad. Assuring a constant price to the producer not only helped 
maintain a certain level of production for Cotontchad but also 
limited costs to the company by holding down producer prices. The 
ONDR, the CSPC, Cotontchad, and the government itself were 
involved in determining producer prices. In addition, the CSPC 
supported the program to improve yields. Between 1971 and 1983, 



98 




Irrigation farming near Mao in Kanem Prefecture 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee) 



99 



Chad: A Country Study 



an estimated 57 percent of all payments by the CSPC were made 
in conjunction with the program to improve cotton production. 

Other major actors in the cotton industry were the private banks, 
the French Textile Development Company (Compagnie Francaise 
pour le Developpement des Textiles — CFDT), and French and 
EEC institutions, as well as the World Bank. Private banks provided 
the credits necessary to Cotontchad and to the peasants to finance 
the opening of each planting season and especially to provide capi- 
tal for the import and distribution of fertilizers and insecticides. 
The CFDT marketed Chad's cotton on the world market. The 
CFDT also contributed to the smooth operation of Cotontchad 
through technical agreements to maintain equipment and to pro- 
vide expertise in improving cropping methods through the ONDR. 
In addition, the CFDT supported research carried out by the Cotton 
and Textile Research Institute (Institut de Recherche sur le Coton 
et les Textiles — IRCT), a small public research facility located near 
Doba. Subsidies to Chad's cotton production under the Lome Con- 
vention were paid through the Stabex system (see Glossary) of the 
EEC. Those funds were channeled to the CSPC for price support 
to the producers. The CSPC also received portions of funds needed 
to assure payments to producers from Cotontchad as well as from 
the central government. Between 1971 and 1983, virtually all 
income to the CSPC derived from rebates paid by Cotontchad into 
the system. 

After 1984 the system became far more dependent on external 
sources of funds (such as Stabex) because of sharply reduced income 
to Cotontchad. In addition to Stabex, the EC's European Develop- 
ment Fund (EDF) contributed directly to the program of improv- 
ing yields. French assistance remained crucial to the system. The 
Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (Caisse Centrale de 
Cooperation Economique — CCCE) was a shareholder in Coton- 
tchad, and the other arm of French foreign aid, the Cooperation 
and Aid Fund (Fonds d'Aide et de la Cooperation — FAC), directed 
assistance to the southern zone in support of the cotton complex. 
FAC also provided direct assistance to the government, which, 
among other things, helped pay the salaries of officials and func- 
tionaries, especially those in the ONDR. 

Pricing Mechanisms 

Prices paid to Chad's cotton producers, the peasants of the 
southern soudanian zone, have risen slowly over the years. The 
structure included separate prices for white cotton and for yellow 
cotton. From 1971, when the distinction arose, to 1978, the price 
for white cotton was CFA F50 per kilogram (for value of the CFA 



100 



The Economy 



F — see Glossary) and stayed at this level during much of the period 
of heavy civil conflict until 1982. From 1982 to 1985, the price 
increased steeply to CFA F100 per kilogram, at which point it had 
leveled by 1987, despite downward pressure because of the fall in 
world prices and a new program of cost reductions by Cotontchad 
under World Bank direction. The price paid for yellow cotton has 
not kept pace with this rise, reaching only CFA F40 per kilogram 
in 1983, where it remained through 1987. 

The price paid to the producer traditionally has not covered actual 
production costs, either for the peasant or for Cotontchad. As much 
as 50 percent of the costs of production has been borne by outside 
donors, primarily from the EDF, through the Stabex system. 
Between 1981 and 1984, the EDF financed between 70 and 80 per- 
cent of the costs of the program to improve yields, largely through 
subsidies to the CSPC for price support and subsidies for Coton- 
tchad in the initial purchase of insecticides and fertilizers. The costs 
of improvements have been reimbursed only partially from pay- 
ments made by producers through the ONDR. 

Restructuring the System 

By 1987, because world prices were still insufficient to recoup 
costs, Cotontchad was rapidly going broke. In the mid-1980s, 
annual net losses were estimated at CFA F18 billion. Net losses 
per kilogram of ginned cotton were estimated at CFA F453 in 1985 
and CFA F298 in 1987. These figures stood in contrast to 1984, 
when there was a net profit of CFA F193 per kilogram. Coton- 
tchad' s position was not expected to improve unless the world price 
of cotton reached the CFA F600-per- kilogram range. 

With World Bank backing and support from France, the Nether- 
lands, and the EC, restructuring of Cotontchad began in 1986 with 
government implementation of the Emergency Cotton Program. 
At the producer level, the program called for freezing the price paid 
producers at the CFA FlOO-per-kilogram level through 1988 and 
studying new methods of fixing producer prices to reflect world 
market conditions. Subsidies on improved inputs, such as fertilizer 
and insecticides, were eliminated as of 1987, with producers 
assuming the costs. Cotton production was to be limited to about 
100,000 tons by restricting the area under production to 75,000 
hectares during the program period. At the company level, Coton- 
tchad sold nonessential assets to the private sector (including 2 air- 
craft and about 150 vehicles), closed its branch office in Bangui, 
Central African Republic, and laid off administrative staff. It also 
closed six ginneries and reduced the number of cotton collection 
centers in accordance with the production target of 100,000 tons. 



101 



Chad: A Country Study 

For its part, the government exempted Cotontchad from taxes, par- 
ticularly export duties, and suspended its contributions to the 
CSPC, the ONDR, and the Debt Amortization Fund (Caisse Auto- 
nome d'Amortissement— CAA). Staffs at the CSPC and the ONDR 
were reduced, and the roles of both organizations were reviewed. 

Subsistence Farming 

Since the 1950s, Chad's food production has declined (see table 4, 
Appendix A). Even so, despite pockets of malnutrition remaining 
in areas where rains failed or locusts damaged local crops, the overall 
picture for Chad's food production was good in the 1985-87 period. 
The rebound of food production in this period was the result of 
good rains, the return of political stability, and the absence of major 
conflict in the sahelian and soudanian zones. The downturn in cot- 
ton production and added restrictions on its cultivation also released 
lands and labor for farmers to put into food production. Produc- 
tion was so high in these years that, for the first time in a decade, 
it was estimated that Chad had returned to food sufficiency. This 
followed a cereal shortfall in the drought years of 1984 and 1985 
of around 325,000 tons. Total cereal production rose thereafter to 
the 700,000-ton level, well above the estimated 615,000 tons of 
grains needed for food sufficiency. 

Yet the overall food sufficiency registered by Chad in these years 
served to underscore the problem of regional imbalances in cereal 
production. The sahelian zone experienced a chronic shortfall in 
cereal production, whereas the soudanian zone traditionally had a 
cereal surplus. The soudanian zone was also the biggest producer 
of all subsistence food crops and of cash crops. It was estimated 
that the soudanian zone produced between 53 and 77 percent of 
Chad's total cereal production- from 1976 to 1985, with the aver- 
age falling in the 60- to 70-percent range. But because the popula- 
tions of the two regions were approximately equal, the lack of a 
good transport system and marketing mechanisms to allow the rapid 
transfer of the southern surplus to the northern zones was a con- 
stant problem. This danger was especially threatening during times 
of drought affecting the sahelian zone. 

Sorghum and Millet 

Chad's most important subsistence crops were sorghum, millet, 
and berebere. Areas under production for these grains showed a down- 
ward trend after the mid-1950s, dropping from an average of 
1.5 million hectares to around 1 million hectares in the 1960s 
and 1970s and falling to levels averaging 750,000 hectares between 
1981 and 1986. Taking an average for all lands devoted to grain 



102 



The Economy 



production during the years from 1981 to 1985, according to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), sorghum and millet 
cultivation accounted for 85 percent of the total area. Between 1980 
and 1985, these coarse grains accounted for 80 to 95 percent of 
all grain production. 

Wheat 

In 1987 wheat was Chad's least important cereal grain. Farm- 
ers planted the crop in polders around the shores of Lake Chad, 
and some small planting also was done in the oases and wadis of 
northern Chad. Replacing an earlier state operation, the Organi- 
zation for the Development of the Lake (Societe pour le Developpe- 
ment du Lac — SODELAC) was founded in 1967 to organize 
cultivation and provide wheat for the state-owned flour mill at 
N'Djamena, the Grands Moulins du Tchad. The flour mill began 
operations in 1964 but closed in 1980; as of 1987, operations had 
not resumed. In the late 1970s, plans to plant some 20,000 hect- 
ares of wheat in polders failed because warfare around Lake Chad 
affected the infrastructure of SODELAC and the construction of 
new polders and because farmers resisted SODELAC -controlled 
production. 

Wheat production generally followed trends similar to the produc- 
tion of other cereals, remaining low in the 1960s and 1970s but 
reaching a high in 1983. In 1984, however, production fell sharply. 
The bulk of wheat was traded through traditional channels to those 
herders in the northern regions of Chad who preferred wheat to 
millet or sorghum. 

Rice and Corn 

At the time of the French conquest, rice was grown on a small 
scale. Before World War I, the Germans on the Cameroon side 
of the Logone River encouraged the spread of rice cultivation. By 
World War II, the French imposed cultivation in the areas of 
southern Chad near Lai and Kelo, along the Logone River. 
Although production was destined originally for colonial troops, 
the taste for rice spread in some localities. What was originally 
intended by the French as a commercial cash crop had become a 
local subsistence crop by the 1980s. 

The Development Office for Sategui Deressia (Office de Mise en 
Valeur de Sategui-Deressia — OMVSD), founded in 1976, replaced 
Experimental Sectors for Agricultural Modernization (Secteurs 
Experimentaux de Modernisation Agricole — SEMAA), originally 
responsible for the organization, improvement, transformation, and 
commercialization of rice. Efforts by these organizations to extend 



103 



Chad: A Country Study 




40 50 60 
Percentage 



100 



Chadian government 
Foreign private 



Chadian private 
Foreign government 



1 National Sugar Company of Chad (Societe National Sucriere du Tchad-SONASUT) 

2 Chadian Textile Company (Societe Tchadienne de Textile--STT) 

3 Logone Breweries (Brasseries du Logone-BdL) 

4 Cigarette Factory of Chad (Manufacture des Cigarettes du Tchad--MCT) 

5 Industrial Agricultural Equipment Company (Societe Industrielle de Materiel Agricole du 
Tchad-SIMAT) 

6 Soft Drinks of Chad (Boissons Gazeuses du Tchad--BGT) 



Figure 6. Ownership of Chad's Major Industries, 1987 



commercial rice cultivation had mixed results. The area under rice 
cultivation has increased since the 1950s. Yet even in the 1980s, 
the greater part of this area was cultivated by traditional means. 
Schemes for controlled paddies at Bongor and Lai put only 3,500 
hectares and 1,800 hectares, respectively, into cultivation before 
political events of the late 1970s and early 1980s disrupted efforts 
and international donor funding ceased. The bulk of rice produc- 
tion from traditional floodwater paddies was traded to the towns 
and cities or was consumed locally. 

Corn was a crop of minor importance, grown in and around vil- 
lage gardens for local consumption. Production from the late 1960s 
through the mid-1980s remained in the 20,000- to 30,000-ton range. 
By 1987 no efforts at commercialization had been made, nor had 



104 



The Economy 



the government tried to improve and extend corn produc- 
tion. 

Peanuts 

Peanuts have become an important food crop in Chad. Peanuts 
were eaten roasted or dry, and their oil was used in cooking. Peanuts 
were cultivated in both the soudanian and the sahelian zones. Produc- 
tion of peanuts was more stable than that of any other major crop, 
staying in the 90,000- to 100,000-ton range from the 1950s through 
1987, with dips in drought years. The area under peanut produc- 
tion also remained stable, although kilograms-per-hectare yields 
declined slightly. The drought-resistant nature of peanuts made 
their production particularly important for the peoples of the sahelian 
zone, where peanuts were planted alone or in combination with 
millet in the first year of rotation; in the soudanian region, peanuts 
were traditionally planted in the third year of crop rotation. 

Although considerable efforts were made to commercialize peanut 
production, most efforts failed. Through the 1960s and 1970s, about 
97 percent of the annual crop went to local consumption. What 
remained was sold to various edible oil manufacturing concerns, 
none of which succeeded. For example, a Chinese-built peanut oil 
mill at Abeche, finished in 1969, never operated. Local farmers 
sold surplus peanuts through traditional channels, rather than to 
the state monopoly set up in 1965, the National Trading Company 
of Chad (Societe Nationale de Commercialisation du Tchad — 
SONACOT). This parastatal bought local produce for sale abroad 
or domestically to state-run commercial operations. Unlike Coton- 
tchad, SONACOT was never given the means to compel farmers 
to sell their crops, and it did not have the resources to compete 
with prices offered by traditional traders. With the collapse of central 
authority in 1979, SONACOT disappeared. The only commer- 
cial sales of peanuts were then limited to Cotontchad purchases 
in the south, but by 1987 these had been halted to reduce costs. 

Tubers 

The importance of tubers has grown dramatically over the years. 
Cassava and yams were the most important crops in this category, 
with much smaller production of potatoes, sweet potatoes, and coco 
yams (taro). Grown only in the soudanian zone, tubers were once 
neglected, although such cultivation is widespread in other parts 
of subtropical West Africa. Estimates in the 1950s put tuber produc- 
tion at 50,000 tons annually. Production rose and by 1961 it 
exceeded 200,000 tons. From 1961 to 1984, the proportion of roots 
and tubers in the national diet rose from 6 to 17 percent. The reason 



105 



Chad: A Country Study 



for this important shift in eating habits among people of the souda- 
nian zone was the hedge these crops provided against famine in 
years when drought reduced millet and sorghum production. 

Livestock 

Livestock raising, and in particular cattle herding, is a major 
economic activity. Animal husbandry was the main source of liveli- 
hood for perhaps a third of Chad's people. The growing impor- 
tance of cattle and meat exports underscored this point. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, these exports were estimated at between 25 and 30 per- 
cent of all merchandise exports. The proportion of these exports 
grew in the 1980s as the value of cotton exports declined. It was 
impossible, however, to know with certainty the actual values of 
cattle exports. For processed meat exports, less uncertainty existed 
because these exports were controlled from the slaughterhouse to 
the point of export; in 1985 processed meat exports represented 
less than 1 percent of all merchandise exports. The real value of 
Chad's cattle herds was in the export by traditional traders to mar- 
kets in Cameroon and Nigeria. These "on the hoof exports passed 
largely outside the control of customs services. Therefore, these 
exports were neither counted nor taxed. Perhaps one-fourth of cat- 
tle's estimated 30-percent share of total exports, was officially 
recorded. 

The size of Chad's herds was also difficult to determine. Consid- 
ered to have declined in the mid-1970s and again in the early 1980s 
because of drought and warfare across the sahelian zone, herds, 
estimated to be growing at a rate of 4 percent annually, reached 
some 4 million head of catde, 4.5 million sheep and goats, 500,000 
camels, and 420,000 horses and donkeys by the mid-1980s. Sheep 
and goats were found in all regions of Chad. 

Before the drought of the 1980s, the sahelian zone held the larg- 
est herds, with about 80 percent of the total cattle herd. Smaller 
numbers of cattle were found in the soudanian zone, along with about 
100,000 buffaloes used in plowing cotton fields. Camel herds were 
concentrated in the dry northern regions. Herders practiced trans- 
humance — seasonal migrations along fairly well-set patterns. 

With the 1984-85 drought, transhumance patterns changed. 
Camels were brought farther south into the sahelian zone in search 
of water. Catde were herded even farther south, sometimes through 
Salamat Prefecture into Central African Republic. 

The government and international donor community had con- 
templated considerable improvements for Chad's livestock manage- 
ment, but these plans were undermined by the Chadian Civil War, 
political instability, and an inadequate infrastructure. The most 



106 



The Economy 



successful programs have been animal vaccination campaigns, such 
as an emergency project carried out in 1983 to halt the spread of 
rinderpest. The campaign reached some 4.7 million head of cattle 
across the nation and demonstrated the capabilities of Chad's animal 
health service when given external support. The Livestock and 
Veterinary Medicine Institute of Chad (Institut d'Elevage et de 
Medecine Veterinaire du Tchad — IEMVT), which was financed 
by foreign aid, was capable of producing vaccines for Chad as well 
as for neighboring countries. Despite plant capacity, by 1984 a lack 
of a trained staff limited production to vaccines for anthrax and 
pasteurellosis. 

Two institutional efforts to manage cattle marketing were 
attempted in the 1970s and 1980s. The Chadian Animal Resources 
Improvement Company (Societe Tchadienne d' Exploitation des 
Ressources Animales — SOTERA), a mixed enterprise formed as 
a livestock company with participation by some traditional livestock 
traders, began operations in 1978. Its aim was to control live animal 
exports through a license system and to have a monopoly on exports 
of chilled meat and hides. It was hoped at the time that the associa- 
tion of traders to SOTERA would increase the effective collection 
of export taxes on livestock by 50 to 75 percent. By 1984, however, 
SOTERA handled only a small portion of the domestic market and 
less than 30 percent of the export trade. A second institution, the 
Center for the Modernization of Animal Production (Centre de 
Modernisation des Productions Animales — CMPA), was engaged 
in marketing dairy products, supplying chicks to farmers, and over- 
seeing the sale of eggs and the processing of feed. But, among other 
problems, the CMPA was unable to compete with local traders for 
milk needed to produce cheese for sale. Although highly subsidized, 
this venture also was unsuccessful and demonstrated the resilience 
of the traditional private network for marketing produce. 

Despite these institutional difficulties, the international commu- 
nity continued to support efforts to expand animal health services 
to Chad's herders. Some estimates suggest that the nation's herds 
could be increased by 35 percent if the distribution of water were 
improved, extension services were made more available, and animal 
health services were expanded. 

Fishing 

With its two major rivers, Lake Chad, and many runoff zones, 
in the 1970s Chad ranked high among Africa's producers of inland 
freshwater fish. With the drought and diversion of the waters of 
some rivers, however, production declined in the 1980s. Tradi- 
tionally, fish has been an important source of protein for those living 



107 



Chad: A Country Study 



along the rivers and lakes, and fishing was also a means of earn- 
ing cash. Because it was practiced in an entirely traditional man- 
ner and totally outside the control of government or modern 
commercial enterprises, there was no accurate statistical informa- 
tion on fishing. 

In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, total production of fish was esti- 
mated at between 60,000 and 120,000 tons per year. But because 
these figures represent production for the Logone River and Lake 
Chad, which are shared with Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, 
Chad's fish production amounted to an estimated 70 percent of 
the total. The largest part of the catch — perhaps two-thirds — was 
consumed locally. In areas adjacent to urban centers, some 
portion — usually the best of the catch, such as large Nile perch 
(called capitaine in Chad) — was marketed fresh. Along Lake Chad 
and the river borders with Cameroon, the surplus catch was dried, 
salted, or smoked before being sold. Between 1976 and 1985, 
production of dried, salted, or smoked fish was estimated at 20,000 
tons annually, representing from 20 to 25 percent of Chad's total 
annual- catch. A large share of the commerce in preserved fish was 
carried on with markets in Cameroon and Nigeria. Small dried 
or salted fish called salanga were most popular on the markets of 
Cameroon. Larger smoked fish called banda were generally exported 
to the major Nigerian market of Maiduguri. 

Through the mid-1980s, Chad had taken few steps to control 
or modernize fishing or to promote fish conservation, although some 
plans had been made in the 1960s and 1970s. Perhaps the most 
significant innovation applied by Chadian fishermen has been their 
use of nylon netting, which began in the 1960s. During the periods 
of conflict, no government plans could be carried out to control 
fishing. Although considerable potential existed for the develop- 
ment of the Chadian fishing industry, because of insufficient govern- 
ment interest traditional production and marketing of freshwater 
fish was likely to remain unchanged for the near term. 

Forestry 

Like most states of the African Sahel (see Glossary), Chad has 
suffered desertification — the encroachment of the desert. Tradi- 
tional herding practices and the need for firewood and wood for 
construction have exacerbated the problem. In the early 1980s, the 
country possessed between 13.5 million and 16 million hectares 
of forest and woodlands, representing a decline of almost 14 per- 
cent from the early 1960s. To what extent this decline was caused 
by climatic changes and to what extent by herding and cutting prac- 
tices was unknown. Regulation was difficult because some people 



108 



The Economy 



traditionally made their living selling wood and charcoal for fuel 
and wood for construction to people in the urban center. Although 
the government attempted to limit wood brought into the capital, 
the attempts have not been well managed, and unrestricted cut- 
ting of woodlands remained a problem. 

Manufacturing, Mining, and Utilities 
Manufacturing 

The small industrial sector was dominated by agribusiness, and 
Cotontchad in particular. Next in importance were the National 
Sugar Company of Chad (Societe Nationale Sucriere du Tchad — 
SONASUT), the Chadian Textile Company (Societe Tchadienne 
de Textile — STT), the Logone Breweries (Brasseries du Logone — 
BdL), and the Cigarette Factory of Chad (Manufacture des 
Cigarettes du Tchad — MCT). Observers estimated that these five 
industries generated some 20 percent of GDP. Of lesser impor- 
tance were the Farcha Slaughterhouse (Abattoir Frigorifique de 
Farcha), the Industrial Agricultural Equipment Company (Societe 
Industrielle de Materiel Agricole du Tchad — SIM AT), and Soft 
Drinks of Chad (Boissons Gazeuses du Tchad — BGT). 

During the Chadian Civil War, the facilities and equipment of 
many industries were badly damaged. Most industrial operations 
either ceased or were reduced greatly, and almost all foreign inves- 
tors withdrew from the country. Those operations that did con- 
tinue on a reduced scale were limited to the soudanian region, which 
was not involved directly in large-scale fighting. By 1983, with the 
reestablishment of political stability on a national scale, the five 
major industrial concerns resumed full operations, and the less 
significant ones, such as SIM AT and the BGT, were rebuilt. 

With the exception of the two bottling companies (the BGT and 
the BdL), which were privately owned, all the other important 
industries were either parastatals with majority government owner- 
ship or mixed companies with important government participa- 
tion (see fig. 6). For the most part, private participation was limit- 
ed to French investors; investment by private Chadian interests 
was extremely rare. French companies were also important share- 
holders in the larger Chadian companies, such as Cotontchad. 
Except for Cotontchad, whose top management was Chadian, all 
the other major industries were run by expatriate directors, accoun- 
tants, and mid-level managers who, for the most part, were French. 

Industrial output grew rapidly in 1983 and 1984, as industries 
resumed operations that had been interrupted by war. By 1984 and 
1985, prewar levels of output had been either reached or exceeded. 



109 



Chad: A Country Study 

Growth slowed for all industries after 1985, however, because of 
the dramatic downturn of world cotton prices, and output in 1986 
began to decline. 

Cotton fiber production by Cotontchad, which directly reflected 
production of raw cotton, fell sharply in 1985. This decline was 
stabilized in 1986-87 by emergency support from international 
donors. These donors prescribed retrenchment programs to pre- 
vent the total collapse of the cotton industry. The restrictions 
imposed on the production of ginned cotton fiber, however, reduced 
by half the number of ginning mills, with raw cotton production 
limited to about 100,000 tons. Production of edible oils by Coton- 
tchad was also affected by the program of cost savings. 

Other industries were affected directiy by the fall of cotton prices. 
STT textile production slowed, as did the production of agricul- 
tural equipment by SIM AT, which made plowing equipment for 
use in cotton planting. Furthermore, the drop in revenues to farmers 
in the soudanian zone for their cotton and peanut production affected 
their ability to buy equipment. Lost revenues to farmers, along 
with the reduction in the numbers of workers needed in ginning 
operations, took a toll on cash earnings and therefore on buying 
power. By 1986 the ripple effect of these lost revenues in the cot- 
ton sector was widespread. The downturn in production in all indus- 
tries left Chad with considerable unused capacity, ranging from 
15 to 50 percent. 

A number of other factors resulted in the slump in Chadian indus- 
try. Commercial sale of goods was low in a largely cash poor or 
nonmonetary economy. The decline in the cotton sector, which 
had provided the largest infusion of cash into the economy, fur- 
ther reduced consumer demand. Another impediment to industry 
was the high local cost of production compared with the cost of 
production in neighboring countries. Factors that raised local 
production costs included high transportation costs, overdependence 
on imports, and restricted economies of scale for small operations. 
Imported inputs were equivalent to about 30 percent of industrial 
turnover for Cotontchad, the BdL, and the STT and to about 
60 percent for the MCT. Local substitutes for inputs were often 
more expensive than imported equivalents. Imports were often mar- 
keted to subsidize local production by a given industry. An exam- 
ple was SONASUT's importing refined sugar at less than local 
production costs, selling it locally, and using the proceeds to sub- 
sidize sugarcane production on SONASUT plantations. Interlock- 
ing relationships of production among companies also kept 
production costs high. For example, the BGT used SONASUT's 
refined sugar in its production of soft drinks, according to a 



110 



The Economy 



convention with the government to use local inputs, even though 
imported refined sugar was cheaper. 

Before the warfare of the 1979-82 period, Chad's industrial sector 
included between 80 and 100 small- to medium-sized enterprises, 
in addition to the major manufacturing industries. Most processed 
agricultural products or competed in the import-export trade. About 
half were local subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms or were Chadian 
firms with significant foreign capital. The foreign-owned distributor- 
ships sold agricultural equipment, construction materials, and 
petroleum products. 

Since 1983 the return of foreign investment has been slow because 
of the high costs of rebuilding and a continuing perception of 
political uncertainty. Of the approximately twenty enterprises that 
had reopened by the late 1980s, most were import-export enter- 
prises that lacked a formal relationship with the banking sector. 
Most Chadian-owned enterprises had managed to reestablish them- 
selves. Yet by 1986, small enterprises that had assembled bicycles, 
motorcycles, and radios remained closed. 

The lack of access to credit was another impediment to business 
expansion in Chad. Despite the reopening in 1983 of the Bank of 
Central African States (Banque des Etats d'Afrique Centrale — 
BEAC) and of two commercial banks, the International Bank for 
Africa in Chad (Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique au Tchad — 
BIAT) and the Chadian Credit and Deposit Bank (Banque Tchad- 
ienne de Credit et de Depot — BTCD), the high proportion of 
available credit going to Chad's major industries limited credit avail- 
able to smaller enterprises (see Banking and Finance, this ch.). 
Moreover, the banks invoked strict criteria for loan eligibility 
because of the high risk of lending in Chad. Few owners of small 
businesses knew sufficient accounting and technical skills to meet 
bank information requirements for loans. 

Mining 

The only mineral exploited in Chad was sodium carbonate, or 
natron. Also called sal soda or washing soda, natron was used as 
a salt for medicinal purposes, as a preservative for hides, and as 
an ingredient in the traditional manufacture of soap; herders also 
fed it to their animals. Natron deposits were located around the 
shore of Lake Chad and the wadis of Kanem Prefecture. 

Natron occurs naturally in two forms: white and black. More 
valuable commercially, hard blocks of black natron were exported 
to Nigeria. White natron was sold on local markets, principally 
in N'Djamena and farther to the south. Although efforts were made 
in the late 1960s to control the commercialization of natron through 



111 



Chad: A Country Study 



the creation of a parastatal, by 1970 those efforts had failed because 
of resistance by traditional chiefs and traders who controlled produc- 
tion through a system of perpetual indebtedness. 

A number of other mineral deposits are known, but none had 
been commercially exploited by the mid-1980s. Bauxite is found 
in the soudanian zone, and gold-bearing quartz is reported in Biltine 
Prefecture. Uranium is reported in the Aozou Strip, as are tin and 
tungsten in other parts of the Tibesti Mountains, but exploration 
reports in 1971 for these three minerals did not indicate large or 
rich deposits. As of 1987, conflicts in the region prevented further 
exploration. 

By far the potentially most important resource is oil. In 1970 
a consortium of Conoco, Shell, Chevron, and Exxon started 
exploration and in 1974 discovered minor oil deposits at Sedigi, 
near Rig Rig, to the north of Lake Chad (see fig. 7). Total reserves 
at Sedigi were estimated at 60 million tons, or roughly 438 million 
barrels of oil. Exploration in 1985 by the Exxon-led consortium 
discovered potentially large deposits near Doba in the southern 
region of Chad. Further efforts were suspended in 1986 when world 
oil prices continued to drop, although the consortium maintained 
a liaison office in N'Djamena in 1988. 

Plans existed in the late 1970s to exploit the deposits at Sedigi 
and to construct a small refinery at N'Djamena. Those plans lapsed 
during the conflicts of the late 1970s and early 1980s but were 
revived in 1986 by the government with the support of the World 
Bank. The reasons for proceeding with plans to exploit these deposits 
and build a refinery were clear. The cost of importing petroleum 
products exceeded the cost of extracting and refining domestic 
crude, even when international oil prices were low. The plans, which 
anticipated operations to begin in the early 1990s, included well 
development in the Sedigi field, a pipeline to N'Djamena, a refinery 
with a 2,000- to 5,000-barrels-per-day (bpd — see Glossary) capac- 
ity, and the transformation or acquisition of power-generating 
equipment in the capital to burn the refinery's residual fuel oil. 
The refinery's output would satisfy 80 percent of Chad's annual 
fuel needs, including all gasoline, diesel, butane, and kerosene; 
lubricants and jet fuel, however, would still have to be imported. 

Water and Electricity 

In the late 1980s, public utilities in Chad were extremely limited. 
The Chadian Water and Electricity Company (Societe Tchadienne 
d'Eau et d'Electricite — STEE), was the major public utility com- 
pany. The government held 82 percent of the shares and CCCE 
held 18 percent. STEE provided water and electricity to the four 



112 



The Economy 



main urban areas, N'Djamena, Moundou, Sarh, and Abeche. The 
company supplied water, but not electricity, to six other towns. 
Despite old equipment and high maintenance costs, STEE was able 
to meet about half of peak demand, which increased significantly 
from 1983 to 1986. Production of electricity rose by 35 percent from 
1983 to 1986, and the supply of water increased by 24 percent dur- 
ing the same period. In 1986 STEE produced 62. 1 million kilowatt- 
hours of electricity and supplied 10.8 million cubic meters of water. 

In N'Djamena the majority of households had access to water. 
There were, however, only about 3,000 officially connected cus- 
tomers, a good proportion of which were collective customers. There 
were also an estimated 1,500 illegal water connections. The rest 
of the people received water from standpipes. Some 5,000 customers 
were officially connected for electricity in the capital in 1986, with 
an unknown number of illegal connections. Because electricity was 
so expensive and because electrical appliances were beyond the 
means of most people, the consumption of power per household 
was low. The high cost of electricity also hindered the expansion 
of small- and medium- sized enterprises. 

Transportation and Communications 

As a landlocked state, Chad has no ports. The nearest ports were 
all located on the Atlantic Ocean. Douala, Cameroon, at 1,700 
kilometers from N'Djamena was the closest port. Furthermore, 
there were no railroads in the country. Two ancient land routes 
connected Chad to the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. The 
first, more than 3,000 kilometers across difficult desert tracks, led 
north to Benghazi, Libya. The second, to the Red Sea via Sudan 
to Port Sudan, was 2,600 kilometers from Abeche and 3,350 kilo- 
meters from N'Djamena. Neither route has been used for com- 
mercial traffic in modern times. There were only two Atlantic routes 
of commercial importance in the 1970s and 1980s. One was the 
Nigerian rail-connected routes to Port Harcourt or Lagos via 
Maiduguri; the other was the Cameroonian route to Douala via 
rail from Ngaoundere. Because of Nigeria's internal political diffi- 
culties and its troubled relations with its neighbors, the Nigerian 
route was intermittentiy closed to Chadian traffic in the 1980s, leav- 
ing open only the Cameroonian route to surface traffic into and 
out of Chad. 

Until 1985 there was no permanent bridge across the Chari River 
to N'Djamena. Access to N'Djamena from Kousseri, Cameroon, 
was by ferry. When water levels fell during the drought of 1984 
and 1985, ferries sometimes were unable to make the crossing. To 
alleviate this problem, in 1985 a pontoon bridge was constructed 



113 



Chad: A Country Study 




Figure 7. Economic Activity, 1987 
114 



The Economy 



over the Chari River. A similar situation existed farther south 
where, in 1986, a bridge was constructed at Lere, across the Mayo- 
Kebbi River. This bridge replaced ferry transport, formerly the 
only means of crossing, and linked southern Chad with Cameroon. 

The closest rail links to Chad were the Nigerian rail system from 
Maiduguri to the ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt and the Cam- 
eroon system from Ngaoundere to Douala. Both were connected 
to Kousseri in Cameroon, across the Chari River from N'Djamena, 
via all-weather roads, then on to Chad via the bridge over the Chari 
(see fig. 8). 

The country's external traffic amounted to some 350,000 tons 
per year in the mid-1980s. For the most part, this traffic was car- 
ried on the road and rail route to Douala via Ngaoundere. A great 
part of this traffic did not leave Chad via the capital. Chad's larg- 
est export, ginned cotton, took routes directly from the southern 
region to Cameroon via Lere (Chad) and Garoua (Cameroon) 
before reaching the rail at Ngaoundere. Petroleum products were 
imported entirely by road, whether from Cameroon or from 
Nigeria. 

As a member of the Customs Union of Central African States 
(Union Douaniere des Etats d'Afrique Centrale — UDEAC), Chad 
exported and imported goods through a free storage area at Douala. 
The facility was completed in 1985 with funding from the EC and 
served both Chad and Central African Republic. The facility per- 
mitted long-term storage of goods exported from or imported into 
Chad. Agreements with Cameroon under UDEAC auspices allowed 
reductions of 50 percent on port taxes and of 25 percent on the 
total charged for handling costs. A quota for rail transport was also 
established whereby Chadian importers and exporters paid only 
65 percent of rail charges to transport their goods and the remain- 
ing 35 percent was assumed by Cameroon. 

Land Transport 

In 1988 the road system in Chad remained deteriorated or under- 
developed. At one time, two paved roads linked the capital to the 
interior: one to Massaguet, 80 kilometers to the northeast, and the 
other to Gelendeng, 160 kilometers to the south. Both roads, 
however, had virtually disappeared by 1987 because of lack of main- 
tenance. Of the 253 kilometers of paved roads reported in 1978, 
none were still paved in 1987. Chad had about 7,300 kilometers 
of dirt roads and tracks that were partly maintained; only 1,260 
kilometers were all-weather roads. About 24,000 kilometers of rural 
marked tracks received no maintenance at all. Most of this road 
and track network was passable only during the dry season. 



115 



Chad: A Country Study 




The Economy 



Considerable foreign donor attention was focused on land trans- 
portation problems. In addition to the externally financed bridges 
constructed to allow passage to Cameroon, the National Office of 
Roads (Office National des Routes — OFNAR) under the Minis- 
try of Public Works, Housing, and Urban Development used tech- 
nical assistance and training financed by the United States Agency 
for International Development (AID) and the United Nations Inter- 
national Development Agency (IDA). In 1987 three OFNAR sub- 
divisions operated in N'Djamena, Sarh, and Moundou. Plans 
existed to open subdivisions in Abeche and Mongo as road rehabili- 
tation advanced into these areas. The National Quarry Office 
(Office National des Carrieres — OFNC) was created in 1986 under 
the Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and Urban Development 
to manage quarry operations at Dandi (north of N'Djamena near 
Lake Chad), using a large crusher financed by AID. The crushed 
stone was to be used for road improvements. 

Government plans for the rehabilitation of the national road net- 
work called for the reconstruction of 3,800 kilometers of priority roads 
from 1987 to 1992. In 1987 about 2,000 kilometers were receiving 
spot repairs. The network of priority roads would reestablish the 
all-weather links between the capital and Sarh via Gelendeng and 
Niellim. It would also connect Sarh to Lere via Moundou in the 
south and N'Djamena to Am Timan via Bokoro and Mongo. The 
reconstruction and maintenance of the system would depend on the 
success of IDA- and AID-funded efforts to restore the capabilities 
of the OFNAR and to start the operation of the Dandi quarry. 

Domestic freight traffic amounted to approximately 265,000 tons 
per year in the early 1980s. More than 100,000 tons of this traffic 
was in the southern regions, which included the transport of the 
cotton crop from collection points to ginning mills and then to points 
of export. The transport of food in normal nondrought years aver- 
aged around 50,000 tons annually. The internal transport of petro- 
leum products represented some 25,000 tons annually of the total 
domestic freight, with the distribution of beer, sugar, and miscel- 
laneous consumer goods making up the balance. 

Transport during the rainy season was difficult, particularly 
between the capital and sahelian and soudanian zones. To avoid the 
swollen rivers and runoffs, Chadian traffic often was forced to pass 
by way of Cameroon, taking all-weather and paved roads via 
Maroua from Lere or Bongor and then on to Kousseri and 
N'Djamena. Travel in the rainy season via Maroua to Mayo-Kebbi 
Prefecture was a day or day-and-one-half journey; the internal route 
south from N'Djamena toward Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture could take 
two weeks or longer. 



117 



Chad: A Country Study 



The main transport carriers in Chad in 1987 were the Coopera- 
tive of Chadian Transporters (Cooperative des Transporteurs 
Tchadiens — CTT), Cotontchad, and the United Nations Develop- 
ment Programme (UNDP) Emergency Food Programme trans- 
port fleet. The CTT was an association of private truck owners 
having a government-granted monopoly on all internal and exter- 
nal transport, except for the operations of Cotontchad and other 
parastatals with private trucking fleets. In 1985 the CTT had 382 
members, who owned 580 trucks with a total capacity of 16,700 
tons, as well as 108 tanker trucks for fuel transport with a capacity 
of 3,427 cubic meters. The CTT transported some 150,000 tons 
of dry cargo and an estimated 8,700 cubic meters of petroleum 
products in the same year. Not all transporters participated in the 
cooperative. Trucks with capacities of five tons or less carried 
unrecorded but significant amounts of goods over short distances. 

Cotontchad, which was not a member of the CTT, was the sin- 
gle largest carrier in Chad. In 1985 it operated about 260 heavy 
trucks and another 100 light- to medium-weight vehicles that trans- 
ported the cotton crop from collection points to ginning operations 
and on to export terminals. In 1986, as a part of the emergency 
restructuring program to reduce transport costs, the company sold 
about eighty of its large tractor trailer trucks to the CTT, which 
was expected to take responsibility for the long-distance import- 
export movement of the cotton crop. 

The UNDP fleet in 1985 consisted of 240 trucks to transport 
emergency food during the drought. In 1987 the number of UNDP 
trucks fell to about 150, and these trucks were underused. In the 
late 1980s, the fleet brought supplies and food to remaining pock- 
ets of malnutrition, especially to those areas hit by locust infesta- 
tions. The government was anxious to maintain this fleet for use 
during any renewed drought, despite the overcapacity and possi- 
ble competition the fleet's operations might pose for the CTT. 

By 1987 overall trucking capacity exceeded demand for domes- 
tic and import-export transport. Much of the fleet was also mis- 
matched for domestic needs, being either oversized or suited more 
for the paved and all-weather roads leading into the country. 
Moreover, many trucks were in poor condition. To compound the 
problem, there were insufficient maintenance and support facili- 
ties available to keep vehicles in good repair. Studies were under 
way in 1987 to improve this situation, with particular attention 
to breaking up the CTT's monopoly. 

Air Transport 

Chad was regularly served by two international air carriers in 



118 



The Economy 



1987, Air Afrique and the French-owned Air Transport Union 
(Union des Transports Aeriens — UTA). These carriers shared four 
flights weekly through Chad's only international airport, at 
N'Djamena, with connections to Paris twice weekly and also south 
to Bangui and Brazzaville twice weekly. N'Djamena's airport was 
capable of receiving the largest aircraft, including Boeing 747 and 
Airbus passenger airplanes used by the two carriers, and giant cargo 
aircraft such as the C-5A used in military supply. The airport was 
rehabilitated after armed hostilities in 1980 and 1981 destroyed all 
control and support facilities. Rehabilitation included widening and 
extending the runway. Other smaller regional carriers handled 
traffic to Khartoum (Air Sudan) and to Douala (Cameroon 
Airlines). Chad's own airline, Air Tchad, served internal routes 
to Abeche, Sarh, and Moundou and to other points on an occa- 
sional basis. In 1987 Air Tchad was equipped with a nineteen- seat 
Twin Otter and a forty-four- seat Fokker 27. Internal traffic also 
was served by several small four- to six-passenger aircraft owned 
privately or by international organizations. In addition to the air- 
port at N'Djamena, smaller fields at Abeche, Sarh, and Moun- 
dou were capable of receiving small jet traffic and propeller aircraft. 
Small dirt strips were also located in several towns throughout the 
country. 

Communications 

Chad's telecommunications system was one of the least devel- 
oped in Africa. International telecommunications were conducted 
by the parastatal International Telecommunications Company of 
Chad (Societe de Telecommunications Internationales du Tchad — 
STIT) under the responsibility of the Ministry of Posts and Tele- 
communications. Telephone and telex service between Paris and 
N'Djamena assured communications with the international com- 
munity. No direct links, however, existed in 1986 between Chad 
and its African neighbors; all telecommunications passed via Paris. 
Some internal telephone service connected Abeche, Moundou, 
Sarh, and N'Djamena. The only means of internal communica- 
tions was by shortwave radio. Postal service via air between Paris 
and N'Djamena existed. However, postal service beyond the capi- 
tal, except to Moundou and Sarh, was limited. In 1987 international 
mail had to be delivered to the central post office in the capital a 
day before the next scheduled flight to Paris to assure delivery. Mail 
arriving in N'Djamena was posted to boxes at the central post office 
for pickup by box owners. No delivery was available to residences 
or businesses, all official addresses in the capital being post office 
boxes. 



119 



Chad: A Country Study 

Trade and Commerce 

Historically, Chad has been a country of traders. The ancient 
kingdoms of Kanem, Borno, and Wadai built their power on trade 
with Libya, Egypt, and Sudan (see Era of Empires: A.D. 900-1900, 
ch. 1). During the colonial period, trade increased with franco- 
phone countries and Nigeria. In the 1970s, the structure and direc- 
tion of external trade remained similar to the pattern of colonial 
times, the most important trading partners being France and 
Nigeria. Exports to France were principally cotton fiber, and 
imports were finished manufactured goods and equipment. Much 
of the trade with Nigeria, consisting of cattle, fish, natron, and 
other traditional products, was unrecorded and did not pass through 
official channels. Since the civil upheavals of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, which restricted all external trade, unofficial trade with 
Nigeria has resumed. Official trade with France declined after 1982, 
primarily because many French-affiliated firms closed during the 
conflicts. As of late 1987, many of those concerns had not reopened. 

Controlling smuggling and black market activity was very 
difficult. Chad and its neighbors had few resources that could be 
devoted to border control. Collusion among smugglers and border 
patrols and customs agents was common. Moreover, Chad's 
unofficial trade with Nigeria, Cameroon, and Central African 
Republic has historical and social roots. Tribal and extended family 
connections across borders encouraged traders to maintain long- 
range commercial and financial networks beyond colonial and, later, 
national government control and taxes. Traders unofficially 
exported the bulk of Chad's exports of cattle, fish, and other tradi- 
tional products. Unofficial imports consisted of petroleum products 
and consumer goods, such as sugar, cooking oil, soap, and ciga- 
rettes, that competed with production by national industries. The 
permeability of Chad's borders and the informality of traditional 
trading networks denied the government revenues ordinarily 
derived from export-import duties. Locally produced goods and 
legal imports fared badly in this market, burdened as they were 
with high production costs, lack of economies of scale, and price 
distortions imposed by government controls. 

Exports 

The bulk of Chad's official exports were agricultural products, 
which have accounted for 80 to 95 percent of all exports since 
independence. Of these exports, cotton fiber was most important, 
followed by cattle and beef exports. The value of Chad's cotton 
fiber exports rose steadily in the 1970s (see Cotton, this ch.). During 



120 



The Economy 



the early 1980s, as armed conflict took its toll on cotton produc- 
tion, the value of cotton fiber exports dropped. The return of 
political stability in 1983 and increased cotton production coincided 
with a rise in world cotton prices, resulting in dramatic increases 
in the value of Chad's cotton exports in 1983 and 1984. The value 
of these exports more than doubled from 1982 to 1983 and almost 
doubled again in 1984. 

The downturn of world cotton prices in 1985 caused a collapse 
in cotton exports. The value of cotton fiber exports from Chad in 
1985 was less than half that of the record 1984 level; the value fell 
even further in 1986. In 1984 cotton fiber had represented 73 per- 
cent of the value of all Chad's exports, but in 1986 it represented 
only 43 percent. The value of all exports also reflected the decline, 
falling from a high in 1984 of almost CFA F48 billion to around 
CFA F34 billion in 1986. 

The estimated value of Chad's cattle exports remained more 
stable from 1983 to 1986. As the value of cotton fiber exports 
declined, the relative importance of cattle exports to the Chadian 
economy grew. 

Imports 

Since the late 1960s, the economic significance of imported 
manufactured and capital goods has grown considerably. From 1967 
to 1970, manufactured goods of all types accounted for 46 to 
50 percent of Chad's imports. By 1975 manufactured goods 
accounted for 65 percent of imports. The total value of all imports 
also grew, doubling between 1965 and 1970 to almost CFA F13 
billion. Total imports continued to grow through 1978 to nearly 
CFA F36 billion before showing a serious decline from 1979 to 1981 
because of the heavy fighting. Imports increased after 1982, reach- 
ing around CFA F37 billion in 1983 and then doubling by 1985. 
The leap in imports between these years reflected not only the 
increase in imported manufactured and capital goods needed to 
rebuild the shattered economic infrastructure but also an increase 
in food assistance in these years of drought. The downturn of 
imports between 1985 and 1986 indicated in part a decline in food 
imports with the return of good rains. 

Direction of Trade 

Throughout the 1960s — Chad's first decade of independence — 
France remained its most important official trading partner. In 1970 
France absorbed 73 percent of Chad's exports and provided some 
40 percent of Chad's imports. Between 1979 and 1985, Chad diver- 
sified its markets by trading more actively with Spain, the Federal 



121 



Chad: A Country Study 



Republic of Germany (West Germany), and particularly Portu- 
gal, which absorbed the bulk of Chad's exports, mainly cotton fiber. 
By 1985 France ranked sixth behind Portugal, West Germany, 
Cameroon, Spain and the Benelux countries (Belgium, The Nether- 
lands and Luxembourg; see table 5, Appendix A). Chad's exports 
of beef and other traditional products to its neighbors, and espe- 
cially to Nigeria, did not appear in official trade figures. 

Although losing significance as a customer, France remained 
Chad's most important supplier. In 1985 France supplied almost 
one-fourth of Chad's total imports. The United States ranked 
second, followed by Cameroon, Italy, and the Benelux countries; 
unspecified West European countries accounted for about 2 1 per- 
cent of Chad's imports in 1985. Chad had little trade with Middle 
Eastern and North African countries. Both official and black mar- 
ket oil imports came from either Cameroon or Nigeria. Chad had 
no declared trade with the Soviet Union or East European countries. 

Balance of Payments and Finance 

Balance of Payments 

With the exception of the 1979-81 period, which were years of 
heavy conflict when collapsed imports were offset by some con- 
tinued cotton exports, Chad has run deficits in its trade balance 
since the 1960s (see table 6, Appendix A). The size of these deficits 
depended on the world cotton market. In 1984, when Chad had 
high export earnings as a result of record cotton production and 
high world cotton prices, the trade deficit was modest. The fol- 
lowing year, when world cotton prices fell, production declined. 
Export earnings from cotton were half those of 1984, and total 
export earnings on all goods dropped by one-third. Problems with 
the cotton sector continued in 1986 and 1987. World cotton prices 
remained low, and the fall in the value of the United States dollar 
aggravated the situation because world cotton prices were quoted 
in dollars. At the same time that export earnings dropped, Chad's 
imports rose. The value of imports increased by almost 40 percent 
in 1985. A large part of this rise resulted from oil exploration, which 
was only partially offset by direct investments in Chad by the oil 
drilling companies. Increased imports of fertilizers and insecticides 
for Cotontchad's expanded program to improve production in those 
years also contributed to the trade deficit. The net result of these 
events was that the modest trade deficits of 1983 and 1984 grew 
into large deficits in 1985 and 1986. 



122 



A ferry over the Chart River 
Courtesy Audrey Kizziar 
Trucks carrying medical supplies over dirt tracks in the sahelian zone 

Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee) 



123 



Chad: A Country Study 

Banking and Finance 

Chad has been a member of the BEAC since independence. The 
BE AC, with the backing of the French treasury, served as the central 
bank of its member states: Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Consequendy, Chad 
has adhered to the Franc Zone, using as currency the African Finan- 
cial Community franc, (Communaute Financiere Africaine — CFA; 
for value of the CFA franc — see Glossary). Use of the CFA franc, 
which was tied to the value of the French franc (FF) at CFA F50 
to FF1, gave Chad a stable, convertible currency. This factor 
spurred trader confidence in the value of the currency and in the 
ability to convert to hard currency acceptable as payment for 
imports. It was particularly helpful to the economy to have a stable 
currency backed by regional and international cooperation and not 
subject to political whim as governments and coalitions fought for 
power in Chad. Reconstruction after 1982 would have been far 
slower and more difficult had currency value suffered the volatility, 
inflation, and distrust of traders so often encountered in other Third 
World nations. 

All banking offices closed in 1979 and 1980 when N'Djamena 
was the scene of heavy fighting. The BEAC reopened in 1981 along 
with the BIAT, the BTCD, and the Development Bank of Chad 
(Banque de Developpement du Tchad — BDT). Only the Interna- 
tional Bank for Commerce and Industry in Chad (Banque Inter- 
nationale pour le Commerce et l'lndustrie du Tchad — BICIT) had 
failed to reopen by late 1987, leaving Chad with only three banks 
plus the central bank. Of the three banks, only the BIAT — the local 
subsidiary of the French-owned International Bank for West Africa 
(Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale — BIAO) was 
totally under private ownership. The government and the French 
bank Credit Lyonnais shared joint ownership of the BTCD, along 
with some other smaller investors. The BDT was the principal 
government-controlled bank for development purposes; it received 
considerable support from the CCCE, a key arm of French foreign 
assistance programs. 

In Chad the flow of credit and cash traditionally followed the 
rhythm of the cotton- growing season. Cotontchad, by law required 
to buy all cotton produced at preset prices, made short-term loans 
from the banks before planting each year to import materials for 
its cultivation improvement programs and to pay the producers 
for their crops at harvest. The credit portfolios of Chad's banks 
reflected this situation. In 1986 almost 90 percent of the claims on 
banks were short-term loans, more than 70 percent of which were 



124 



The Economy 



consigned to Cotontchad. Overall, Cotontchad claimed 64 percent 
of all credit available to the economy. In 1984, with rising cotton 
production and good world prices, credit extended by the BE AC 
expanded quickly. This credit permitted an adequate level of indus- 
trial and consumer imports but drained the BEAC's exchange 
reserves. With the collapse of world cotton prices in 1985, Coton- 
tchad's revenues dropped, and foreign exchange flowing into Chad 
declined. As a result, the BEAC's exchange reserves dropped 
precipitously in 1986. Operations in the banking sector ground to 
a halt as Cotontchad fell into arrears on repayments of its short- 
term debt. In late 1986, the BEAC negotiated a rescheduling of 
about three-fourths of the short-term debt, allowing a ten-year matu- 
rity, including a five-year grace period with an interest rate of 
6 percent. The solution neither reduced the exposure of the pri- 
vate banks for loans to Cotontchad nor direcdy improved the general 
credit situation for other potential borrowers, especially the small - 
and medium-sized enterprises that often were squeezed out of the 
market. It did, however, save Chad's banking structure and Coton- 
tchad from immediate collapse by buying time for longer-term solu- 
tions to be formulated with the aid of foreign donors. 

No mechanisms existed for extending credit directly to farmers 
beyond assistance for cotton production. Before the Chadian Civil 
War, the BDT and the ONDR extended credit on a limited basis, 
as did the government's Rural Action and Development Fund 
(Fonds de Developpement et d'Action Rurale — FDAR). But these 
credits for marketing agricultural products were not repaid, and 
the FDAR ceased operations in 1981 . In 1985 the government cre- 
ated the Fund for Rural Intervention (Fonds d 'Intervention 
Rurale — FIR) to replace the FDAR. Through 1987 the govern- 
ment was unable to fund the FIR, and the international donor com- 
munity did not provide agricultural credit on a sectoral level other 
than for cotton, which impeded Chad's intention to diversify its 
agricultural economy. In 1986 the World Bank financed a study 
and a long-term technical assistance program to determine credit 
needs and options for the design of an appropriate system of rural 
credits. These actions were taken in cooperation with other insti- 
tutions, such as the ONDR (extension services) and SIMAT under 
the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop- 
ment. 

In 1983 the government imposed a five-year moratorium that 
froze all deposits and outstanding credits before 1980. The morato- 
rium's purpose was to prevent a run on banks and to staunch capi- 
tal flight when banks restored operations in early 1983 under the 
new government. The impact of the moratorium was twofold. On 



125 



Chad: A Country Study 



the one hand, it served to reduce credit available to the economy 
because entrepreneurs were unable to withdraw assets for invest- 
ment or operations. On the other hand, the amount of frozen credits 
was more than double that of frozen deposits, so the action pro- 
tected other businesses from service on debts during the hard times 
of recovery. 

The longer-term financial situation was bleak. The problem of 
interest payments to the BEAC for rediscounted credits, which made 
up the majority of frozen credits, compounded by Cotontchad's 
difficulties in meeting its debt obligations to the banks, seriously 
strained Chad's banking system. 

Government Finances 

In 1983 the Ministry of Finance produced its first central govern- 
ment budget in four years. By 1986 the government had adopted 
a standardized nomenclature that resulted in more effective manage- 
ment of revenues and expenditures throughout government minis- 
tries. The government also initiated measures to improve tax 
administration, including the reorganization of customs inspections 
in the capital, the creation of tax enforcement teams and tax offices 
in secondary cities, and greater control over records for the larg- 
est tax-paying enterprises. The State Control (Controle d'Etat), 
an autonomous auditing unit directly attached to the presidency, 
performed audits and investigations throughout public agencies and 
enterprises to deter fraud and misuse of public funds. 

Chad's public sector was small compared with the size of the 
economy. In 1977 total government revenues amounted to about 
9 percent of GDP. The deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP, although 
low when compared with such figures for other nations, was 
nevertheless significant because the figure represented one-third 
of total government revenues in that year. In absolute terms, 
revenues and expenditures were small but increasing from 1983 
through 1985. The small size of government was a consequence 
of its reestablishment after the conflicts ended in 1982 and the 
limited resources of administration. The government's preference 
for a liberal economy, with the public sector a complement to, and 
not a substitute for, the private sector, also helped to hold down 
the size of the central administration. The sharp increases in 
expenditures and revenues from 1983 to 1985 reflect the reinstitu- 
tion of government operations after 1982 and the increases in cotton- 
generated revenues during these years of good crops and high world 
cotton prices. The equally sharp decline in revenues in 1986 
reflected the drop in world cotton prices and the halt in Coton- 
tchad's contributions to the central treasury through duties on cotton 



126 



The Economy 



exports. In the mid-1980s, expenditures, elevated by defense spend- 
ing and the needs of a stable administration, first stagnated and 
then dropped somewhat. The reduction, however, did not keep 
pace with declining revenues, resulting in a 90 percent increase 
in the deficit in 1986. 

During the same year, under terms of the Emergency Cotton 
Program, Cotontchad ceased all fiscal contributions to the govern- 
ment. The government's challenge was to control the fiscal deficit 
in the absence of cotton revenues either by cutting expenditures 
or by generating additional revenues. There was little room for 
movement on the expenditure side. Military outlays and salaries 
of government employees were the largest budget items. Defense 
spending was highly unpredictable and unlikely to be reduced 
quickly in the face of continued insurgency in the north. The offi- 
cially declared defense expenditures were between 34.5 and 
37.6 percent of government spending from 1984 to 1986 (see 
Defense Expenditures, ch. 5). Clearly, however, such figures 
represented only a part of total military spending, which may have 
been as high as 70 percent of government expenditures. 

Government salaries were also difficult to reduce. The reinsti- 
tution of administrative government activities in 1982 brought the 
number of civil servants to between 20,000 and 23,000 by 1985. 
This increase reflected not only the government's renewal of opera- 
tions but also its policy of national reconciliation. In part, that policy 
guaranteed positions to the most important former civil servants — 
largely those from the southern regions — who wanted to reenter 
government service. In the 1985-86 period, the government paid 
civil servants only 60 percent of their salaries, based on salary scales 
set in 1967. Although salaries for civil servants were low, the govern- 
ment was often unable to finance the whole wage bill without 
external budget support, and it often delayed payments until dis- 
bursements were covered by international donors. 

Expenditures on government goods and services were low, as 
evidenced by the general scarcity of basic equipment and supplies 
in government offices. Civil servants often functioned without desks, 
chairs, paper, and such office equipment as typewriters and copy- 
ing machines. Moreover, cutting expenditures for parastatals 
achieved no savings because the government did not subsidize their 
operations directly. The parastatals relied on their own sources of 
local revenues or foreign donor support. Donors also financed public 
investment and a large part of recurrent costs associated with 
development projects. 

The government's financial resources consisted of fiscal revenues, 
special funds, and exceptional taxes. The small size of Chad's 



127 



Chad: A Country Study 

modern, monetary sector limited the tax base. With the fall of world 
cotton prices and reduced production and income both to Coton- 
tchad and to peasant producers, the tax base shrank even more 
in 1985. In the mid-1980s, relatively few economic agents bore the 
tax load. Taxes were derived particularly from the five major 
industries — Cotontchad (exempted in 1986), the STT, the BdL, 
SONASUT, and the MCT. Their burden included (in order of 
importance) import-export duties, excise taxes, corporate taxes, 
and turnover taxes. In 1986 fiscal revenues amounted to 5 percent 
of GDP, compared with 9 percent in 1977 and 15 percent in the 
peak year of 1971. This percentage compared unfavorably with 
those in some other African states, such as Central African Republic 
(12 percent), Mauritania (22 percent), and Senegal (19.5 percent). 

In 1984 the government first imposed exceptional taxes to finance 
national reconstruction. All salaried employees, whether in govern- 
ment or in the private sector, were taxed one month's salary. In 
1985 the government repeated the effort to combat the effects of 
drought and in 1987 introduced a variable tax to support the war 
effort. Although these taxes placed a burden on taxpayers, the 
government did not account for these taxes in the official budget. 

Several special funds either collected taxes on behalf of the govern- 
ment or derived revenues from their own activities. The two most 
important funds were the CSPC, and the Petroleum Products Fund 
(Fonds d'Intervention des Produits Petroliers— FIPP). The CSPC's 
mandate included stabilizing producer prices for cotton furnished 
to Cotontchad, financing the deficit of Cotontchad, and playing 
a part in industrial and commercial operations of the cotton sec- 
tor. The plan called for 80 percent of any Cotontchad surplus to 
go to the CSPC, with Cotontchad retaining the remainder. Any 
Cotontchad deficit was to be financed by the CSPC. From 1972 
through 1984, Cotontchad transferred about CFA F21 billion to 
the CSPC. The CSPC, however, did not finance Cotontchad's 
deficits, which were particularly acute after 1985. Rather, the CSPC 
used its resources to subsidize the ONDR and the IRCT to invest 
in other public enterprises and to finance its own administrative 
costs. Since 1986, under the Emergency Cotton Program, Coton- 
tchad ceased contributions to the CSPC, which no longer played 
its mandated role. FIPP was set up to equalize petroleum import 
prices from Nigerian and Cameroonian sources, so that Chad would 
not become overly dependent on either source for its fuel supplies. 
FIPP was to tax cheaper Nigerian imports, thereby subsidizing 
Cameroonian imports, breaking even in the process. But the sys- 
tem never worked properly and ultimately led to considerable fraud, 
with cheaper Nigerian imports often receiving subsidies after leaving 



128 



The Economy 



Cameroon. Poor border control also contributed to FIPP's inability 
to stabilize and equalize imports and prices on petroleum. In 1987 
the government, along with the donor community, were review- 
ing the roles of these two institutions. 

The National Debt and Foreign Assistance 
National Debt 

The CAA was responsible for servicing Chad's external public 
debt. The CAA collected revenues not included in the government 
budget to service the debt. Those revenues consisted mostly of unit 
taxes on manufactured goods and taxes on the profits of industry, 
banks, and the surpluses of other special funds. In 1985 and 1986, 
losses of revenues from the cotton sector also affected the CAA's 
revenues. In 1986 the CAA compensated by imposing new taxes 
on other industries, and it also strengthened its administration and 
collection abilities. 

From 1980 to 1985, Chad's annual external debt averaged 
US$169 million (see table 7, Appendix A). In 1987 Chad's public 
and publicly guaranteed debt (outstanding and disbursed) stood 
at about US$206 million, amounting to 25 percent of GDP. Three- 
fourths of the debt was given on concessional terms; two-thirds of 
this amount was owed to multilateral creditors, and one- third was 
owed to bilateral donors. One-fourth of the debt represented non- 
concessional loans that predated the 1979-82 conflict and were owed 
to suppliers, private financial institutions, and certain bilateral credi- 
tors, such as Kuwait. Even before hostilities escalated in 1979, 
Chad's credit-worthiness was low and through 1987 was insuffi- 
cient to tap private financial markets. Only official creditors lent 
to Chad. The volume of lending was low in the 1983-85 period, 
but in 1986 the World Bank resumed lending, and France increased 
its lending. In 1987 lending on concessional terms to Chad reached 
pre- 1977 levels of about US$40 million a year. Chad's actual debt 
service ratio — as a proportion of export earnings on goods and 
services — was low in 1986, standing at 1.5 percent. When payments 
on arrears and the BEAC payments to the IMF (which were to 
be transferred to the CAA in 1988) were added, Chad's total debt 
service ratio stood at between 5 and 7 percent. Although consid- 
ered low by most standards, this situation created a heavy burden 
for the CAA and the Chadian government. For the 1987-89 period, 
Chad faced scheduled debt service on existing loans of between 
US$10 and US$13 million per year, more than double the amount 
the government was able to pay in the 1985-87 period. Debt ser- 
vice of US$10 million represented about 15 percent of expected 



129 



Chad: A Country Study 

government revenues in 1987, not including unsettled existing 
arrears. The CAA's efforts to increase revenues by instituting new 
taxes and by improving administration were encouraging through- 
out 1987. In late 1987, observers were unable to predict how Chad 
would cope with its long-term debt problems, especially in the face 
of a shrinking tax base, which was exacerbated by difficulties in 
the cotton industry. 

Foreign Assistance 

Since independence, all of Chad's several governments have 
relied on foreign assistance to meet current expenses, to finance 
government and trade deficits, to combat drought and famine, to 
wage war, and to rebuild from the ravages of war. France provided 
the most aid, with some also from multinational organizations, such 
as the EEC, the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank, and 
from bilateral donors, such as the United States, Italy, and West 
Germany. Donor assistance has fluctuated. It fell during the con- 
flicts of the late 1970s and early 1980s, particularly from 1979 
through 1982. Some donors, such as the United States, halted all 
aid between 1980 and 1982, when Goukouni Oueddei, who was 
supported by Libya, held power (see Transition to Northern Rule, 
ch. 4). France, however, continued to provide some form of non- 
military aid to Chad throughout the period, but it was channeled 
to the south and not to the central government. As other donors 
pulled out, the share of French aid relative to all official aid to Chad 
rose from 23.6 percent in 1978 to 42.2 percent in 1980. In 1982, 
as other donors returned, the proportion of French aid to all offi- 
cial aid to Chad began to decline, amounting to only 18 percent 
by 1985. Despite this relative decline and the increased aid from 
other donors, especially UN organizations and the United States, 
France remained Chad's most important donor, both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of total official aid, for all years except 
1985. In that year, the World Food Programme (WFP) was Chad's 
single largest donor because of drought; that aid, therefore, con- 
sisted of food aid and not development assistance. 

Because of drought between 1983 and 1985 and because of the 
needs of recovery from the dislocations of war, foreign aid in these 
years focused on emergency assistance. Famine relief, health, and 
sanitation formed the base of this assistance, with funds also directed 
to correcting the most basic logistics problems of food delivery to 
the country. As the rains improved in 1985, resulting in good har- 
vests, a shift away from emergency operations toward longer-range 
development planning began. Budget support also increased after 
1985 in response to lost government operating revenues because 



130 



A tailor plies his trade on 
a street in N'Djamena 
Courtesy Joseph Krull 




of the cotton crisis. By 1987 about 85 percent of estimated aid flows 
provided for development assistance, and 12 percent supported the 
budget. Disbursements of food aid fell from the high of 176,000 
tons in 1985, when the international community responded to 
drought across Africa, to an estimated 1987 shipment of 30,000 
tons, used as food security reserves to relieve chronic pockets of 
malnutrition. The shift in emphasis accompanied a rise in overall 
disbursements, which were expected to reach US$250 million in 
1987. 

Almost all of Chad's external assistance during the ten years 
before 1986 was on concessional terms. After 1986, however, the 
proportion of loans compared with grants increased significantly. 
In the 1983-85 period, with emphasis on emergency aid in health 
and nutrition, loans represented only 9 percent of aid disburse- 
ments. In 1986, with the shift to project development assistance, 
renewed World Bank lending, and the need to target money to the 
cotton sector, loans increased to 14 percent of total aid disburse- 
ments. In 1987 donors were expected to increase the proportion 
of loans in overall aid to as much as 33 percent, all on a conces- 
sional basis. 

In the mid-1980s, foreign donors financed all public investment 
in Chad. Recurrent costs also were financed by donors, in large 
part for programs and projects to rehabilitate the economy and to 
provide basic social services in health care and education. Roughly 



131 



Chad: A Country Study 



half of the projected aid disbursements in 1987 supported public 
investment to rebuild and expand the nation's socioeconomic 
infrastructure; about 19 percent supported recurrent costs of the 
government, and about 21 percent supported operating costs of 
the parastatals. 

A sectoral analysis of projected aid in 1987 showed about 32 per- 
cent of donor assistance targeted to infrastructure, 26 percent to 
rural development, 22 percent to industry and energy, and 16 per- 
cent to social services, including health and education. Regional 
distribution of aid for the same year proposed about 16 percent 
of project assistance to the capital and its environs, 21 percent to 
the sahelian zone, 26 percent to the soudanian zone, and 37 percent 
to projects cutting across regions. For ethnic and humanitarian rea- 
sons, several large donors concentrated their efforts in particular 
regions of the nation. Italy focused its aid in the Kanem and Lac 
prefectures, the EDF on Chari-Baguirmi Prefecture, and West Ger- 
many on Mayo-Kebbi and Ouaddai prefectures. 

The terms of aid disbursements projected for 1987 were consis- 
tent with past trends and took into consideration the financial con- 
straints on the Chadian government and economy. Approximately 
two- thirds of donor aid consisted of grants. The remaining one- 
third of loans came almost entirely from multilateral organizations 
on concessional terms. Overall, 40 percent of the disbursements 
in 1987 came from bilateral donors, with France the largest (24 per- 
cent), followed by Italy (11 percent), the United States (6 percent), 
and West Germany (4 percent). The multilateral organizations 
accounted for 55 percent of disbursements, of which the IDA was 
the largest contributor, providing 15 percent. Other UN organiza- 
tions provided 11 percent, and EC agencies gave 12 percent. 

By 1986 the international donor community, led by the World 
Bank and the IMF, recognized the need for concerted action in 
Chad. Once the drought ended and essential reconstruction from 
war damage had begun, the widespread economic dislocation caused 
by Cotontchad's difficulties forced the government and its donors 
to consider long-term structural adjustments for the whole economy. 
The adoption of the Emergency Cotton Program in 1986 could 
only stave off short-term collapse and enable Cotontchad to posi- 
tion itself better until world prices improved. Diversification away 
from dependence on the cotton complex in agriculture, industry, 
and finance was essential. For the long term, incentives had to be 
found to stimulate other sectors of the economy. 

In 1987 the government agreed to medium- term adjustment 
targets through 1990. As a result, the IMF began providing budget 
support to Chad, and the World Bank provided project assistance, 



132 



The Economy 



as a part of a comprehensive package that included support from 
other donors. These coordinated efforts at adjustment focused on 
defining and implementing sectoral strategies for cotton, noncot- 
ton agriculture, livestock production and marketing, rural credit, 
reforestation, transportation, and human resources and training. 
Studies to implement comprehensive programs to rehabilitate 
government fiscal policies and management, to develop priorities 
for government investment programs, and to address questions rela- 
tive to the operations of parastatals and public institutions, along 
with the management of public domestic and foreign debt, were 
all part of the package. On the one hand, fiscal and management 
practices would be tightened. On the other hand, the private sec- 
tor would be encouraged by the loosening of monopoly operations 
by public institutions. 

* * * 

As of late 1987, there were few sources that addressed Chad's 
economy, and no single book dealt comprehensively with the topic. 
Economic information, however, could be found in general sources, 
the focus of which was most often political. The best books were 
in French and included Jean Cabot and Christian Bouquet's Le 
Tchad: Que sais-je?, Christian Bouquet's Tchad: La genese d'un con- 
flit, as well as Gali Ngothe Gatta's Tchad: Guerre civile and desagrega- 
tion de Vetat. Among the few English-language sources was Michael 
P. Kelley's A State in Disarray, which contains a good section on 
the impact of foreign assistance on economic development. 

Several periodicals provided valuable data on the Chadian econ- 
omy in the 1980s. These periodicals include Marches tropicaux et 
mediterraneens; Bulletin de I'Afrique noire, Africa Economic Digest, and 
the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly reports. Occasional arti- 
cles in Revue tiers-monde and Courier were also helpful. 

Publications of international organizations and government agen- 
cies provided much of the detail lacking in general narratives; 
however, figures often conflicted because of differing methods of 
compilation. These publications were produced by the United 
Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United States 
Agency for International Development, and a number of French 
government agencies. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



133 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




A view of the Fountain of Unity in N'Djamena 



SEVERAL THREADS OF CONTINUITY ran through Chad's 
political development during its first twenty-eight years of indepen- 
dence that began in 1960. Dominated by a series of authoritarian 
regimes, most under military rule, Chad had no representative 
national institutions in 1988. Its ruling party, the National Union 
for Independence and Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'lndepen- 
dance et la Revolution — UNIR) was organized by the government 
in 1984; UNIR leaders were appointed by the president from among 
government officials, and the party served primarily to reinforce 
government policy. By late 1988, UNIR had not opened the political 
process to democratic participation. 

Political fragmentation also characterized Chad's political devel- 
opment since independence. The Islamic northern and central 
regions and the colonially exploited south Were divided by regional 
stereotypes rooted in their past, which included centuries of slave 
raids from the north. Subregional, religious, cultural, and individual 
differences complicated major regional divisions. 

Chad's diverse population was drawn into power struggles in 
the drive for independence following World War II. Numerous 
political parties and coalitions sought foreign assistance to bolster 
weak popular support. The nation's first independent regime grew 
increasingly repressive during its fifteen years in power as its leader, 
Francois Tombalbaye, attempted to pacify this fractious popula- 
tion and transform southern economic domination into political 
control. Several dissident groups, most from the northern and cen- 
tral regions, united under the National Liberation Front of Chad 
(Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad— FROLIN AT), but this 
coalition, too, was plagued by factional strife. 

In the early 1970s, Tombalbaye contributed to his own eventual 
downfall by implementing the authenticite movement, an ill-conceived 
campaign that sought to impose southern-based ritual traditions 
on the nation's civil service. The resulting cycle of public protest 
and government repression culminated in a 1975 coup, in which 
Tombalbaye was killed. His successor, Felix Malloum, continued 
the pattern of concentrating political power in the executive branch 
of government but was persuaded to bring rebel leaders Goukouni 
Oueddei and Hissein Habre into his government. Their rebel forces 
eventually proved stronger than Malloum 's army, and he was forced 
out of office in 1979. His successor, Goukouni, was the first of 
Chad's insurgent leaders to become president of Chad. 



137 



Chad: A Country Study 



A series of unsuccessful coalition governments oversaw Chad's 
descent into a state of civil war. The major coalition, the Transi- 
tional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d' Union 
Nationale de Transition — GUNT), was led by Goukouni, whose 
relatively conciliatory style of governing contrasted with the previous 
pattern of authoritarian regimes. His critics considered him weak 
and indecisive, and he was strongly influenced by Libyan leader 
Muammar al Qadhafi, whose primary aims were to install a sym- 
pathetic Muslim leader in Chad, expand Libya's influence in the 
region, and reduce Western influence across the continent. 

A salient feature of Chad's foreign policy since independence 
has been foreign intervention — especially by Libya, Chad's aggres- 
sive neighbor to the north, and France, the former colonial power. 
Libya took advantage of Chad's instability in the early 1970s to 
press its claim to the Aozou Strip (see Glossary) in northern Chad, 
based on centuries of close ties among border populations and an 
unratified 1935 Franco- Italian agreement, which had been ignored 
by intervening governments. French ties with Chad, based on 
historical, commercial, political, and strategic interests, rivaled those 
of Libya, and the Aozou Strip provided an arena in which this 
rivalry could be pursued. In addition, neighboring countries, espe- 
cially Sudan and Nigeria, also took an active role in events in Chad, 
hoping to achieve a favorable balance of power in the region. Other 
Central African and West African states sought to contain Chad's 
violence and avoid being caught up in the spreading instability. 

Chad's political shifts in the early 1980s resulted from interna- 
tional fears of Libyan intervention through influence in Goukouni 's 
regime, France's revised African policy following the Socialist 
Party's election victory in 1981, and military gains by Habre. Habre 
had served in governments led by Tombalbaye, Malloum, and 
Goukouni, and he had led insurgencies against all. Finally in 1982, 
with loyal northern forces and French and United States support, 
Habre ousted Goukouni and proclaimed himself president of Chad. 

Habre' s patrimonial state was another authoritarian regime. A 
written constitution empowered him to appoint almost all high offi- 
cials and reduced the legislative branch to a token assembly. He 
determined the pace and direction of activity in all branches of 
government. At the same time, Habre gained popular support by 
stabilizing Chad and working to establish peace. He also began 
to reintroduce social services to a population for whom warfare had 
been the most noticeable sign of government activity. 

In 1988 factional dynamics in Chad still resembled precolonial 
politics. Habre was a master strategist in this arena, and he suc- 
ceeded in winning over numerous former opponents through 



138 



Government and Politics 



combined military and political means. Nevertheless, the threats 
of new rifts among allies and of future alliances among enemies 
still existed, in keeping with the model of the segmentary political 
systems that had dominated the region for centuries. 

To strengthen existing ties among former opponents and to mobi- 
lize grass-roots support for his government, Habre proclaimed his 
intention in 1988 to transform the ruling party, UNIR, into a peo- 
ple's vanguard party. Many people in outiying areas were still skep- 
tical of the need for an increased governmental presence, however, 
and many southerners still considered national government a north- 
ern imposition. Both problems underlined the political challenge 
that faced Chad as the 1990s approached. 

Political Background 
Preindependence Factions 

Chad became part of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatori- 
ale Franchise — AEF; see Glossary) in 1905 and became a separate 
colony within the AEF in 1920 (see Arrival of the French and 
Colonial Administration, ch. 1). Colonial policy exploited the agri- 
cultural potential of the south, exacerbated regional animosities 
that were the result of centuries of slave raids from the north, and 
failed to prepare Chadian citizens for self-rule. During World War 
II, the colonial governor general, Felix Eboue, brought Chad to 
international attention by leading the AEF in support of Charles 
de Gaulle's Free French movement. 

After the war, Gabriel Lisette and other political activists, includ- 
ing Francois Tombalbaye, established the Chadian Progressive 
Party (Parti Progressiste Tchadien — PPT). The PPT protected 
southern interests in competition with the more influential Chadian 
Democratic Union (Union Democratique Tchadienne — UDT). 
The UDT was dominated by expatriates, who treated Chad's 
political arena as a forum for debate over events in Paris (see 
Decolonization Politics, ch. 1). 

More than two dozen political parties and coalitions arose to 
oppose this Eurocentric view of local politics and to compete with 
the UDT and the PPT. These groups were generally aligned as 
southerners, northerners who sought to share in the nation's 
economic development, other northerners who opposed moderni- 
zation, and socialist groups who hoped to replace the European- 
dominated economy with one oriented more toward local needs. 
Further fragmentation occurred along subregional and religious 
lines and over the question of the future role of expatriates in Chad. 



139 



Chad: A Country Study 

Chad's 1946 constitution declared it an overseas territory of 
France. As French citizens, its people elected representatives to a 
territorial assembly, which in turn elected delegates to a French 
General Council for the AEF and to several governing bodies in 
France. Chadians demanded further political rights, however, 
including training in administrative and technical areas that would 
lead to self-government and the right to set their own political 
agenda independent of other francophone states. The PPT won 
a plurality in the Territorial Assembly, and Lisette became head 
of the first government established under the hi cadre of 1956, an 
enabling act that made Chad an autonomous republic within the 
French Community, instituted universal suffrage, and established 
a single electoral roll. 

Demands for greater local control of politics led to dramatic 
political shifts in the late 1950s. The UDT, attempting to shed its 
expatriate emphasis, was reorganized and renamed Chadian Social 
Action (Action Sociale Tchadienne — AST). The AEF was dissolved 
in 1958 amid rising African demands for autonomy. A series of 
unstable provisional governments followed the ouster of Lisette as 
the PPT's leader in 1958. His successor, Tombalbaye, became head 
of the Territorial Assembly in 1959 and head of the nation's first 
independent government in August 1960. 

Southern Dominance, 1960-78 

Tombalbaye banished Lisette and many of his supporters from 
Chad and eliminated Lisette 's power base by dividing the Logone 
region of the south into three prefectures. Tombalbaye openly dis- 
criminated against the north, ignored the growing national politi- 
cal awareness that was evident during the postwar years, and 
established a repressive regime that contributed to Chad's frag- 
mentation during his fifteen-year tenure as president. 

Major regional rifts were complicated by intraregional divisions, 
especially in the north, where numerous warlords, each with an 
ethnic-based following or cadre of supporters, attempted to over- 
throw Tombalbaye 's regime. In 1966 northern rebels united as the 
FROLINAT. They established bases in Sudan and received assis- 
tance from Algeria and Libya, but FROLINAT, too, was divided 
over military and political issues, attitudes toward Libya, interpreta- 
tions of Islam, and individual leadership style (see The FROLINAT 
Rebellion, 1965-79, ch. 5). An important split occurred in 1969 
between northern factions and those from Chad's eastern and cen- 
tral regions, which had dominated the group for three years. North- 
ern factions went on to form FROLINAT' s Second Liberation 
Army (see Appendix B). 



140 




The headquarters of the PPT, with President Frangois Tombalbaye 3 s 

picture on the sign 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 

Tombalbaye expelled French troops from Chad but otherwise 
perpetuated the dependence established under colonial rule. He 
employed French advisers in many government posts and allowed 
France to control most of the nation's financial operations. Tom- 
balbaye also strengthened presidential authority and resisted recom- 
mendations of his expatriate advisers, who urged him to decentralize 
authority to provincial officials and traditional leaders. Rather than 
assuage northern grievances or pacify the increasingly numerous 
rebel armies, Tombalbaye responded with repression. He dissolved 
the National Assembly in 1963 and eliminated rival political parties. 
He also jailed outspoken critics and closed down most public media. 
His repressive style and rebel violence were mutually reinforcing, 
leading Tombalbaye to recall French troops. 

Amid increasing destabilization in the early 1970s, Tombalbaye 
sought first to protect southern interests. He implemented the authen- 
ticity movement, an ill-conceived campaign (modeled on that of 
Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko) that deemed southern cul- 
tural characteristics more authentic than those of the north. 
Opponents successfully exploited public outrage when Tombalbaye 
required civil servants to undergo yondo — traditional initiation rites 
indigenous only to his ethnic constituency among the Sara popu- 
lation of the south (see Classical African Religions, ch. 2). Weak 



141 



Chad: A Country Study 



efforts to pacify the north by granting limited autonomy to tradi- 
tional leaders and releasing prominent political prisoners served 
only to recruit new dissidents. 

After Muammar al Qadhafi seized power in Libya in 1969, he 
exploited Chad's instability by stationing troops in northern Chad 
and by channeling support to Chadian insurgents. Although 
Tombalbaye expelled Libyan diplomats in 1971 , blaming them for 
inciting a coup attempt and inspiring unrest, in general he sought 
a balance between concessions and resistance to Qadhafi 's regional 
designs, hoping to persuade Qadhafi to reduce his support for 
Chadian insurgents. Tombalbaye voiced a willingness to cede the 
Aozou Strip and did not object to Libyan troops' being stationed 
there after 1973. Chad erupted in renewed protests against Tom- 
balbaye 's unpopular and weakened regime, culminating in a suc- 
cessful coup against him in 1975. 

General Felix Malloum, a former government critic imprisoned 
by Tombalbaye, proclaimed himself head of the Supreme Mili- 
tary Council (Conseil Superieur Militaire — CSM), which seized 
power in 1975. As a southerner with strong kinship ties to the north, 
Malloum believed that he could reconcile Chad's divided regions 
and establish representative institutions. He set a high priority on 
freeing Chad from French economic and political control, but in 
this effort he was unsuccessful. He sent French combat forces home, 
but he retained several hundred French advisers and renegotiated 
a series of military accords to ensure emergency aid. 

Malloum was unable to convert dissatisfaction with Tombal- 
baye 's regime into acceptance of his own. His opponents exploited 
popular displeasure with the remaining French presence by recruit- 
ing new dissidents. In response to this threat, Malloum seized con- 
trol of all branches of government and, in the increasingly repressive 
manner that characterized his presidency, banned almost all political 
activity. His opposition coalesced around FROLINAT, which 
established alternative administrations in outlying areas to com- 
pete with N'Djamena. In 1978, in the face of mounting violence, 
Malloum reluctandy called for the return of French forces (see Civil 
Conflict and Libyan Intervention, ch. 5). 

Transition to Northern Rule 

In 1978 officials in Chad and neighboring countries attempted 
to craft a coalition that could control the country through military 
force and still claim to have some popular support. Urged by Afri- 
can heads of state and French advisers, Malloum attempted to bring 
FROLINAT faction leaders Hissein Habre and Goukouni Oueddei 
into the government, but these two northerners soon clashed with 



142 




Troops being reviewed in 1970 at Fada 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 

Malloum and each other. While Habre's troops engaged govern- 
ment forces, Goukouni seized the opportunity to occupy govern- 
ment buildings and claim control of N'Djamena. Talks were held 
first in Sudan and then in Nigeria, but by late 1979 neighboring 
states were working primarily to contain Chad's spreading violence 
and limit Libyan interference in regional affairs (see Relations with 
Other African States, this ch.). 

As N'Djamena became a war zone, with fighting among 
FROLINAT factions and southerners going on between 1979 and 
early 1982, outsiders proclaimed the disintegration of the state. 
Although major disruptions occurred, the government struggled 
to maintain basic official functions. Executive functions were allo- 
cated according to ministerial portfolios and were given limited 
attention. Many buildings in the capital city were destroyed, but 
a small civil service continued to operate. Public services were erratic 
but not absent. Still, the government fought for its survival rather 
than to protect its citizens, and thousands of people sought refuge 
in rural areas or neighboring countries. 

Talks in Lagos and Kano in 1979 culminated in the formation 
of GUNT, led by Goukouni, which incorporated several rival north- 
ern commanders. Malloum left the country, and the locus of govern- 
mental power shifted from south to north, largely because of 
northern military successes, popular discontent throughout the 



143 



Chad: A Country Study 



country, and pressure from neighboring states for an end to Chadian 
violence. National unity became increasingly ephemeral, however, 
as members of this coalition were polarized between Habre and 
Goukouni. Goukouni was the son of the derde, a respected tradi- 
tional leader among the Teda population of the north, one of the 
Toubou groups that had generally been receptive to the Libyan- 
based Sanusiyya brotherhood before independence (see Languages 
and Ethnic Groups; Islam, ch. 2). In his view, Libyan interests 
in Chad were valid. Goukouni requested Qadhafi's assistance 
against Habre in 1980, bringing Libyan troops into the country 
as far south as N'Djamena. 

As head of state, Goukouni did not implement promised demo- 
cratic reforms, but neither did he tolerate unlimited reprisals against 
the south. Instead, he was relatively tolerant of minor expressions 
of dissent, warned security forces against harsh retaliation in the 
south, and gave local administrators limited autonomy. 

Both allies and opponents perceived this relatively conciliatory 
attitude as a presidential weakness and a hesitant style of leader- 
ship. Indeed, this hesitancy was apparent in 1981 when Qadhafi 
proclaimed a merger between Libya and Chad. Following inter- 
national and domestic protests, Goukouni reversed his position and 
balked at Qadhafi's regional demands. 

French political shifts in 1981 also had an important impact on 
events in Chad. The election of Francois Mitterrand as French 
president heralded a reorientation in African policy. Socialist leaders 
vowed to reduce the overall French presence in Africa and to avoid 
an open confrontation with Libya, a major source of French oil 
imports. French support shifted cautiously to Habre, who appeared 
willing to resist Libyan domination with outside support and whose 
decisive leadership had been demonstrated against French troops 
for over a decade. France's Socialist Party pursued its goal of reduc- 
ing its interventionist profile in Africa by persuading francophone 
states, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to send 
peacekeeping troops to Chad. Goukouni called for the removal of 
Libya 5 s forces, but when Habre' s Armed Forces of the North 
(Forces Armees du Nord — FAN) moved on the capital, they 
encountered almost no resistance from the OAU-sponsored Inter- 
African Force (IAF). As a result, in June 1982 FAN seized 
N'Djamena and proclaimed Habre head of state. 

Habre 's decisiveness and his preference for French rather than 
Libyan patronage shifted the focus of government once again. He 
took limited steps to assuage regional dissent, relying on north- 
erners in most military commands and top political offices but 
appointing southerners to several executive and administrative 



144 



Government and Politics 



positions. Habre also reduced the aim of independence from French 
domination to the status of a long-term goal. France maintained 
vital economic, financial, military, and security assistance; under- 
wrote the budget; effectively operated the banking system; and 
provided a variety of commercial and technical advisers. Further- 
more, Habre used French and United States military assistance 
to repel Libyan troops, Libyan-supported insurgents, and local rebel 
forces (see Habre 's Return to Power and Second Libyan Interven- 
tion, 1982-84, ch. 5). French funds also helped Habre co-opt former 
opponents. 

As president, Habre brought more peace to Chad than that coun- 
try had known in a decade. Habre vowed to remove Libyan forces 
from the north, reconcile north and south, and establish a demo- 
cratic state. In his first six years in office, he took steps to accom- 
plish some of these goals. 

Structure of Government 
Constitutional System 

Between 1959 and 1988, Chad's constitution was revised six times 
and altered by several major amendments. The preindependence 
constitution adopted by the Territorial Assembly in March 1959 
was modified at independence in 1960. The new document estab- 
lished a parliamentary system of government with an executive 
prime minister. Further revisions in 1962 strengthened the execu- 
tive, and the 1965 constitution eliminated all rivals to the ruling 
party, the PPT. In 1973 President Tombalbaye codified in the con- 
stitution his version of the authenticite movement to reaffirm indige- 
nous values. This movement required civil servants to undergo 
initiation rites common to some ethnic constituencies of the south. 
Following a military coup in 1975, in which Tombalbaye was killed, 
and the general deterioration of state institutions, lengthy negotia- 
tions in 1978 led to a new constitution that established an unsuc- 
cessful coalition among Chad's warring factions. 

In June 1982, when Habre seized control of N'Djamena, he dis- 
solved the existing government and in October promulgated the 
Fundamental Law, a document that served as an interim consti- 
tution through 1988. In July 1988, Habre appointed a constitu- 
tional committee to draft a new document to be presented to the 
government in 1989. 

The Fundamental Law of 1982 declared Chad a secular, indivisible 
republic, with ultimate power deriving from the people. Both French 
and Arabic were adopted as official languages, and "Unity- Work- 
Progress" was adopted as the nation's motto. The constitution 



145 



Chad: A Country Study 



authorized the office of president, Council of Ministers (cabinet), 
National Advisory Council (Conseil National Consultatif — CNC, 
an interim legislature), and national army. It placed overriding 
authority for controlling all of these in the office of the president. 

President 

Article 2 of the Fundamental Law designated the president as 
head of state and government. He was chairman of the Council 
of Ministers, with a mandate to define the fundamental policy 
choices of the nation. The president was the commander in chief 
of the armed forces and head of an ostensibly civilian government. 
The Fundamental Law allowed the Command Council of the 
Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de Commandement des Forces 
Armees du Nord — CCFAN) to select the president. Habre dissolved 
the CCFAN when he established the ruling party, UNIR, in 1984. 
No succession procedures were in place after 1984, and most 
observers expected Habre to remain in office after the new consti- 
tution was presented to the government in 1989. 

The Fundamental Law authorized the president to legislate by 
decree, and he often did so. He also appointed and dismissed 
ministers, legislators, and high-level civil and military officials. Only 
the president could initiate constitutional amendments; this proce- 
dure required, however, consultation with both ministers and legis- 
lators. 

The president's international authority included negotiating and 
ratifying treaties and accords and guaranteeing Chad's observance 
of them. He was technically required to consult with ministers and 
legislators, but more often he simply notified them of his foreign 
policy decisions. 

Council of Ministers 

The president and twenty-three appointed ministers formed the 
Council of Ministers in 1988. The council's portfolios included 
agriculture and rural development; civil service; commerce and 
industry; culture, youth, and sports; national defense, veterans, and 
war victims; education; finance; food security and afflicted groups; 
foreign affairs; information and civic orientation; interior; justice; 
labor; livestock and rural water; mines and energy; planning and 
reconstruction; posts and telecommunications; public health; public 
works, housing, and urban development; social affairs and the pro- 
motion of women; state; tourism and the environment; and trans- 
portation and civil aviation. The president held the portfolio for 
defense. Only one woman served on the Council of Ministers. 
Executive appointments were divided among most regions of the 



146 



A woman sells bottles of gasoline on a war-damaged street 

in the capital 
Courtesy United Nations (John Isaac) 

country, although northerners dominated most organs of govern- 
ment. 

The general responsibility of the Council of Ministers was to carry 
out the wishes of the president, although constitutional language 
defined its task as overseeing national reconstruction, establishing 
a democratic way of life, guaranteeing fundamental rights of indi- 
viduals and associations, and guaranteeing the effective participa- 
tion of all social classes in the managing of public affairs. The council 
was also responsible for maintaining a national army, reorganizing 
the national police, reorganizing public enterprises and parastatals, 
developing an effective health care system, assisting victims of war, 
relaunching the economy, reforming the school system, devising 
an investment code to encourage domestic and foreign capital for- 
mation, reconstructing the communication system, and regaining 
Chad's self-sufficiency in food. 

Article 18 summarized ministerial responsibilities in foreign 
policy. These responsibilities were to maintain friendship and 
cooperation with all peaceful countries, to uphold the principles 
of the United Nations (UN) and OAU, to support legitimate strug- 
gles by people under racial and colonial domination, to combat 
all forms of expansionism, and to practice nonalignment in foreign 
policy-making. Article 19 restricted ministers from holding a second 



147 



Chad: A Country Study 



office in government, although many government officials in 1988 
also held office in UNIR. 

National Advisory Council 

The Fundamental Law formalized the institution of a weak legis- 
lative branch of government. Thirty advisers, who served at the 
discretion of the president, made up the CNC in 1988. Although 
they were authorized to elect their own council president and two 
vice presidents, their mandate was only to advise the president 
regarding states of emergency and war and to consult with him 
regarding fundamental policy choices, international agreements, 
budgetary allocations, and general plans for political, social, and 
economic development. In practice, the CNC supported presidential 
policy. 

As of 1988, the people of Chad had no elected representatives 
at the national level. The appointed CNC provided a formal struc- 
ture for representative government and policy deliberation, but it 
was entirely subordinate to the executive branch. Legislators effected 
policy changes only if the president agreed with them. 

Regional Government 

Throughout the 1980s, Chad was divided into fourteen prefec- 
tures (see fig. 1). Each was further subdivided into subprefectures, 
administrative posts, and cantons. Most prefectures were divided 
into two to five subprefectures; the total number of subprefectures 
was fifty-four. Administrative posts and cantons were often orga- 
nized around traditional social units, especially in areas where an 
existing bureaucratic structure could represent the state. In general, 
the national government relied on traditional leaders to represent 
its authority in rural areas. In many of these areas, civil servants 
could not maintain order, collect taxes, or enforce government edicts 
without the cooperation of respected local leaders. 

Administrators at each of these levels (prefects, subprefects, 
administrators, and canton chiefs) were appointed by the presi- 
dent or the minister of interior and remained in office until the 
president dismissed them. Each prefect was assisted by a consul- 
tative council composed of ten or more members nominated by 
the prefect and approved by the minister of interior. Traditional 
leaders were often included, and council protocol was sometimes 
based on local rank and status distinctions. 

During the 1960s, the government granted municipal status to 
nine towns, based on their ability to finance their own budgets. 
These municipalities generated most of their revenues through 
administrative fees, fines, and taxes, and they organized communal 



148 



t t 



' ' ' t , 





The residence of a subprefect, often the only symbol of government 

in rural areas 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 



work projects for many city improvements. Their governing bod- 
ies were relatively autonomous municipal councils, chosen by popu- 
lar consensus or informal elections. Each council, in turn, elected 
a mayor from its own ranks. The official policy of autonomy for 
municipal councils was generally overridden by the requirement 
that almost all council decisions be ratified by the prefect or the 
minister of interior. 

Judicial System 

Chad's legal system was based on French civil law, modified 
according to a variety of traditional and Islamic legal interpreta- 
tions. In the late 1980s, the civilian and military court systems over- 
lapped at several levels, an effect of Chad's years of warfare (see 
The Criminal Justice System, ch. 5). Civilian justice often deferred 
to the military system, and in some areas, military courts — many 
of which were established by rebel armies during the late 1970s — 
were the only operating courts. In the 1980s, the government was 
working to reassert civilian jurisdiction over these areas. 

Chad's Supreme Court was abolished following the coup in 1975 
and had not been reestablished by 1988. The highest court in the 
land was the Court of State Security, comprising eight justices, 
including both civilians and military officers, all appointed by the 



149 



Chad: A Country Study 

president. In addition, a court of appeals in N'Djamena reviewed 
decisions of lower courts, and a special court of justice established 
in 1984 heard cases involving the misappropriation of public funds. 

Criminal courts convened in N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, and 
Abeche, and criminal judges traveled to other towns when neces- 
sary. In addition, each of the fourteen prefectures had a magis- 
trate's court, in which civil cases and minor criminal cases were 
tried. In 1988 forty-three justices of the peace served as courts of 
first resort in some areas. 

Chad also had an unofficial but widely accepted system of Islamic 
sharia courts in the north and east, which had operated for a cen- 
tury or more. Most cases involved family obligations and religious 
teachings. In other areas, traditional custom required family elders 
to mediate disputes involving members of their descent group, i.e., 
men and women related to them through sons and brothers. Civil 
courts often considered traditional law and community sentiment 
in decisions, and the courts sometimes sought the advice of local 
leaders in considering evidence and rendering verdicts. 

Political Dynamics 
Factionalism 

Chad's political environment in the 1980s was a fluid, chang- 
ing network, bearing the imprint of centuries of factional dynamics. 
Traditional authority has generally been diffuse, rather than con- 
centrated in a single individual for an entire society. Clusters of 
descent groups defined the society in many areas. Factions arose 
when descent groups clashed, and strong leaders sought kin-group 
support in confronting one another. Social norms focused on pre- 
venting conflict through family law, religion, and authority rela- 
tions, and a key feature of factional strife was the reunion that 
eventually followed many violent clashes. 

As a result of these traditional beliefs and practices, many Chad- 
ians viewed politics according to a segmentary model of descent 
group fragmentation. They scorned the idea that national leaders, 
in fixed terms of office, could demand loyalties, regardless of the 
issues involved. From their perspective, centralizing power and 
authority served to deny, rather than to implement, democratic 
principles. In Chad, as in other faction-ridden political systems, 
opposition and alliance were constantly recalculated, as costs and 
benefits to the individual or kin- group were weighed. Politics were 
often blurred and not defined in terms of distinct bipolar rivalries. 

Factional fragmentation in Chad occurred in response to predic- 
table issues, such as France's postcolonial role, relations with Libya, 



150 



Government and Politics 



the value of negotiation versus armed confrontation, and ethnic 
and regional balances of power. Rifts also resulted from basic dis- 
agreements over policy decisions, forms of retaliation against rivals, 
and personality clashes. Reconciliation often brought former rivals 
together in the face of a more threatening opponent. 

Factions assumed particular importance after independence 
because of Chad's diverse ethnic groups, the traditional scorn for 
centralized authority, the weak impact of central government poli- 
cies in the north, and the generally inadequate infrastructure that 
impeded communication among regions. Most important, north- 
ern resentment found its expression in numerous strong leaders — in 
effect, warlords — but instead of organizing under a strong warlord 
to secede, factional armies in the north sought to wrest control from 
the government and from each other. 

Hissein Habre is an example of a leader whose career has demon- 
strated skill as a factional strategist. He entered politics after return- 
ing from graduate study in France in 1971, but he abandoned his 
original post in the Tombalbaye government to join the opposi- 
tion FROLINAT. In this organization, he had personality clashes 
with a number of leaders, including FROLINAT 's ideologue, Abba 
Siddick. In 1972 Habre formed an army of his own, allied with 
fellow northerner Goukouni Oueddei, in opposition to Siddick. 
Habre and Goukouni managed a fragile alliance for more than three 
years, despite differences in style and ability. Habre negotiated a 
large ransom payment from Paris for French hostages he and 
Goukouni kidnapped in 1974, but by the time the hostages were 
released in 1977, Habre and Goukouni had ended their alliance. 

This arrangement did not last because Habre clashed with Mal- 
loum over regional and policy issues. Their confrontation allowed 
Goukouni to seize the capital and declare himself head of state. 
As minister of national defense, veterans, and war victims in 
Goukouni's regime, Habre continued to clash with his northern 
rival over policy, style, and, increasingly, over Libyan involvement 
in Chad. Habre fled N'Djamena and, with French and United 
States support, returned to oust Goukouni as head of state in 
June 1982. 

Habre decided he would form alliances only from a position of 
strength, and he proceeded to defeat, intimidate, or co-opt a number 
of rebel leaders. He then moved to end factional strife, curb the 
nation's continuing violence, and extend the reach of government 
into the countryside. As of 1988, he had been fairly successful in 
his dual pursuit of national reunification and reconciliation. He 
had consolidated his control of Chad's fractious population through 
both military and political tactics, and, following the example of 



151 



Chad: A Country Study 



his predecessors, he had strengthened the executive branch of 
government and postponed democratic reforms. Habre's authori- 
tarian rule outweighed the nation's strong centrifugal tendencies, 
but just barely. He defeated numerous rebel armies between 1983 
and 1987, and as a result of these clashes, the disarray among his 
opponents, and French financial assistance, he won over most 
former opponents. 

Among those groups that rallied to Habre's government was the 
Action Committee of the Democratic Revolutionary Council 
(Comite d'Action et de Concertation du Conseil Democratique 
Revolutionnaire — CAC-CDR), founded in 1984 as the intellectual 
wing of the opposition CDR. Under the leadership of Mahamat 
Senoussi Khatir, it declared support for Habre in 1985. The Peo- 
ple's Armed Forces (Forces Armees Populaires — FAP), a former 
FROLINAT faction led by Goukouni, also declared support for 
Habre in October 1986, although Goukouni remained outside the 
country, attempting to negotiate a dignified return. Goukouni 's 
one-time vice president and leader of the Chadian Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Tchadiennes — FAT), Wadel Abdelkader Kamou- 
gue, was Habre's minister of agriculture and rural development 
in 1988. The Democratic Front of Chad (Front Democratique du 
Tchad — FDT) was also won over by Habre. The FDT was a coali- 
tion of groups formed in Paris in 1985 in opposition to both 
Goukouni and Habre. Led by General Negue Djogo, the FDT 
shifted its support to Habre later that year. Djogo became Habre's 
minister of justice in early 1986 and was shifted to minister of trans- 
portation and civil aviation in mid- 1988. Two other former FDT 
leaders also joined the government, one as minister of finance and 
the other as minister of culture, youth, and sports. 

Several factions of codos, or commandos, were also convinced 
to rally to the government. Codos were southern rebel formations 
nominally united under the leadership of Colonel Alphonse Kotiga. 
Many of them declared their support for Habre during 1985 and 
1986. Other small groups also rallied to Habre's government in 
1986 and 1987, including the Democratic and Popular National 
Assembly (Rassemblement National Democratique et Populaire — 
RNDP) and the Assembly for Unity and Chadian Democracy (Ras- 
semblement pour 1' Unite et la Democratic Tchadienne — RUDT). 

A number of groups remained actively opposed to the govern- 
ment in 1988. Several of these formed a coalition, the Supreme 
Council of the Revolution (Conseil Supreme de la Revolution — 
CSR) in 1985. The CSR included nominally united remnants 
of GUNT, which had controlled the national government under 
Goukouni's leadership from 1979 to 1982 (see Civil War and 



152 



A building showing the destructiveness of the Chadian Civil War 

Courtesy United Nations (John Isaac) 

Multilateral Mediation, 1979-82, ch. 1). Goukouni disappeared 
from the GUNT command while he negotiated unsuccessfully to 
return to Chad on his own terms in 1987. In 1988 he proclaimed 
his allegiance to Habre but soon thereafter announced the reor- 
ganization of the GUNT alliance under his command. 

Another group in the CSR, the CDR, was founded in 1979 by 
Acyl Ahmat but in 1988 led by Acheikh ibn Oumar. The CDR 
formed the core of Habre 's opposition in 1988, following military 
and political losses by GUNT. Also opposed to the government 
in 1988 were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad 
(Mouvement Populaire pour la Liberation du Tchad — MPLT), 
which had broken away from FAP under Aboubakar Abdel 
Rahmane's leadership, and its splinter group, the Western Armed 
Forces (Forces Armees Occidentales — FAO); several factions of 
FROLINAT, including those led by Hadjero Senoussi and 
Abdelkader Yacine; and the Movement for the National Salva- 
tion of Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad — 
MOSANAT), led by Boda Maldoun. MOSANAT, a Hajerai- 
based organization, maintained its antigovernment stance through 
several administrations. No remaining rebel army, by itself, posed 
an immediate threat to Habre 's regime (see Internal Security Con- 
ditions, ch. 5). 



153 



Chad: A Country Study 

National Union for Independence and Revolution 

Habre 's political support came primarily from northerners, the 
army that brought him to power, and civilians who admired his 
tough stand on such issues as opposition to Libyan interference 
in Chadian affairs. To broaden his support, in 1984 he undertook 
a program to extend the reach of government into rural areas, first 
by seeking the advice of the nation's prefects. Southern prefects 
advised that in addition to lingering animosity based on the early 
association of FAN with FROLINAT, which had worked to oust 
the southern-based government of Tombalbaye, a major concern 
in that region was the conduct of the army. The army had become, 
in effect, an obstacle to security. 

In 1984 Habre dissolved the CCFAN and established a political 
party, UNIR. Habre retained broad power to control the party 
agenda, and he appointed military officers to nine of the fourteen 
positions on the party's Executive Bureau, which served as the 
primary liaison between the party and the government. To placate 
the south, six posts were allocated to southerners. 

UNIR was designed primarily to mobilize and inspire popular 
participation in government and to enable the president to control 
that participation. Other important goals were to increase the 
civilian emphasis in government and, finally, to achieve peace 
between north and south. The party invoked national values 
such as brotherhood and solidarity, individual respect, confi- 
dence, and "healthy criticism and self-criticism." It also developed 
a repertoire of songs, chants, and sayings intended to bolster these 
aims. 

The eighty-member UNIR Central Committee was important 
in extending the reach of the party throughout the nation. For this 
purpose, it employed groups of about sixty agents (animateurs) and 
ten organizers (encadreurs) in each prefecture to convert apathetic 
and war- weary citizens into party activists. Militant UNIR 
recruiters delivered public speeches on the need for unity, peace, 
and progress through the party organization and for reduced Libyan 
influence in Chad. They also helped recruit members to party 
affiliates, such as youth groups, women's organizations, and trade 
associations. 

The main political impact of UNIR by 1988 was to maintain 
a cadre of elites on the periphery of the government. The party 
was successful at orchestrating political displays but had not inspired 
widespread loyalty. People generally remained skeptical of the 
ability of government to improve their lives. Rural citizens in par- 
ticular had seen few benefits of national development and feared 



154 



Government and Politics 



that the government's inevitable urban bias would make life even 
harsher for them. 

The party's effectiveness as a democratic forum was hampered 
by the fact that the president controlled its agenda. UNIR provided 
very limited opportunities for debating government policy and had 
little patronage to dispense, except its own offices. It served primar- 
ily to convey to the president a sense of popular opinion and to 
reassure him that his government was not entirely out of touch with 
its constituency. In this role, UNIR usurped much of the limited 
power of the interim legislature, the CNC, and left the appointed 
legislators to act primarily as bureaucratic housekeepers. Habre 
reportedly intended to allow for greater democratic participation 
at some time in the future, but before doing so, he hoped to pro- 
vide sufficient political indoctrination to guarantee support for party 
aims. 

In 1988 Habre proclaimed his intention to convert UNIR into 
a people's party, a "revolutionary vanguard," for the purpose of 
grass-roots political mobilization. To begin this task, he created 
the People's Revolutionary Militia (Milice Populaire de la Revolu- 
tion — MPR), but the MPR was not yet operational in mid- 1988. 
As head of the UNIR Executive Bureau, the president was to 
appoint the leader of the MPR and control its agenda. 

The MPR mandate was to reach people through the local party 
organization in each of the nation's administrative divisions. This 
structure — subdivided into groups, subgroups, sectors, and sub- 
sectors corresponding to the nation's prefectures, subprefectures, 
administrative posts, and cantons — was intended to provide UNIR 
with an apparatus for enforcing its decisions and a forum for 
promoting its programs. It would also augment the government's 
internal security apparatus. 

Political Style 

During his first six years as president, Habre 's style of govern- 
ing was essentially to juxtapose spheres of influence, including the 
Council of Ministers, a few close advisers, and personal friends 
and relatives, all of whom sought to influence presidential deci- 
sion making. Habre was at the center of these spheres, each of which 
coalesced around his agenda. His political strategy was based on 
a segmentary model that exploited Chad's traditionally fluid, fac- 
tional political dynamics. 

Habre understood factional dynamics on several levels, first as 
one of the Toubou herdsmen among whom he was born and whose 
livelihood had for centuries depended on manipulation of the social 
system to their advantage, and as a Western-educated member of 



155 



Chad: A Country Study 



a small elite, whose political longevity depended on his ability to 
broker alliances. Habre used this traditional and modern back- 
ground in his efforts to craft a stable nation out of a divided state 
torn by factional strife. 

That people were tired of war also contributed to Habre 's politi- 
cal successes in his first six years as president. A combination of 
resignation and opportunism brought former opponents into alli- 
ance with the president, who often was simply more tenacious than 
they were. To most of these former opponents, Habre 's authoritar- 
ian regime was preferable to a return to civil war. Factional dis- 
putes were not always resolved; sometimes they were submerged 
and could be expected to recur. 

Habre 's military style was characterized as smart, tough, and 
decisive. Observers described him as a pragmatic military leader, 
undeterred by bureaucratic and political niceties and undistracted 
by sentiment, ideology, or foreign entanglements. Although he had 
a sizable following among civilians, as of 1988 he still governed 
largely as a military officer. He had not made the shift in style from 
supervising a military bureaucracy, in which orders were given and 
obeyed, to overseeing a civilian government that required broad 
consensus formation. Political communication was generally one 
directional, from the president down. 

Habre established a reputation for ignoring seniority in making 
assignments, and, as a result, officers sometimes reported to their 
juniors when working on specific projects. One military com- 
mander, Hassane Djamouss, whose 1987 successes led to the rout 
of Libyan forces from much of the north, became a well-known 
example of this feature of Habre 's style (see Repelling Libya's 
Occupying Force, 1985-87, ch. 5). Djamouss was a former minister 
of the civil service, trained as a livestock technician, but correctly 
judged by Habre to be a master strategist. 

Habre also developed the reputation as a manager who set overall 
goals for his subordinates and left the mechanics of accomplishing 
those goals to lower-level managers. This decentralized responsi- 
bility and decision-making authority accorded well with traditional 
values of individualism held by many Chadian ethnic groups, and 
it had worked well in many military settings. A by-product of this 
feature of Habre 's style was that officials with delegated responsi- 
bility commonly bypassed bureaucratic regulations in order to 
accomplish their goal. Adhering to the chain of command was not 
the measure of success in Chad's government of the 1980s. 

Habre made several cautious attempts to bring peripheral eth- 
nic groups into the political process. Most high civilian and mili- 
tary appointments were from his own or a closely related ethnic 



156 




President Hissein Habre (in white) at a 1985 meeting of the 
United Nations Development Programme 
Courtesy United Nations 

group, but he appointed southerners and other non-Toubou 
civilians to several executive and administrative positions, despite 
occasional bureaucratic snarls that resulted from these attempts at 
national reconciliation. 

Faced with internal threats to his regime, Habre 's reaction was 
essentially repressive. Political opponents were often imprisoned 
or had their travel restricted. He broadened intelligence- gathering 
networks within the military (in 1986, for example, in response 
to growing opposition within the army) and expanded the power 
of the Presidential Guard (see The Chadian National Armed Forces, 
ch. 5). At the same time, he believed in his own power to ' 'reha- 
bilitate" and co-opt former opponents and was sometimes successful 
in gaining a measure of their trust. 

During its first nearly three decades of independence, Chad had 
a strong president and weak state institutions, but it also enjoyed 
some benefits of the weakness of the state. It had been spared much 
of the flamboyant political posturing that was evident in a few more 
peaceful and prosperous nations. Habre had not squandered pub- 
lic resources on grandiose monuments to himself, nor had he 
encouraged a sycophantic cult of personality. Public office was not 
yet synonymous with extraordinary wealth, and, as a result, pub- 
lic cynicism toward government in the 1980s was surprisingly low. 



157 



Chad: A Country Study 
Mass Media 

Communication across Chad's troubled regional boundaries was 
difficult in the late 1980s. Even telephone service was erratic and 
subject to frequent interruption (see Communications, ch. 3). 
Media development had been slowed by security problems, infra- 
structural weakness, and general economic disarray. During the 
1980s, some UN assistance was earmarked for improving print and 
broadcast media, but in a few cases, damaged equipment was 
destroyed as soon as it was repaired, and in general progress was 
slow. 

In 1988 Chad's only radio network, Radiodiffusion Nationale 
Tchadienne (RNT), was able to reach the entire country through 
transmitters located at N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, and Abeche. 
RNT's Voix de I 'unite et du progres (Voice of Unity and Progress) 
broadcast news in French three times a day, as well as a variety 
of programs in Chadian Arabic and several local languages. Esti- 
mates of the number of radio receivers operating in Chad in the 
late 1980s ranged from 100,000 to 1 million. No television service 
was available, but in September 1988 France agreed to provide 
CFA F185 million to install a television station at N'Djamena to 
reach the surrounding area. 

Print media, too, were limited by their lack of capital and equip- 
ment and by travel and communications difficulties. In 1988 the 
government-owned Chadian Press Agency (Agence Tchadienne 
de Presse) published a daily bulletin, Info-Tchad, in French, but 
its circulation was only 1,500. The UNIR information office also 
published a weekly newsletter, Al Watan, in French and Arabic. 
French newspapers such as Le Monde were also available, and 
government communiques were circulated in most cities. 

All media were owned and controlled by the government. Even 
the underground publication of antigovernment views was rela- 
tively rare, although Radio Bardai broadcast antigovernment views 
on behalf of opposition groups, usually in Chadian Arabic. Chad's 
small journalistic community looked forward to the improvement 
of nationwide media as a means of educating and unifying the popu- 
lation. 

Foreign Relations 

Chad lacked established channels for foreign policy debate in 
the late 1980s. Few people were accustomed to formulating or 
expressing foreign policy concerns beyond the desire for peace and 
an end to foreign intervention. As a result, Chad's foreign policy 
reflected its colonial past, economic and military needs, and the 



158 



Government and Politics 



quest for national sovereignty. Habre's overall plan for reinforc- 
ing national sovereignty was to eliminate Libyan intervention in 
the north, to reduce the nation's dependence on France, and, even- 
tually, to proclaim a democratic state of Chad. Consistent with its 
liberal economy and relatively small public sector, Chad's foreign 
policy was pro- Western in the 1980s, but the basis for this orien- 
tation was rooted in its dependence on Western military assistance 
and foreign aid and investment, rather than on popular concern 
about superpower rivalries. Habre maintained in 1988 that the 
spread of communism posed a threat to Africa, but he intended, 
nonetheless, to assert Chad's nonalignment and autonomy from 
the West once peace with its neighbors was established. 

After independence, Chad's importance in Africa increased, 
although its new stature derived more from its weaknesses than 
its strengths. It struggled to establish and maintain sovereignty 
within its boundaries, as Libya claimed a portion of northern Chad. 
Numerous dissidents within Chad considered Libyan domination 
preferable to Habre's administration of the 1980s or continued 
dependence on France. Some neighboring states hoped Chad would 
solve its internal problems and serve as a buffer against Libyan 
advances into the Sahel (see Glossary), pacify its warring rebel 
armies, and avoid destabilizing their regimes. Other neighboring 
states, especially Libya and Nigeria, hoped to exploit Chad's 
mineral wealth, and most of Chad's Arab neighbors saw it as a 
potential ally in the effort to weaken Western influence on the con- 
tinent. 

Libya and France were the key power brokers in Chad. Chad's 
relations with these two nations were interrelated throughout the 
1980s, complementing one another in many instances. France's 
ties with its former colony were rooted in historical, economic, politi- 
cal, and security issues. Libya's long-standing ties with Chad, con- 
versely, had cultural, ethnic, and religious bases — less important 
to governments but more so to many people in northern Chad. 
France and Libya also formulated policies toward Chad in the con- 
text of their own ambivalent relationship. France imported Libyan 
oil at favorable prices and assisted Libya's burgeoning military 
institutions yet faced the dilemma of arming both sides in the dis- 
pute over the Aozou Strip. 

Within this foreign relations triangle, Chad's national leaders 
confronted many of the foreign policy issues that plagued the entire 
continent in the 1980s — the legacy of arbitrary colonial boundaries, 
the perceived need for strong armies to defend them, continuing 
postcolonial dependence, questions regarding the role of Islam in 
a secular state, and the problem of establishing African forms of 



159 



Chad: A Country Study 



democracy under these conditions. Viewed in this light, Chad's 
political environment was a microcosm of Africa's international 
concerns. 

Relations with France 

France was Chad's most important foreign donor and patron 
for the first three decades following independence in 1960. At the 
end of the 1980s, economic ties were still strong, and France pro- 
vided development assistance in the form of loans and grants. It 
was no longer Chad's leading customer for agricultural exports, 
but it continued to provide substantial military support. 

Chad remained a member of the African Financial Community 
(Communaute Financiere Africaine — CFA; for value of the CFA 
franc — see Glossary), which linked the value of its currency, the 
CFA franc, to the French franc. French private and government 
investors owned a substantial portion of Chad's industrial and finan- 
cial institutions, and the French treasury backed the Bank of Central 
African States (Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale — BEAC), 
which served as the central bank for Chad and six other member 
nations (see Banking and Finance, ch. 3). Chad's dependence on 
France declined slightiy during Habre's tenure as president, in part 
because other foreign donors and investors returned as the war sub- 
sided and also because increased rainfall after 1985 improved food 
production. French official attitudes toward Chad had changed from 
the 1970s policies under the leadership of Giscard d'Estaing to those 
of the Mitterrand era of the 1980s. Economic, political, and stra- 
tegic goals, which had emphasized maintaining French influence 
in Africa, exploiting Chad's natural resources, and bolstering 
francophone Africa's status as a bulwark against the spread of Soviet 
influence, had been replaced by nominally anticolonialist attitudes. 
The election in France of the Socialist government in 1981 had 
coincided with conditions of near- anarchy in Chad, leading France's 
Socialist Party to reaffirm its ideological stance against high-profile 
intervention in Africa. Hoping to avoid a confrontation with Libya, 
another important client state in the region, President Mitterrand 
limited French military involvement to a defense of the region sur- 
rounding N'Djamena in 1983 and 1984. Then, gradually increas- 
ing its commitment to reinforce Habre's presidency, France once 
again increased its military activity in Chad (see The French Mili- 
tary Role in Chad, ch. 5). 

Relations with Libya 

Chad's relations with Libya, arising out of centuries of ethnic, 
religious, and commercial ties, were more complex than those with 



160 



Government and Politics 



France. Under French and Italian colonial domination, respectively, 
Chad and Libya had diverged in orientation and development. But 
even after Chad's independence in 1960, many northerners still 
identified more closely with people in Libya than with the southern- 
dominated government in N'Djamena. After seizing power in 1969, 
Libyan head of state Qadhafi reasserted Libya's claim to the Aozou 
Strip, a 100,000-square-kilometer portion of northern Chad that 
included the small town of Aozou. Libya based its claim on one 
of several preindependence agreements regarding colonial bound- 
aries, and it bolstered these claims by stationing troops in the Aozou 
Strip beginning in 1972. (Maps printed in Libya after 1975 included 
the Aozou Strip within Libya.) 

Qadhafi 's desire to annex the Aozou Strip grew out of an array 
of concerns, including the region's reported mineral wealth. He 
also hoped to establish a friendly government in Chad and to extend 
Islamic influence into the Sahel through Chad and Sudan, with 
the eventual aim of a Central African Islamic empire. 

A complex set of symbolic interests also underlay Libya's pur- 
suit of territory and influence in the Sahel. Qadhafi 's anticolonial 
and anti-imperialist rhetoric vacillated between attacks on the 
United States and a campaign focused on the postcolonial Euro- 
pean presence in Africa. He hoped to weaken Chad's ties with the 
West and thereby reduce Africa's incorporation into the Western- 
dominated nation-state system. Forcing the revision of one of the 
colonially devised boundaries affirmed by the OAU in 1963 was 
a step in this direction — one that seemed possible in the context 
of the troubled nation of Chad, which OAU members dubbed the 
continent's ' 'weakest link." 

Qadhafi attempted alliances with a number of antigovernment 
rebel leaders in Chad during the 1970s, including Goukouni, 
Siddick, Acyl Ahmat (a Chadian of Arab descent), and Kamougue, 
a southerner. Goukouni and Acyl were most sympathetic to 
Qadhafi's regional ambitions, but these two men clashed in 1979, 
leading Acyl to form the CDR. After Acyl's death in 1982, Libyan 
support swung strongly to Goukouni 's GUNT (see Civil Conflict 
and Libyan Intervention, ch. 5). 

By mid- 1988 Qadhafi appeared more willing to come to an agree- 
ment with Habre than to continue to support Qadhafi's fractious 
allies, who had suffered losses at Habre' s hands. Chadian and 
Libyan foreign ministers met in August 1988, and the two govern- 
ments agreed to further talks. At the same time, Libyan troops 
remained in the Aozou Strip, and its future status was uncertain 
(see Repelling Libya's Occupying Force, 1985-87, ch. 5). 



161 



Chad: A Country Study 



Relations with Nigeria and Sudan 

Within the complex and changing foreign relations triangle com- 
prising Chad, France, and Libya, the large nations of Nigeria and 
Sudan were also important actors. Nigeria considered France its 
primary rival in its attempt to chart the course of West Africa's 
political development. Its generally paternalistic relations with Chad 
intensified after the coup that ousted President Tombalbaye in 1975. 
After that, limiting Libyan expansion while avoiding direct clashes 
with Libyan troops also became important goals. Nigeria sponsored 
talks among Chad's rival factions in 1979 and promoted a little- 
known civil servant, Mahmat Shawa Lol, as a compromise head 
of a coalition government. Lol's perceived status as a Nigerian pup- 
pet contributed to mounting opposition during his short term as 
president in 1979. 

The two nations forged stronger ties during the 1980s. Hoping 
to benefit commercially and diplomatically by expanding regional 
trade relations, Nigeria replaced France as Chad's major source 
of export revenues. Bilateral trade agreements involved Chadian 
exports of livestock, dried fish, and chemicals and imports of 
Nigerian foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Both governments 
also recognized the potential value of the large informal trade sec- 
tor across their borders, which neither country regulated. In addi- 
tion, Nigerian industry and commerce employed several thousand 
Chadian workers. 

Chad's relationship with Nigeria was not without its strains, 
however. Beginning in the late 1970s, clashes occurred around Lake 
Chad, where both countries hoped to exploit oil reserves. Both also 
sought to defuse these confrontations, first by establishing joint 
patrols and a commission to demarcate the boundary across the 
lake more clearly. Then in the early 1980s, the low level of Lake 
Chad brought a series of tiny islands into view, leading to further 
disputes and disrupting long-standing informal trade networks. 

This relationship was also complicated by Nigeria's own insta- 
bility in the north, generated by rising Islamic fundamentalism. 
Thousands of casualties occurred as the result of violent clashes 
in Nigeria throughout the 1980s. Most religious violence was domes- 
tic in origin, but Nigerian police arrested a few Libyans, and 
Nigerian apprehension of Libyan infiltration through Chad inten- 
sified. 

Nigeria's 1983 economic austerity campaign also produced strains 
with neighboring states, including Chad. Nigeria expelled several 
hundred thousand foreign workers, mostly from its oil industry, 
which faced drastic cuts as a result of declining world oil prices. 



162 



Government and Politics 



At least 30,000 of those expelled were Chadians. Despite these 
strains, however, Nigerians had assisted in the halting process of 
achieving stability in Chad, and both nations reaffirmed their 
intention to maintain close ties. 

Sudan, Chad's neighbor to the east, responded to Chad's con- 
flict with Libya based on its own regional, ethnic, and cultural ten- 
sions. In Sudan, the Islamic northern region had generally 
dominated the non-Muslim south. Sudan's ties with Libya, 
although cautious during the 1970s, warmed during the 1980s, 
strengthening N'Djamena's fears of insurgency from the east. 

The populations of eastern Chad and western Sudan established 
social and religious ties long before either nation's independence, 
and these remained strong despite disputes between governments. 
Herdsmen in both countries freely crossed the 950-kilometer border, 
seeking pastureland and water sources as they had for centuries. 
Muslims in eastern Chad often traveled through Sudan on the hajj, 
or annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and many young people from 
eastern Chad studied at Islamic schools in Sudan. In addition, 
Sudan's cotton plantations employed an estimated 500,000 Chadian 
workers in 1978. 

At the same time, the basis for political enmity between these two 
nations was set in the early 1960s, when Chad's southern bias in 
government offended many Sudanese Muslims. Sudan allowed 
FROLINAT rebels to organize, train, and establish bases in western 
Sudan and to conduct raids into Chad from Sudan's Darfur Prov- 
ince. Refugees from both countries fled across their mutual border. 

Following the coup that ousted Tombalbaye in 1975, relations 
between presidents J aafar an Numayri and Malloum were surpris- 
ingly cordial, in part because both nations feared Libyan destabili- 
zation. Sudan sponsored talks among Chad's rebel army leaders 
in the late 1970s and urged Malloum to incorporate them into his 
government. (Numayri promoted the talents and intelligence of 
Habre, in particular, and persuaded Malloum to appoint Habre 
to political office in 1978.) These ties were strained in part because 
of Numayri 's warming relations with Libyan leader Qadhafi. 

As violence in Chad increased between 1979 and 1982, Sudan 
faced its own internal rebellion, and relations deteriorated after 
Numayri was ousted in 1983. In 1988 Habre assailed Sudan for 
allowing Libyan troops to be stationed along Chad's border and 
for continuing to allow assaults on Chadian territory from Sudan. 

Relations with Other African States 

Chad maintained generally close ties with its other African neigh- 
bors, but the primary base of these ties were Chad's economic and 



163 



Chad: A Country Study 

security needs, together with other governments' concerns for 
regional stability. Overall, African states sought to protect their 
own interests — to isolate or contain Chad's continuing violence 
without becoming involved militarily. As France was attempting 
to transfer more responsibility to former colonies and subregional 
powers, francophone African leaders urged each other and the 
former colonial power to increase assistance to Chad. Each side 
partially succeeded. 

African states had other reasons for ambivalence toward Chad 
in addition to their own security concerns. Chad's long-standing 
unrest, border conflicts, overall instability, and poverty contributed 
to its image as a relatively unimportant ally. It underwent frequent 
shifts in government; from 1979 to 1982, it was not always clear 
who was in charge. In 1982 Chad's new president, Habre, appeared 
to some African heads of state to be a Paris-educated northerner 
with aristocratic pretensions, who had not done enough to win their 
support. 

Because of Chad's landlocked status and limited air transport 
service, Cameroon was an important neighbor and ally through- 
out most of the 1970s and 1980s. Imports and exports were shipped 
between Yaounde and N'Djamena by rail and road, as were mili- 
tary and food assistance shipments. Cameroon became an increas- 
ingly important trading partner during the 1980s, following 
unsuccessful attempts in the 1970s to conclude multilateral trade 
agreements with Congo and Central African Republic. In 1987 
Cameroon was Chad's third largest source of imports after France 
and the United States, and Cameroon purchased Chadian cotton 
and agricultural products. 

The Cameroonian town of Kousseri had been an important sup- 
ply center and refuge for Chadians during the worst violence of 
the late 1970s (see fig. 8). The population of the town increased 
from 10,000 to 100,000 in 1979 and 1980. Cameroon's govern- 
ment urged France to increase assistance to stem Libyan advances 
because officials feared direct confrontation with Libyan troops and 
the influx of weapons and refugees from Chad. 

Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko was one of President Habre 's 
most consistent allies in Central Africa. Even before Habre seized 
power in 1982, Mobutu's desire to lead Africa's pro-Western, anti- 
Qadhafi efforts and to compete with Nigeria as a subregional power 
had led him to provide military training and troops for the IAF 
in Chad. 

Chad's relations with Central African Republic were not cordial, 
but the two nations were generally on good terms. Central African 
Republic controlled another important access route, and the two 



164 



An American C-5A delivers weapons at N'Djamena Airport 

Courtesy Joseph Krull 

nations had concluded a number of agreements regarding trade, 
transportation, and communication. Chad's President Tombalbaye 
had clashed with the former president of Central African Repub- 
lic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, over the establishment of a central Afri- 
can customs union in the late 1960s, however, leading Tombalbaye 
to close their common border. After this occurrence, Central African 
Republic remained fairly aloof from Chad's economic and security 
problems. Some Chadian refugees crossed into Central African 
Republic during the 1980s, but Bangui's major concern was 
preventing Chad's ongoing turmoil from spreading across its 
southern border. 

Niger and Chad shared a number of common features of post- 
independence political development, but these two landlocked, poor 
nations were unable to contribute noticeably to each other's progress. 
The inhabitants of their northern provinces — primarily Tuareg in 
Niger and Toubou groups in Chad — were both referred to by Lib- 
yan leader Qadhafi as his ethnic constituents, and both nations com- 
plained of Libyan insurgence in these mineral-rich areas. At the same 
time, important segments of both societies supported Qadhafi' s goal 
of establishing a Central African Islamic empire. Both nations also 
shared the dual heritage of Muslim and Christian influences and 
regional economic inequities, and both found themselves over- 
shadowed by Nigeria's wealth and large population. 



165 



Chad: A Country Study 

Chad had become one of Africa's intractable dilemmas in the 
1970s, confounding leaders who sought peace and prosperity for 
the continent as a whole. Chad's conflict with Libya became sym- 
bolic of the OAU's frustrated attempts to impose a coherent frame- 
work on Africa, and it defied the OAU resolution to uphold 
colonially imposed boundaries and settle inter-African disputes 
peacefully. The OAU formed a series of ad hoc committees to medi- 
ate the Chad- Libya dispute, and in 1988 the six committee 
members — Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and 
Senegal — succeeded in bringing together foreign ministers from 
Chad and Libya to pursue diplomatic recognition and peace talks. 
The committee also requested written documentation of each side's 
claims to the Aozou Strip in the hope of finding a legal channel 
for curbing violence there. 

Relations with the United States 

United States interest in Chad increased steadily during the 
1980s, as United States opposition to Libyan leader Qadhafi intensi- 
fied and Chadian instability threatened to contribute to regional 
destabilization. During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States and 
Chad had maintained fairly low-level economic ties, including 
investment guarantees and project aid, such as Peace Corps involve- 
ment. Drought in the early 1970s brought United States food and 
agricultural aid to remote areas, including grain supplies, animal 
health services, and technical assistance. Other economic agree- 
ments included road building in the Lake Chad area and rural com- 
munity development. 

Although the United States considered Chad part of France's 
sphere of influence, it also provided a low level of military assistance 
until 1977. President Malloum's 1978 request for increased mili- 
tary aid to fight the FROLINAT insurgency coincided with a 
marked increase in Soviet activity in Africa, especially in Ethio- 
pia, and increased Soviet arms shipments to Libya. United States 
relations with African states were redefined in accordance with the 
new strategic value assigned to African allies, and United States 
foreign policy shifted accordingly. Thus, in the 1980s United States 
interest and involvement in Chad increased. 

For a time in the early 1980s, the United States commitment 
to military support for Habre was more enthusiastic than that of 
France, which hoped to preserve its relationship with Libya. 
Although military and financial aid to Habre increased, by 1988 
United States advisers had begun to stress the need to reconcile 
warring factions and pacify rebel groups within Chad. United States 
support to Chad included several economic and military aid 



166 



Government and Politics 



agreements, including training programs to improve the effective- 
ness of Habre 's administration and to bolster public confidence 
in the government and intelligence-sharing to assist in countering 
Libyan forces in 1987. 

Relations with Arab States 

Despite centuries-old cultural ties to Arab North Africa, Chad 
maintained few significant ties to North African or Middle Eastern 
states in the 1980s. (Ties with Israel had been severed in 1972.) 
President Habre hoped to pursue greater solidarity with Arab 
nations in the future, however, viewing closer relations with Arab 
states as a potential opportunity to break out of his nation's post- 
colonial dependence and assert Chad's unwillingness to serve as 
an arena for superpower rivalries. In addition, as a northern Mus- 
lim, Habre represented a constituency that favored Afro- Arab 
solidarity, and he hoped Islam would provide a basis for national 
unity in the long term. For these reasons, he was expected to seize 
opportunities during the 1990s to pursue closer ties with Arab 
nations. 

During the 1980s, several Arab states had supported Libyan 
claims to the Aozou Strip. Algeria was among the most outspoken 
of these states and provided training for anti-Habre forces, although 
most recruits for its training programs were from Nigeria or Camer- 
oon, recruited and flown to Algeria by Libya. By the end of 1987, 
Algiers and N'Djamena were negotiating to improve relations. 
Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party also sent troops to support 
Qadhafi's efforts against Chad in 1987, but other Arab states and 
the League of Arab States (Arab League) limited their involvement 
to expressions of hope that the dispute over the Aozou Strip could 
be settled peacefully. 

* * * 

Several scholars have analyzed Chad's political development dur- 
ing the 1980s. Robert Buijtenhuijs, in Le Frolinat et les revokes 
populaires du Tchad, 1965-1976 provides background on the role of 
the opposition coalition in shaping the political environment. 
Bernard Lanne's Tchad-Libye: La querelle des frontieres analyzes the 
development of the dispute over the Aozou Strip. Virginia M. 
Thompson and Richard Adloff s Conflict in Chad provides valuable 
perspectives on attempts to bolster the faltering state in recent 
decades. Lanne's "Chad — Recent History" in Africa South of the 
Sahara, 1988 synthesizes Chad's complex political dynamics in a 
brief, coherent narrative. William J. Foltz's Chad's Third Republic 



167 



Chad: A Country Study 



assesses President Habre's political success and prospects for the 
future. Several of Rene Lemarchand's publications — in particu- 
lar, "Chad: The Road to Partition" and "Chad: The Misadven- 
tures of the North-South Dialectic" — provide insight into factional 
politics in segmentary lineage-based societies. 

Other valuable works include Samuel Decalo's Historical Dictionary 
of Chad (1987 edition), which presents concise political entries and 
a comprehensive bibliography. Gali N go the Gatta's Tchad: Guerre 
civile et desagregation de Vetat and Michael P. Kelley's A State in Disarray 
assess internal and external factors contributing to Chad's politi- 
cal turmoil. Pearl T. Robinson's "Playing the Arab Card" 
describes Libya's evolving role, and Kola Olufemi's "Chad: From 
Civil Strife to Big Power Rivalry" traces the rising external involve- 
ment in Chad's political drama. Finally, several interviews with 
President Habre illuminate his political views. Selections from these 
are found in Courier (March-April 1987), Jean-Jacques Lafaye's 
"Consolider la victoire," and Guy Jeremie Ngansop's Tchad: Vingt 
ans de crise. 

A variety of periodicals provide coverage of events in Chad, 
including Africa Economic Digest, Africa Report, Africa Research Bulle- 
tin, Africa Today, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia published 
by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Marches tropicaux et 
mediterraneens , Le Monde, Politique africaine, Politique internationale, 
Washington Post and West Africa. Africa Contemporary Record provides 
annual updates on political and economic developments and valu- 
able chapters on France in Africa and the Organization for Afri- 
can Unity. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



168 



Chapter 5. National Security 




elderly hunter from southern Chad 



AFTER CHAD GAINED its independence in 1960, its national 
army consisted of only about 400 men, mostiy members of the Sara 
ethnic group who had distinguished themselves in French army 
service during World War II and later in Algeria and Indochina. 
By the mid-1960s, however, rebellion in northern and eastern Chad 
necessitated the enlargement of this army. The rebellion also caused 
French forces stationed in nearby countries to intervene repeatedly 
to assist the Chadian government. 

By 1979 conditions had become chaotic. As many as eleven 
separate factional armies were contending for control, generating 
alliances and schisms at a bewildering rate. In the capital of 
N'Djamena, after the national army had been pushed aside, the 
two main northern rivals, Goukouni Oueddei and Hissein Habre, 
struggled for domination. Libya's intervention in 1980 on behalf 
of Goukouni resulted in the defeat of Habre 's army. With only 
a few hundred of his hardiest followers remaining, Habre was forced 
to seek a haven in western Sudan. But after Libya withdrew under 
international pressure, Habre 's revitalized army fought its way back 
to the capital, and he assumed power in 1982. 

The confused pattern of civil warfare continued, but Habre 
gradually consolidated his political position and brought the 
resistance in the south under control. With the help of a French 
expedition, he repelled a new offensive from the north in 1983 that 
had been mounted by a coalition of opponents under Goukouni 's 
leadership and backed by Libya's armor and air power. In 1986 
a split developed among the insurgents in the north when the major 
part of Goukouni 's army turned against the Libyans. Joined by 
these rebel forces, Habre 's army was strong enough in early 1987 
to wage a successful campaign to clear the Libyan invaders from 
most of Chad's vast northern territories and to threaten the Aozou 
Strip (see Glossary), which Libya had occupied since 1972. 

In 1983 the military arm of Habre 's movement became the 
nucleus of a new national army, the Chadian National Armed 
Forces (Forces Armees Nationales Tchadiennes — FANT). By 1987 
FANT had evolved into a potent, mobile, and battle-tested mili- 
tary organization. It had acquired modern arms adapted to the 
rigorous conditions of the far-flung arena of conflict in the north. 
In addition to receiving arms deliveries from France and the United 
States, FANT had captured a large stock of Libyan armored vehi- 
cles, missiles, artillery, and materiel. In its stricken financial state, 



171 



Chad: A Country Study 



the country continued to be dependent on its Western backers for 
munitions and fuel, as well as maintenance and training support 
for its newly acquired weaponry. Its air arm was insignificant, but 
French transport and combat aircraft remained in the country. 
Moreover, the army's antiaircraft missile defenses had effectively 
blunted Libyan air assaults. 

Habre had been remarkably successful in enlisting previously 
bitter adversaries in a common undertaking to regain the nation's 
territory. As part of the reconciliation with his former armed 
opponents, Habre had absorbed into FANT the remnants of the 
postindependence national army, dissident guerrilla fighters from 
the south, and most of the rebel coalition forces of his northern 
rival, Goukouni. Only the Presidential Guard, a select force mostly 
drawn from Habre 's own ethnic group, retained its separate 
identity. 

This large assemblage of manpower, however, could not be 
militarily justified as a permanent force once the Libyan danger 
was removed. For the future, a major problem for the military 
leadership would be the welding of FANT into an integrated force 
of sufficient loyalty to be entrusted with a primarily internal security 
mission and at strengths and equipment levels compatible with the 
country's financial means and defense requirements. 

External and Domestic Security Concerns 

At independence Chad's economic and strategic importance was 
limited. Isolated and landlocked, it boasted no developed natural 
resources, and most of its inhabitants lived at the subsistence level. 
There were few enduring disputes or traditional animosities likely 
to precipitate discord with its African neighbors. Because of Chad's 
good relations with its neighbors, it was a very unlikely candidate 
for international attention. 

In spite of these factors, Chad's vast territories have been a demo- 
graphic and cultural crossroads where outside forces have often com- 
peted for influence. The most significant of these forces has been 
Libya, whose efforts to assert itself in Chad have historical roots 
(see Civil Conflict and Libyan Intervention, this ch.). In modern 
times, however, these efforts have been ascribed to the ambition 
of Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi, who hoped to impose his 
concept of Islamic unity on African states bordering the Sahel (see 
Glossary). Asserting a legal claim to the Aozou Strip in northern 
Chad, Libya occupied the territory in 1972. To further his claim 
to the region, Qadhafi used troops from Libya's Islamic Legion — a 
unit whose members were recruited from among Muslims of Cen- 
tral Africa and West Africa. With no demonstrated economic value, 



172 




A former French Foreign Legion fort in Fada 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 

the area was useful primarily as a forward base to facilitate Libya's 
interference in Chadian military and political affairs. In response 
to Libya's claims, Chadian forces, supplied by France and the 
United States, inflicted a series of defeats on Libya in 1987. These 
strokes alleviated the threat from Qadhafi, although continued 
Libyan occupation of the Aozou Strip left the ultimate resolution 
of the conflict undecided. 

No other adjacent state has sought to stake out areas of influence 
or to assert territorial claims in Chad. In 1987 three of Chad's 
neighbors — Niger, Cameroon, and Central African Republic — 
had only nominal military establishments, which posed no threat 
to the relatively large and well-equipped Chadian army. Their 
mutual relations, moreover, were amicable, based on their shared 
experiences as members of the French colonial empire and con- 
tinued military collaboration with France. Several regional states, 
including Cameroon, Gabon, and Zaire, have directly or indirectly 
supported Chad in its conflict with Libya. 

Bordering Lake Chad, Nigeria, the most powerful of Chad's sub- 
Saharan neighbors, has been involved at various times with Chad 
in a peacekeeping role. One purpose of Nigeria's involvement was 
to reduce Chad's need for a French military presence; Nigeria has 
historically viewed French interests in Africa with suspicion. But 
a more important purpose was to prevent Qadhafi from gaining 



173 



Chad: A Country Study 



a foothold in sub-Saharan Africa, from which he could further his 
vision of radical Arab socialism under an Islamic banner. 

Chad's other large neighbor, Sudan, had given refuge to Habre 
and had helped reequip his army after its defeat in 1980 by the 
combined forces of Goukouni and Libya. Subsequently, fearful of 
offending Qadhafi and inciting him to aid the rebellion in its own 
southern region, Sudan adopted a neutral posture. Chad's border 
with Sudan remained volatile in 1988. Rebellious tribal groups, 
dispersed remnants of Goukouni 's defeated northern forces, Libyan 
troops, and members of the Islamic Legion were all involved in 
cross-border fighting. In this environment, banditry could not easily 
be distinguished from civil conflict. 

Since Chad's independence in 1960, the absence of cohesive social 
and economic forces has produced conditions of almost constant 
domestic turmoil and violence. Competing groups have tried to 
protect their own interests by supporting local "armies" — often 
armed bands of no more than a few hundred ill-trained recruits. 
Badly equipped and lacking a stable source of funds, these factions 
turned to foreign patrons to keep their movements viable. 

Concurrent with the success of his military campaigns, Habre 
pursued a policy of reconciliation with dissident groups. As a result, 
by 1987 he had either won over or defeated all his major rivals. 
Several former factional leaders who had contested Habre on the 
battlefield had been granted senior positions in the central govern- 
ment, and their forces either had been integrated into the national 
army or had peacefully demobilized. As of 1988, only two rivals 
of any stature remained — Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar. 
Goukouni no longer commanded significant military forces, and 
his reconciliation with Habre remained a possibility. Oumar' s 
Democratic Revolutionary Council (Conseil Democratique Revolu- 
tionnaire — CDR) had been decimated in the 1987 fighting, and 
the smaller Arab groups that constituted his following were of little 
significance. Nonetheless, revival of these movements with the aid 
of Libyan patronage could not be ruled out. It was feared that Libya 
might use support for them as a pretext for renewed intervention. 

Few observers believed that ethnic rivalries had been permanendy 
suppressed or that new factional disputes would not arise to threaten 
domestic stability. In 1987 reports revealed that one small resistance 
force, recruited among the Hajerai ethnic group, had become active 
in the mountains of Guera Prefecture (see fig. 1 ; Languages and 
Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Known as the Movement for the National 
Salvation of Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad — 
MOSANAT), it claimed to have been formed in protest against 
heavy taxes and exactions by the government, which northerners 



174 



National Security 



dominated. In late 1987, however, MOSANAT rebels had fled 
across the nearby Sudanese border (see Internal Security Condi- 
tions, this ch.). 

The Armed Forces 

From independence through the period of the presidency of Felix 
Malloum (1975-79), the official national army was known as the 
Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armees Tchadiennes — FAT; see 
Appendix B). Composed mainly of soldiers from southern Chad, 
FAT had its roots in the army recruited by France and had mili- 
tary traditions dating back to World War I. FAT lost its status as 
the legal state army when Malloum 's civil and military adminis- 
tration disintegrated in 1979. Although it remained a distinct mili- 
tary body for several years, FAT was eventually reduced to the 
status of a regional army representing the south. 

After Habre consolidated his authority and assumed the presi- 
dency in 1982, his victorious army, the Armed Forces of the North 
(Forces Armees du Nord — FAN), became the nucleus of a new 
national army. The force was officially constituted in January 1983, 
when the various pro-Habre contingents were merged and renamed 
FANT. 

Origins and Early Development 

When Chad became independent in 1960, it had no armed forces 
under its own flag. Since World War I, however, southern Chad, 
particularly the Sara ethnic group, had provided a large share of 
the Africans in the French army. Chadian troops also had con- 
tributed significantly to the success of the Free French forces in 
World War II. In December 1940, two African battalions began 
the Free French military campaign against Italian forces in Libya 
from a base in Chad, and at the end of 1941 a force under Colonel 
Jacques Leclerc participated in a spectacular campaign that seized 
the entire Fezzan region of southern Libya. Colonel Leclerc 's 
3,200-man force included 2,700 Africans, the great majority of them 
southerners from Chad. These troops went on to contribute to the 
Allied victory in Tunisia. Chadians, in general, were proud of their 
soldiers' role in the efforts to liberate France and in the interna- 
tional conflict. 

The military involvement also provided the country's first taste 
of relative prosperity. In addition to the wages paid its forces, Chad 
received economic benefits from three years of use as a major route 
for Allied supply convoys and flights to North Africa and Egypt. 
By 1948 about 15,000 men in French Equatorial Africa (Afrique 
Equatoriale Francaise — AEF; see Glossary) were receiving military 



175 



Chad: A Country Study 



pensions. Many Chadian southerners, finding military life attrac- 
tive, had remained in the French army, often becoming noncom- 
missioned officers (NCOs); a few had earned commissions as well. 
The French wars in Indochina (1946-53) and Algeria (1954-62) 
also drew on Chadians in great numbers, enlarging the veteran 
population still further. Those men receiving pensions tended to 
form the economic elite in their villages. As southerners they did 
not become involved in later insurgent movements that developed 
in central and northern Chad. 

Prior to independence, the French forces had been reorganized 
to redeploy some of the Chadian troops assigned to other African 
territories back into Chad. Following independence Chad's army 
was created from southern troops that had served with the French 
army. Initially, the army was limited to 400 men, some Chadian 
officers and many French commissioned officers and NCOs. Other 
soldiers were transferred into a larger paramilitary security force, 
the National Gendarmerie (see Police Services, this ch.). Equipped 
with light arms and other supplies, the army used facilities inherited 
from the French units that it had replaced. 

Because the French army units in Chad provided security, a large 
indigenous force was unnecessary. Accordingly, the Chadian army 
was deliberately restricted in size. By 1966, however, the depar- 
ture of the French administration from sparsely populated Borkou- 
Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture in the north encouraged dissident forces 
in the central prefectures to rebel. In response the government 
expanded its armed strength to a 700-man infantry battalion with 
supporting light artillery and also activated an air unit (see The 
Air Force, this ch.). 

The continued insurgency necessitated further enlargement of 
the army, to a total of 3,800 men by 1971. The army formed a 
paratroop company from 350 Chadians trained by Israeli instruc- 
tors at a base in Zaire. In addition to strengthening the regular 
army, the government increased mobile security companies of the 
National Gendarmerie, equipped as light infantry, to a strength 
of more than 1,600 men. A third force, the National Guard (later 
known as the National and Nomad Guard), which had at least 3,500 
members, provided security for officials, government buildings, 
and regional government posts. 

Except for the small number of nomad guards, the army and 
other security components continued to be composed primarily of 
members from southern ethnic groups, especially the Sara. Little 
effort was made to enlist northerners, who, in spite of their repu- 
tation as fierce warriors, were not attracted to the professional army. 
Consequendy, southern troops stationed in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti 



176 



Chadian military vehicles on parade, around 1970 
Courtesy Michael R. Saks 

Prefecture were looked upon as an army of occupation. They 
imposed humiliating restrictions in the northern settlements, and 
their abusive behavior was a source of bitterness. 

The growing unpopularity of the country's first president, 
Francois Tombalbaye, impelled him to strengthen further the inter- 
nal security forces and to employ a unit of Moroccan troops as his 
personal bodyguard. During the early 1970s, Tombalbaye doubled 
the size of the National and Nomad Guard and augmented the 
National Gendarmerie considerably. At the same time, he neglected 
and downgraded FAT, which the force interpreted as a lack of trust. 
These actions ultimately contributed to the decision by a small group 
of officers to carry out a coup in 1975 that resulted in Tombalbaye 's 
death and a new government under Malloum's presidency. 

Malloum's military regime insisted on the departure of the 
French troops. FAT, however, found itself increasingly unable to 
cope with the insurgency in the north, and, as a consequence, 
Malloum was obliged to invite the French back in 1978. As part 
of an effort at conciliation with one of the rebel factions, Habre 
was brought into the government. Habre rejected, however, the 
plan to integrate his FAN troops into the army, and his force soon 
demonstrated its superior resolution and strength by expelling 
Malloum's army from N'Djamena (see The FROLINAT Rebel- 
lion, 1965-79, this ch.). 



177 



Chad: A Country Study 

Organization of the National Security Establishment 

By the late 1980s, Chad's national security establishment was 
a conglomeration of former rebel armies under the command of 
Habre, whose troops were mostly from the north. The evolution 
of the national security establishment from an army of mostly 
southerners was rapid. This change occurred between April 1975, 
when Malloum assumed power, and early 1979, when the com- 
bined northern forces of Habre and Goukouni drove the southern- 
dominated FAT from N'Djamena. 

Internecine conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, 
prevented Chad from achieving political or military unity. Erst- 
while comrades Habre and Goukouni became bitter adversaries, 
and, with Libyan backing, Goukouni evicted Habre from the capital 
in 1980. Although forced to flee, Habre had fought his way back 
to N'Djamena by mid-1982. His occupation of the city was fol- 
lowed by victories in the south against his divided opponents (see 
Habre 's Return to Power and Second Libyan Intervention, 
1982-84, this ch.). With most regions of the country now under 
his authority, Habre assumed the presidency, promulgated a provi- 
sional constitution, the Fundamental Law of 1982, and introduced 
a cabinet and other institutions broadly representative of the existing 
political forces (see Constitutional System, ch. 4). 

The Fundamental Law, which remained in effect as of 1988, 
declares that the president is the supreme commander of the army 
and is authorized to appoint high-ranking military officers, such 
appointments to be subject to implementing decrees approved by 
the Council of Ministers (cabinet). Article 21 of the Fundamental 
Law states that "under the authority of the President of the Repub- 
lic, the Chief of State, and the government, the national army has 
the task of defending the national independence and unity, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, the security of the country, and 
its preservation from subversion and any aggression. The army 
participates in the work of national reconstruction." 

Habre, who had personally commanded the major element of 
the northern forces during most of the Chadian Civil War, retained 
the title of supreme commander and a large measure of control 
over the military establishment. In addition to his positions as presi- 
dent and supreme commander, Habre had assumed the ministerial 
portfolio of national defense, veterans, and war victims. In a prac- 
tical sense, however, in 1988 the Ministry of National Defense, 
Veterans, and War Victims was not a fully staffed government 
department independent of the military command structure. 



178 



National Security 



At the head of the military chain of command in 1988 was 
Hassane Djamouss, the commander in chief of FANT and the bat- 
tlefield commander during the succession of military victories over 
Libya. His senior deputy with responsibility for administration and 
logistics was Zamtato Ganebang. The second deputy, Adoum 
Yacoub, formerly commander of the People's Armed Forces (Forces 
Armees Populaires — FAP), a rebel army in the north, was respon- 
sible for tactics and operations. Another former rebel leader, Oki 
Dagache Yaya, was the senior representative of the FAP units that 
had been integrated into FANT. 

The creation of a five-member military cabinet attached to the 
presidency, on which several of the ethnic groups composing FANT 
were represented, was one of the measures adopted by Habre to 
provide a governmental role for his former opponents. The extent 
to which Habre relied on its advice on matters of military policy 
was not certain; some observers believe that Habre 's former adver- 
saries had been given symbolic positions having no real influence. 
The headquarters staff of FANT totaled about twenty officers and 
was composed of a number of bureaus patterned after those of the 
French military. Included were personnel (B-l), intelligence (B-2), 
operations (B-3), logistics (B-4), and communications (B-5). Others 
bureaus were tactics and recruitment. French advisers were detailed 
to all but the intelligence bureau (see fig. 9). 

The Presidential Guard (Securite Presidentielle — SP) was respon- 
sible for the personal security of the president and performed other 
internal security duties as well. Although the Presidential Guard 
participated in combat missions, it functioned as an independent 
wing of the armed forces. The Presidential Guard depended on 
FANT headquarters for administration and was officially part of 
FANT's structure, but it operated as a separate army, often in semi- 
secrecy. Dominated by soldiers of Habre's ethnic group, the Daza, 
it enjoyed many privileges and was assigned the most modern trans- 
portation equipment and weaponry. In 1987 the 3,600-man force 
was commanded by Ahmed Gorou. 

Except for the north, which had been organized into a separate 
military region, the country was divided into twelve military zones, 
each with headquarters in a major town. The senior officer, gener- 
ally a major of the Presidential Guard, held command responsi- 
bility for any military units within his designated zone. Subzones 
were located in smaller communities, usually under a lieutenant. 

The Chadian National Armed Forces 

As of mid-1987, FANT had a manpower strength of 28,000, 
exclusive of the Presidential Guard. At the time of its official 



179 



Chad: A Country Study 



SUPREME COMMANDER 



PRESIDENTIAL 
GUARD 



MILITARY 
CABINET 



COMMANDER IN CHIEF 



CHIEF OF SPECIAL 
HEADQUARTERS 



INSPECTOR OF 
THE ARMY 



CONTROLLER 

GENERAL 
OF THE ARMY 



DIRECTOR OF 
PROGRAMS AND 
PLANNING 



DIRECTOR OF 

MILITARY 
COOPERATION 



FIRST ASSISTANT 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 



COMMANDER 
GROUND FORCES 



SECOND ASSISTANT 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 



COUNSELOR 



COMMANDER 
AIR FORCE 



COMMANDER 
MILITARY POLICE 



HIGH COMMAND 
HEADQUARTERS 



INTERSERVICE 
DIRECTORATES 



PERSONNEL 



INTELLIGENCE 



OPERATIONS 



COMMUNICATIONS 



TACTICS 



RECRUITMENT 



Figure 9. Organization of Chadian National Armed Forces, Late 1985 



establishment in 1983, FANT consisted primarily of FAN troops, 
the well-disciplined and hardened combat veterans who had been 
the original followers of Habre. FANT gradually expanded, recruit- 
ing members of the former national army, FAT, who were pre- 
dominantly southerners of the Sara ethnic group. Later, additional 
southerners, the commandos or codos who had opened a guerrilla 
campaign against the government in 1983, were won over after 
two and one-half years of negotiations. Assigned to rehabilitation 
camps for retraining, the physically fit among them were also 
inducted into FANT. Finally, in the latter half of 1986, after FAP, 
the largest component of Goukouni's northern rebel army, had 



180 



National Security 



revolted against its Libyan ally, FAP soldiers were merged into 
FANT to join the campaign against the Libyan bases in Chad (see 
Appendix B). 

Under Chadian law, both men and women reaching the age of 
twenty-one were obligated for one year of military or civic service. 
There was no systematic conscription system; young men were sim- 
ply rounded up periodically in their communities and required to 
serve in the army for longer or shorter periods as military needs 
dictated. According to one source, very few members of FANT 
were conscripts in 1987. Women served in the military, but their 
exact duties were unknown. 

The Chadian army has never been organized at higher than bat- 
talion level. As of 1987, four battalions had been established within 
FANT. Sometimes known as "commando battalions," they were 
far smaller than standard battalions, with no more than 400 soldiers 
in each. Two of the battalions had completed training in Zaire, 
and the training of a third was under way. The fourth battalion 
existed mainly on paper; the companies assigned to it were still 
operating independently. 

The bulk of the remainder of FANT consisted of 127 infantry 
companies. Each company had a nominal strength of about 150 
men but in many cases as few as 100 because of casualties and other 
forms of attrition. The organizational pattern was flexible; a new 
company could be formed as needed by detaching troops from 
existing units and then might be dismantled after the operational 
need had ended. Moreover, a force of wheeled armored vehicles 
was organized separately into armored squadrons, each ordinarily 
supplied with ten or eleven vehicles along with truck-mounted recoil- 
less rifles and antitank missiles, and subdivided in up to four 
armored sections. The armored squadrons could be detailed as 
needed to operate in conjunction with infantry companies. 

FANT had no separate elements dedicated to airborne opera- 
tions. Soldiers trained as paratroopers, however, were scattered 
throughout FANT and the Presidential Guard after they had 
received instruction from the French teams that visited Chad and 
other French-speaking African states annually for this purpose. 

Because of the chaotic conditions and the severe financial con- 
straints on the government, systematic promotions in the officer 
corps had been suspended in the 1970s. As a result, many officers 
with senior responsibilities were lieutenants or captains, or they 
held no formal military rank at all. Officers of Habre's original 
FAN were known simply as camarade (comrade), and many, like 
the commander in chief, Djamouss, continued to be addressed in 



181 



Chad: A Country Study 



this way. Trusted associates of Habre were sometimes detached 
from civilian posts and given temporary military commands. 

Those officers of the former national army, FAT, who rallied 
to FANT were guaranteed retention of their former ranks, but not 
positions of equivalent responsibility. Accordingly, a major or 
colonel sometimes served under a lieutenant or captain. On occa- 
sion, an officer selected for training abroad might be granted the 
rank appropriate for the program to which he had been nominated, 
in effect resulting in his promotion. Thus, Idris Deby, the former 
commander in chief of FANT, was promoted to lieutenant colonel 
in conjunction with his attendance at the French war college. With 
the exception of two generals no longer holding active commands 
in 1988, the highest rank in FANT was that of colonel. 

The main fighting units of FANT, a group that had performed 
superbly against the Libyans during the 1987 offensive, were young 
but toughened by several years of harsh desert warfare. Their tactics 
of rapid movement and sudden sweeps upon an unsuspecting enemy 
were reminiscent of their nomadic warrior forebears. Decentral- 
ized decision making reportedly permitted field commanders to 
mount major attacks on their own initiative. Limited by poor com- 
munications, these commanders, in turn, sometimes described only 
general objectives in advance of an attack and depended on indi- 
vidual unit leaders to coordinate blows of devastating surprise and 
firepower. 

Foreign military observers were impressed by FANT's fighting 
style and rated it highly for esprit and combativeness. Neverthe- 
less, the discipline and orderliness of a traditional army were not 
greatiy in evidence. Except for members of the Presidential Guard, 
who favored the desert camouflage uniform of the United States 
Army if it were available, the troops did not wear a standard uni- 
form. Personal gear sometimes consisted merely of a prayer rug — 
which also served as a sleeping pad — and a sheepskin for warmth. 
Shower clogs were considered adequate footgear, nor were the 
rations what one might expect in a regular army. Individual com- 
bat rations were often no more than green tea, dried dates, and 
hard biscuits. Occasionally, meat from a slaughtered sheep or camel 
would be available. A FANT veteran could survive desert heat on 
as little as one liter of water a day. 

Unreliable payment of wages was a persistent problem for FANT 
troops. The bitterness in the south against the central government, 
which had resulted in outbreaks of violence between 1983 and 1985, 
was caused in part by confiscations of food and personal property 
by unpaid FANT troops. As of 1983, it was reported that FANT 
soldiers were paid the equivalent of US$140 for each major battle, 



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National Security 



although those qualified to fire large-caliber weapons and missiles 
could earn much more. By 1986 a system of monthly payments 
was in effect, but, owing to the government's financial distress, 
both soldiers and civil servants were on half pay. In practice, only 
the Presidential Guard received its wages in full and on a timely 
basis. The salary of an NCO in the Presidential Guard was about 
US$70 a month; officers could earn up to US$150. In FANT, the 
officer's basic salary of about US$70 a month was likely to be aug- 
mented by supplemental allowances based on the position being 
filled. Djamouss, the highest paid officer in FANT, earned about 
US$1 ,000 a month, plus the use of an automobile and a house and 
other privileges. 

Although the military victories of 1987 had imparted a sense of 
national pride and unity to FANT that had not existed previously, 
the dependability of the troops newly recruited from other armed 
factions had not yet been fully demonstrated. In early 1988, long- 
standing animosities and ethnic rivalries remained, and morale 
among ordinary soldiers was believed to be no better than fair. Rates 
of desertion and absence without leave were high, although not 
yet serious enough to affect the army's performance. Neverthe- 
less, in spite of its austerity, military life provided food, clothing, 
and minimal cash compensation. For many recruits, these modest 
benefits compared favorably with the impoverished conditions they 
faced when they returned to civilian existence. 

Training 

France has played a paramount role in the training of the Chad- 
ian armed forces since independence. In 1980, during the worst 
fighting of the Chadian Civil War, the French withdrew their train- 
ing mission and other forms of military cooperation. French involve- 
ment resumed in 1983 when Habre appealed for help against 
renewed Libyan intervention in northern Chad (see Foreign Mili- 
tary Cooperation, this ch.). As of late 1987, the French training 
mission consisted of about 250 officers and enlisted men. Of the 
10,000 soldiers composing FANT at its inception in 1983, about 
8,000 had been rotated through French training by 1987. The prin- 
cipal training sites were at N'Djamena, Koundoul, and Moussoro. 
At an instructional center at Mongo, thousands of former codos 
(commandos) had been * ' recycled" by French trainers, assisted by 
a large cadre of Chadian military. A small number of codos had 
been integrated into FANT, but most had been organized into work 
brigades for service as agricultural or road laborers. 

The French- supervised training was complicated by the extreme 
variation in educational and experience levels of the soldiers. In 



183 



Chad: A Country Study 



some cases, combat veterans had to be combined with new recruits. 
Most enlisted men were illiterate and did not understand French; 
when an interpreter was unavailable, instruction was done by 
demonstration and imitation. The wide range of equipment and 
weapons in the growing Chadian inventory presented a further 
challenge for the French instructional teams. 

An interservice officers' school staffed by the French was located 
at N'Djamena. In 1986 the school graduated its first class; an earlier 
school on the same site had suspended operations in 1979. The 
annual intake of thirty-five cadets was selected from those civilian 
and military candidates who had a junior high school level educa- 
tion. The two-year program combined general and military sub- 
jects; graduates were commissioned as infantry platoon leaders with 
the rank of second lieutenant. 

A number of officers were also selected for advanced training 
abroad, principally in France and in other francophone countries 
of Africa. According to Chadian government data, in 1987 it was 
expected that forty officers would be assigned to schools in France, 
thirty-one to Senegal, and about forty to Congo, Cote dTvoire, 
and Zaire combined. A total of forty officers and NCOs had received 
training in the United States in infantry and engineering skills and 
in equipment repair and maintenance. In addition, United States 
mobile training teams visited Chad in the late 1980s for periods 
of one week to two months to offer instruction in the use of new 
weapons. 

Equipment 

FANT's unique combat requirements have dictated equipment 
policies. These requirements include the capability to shift troops 
and equipment across vast distances over rough desert tracks, along 
with the need for cross-country movement to avoid mines and to 
achieve surprise. In 1987 superior maneuverability and swiftly 
applied firepower enabled FANT to offset Libya's heavier armor 
and to reduce the danger of counterattacks from the air. To achieve 
mobility, FANT favored light armored vehicles and four-wheel 
drive pickup trucks. The main armored vehicles were French- 
manufacture Panhards mounted with 90mm guns and supple- 
mented by several V-150 Cadillac Gage Commandos manufactured 
in the United States. The principal antitank weapons were 106mm 
and 1 1 2mm recoilless rifles and the French Milan missile mounted 
on trucks especially designed for desert operations. The FANT 
arms inventory was greatly augmented in late 1986 and early 
1987 by military aid from France and the United States. The aid 
included additional Panhard armored vehicles, two-and-one-half 



184 



Chadian troops receiving instruction on the use of antitank weapons 

Courtesy Joseph Krull 

ton all-terrain trucks, fresh stocks of French and American anti- 
tank missiles, and American-built jeeps. Toyota pickup trucks were 
purchased separately (see table 8, Appendix A). 

Surface-to-air missile defense consisted primarily of the United 
States- supplied shoulder-launched Redeye and Soviet SA-7s cap- 
tured from Libya. In late 1987, it was reported that the United 
States planned to supply the more advanced Stinger as well. In 
the late 1980s, France had provided equipment and training for 
an air defense platoon of Panhard armored vehicles mounted with 
radar and 20mm cannons. 

Small arms carried by individual soldiers had been obtained from 
a variety of sources. The weapons included Soviet-origin Kalash- 
nikov rifles, the American M-14, the Belgian FAL, the Swiss SIG- 
Manurhin, the French MAT-49, and some Israeli Uzis, as well 
as many rifles of World War II vintage. 

The series of victories over Libyan forces in 1987 resulted in 
a vast accumulation of armor, weapons, and aircraft, much of it 
in good operating condition. The captured materiel included tracked 
and wheeled armored vehicles, rocket launchers, antiaircraft radar 
systems, light aircraft, helicopters, and pickup trucks (see table 9, 
Appendix A). It was uncertain to what extent this arsenal could 
be effectively introduced into FANT in view of the operating 
expense and maintenance burden, not to mention the need for 



185 



Chad: A Country Study 

training personnel in the use of a variety of complex weapons sys- 
tems. Some Chadian army commanders were opposed to employ- 
ing heavy armored equipment because of its unsuitability to combat 
conditions in Chad and to the tactics that had proved so successful 
for FANT. Others were said to be intrigued with the idea of 
developing an armored element based on tanks. 

The Air Force 

The small Chadian air force, which in 1987 had fewer than 200 
men assigned to it, was a branch of the army. When activated in 
the early 1960s, its inventory consisted of one C-47 transport air- 
craft, together with five observation aircraft and helicopters, all 
flown by French pilots. By the mid-1960s, the air force had a num- 
ber of Chadian pilots. Within a decade, an additional thirteen C-47s 
were acquired, as well as several French-built utility aircraft and 
helicopters. The capabilities of the air force remained limited to 
transport, communications, and liaison, however. The air force 
was used extensively in support of French and Chadian units oper- 
ating against rebel activity in the north. French fighter aircraft were 
regularly rotated into the country from neighboring bases for rapid 
deployment exercises. After the withdrawal of French forces from 
Chad in 1975, the government reached an agreement with France, 
which provided for continued French logistical support and train- 
ing of pilots and mechanics. 

In 1976 the air force began to acquire a modest combat capabil- 
ity in the form of seven propeller-driven Douglas AD-4 Skyraid- 
ers obtained from France. Flown primarily by French and other 
contract pilots, these aircraft were used for several years in sup- 
port of antiguerrilla campaigns in the north. As of 1987, the sur- 
viving Skyraiders were no longer operable. In 1985 Chad acquired 
from France two Swiss-built Pilatus PC -7 turboprop trainers, armed 
with 20mm guns. These aircraft were suitable for counterinsur- 
gency operations, but as of late 1987 they had been used only for 
reconnaissance or liaison duties. 

The United States had supplied Chad with four C-130 Hercules 
transport and cargo aircraft in the mid-1980s, of which two 
remained in operation in 1987. Three of the C-47s and one DC-4 
were also still in use. Seven L-39 Albatros jet fighter- trainers of 
Czechoslovak manufacture captured from Libya were not in 
operating condition; in any event, the air force did not have jet- 
qualified pilots. Several of the Italian SF-260 Marchetti turboprop 
trainer aircraft captured at Ouadi Doum and Fada were reportedly 
being flown on reconnaissance missions. Armed with 20mm 
cannons, these light aircraft brought new ground support and 



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National Security 



counterinsurgency potential to the air force. None of the helicop- 
ters previously supplied by France remained in the inventory as 
of 1987 (see table 10, Appendix A). 

As of late 1987, Lieutenant Mornadji Mbaissanabe was serv- 
ing as acting commander of the air force. Pilots and crews were 
of Chadian, French, and Zairian nationalities. France had under- 
taken responsibility for repair and maintenance of the aircraft, 
although the actual maintenance teams were of diverse origins. 
Spare parts and major overhauls for the C-130s were being provided 
by the United States; France provided service depot visits, crew 
training, and fuel. 

Defense Expenditures 

An accurate picture of the actual economic burden of defense 
costs in 1987 could not be obtained because of the limited statisti- 
cal data available from Chadian government sources. Officially, 
defense expenditures came to about CFA F9.0 billion in 1984, CFA 
F9.4 billion in 1985, and CFA F8.4 billion in 1986 (for value of 
the CFA F — see Glossary). These expenditures constituted slightly 
in excess of 37 percent of the total budget in 1984 and 1985 and 
slightly less than 35 percent in 1986. 

It was believed, however, that actual defense expenditures were 
considerably higher than those given in official figures. Moreover, 
the available data did not reflect most of the assistance received 
from France, which was used to meet personnel and operating 
needs. The expansion of FANT and the heavy financial burden 
imposed by the fighting in 1987 undoubtedly necessitated a fur- 
ther upsurge in defense outlays. In view of the small proportion 
of the government budget that could be met through taxation and 
other domestic revenues, continuation of a high level of French 
subsidy was indispensable to cover such ongoing military costs as 
fuel, supplies, munitions, and wages (see Government Finances, 
ch. 3). 

In addition to official budget expenditures, it was reported that 
a further CFA F2 billion had been raised annually since 1984 on 
behalf of FANT in the form of "voluntary" donations collected 
from private citizens and businesses by officials of the only recog- 
nized political party, the National Union for Independence and 
Revolution (Union Nationale pour lTndependance et la Revolu- 
tion — UNIR; see National Union for Independence and Revolu- 
tion, ch. 4). In spite of the fund-raising, FANT troops received 
only five months' pay during 1986. 



187 



Chad: A Country Study 

Civil Conflict and Libyan Intervention 

By the close of 1987, Chad had experienced conditions of chronic 
warfare for twenty-two years. During the first fourteen years of 
this period (1965-79), Muslims of the north and central regions 
had pursued a guerrilla campaign against the central government, 
which was dominated by non-Muslim, French-speaking southern- 
ers. The military occupation of N'Djamena by northern insurgents 
in 1979 was an important turning point. Although the struggle con- 
tinued with increasing severity, its shape now changed. Differences 
between north and south persisted but had become secondary to 
the developing conflict between the two northern rivals — Habre 
and Goukouni. Habre' s skills as a military commander repeatedly 
enabled him to prevail against domestic military opponents. He 
could not withstand, however, the combined onslaught of the forces 
of Goukouni and his Libyan collaborators when Qadhafi interceded 
in strength in 1980 and again in 1983. 

French troops returned to Chad in 1983 to block the southward 
advance of the Libyans, imposing a de facto cease-fire and parti- 
tion of the country. The south and central regions were controlled 
by Habre, protected by a French line of defense, and the north 
was occupied by the armies of Goukouni shielded by Libyan ground 
and air power. 

In the late summer of 1986, the balance of military power shifted 
when most of the troops of Goukouni 's coalition rebelled against 
their Libyan allies. Isolated and demoralized, the Libyans were 
driven from their Chadian bases in a series of stunning blows by 
Habre's army in the early months of 1987. The conflict had been 
transformed from a civil war, in which Libya was backing one of 
the claimants to authority in Chad, into a national crusade 
by a virtually united Chad to drive Libyan forces from its terri- 
tory. 

The FROLINAT Rebellion, 1965-79 

The prolonged civil warfare in Chad had its origins in a spon- 
taneous peasant uprising in Guera Prefecture in 1965 against new 
taxes imposed by President Tombalbaye. The rebellion represented 
a rekindling of traditional animosities between the Muslim northern 
and central regions and the predominantly non-Muslim people of 
the south who had dominated the government and civil service since 
independence. After unrest broke out in other areas, the various 
dissident groups were merged into the National Liberation Front 
of Chad (Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad— FROLINAT) 
at a meeting in Sudan in 1966, although FROLINAT leaders at 



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National Security 



first had little contact with the fighting men in the field. From its 
starting point in Guera, the rebellion spread to other east-central 
prefectures. The struggle broke out in the north in early 1968, when 
the always-restive and warlike Toubou nomads destroyed the army 
garrison at Aozou. 

The government asked the French to intervene when rebel 
activity threatened some of the administrative posts in the east and 
north. A French expeditionary force succeeded in recapturing most 
of the FROLINAT-held regions, but, after the withdrawal of the 
French in 1971, FROLINAT was again able to operate relatively 
freely. Internal divisions, however, prevented FROLINAT from 
capitalizing immediately on the weaknesses of the Tombalbaye 
regime. Early on, the movement's ideologue, Abba Siddick, lost 
control to more militant factions. Goukouni broke with the First 
Liberation Army, which Siddick commanded, and formed the 
Second Liberation Army, later known as FAN. As of 1973, northern 
Borkou and Tibesti subprefectures were occupied by the Second 
Liberation Army, leaving the First Liberation Army in control in 
Ennedi Subprefecture (see Appendix B). 

In the meantime, Goukouni had been joined by the young and 
dynamic Habre, who had been named commander in chief of the 
Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de 
Commandement des Forces Armees du Nord — CCFAN). Habre, 
however, was ousted in 1976, when he objected to Goukouni' s will- 
ingness to cooperate with Libya to further the struggle against the 
central government. The two leaders also differed over Habre 's 
kidnapping of French citizens and holding them for ransom as a 
means of raising funds. 

Most of FROLINAT' s First Liberation Army was reunified 
under Goukouni 's overall command as FAP during 1977. (Habre 
reclaimed the name FAN for his followers.) Equipped with freshly 
supplied Libyan weapons, FAP carried on a broad offensive against 
government troops until a cease-fire was laboriously negotiated in 
March 1978. The truce was soon broken by Goukouni, whose 
troops soundly defeated the government army and threatened 
N'Djamena. French forces were again airlifted into the country 
and were decisive in routing FAP in a series of sharp engagements 
during the spring of 1978. During the course of the fighting, much 
of the new equipment FAP had received from Libya was 
abandoned. 

In spite of the French rescue effort, the Malloum government 
was weakened both politically and militarily by the defeats admin- 
istered to FAT, the national army. To shore up his position, Mal- 
loum offered Habre the post of prime minister in a government 



189 



Chad: A Country Study 



of national unity under the former's presidency. The new govern- 
ment, however, failed to function because it was paralyzed by fac- 
tional differences. Clashes between FAT and Habre's FAN were 
frequent in the capital. General fighting broke out between the two 
forces in February 1979. The poorly led, less aggressive FAT troops 
were soon driven out of N'Djamena by FAN. When the fighting 
ended, the looting and summary executions that followed precipi- 
tated a mass exodus of southern civilians. Mutual reprisals followed. 
Massacres of Muslims in southern towns were countered by execu- 
tions of southern officials in eastern areas controlled by FAN. 

French troops present in the N'Djamena area did not intervene; 
French neutrality in effect favored Habre, although the French 
attitude toward him was divided. Goukouni's FAP, meanwhile, 
had descended from the north to fight alongside FAN. By March 
1979, the struggle had resulted in a de facto partition of Chad: the 
Muslim armies of FROLINAT controlled the capital, together with 
the northern and central prefectures, and Malloum controlled the 
five southernmost prefectures. 

First Libyan Intervention, 1980-81 

Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) through 
most of 1979 brought temporary reconciliation among the warring 
factions. Nigeria acted as host to four conferences — the first two 
in Kano and the second two in Lagos — that gave rise to the Tran- 
sitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d' Union 
Nationale de Transition — GUNT). Goukouni served as president, 
Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue of FAT as vice president, and Habre 
as minister of defense in the government. An African peacekeep- 
ing force composed of units from Benin, Congo, and Guinea was 
also scheduled to be sent to Chad. The units from Benin and Guinea 
failed to arrive, however, and the 600 Congolese who appeared 
in January 1980 were withdrawn three months later without 
becoming involved in any military action. 

The formation of GUNT did not end conflict among the fac- 
tional armies. Both Goukouni's FAP and Habre's FAN occupied 
parts of N'Djamena during the negotiations of 1979 and after the 
coalition government was installed, maintaining separate spheres 
of influence radiating from their respective headquarters. When 
skirmishes broke out in the capital in March 1980, fighting between 
FAP and FAN gradually escalated. In spite of brief cease-fires and 
efforts at mediation, the struggle persisted for nearly nine months 
without much change in the positions of the combatants. Artillery 
exchanges reduced much of the capital to rubble. Civilian casual- 
ties were high, even though most of the remaining population had 



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taken refuge in nearby towns in Cameroon and Nigeria. Under 
Kamougue FAT cooperated with Goukouni's GUNT coalition, but 
its attacks from the east on FAN failed. Despite FAT's attacks, 
FAN managed to preserve its supply lines from Sudan by main- 
taining control over the N'Djamena-Abeche road. 

Although French troops were still present, they did not inter- 
vene. They deferred willingly to the efforts of the African nations 
to restore peace and at Goukouni's request departed in May 1980. 
FAN's superior firepower and discipline, however, was gradually 
imperiling the GUNT coalition and led Goukouni to turn to Libya 
for help. GUNT and Libya signed a treaty of friendship and 
cooperation on June 15, 1980. 

Under the treaty, the Chadian government had the right to call 
upon Libya should Chad's independence, territorial integrity, or 
internal security be threatened. Armed with this legal pretext, Libya 
sharply increased its involvement in the country. After Habre 
resumed his offensive against GUNT in October 1980, Goukouni 
shifted the FAP's operations to Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, 
where, stiffened by Libya's backing, his force ousted FAN from 
the main settlements. In the meantime, a substantial Libyan force 
of 7,000 to 9,000 troops accompanied by tanks and self-propelled 
artillery was transported southward from assembly points in 
southern Libya. With military advisers from the German Demo- 
cratic Republic (East Germany) and the Soviet Union coordinating 
its movements, FAP seized the town of Ati on the N'Djamena- 
Abeche road, cutting Habre 's supply line to the east. The Libyan 
army, which included 4,500 to 5,000 members of the Islamic 
Legion, was then moved into position for a strike at N'Djamena. 
After a week of intensive shelling, FAN was forced to evacuate the 
capital on December 15, 1980. 

With the Libyans present in force, a period of relative calm 
ensued, although the various regions of the country remained 
divided under the control of rival military factions. The Libyan 
army occupied N'Djamena and was posted at bases in northern 
Chad alongside Goukouni's FAP; the latter's strength was estimated 
at over 5,000. Kamougue 's FAT, comprising some 3,000 to 5,000 
troops, occupied the south. The pro- Libyan Democratic Revolu- 
tionary Council (Conseil Democratique Revolutionnaire — CDR), 
led by Acyl Ahmat, had about 3,000 men in Arab areas of the east. 
Habre 's defeated FAN, numbering no more than 4,000 troops, 
had retreated to its original stronghold in Biltine Prefecture and 
along the Sudanese border. 

On January 6, 1981, Goukouni signed an accord with Qadhafi 
to merge Chad and Libya, evoking a highly negative reaction 



191 



Chad: A Country Study 



among the Chadian factions and other African states. Under sus- 
tained pressure from African nations and from France to sever his 
dependence on Libya, Goukouni in effect later renounced the plan 
of unification and called for the withdrawal of the Libyan forces. 
Although Qadhafi's army had become highly unpopular and 
hundreds of his soldiers had become casualties of guerrilla activity, 
the haste with which he pulled back the Libyan units within a two- 
week period in November 1981 came as a surprise. 

The Libyans were replaced by an OAU peacekeeping force, the 
Inter- African Force (IAF), consisting of 2,000 Nigerians, 2,000 
Zairians, and 800 Senegalese. Originally, seven African govern- 
ments had promised contributions, but disputes over financing 
limited the OAU operation. Because of the vague mandate of the 
peacekeeping force and the determination of all three countries to 
avoid combat, the IAF made no effort to block Habre's military 
comeback after the departure of the Libyans. 

Habre's Return to Power and Second Libyan Intervention, 
1982-84 

Goukouni 's army, weakened by defections and dissension and 
no longer benefiting from Libya's help, could not prevent Habre's 
advance. By the end of 1981, Habre had retaken Abeche, Fay a 
Largeau, and other key points (see fig. 10). Following sharp fight- 
ing in the outskirts of N'Djamena, Habre entered the capital on 
June 7, 1982. 

After initially fleeing the country, Goukouni returned to gather 
his forces around Bardai in the far north. Numbering some 3,000 
to 4,000, his troops included the remnants of the CDR, FAP, FAT, 
the First Liberation Army, the Volcan Forces, and the Western 
Armed Forces (Forces Armees Occidentales — FAO) (see Appen- 
dix B). Regrouped as the National Liberation Army (Armee 
Nationale de Liberation — ANL), they were trained and equipped 
by the Libyans. Negue Djogo, a French-trained officer from the 
south, was placed in command. 

When formed in January 1983, Habre's new FANT had an esti- 
mated strength of 10,000; the force consisted of a core of 6,000 
members from FAN and 4,000 troops absorbed from other fac- 
tions. Arrayed against it were Goukouni' s coalition forces buttressed 
by Libyan units and the Islamic Legion, which had crossed back 
into northern Chad. Together, these forces amounted to about 
12,000 troops. Returning to the offensive, Goukouni 's army was 
able to take Faya Largeau in June 1983, following a devastating 
Libyan air bombardment. Continuing southward, Goukouni 's 
army captured Kalait and Oum Chalouba; however, by the time 



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National Security 



it reached Abeche on July 8, 1983, severing Habre's supply line 
to Sudan, it had become overextended. 

As the rebels advanced, aided by the poorly concealed partici- 
pation of Libya, Habre made insistent appeals for international 
help. Rejecting direct intervention, France was prepared to go no 
further than airlifting arms and fuel. Zaire flew in a detachment 
of paratroopers, eventually furnishing about 2,000 men. Deployed 
chiefly around N'Djamena, they freed Chadian troops to fight the 
rebels. The United States announced that US$25 million in criti- 
cally needed equipment would be provided (see United States Mili- 
tary Aid, this ch.). In a desperate effort to turn the tide, Habre 
took personal command of F ANT, driving Goukouni's army out 
of Abeche four days after the city's fall, recapturing Faya Largeau 
on July 30, 1983, and sweeping on to retake other points in the 
north. 

Faced with the collapse of the offensive spearheaded by Gou- 
kouni's army, Qadhafi increased his commitment of forces in Chad. 
Preceded by intensive strikes by ground attack fighters and bomb- 
ers, a large Libyan armored force drove FANT out of Faya Largeau 
on August 10. The Libyan contingent of 4,000 to 5,000 troops was 
heavily equipped and included tanks and armored personnel car- 
riers, supported by long-range self-propelled artillery and multi- 
ple rocket launchers. 

In response to the introduction of the Libyan mechanized bat- 
talions, which led to the fall of Faya Largeau, the French reluc- 
tantly agreed to a renewal of direct involvement. They contributed 
a round-the-clock airlift of supplies and 180 French military 
advisers. A much larger troop commitment soon followed. The 
French force eventually totaled 3,500 air force, Foreign Legion, 
and airborne personnel in what was designated as Operation Manta 
(Stingray). The first contingents were deployed north of N'Djamena 
at points on the two possible routes of advance on the capital. Fighter 
aircraft and antitank helicopters were dispatched to Chad to dis- 
courage an attack on N'Djamena. As the French buildup proceeded, 
forward positions were established roughly along the parallel of 16° 
north latitude, which the French tried to maintain as the line 
separating the combatants. 

In 1983 Goukouni's forces and their Libyan allies continued to 
occupy virtually all of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture. Mean- 
while, Libya was rapidly building new airstrips in southern Libya 
and in the Aozou Strip to provide support to Libyan forces and 
its Chadian allies. Protracted bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
eventually were successful in producing agreement on a simul- 
taneous withdrawal of French and Libyan forces. Within the 



193 




Figure 10. Areas of Fighting, 1980S 7 



stipulated period of two months, on November 10, 1984, the French 
withdrawal was completed. But evidence provided by United States 
satellite photographs made it apparent that Qadhafi had violated 
his commitment by not removing his troops from Borkou-Ennedi- 
Tibesti Prefecture. Although French president Francois Mitterrand 
confronted Qadhafi over his actions at a hastily arranged confer- 
ence, he failed to obtain the Libyan leader's compliance. 

Repelling Libya's Occupying Force, 1985-87 

Although French negotiating efforts had failed to dislodge the 
Libyans from their foothold in northern Chad, Habre continued 
to consolidate his military situation during 1985 and 1986. At the 
same time, Goukouni's forces were becoming debilitated because 
of defections and internal dissension. Rebellion in the south by 



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National Security 



codos had virtually ceased by the summer of 1986, as increasing 
numbers of codos yielded to the Habre government. According to 
Colonel Alphonse Kotiga, the former codo leader who had become 
reconciled with Habre in 1986, as many as 15,000 had accepted 
offers of compensation and training to become reintegrated into 
civil or military life. Only about 10 percent could be absorbed as 
recruits by FANT, but the end of the revolt permitted the redeploy- 
ment of F ANT units from the south to face Goukouni's Libyan- 
backed forces in the north. 

Goukouni's GUNT, reequipped by Libya and now numbering 
4,000 to 5,000 men, was concentrated in the Tibesti region and 
at Fada and Faya Largeau. In addition to these forces, about 5,000 
Libyan troops remained in northern Chad. At Ouadi Doum, near 
Faya Largeau, the Libyans had constructed a new air base to han- 
dle bombers and air resupply operations. A GUNT offensive in 
February and March 1986 ended the military stalemate that had 
prevailed through most of 1985. The GUNT drive, heavily sup- 
ported by Libya, triggered a return of French forces, called Opera- 
tion Epervier (Sparrowhawk). Initially involving about 1 ,400 men, 
by early 1987 when Libya appeared to be massing for a new thrust, 
the French deployment had mounted to 2,500 and included, in addi- 
tion, a detachment of Jaguar and Mirage aircraft. 

Differences within GUNT reached a critical stage in August 1986. 
Acheikh ibn Oumar, who had succeeded the deceased Acyl Ahmat 
as leader of the pro-Libyan CDR, had become Goukouni's adver- 
sary. The followers of Goukouni, essentially the former FAP, were 
increasingly resentful of Libya's domination in the north and were 
reluctant to renew their offensive against FANT. When fighting 
broke out between FAP units and the CDR at Fada, Libya inter- 
vened with armor and air power. As a result, Goukouni's men, 
constituting about two-thirds of the GUNT army, were forced to 
take refuge in the surrounding mountains. 

A cease-fire was arranged in October 1 986 between the govern- 
ment 's FANT and the mutinous FAP units, although Goukouni 
himself was reportedly under house arrest at the Libyan capital 
of Tripoli. Provided by FANT with rations and military supplies, 
FAP troops set out to harass Libyan and CDR concentrations. But, 
under pressure from Libyan air strikes, most of FAP gradually made 
its way to traditional strongholds in the mountainous Tibesti region 
or slipped southward to be absorbed into FANT. 

In mid-December 1986, three Libyan armored columns attacked 
the main settlements occupied by FAP in the Tibesti region. They 
forced the Chadians to retreat from the towns of Zouar and Wour 
into the nearby mountains; at Bardai, however, the tide turned, 



195 



Chad: A Country Study 



and the Chadians repelled the Libyans, who suffered heavy losses. 
In the meantime, FANT troops had assembled at Kalait to pre- 
pare an assault on Fada, which was occupied by 1,200 Libyan and 
400 CDR soldiers. FANT units had been equipped by France and 
the United States with light armored vehicles, all-terrain pickup 
trucks, and antitank and antiaircraft missile launchers. 

The tactics employed by FANT at Fada became a model for sub- 
sequent attacks on Libyan garrisons. In a series of swifdy executed 
pincer movements, successive barriers of Libyan tanks and armored 
vehicles defending the desert track south of Fada were breached 
in the early hours of January 2, 1987. The fast-moving FANT 
columns would leave the road to outflank the entrenched Libyan 
armor, which was protected by mine fields, then open fire with 
antitank missiles and recoilless rifles, at times from ranges as close 
as fifty meters. In some cases, the destruction of one Libyan tank 
induced the others to flee. The final two Libyan tank barriers, 
twenty and ten kilometers south of Fada, were hurriedly withdrawn 
and regrouped around the headquarters and airstrip northwest of 
the oasis; by noon, however, both strongpoints had fallen. Most 
of the Libyan command escaped by air, but the Libyan death toll 
was more than 700, and 150 prisoners were taken. A considerable 
arsenal of weapons, armor, and munitions, as well as armed trainer 
aircraft, was captured (see table 10, Appendix A). 

Striving to reestablish his position and salvage the reputation 
of his army, Qadhafi built up his troop strength in the region from 
6,000 at the end of 1986 to 1 1 ,000 by March 1987. Offensive opera- 
tions were resumed in late February 1987 against several oases. 
Two Libyan columns attempted to drive south from Ouadi Doum 
toward Fada, but each was routed by elements of FANT near Bir 
Korba on March 19 and 20. Pursuing the retreating Libyans, 
FANT units caught the defenders of Ouadi Doum unprepared and 
succeeded in capturing the base after a twenty-five-hour battle on 
March 22-23. Libyan casualties were especially heavy; reportedly, 
over 1,200 were killed and about 450 taken prisoner. At both Bir 
Korba and Ouadi Doum, FANT units captured large amounts of 
equipment intact, including 50 tanks, more than 100 other armored 
vehicles, and additional aircraft. 

The fall of Ouadi Doum was a severe setback for Libya. Deserted 
by most of their Chadian allies, Libyan forces found themselves 
isolated in alien territory, and the loss of the main Libyan air base 
in Chad prevented Libya from providing close air cover to its troops. 
In general, the offensive against FANT had exposed the vulner- 
ability of Libya's heavy armor to a more mobile enemy. Libya's 
combat performance reflected growing discouragement and a 



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National Security 



sapping of the will to fight. On Qadhafi's orders, a general with- 
drawal was undertaken from Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, 
beginning with Faya Largeau, which had served as the main Libyan 
base during the preceding four years. Its garrison of 3,000 troops, 
together with the survivors of Bir Korba and Ouadi Doum, retired 
toward the Libyan base at Maatan as Sarra, north of the Chadian 
border. Subsequently, Libya mounted bombing raids from bases 
in its southern region in an effort to keep FANT from using the 
abandoned equipment. 

In August 1987, the Chadians carried their offensive into the 
disputed Aozou Strip, occupying the town of Aozou following 
another battle in which the Libyans suffered severe losses in troops 
and abandoned equipment. In retaliation Libya intensified its air 
bombardments against towns in the north, usually from altitudes 
beyond the range of FANT's shoulder-fired missiles. Appeals by 
Habre for French air missions to defend the area against the bomb- 
ing were rejected. President Mitterrand distanced himself from the 
advance into the Aozou Strip, calling for international mediation 
to settle competing claims to the territory. 

After a succession of counterattacks, toward the end of August 
the Libyans finally drove the 400 Chadian troops out of the town 
of Aozou. This victory — the first by Libyan ground forces since 
the Chadian offensive had gotten under way eight months earlier — 
was apparently achieved through close-range air strikes, which were 
followed by ground troops advancing cross-country in jeeps, Toyota 
all-terrain trucks, and light armored vehicles. For the Libyans, who 
had previously relied on ponderous tracked armor, the assault 
represented a conversion to the desert warfare tactics developed 
by FANT. 

Habre quickly reacted to this setback and to the continued bomb- 
ing of FANT concentrations in northern Chad. On September 5, 
1987, he mounted a surprise raid against the key Libyan air base 
at Maatan as Sarra. Reportedly, 1,000 Libyans were killed, 300 
were captured, and hundreds of others were forced to flee into the 
surrounding desert. Chad claimed that its troops destroyed about 
thirty-two aircraft— including MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, Su-22 
fighter-bombers, and Mi- 2 4 helicopters — before the FANT column 
withdrew to Chadian soil. 

The fighting was at least temporarily suspended on September 
1 1 , 1987, when both leaders accepted a cease-fire proposed by the 
OAU. Chadian efforts to regain the Aozou Strip were halted, and 
Libyan bombings were terminated. As of early 1988, the OAU 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Border Dispute was continuing to seek 



197 



Chad: A Country Study 



a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but prospects for success were 
not considered to be bright. 

Foreign Military Cooperation 

Since Chad's independence, France has exercised a preeminent 
role in the military sphere, sustaining both ground and air forces 
by providing the bulk of the equipment and training needs of the 
country. French military contingents have either been present in 
Chad or poised in nearby countries for rapid deployment during 
periods of instability. Aside from Libya, which had provided mas- 
sive help to the forces arrayed against Habre, the United States 
was the only other country that had supplied military equipment. 
The rate of arms transfers to FANT from both France and the 
United States mounted sharply in 1986 and 1987 as the conflict 
with Libya intensified. During this phase, the value of the equip- 
ment supplied by the two countries was roughly the same, although 
the ongoing burden on France — including support for the defense 
budget, training, construction, and French troop operations — was 
much higher. 

The French Military Role in Chad 

Upon achieving independence in 1960, Chad joined former AEF 
members Central African Republic, Gabon, and Congo in a multi- 
lateral military assistance agreement with France. The agreement 
provided France with use of a major military base outside 
N'Djamena (then called Fort-Lamy), as well as with automatic tran- 
sit and overflight rights. In return, France not only was to provide 
defense against external threats but also was to assist in maintain- 
ing internal security in the four countries. Under this clause, Chad 
or any other signatory could automatically request direct French 
intervention to ensure the security of its government in the face 
of insurgency or coup attempts. The French government, however, 
had the right to honor or refuse requests as it saw fit. Chad also 
signed a bilateral military technical assistance agreement under 
which France continued to provide equipment, training, and French 
advisers in Chadian uniforms. Fort-Lamy continued to serve as 
a combined army and air base and was one of the main French 
installations in Africa from which troops and aircraft could be 
rapidly deployed to any of the former French African colonies. 

Finding it increasingly difficult to stem the rebellion that had 
broken out in 1965, President Tombalbaye sought French inter- 
vention to help restore order. From April 1969 until September 
1972, the Foreign Legion and other French units supplied 2,500 
soldiers, who joined in operations against the rebels. A mixed 



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regiment was permanently stationed near Fort-Lamy. A limited 
number of ground attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters sup- 
ported the Franco-Chadian forces facing the insurgents. As regu- 
lar Chadian units were formed and exposed to French training, 
the French forces were gradually reduced. 

After Tombalbaye was overthrown in 1975, France's disagree- 
ments with the new Malloum government resulted in withdrawal 
of the remaining French combat forces, although more than 300 
advisers to the ground and air forces remained. In 1976 another 
series of military accords was negotiated covering future French 
military aid and the transfer of equipment left behind by the French. 
In 1978 Malloum invoked the guarantee clause of these agreements 
to ask for renewed French help in stabilizing his regime against 
the revitalized FROLINAT. French paratroopers and Foreign 
Legion units returned to Chad in response to Malloum' s request 
but were evacuated two years later at Goukouni's insistence. 

In spite of the decisive commitment of Libyan forces in the 
GUNT offensive of mid- 1983, the French were at first reluctant 
to respond to Habre's urgent request for direct intervention. After 
further appeals from other francophone heads of state in Africa and 
from the United States, however, the French launched Operation 
Manta, a task force of ground troops accompanied by fighter air- 
craft and air defense systems. Except for several retaliations against 
Libyan incursions to the south, France avoided direct contact with 
GUNT insurgents and their Libyan allies. The French presence, 
however, protected Habre by deterring a GUNT-Libyan offen- 
sive south of 16° north latitude, where the French forward posi- 
tions were established. 

Libya's failure to honor its commitment to remove its troops, 
followed by a Libyan air attack across 16° north latitude in February 
1986, triggered a new French deployment, Operation Epervier. 
The operation initially consisted of about 1,400 troops, backed by 
air units; continued replenishment brought the total to about 2,500 
in early 1987. As of late 1987, most of the remaining French troops 
were grouped around the capital and at Abeche. The only French 
forces in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture were a group of 150 
engineers engaged in land mine disposal at Faya Largeau. The 
French aircraft were based at N'Djamena and protected by bat- 
teries of Crotale and Hawk surface-to-air missiles; radar units were 
installed at Abeche and Moussoro to provide early warning. 

Although official data were not available, according to one esti- 
mate the value of French military assistance to FAN and FANT 
between 1983 and 1987 was about US$175 million. During the 
first six months of 1987 alone, all forms of aid, including the expense 



199 



Chad: A Country Study 



of Operation Epervier, amounted to nearly US$100 million. This 
figure included a US$12 million construction program that would 
enable the N'Djamena air base to handle Boeing 747 cargo air- 
craft and a project to harden the runway at Abeche to permit its 
use by fighter aircraft. 

United States Military Aid 

Until the early 1980s, United States aid to Chad had been 
restricted to shipments of food and development assistance. The 
United States had declined to become involved on behalf of any 
of the Chadian factions and had no desire to supplant France, which 
had shouldered the principal Western responsibility in Chad. 

Military equipment valued at US$10 million reportedly was deliv- 
ered in 1981 and 1982, mainly from Sudanese and Egyptian stocks 
(later replenished) to enable Habre to regroup and rearm after his 
forces had been driven into eastern Chad by the combined forces 
of GUNT and Libya. The United States also offered US$12 mil- 
lion to the IAF in 1980, but only 75 percent of that amount was 
spent. The United States viewed Libyan expansionism as the cause 
of the Chadian crisis of 1983 and sought to check Libyan involve- 
ment. Accordingly, in April 1983 Washington negotiated an agree- 
ment with N'Djamena to provide training in the United States for 
Chadian personnel in a number of military specialties. In July of 
the same year, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was 
signed, which provided for sending military equipment to Chad. 

In August 1983, Washington authorized US$25 million emer- 
gency aid package to help the Habre government, including the 
delivery of Redeye antiaircraft missiles and missile launchers. Three 
United States specialists visited Chad briefly to train Chadians in 
the use of the equipment. As a further symbol of American con- 
cern, two Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) air- 
craft, with support crews and fighter escorts, were sent to Sudan 
for possible deployment in conjunction with French combat air- 
craft. The AWACS aircraft, however, were not deployed and were 
withdrawn after about two weeks. 

In United States fiscal years (FY) 1984 through 1987, United 
States military aid to Chad totaled about US$70 million; an addi- 
tional US$9 million was proposed for FY 1988. Expenditures for 
training were about US$200,000 annually. Most of the assistance 
consisted of transport aircraft and aircraft maintenance, small arms, 
ammunition, trucks, jeeps, antiaircraft and antitank weapons, uni- 
forms, first aid kits, and food rations. The United States also cooper- 
ated with France in the air delivery of items deemed critical. For 



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example, in January 1986 the United States Air Force ferried a 
Hawk missile battery from France to N'Djamena. 

Internal Security and Public Order 

During more than twenty years of domestic conflict, the agen- 
cies of public order and the judiciary in Chad were severely dis- 
rupted. In areas of rebel activity in the south and in regions of the 
north under Libyan domination, the forces of civil protection and 
the system of criminal justice disintegrated. Where the national 
government was able to reimpose its authority, harsh and arbitrary 
martial law often resulted in mistreatment, torture, and extrajudicial 
detentions and executions. By 1986 efforts were under way to 
rebuild the civilian legal system, although long periods of deten- 
tion without trial were still common, and the rights of accused 
persons were not fully respected during court proceedings (see 
Judicial System, ch. 4). The various elements of the police respon- 
sible for domestic security continued to reflect the strong influence 
of the military. Abuses by unsupervised military authorities, 
however, had diminished as a result of the Habre government's 
attempt to impose greater discipline and control. 

Police Services 

Police functions in Chad were the responsibility of the National 
Military Police (Police Militaire Nationale — PMN), the Territorial 
Military Police (Police Militaire Territoriale — PMT), and the 
National Security Police, known as the Surete. Certain internal 
security, intelligence, and antiterrorism operations were conducted 
by the Presidential Guard (Securite Presidentielle — SP). The 
Bureau of Documentation and Security (Direction de la Documen- 
tation et de la Securite — DDS) was a separate intelligence organi- 
zation and political police force that sometimes engaged in covert 
operations against opponents of the government. The Special Rapid 
Intervention Brigade performed similar functions within the mili- 
tary, although it was controlled by the DDS and was not formally 
part of FANT. 

The Surete was originally part of a unified force that, until 1961 , 
served all four countries of the former AEF. With about 800 agents, 
the Surete constituted the national civil police and the municipal 
police force of the major towns. Its duties included maintenance 
of law and order, crime prevention, maintenance of criminal records 
and identification files, investigations and arrests, and traffic control. 

Until 1979 the National Gendarmerie, a paramilitary body 
created in 1960, had primary responsibility for maintaining order 
in the countryside. The force had remained under the command 



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Chad: A Country Study 

of a French officer until 1971. Later, in 1979, headed by Habre's 
political rival, Kamougue, and composed mainly of southerners, 
the National Gendarmerie had been involved in the fighting around 
N'Djamena. It remained active as part of the southern resistance 
to Habre after the overthrow of the Malloum regime. The National 
Gendarmerie's basic units were twenty-five-man mobile platoons, 
which had responsibility for internal security and crowd control, 
and "brigades" (squads) of four to eight gendarmes, who performed 
ordinary police work in small towns and rural areas. Another force, 
the paramilitary Ghadian Security Companies (Compagnies Tcha- 
diennes de Securite — CTS), organized by Tombalbaye in 1967, 
performed mainly constabulary functions in eastern Chad against 
smugglers, catde rusders, and dissidents. The CTS resisted the 1975 
coup that overthrew Tombalbaye, and it was subsequently dis- 
banded. 

To replace the National Gendarmerie, the 1979 GUNT coali- 
tion formed a police unit of soldiers drawn from FAN and FAP, 
with token contributions from the other military factions. Mixed 
military patrols attempted to maintain order in the capital among 
the contending factions. After the Habre government had been 
installed in 1982, most of the previous functions of the National 
Gendarmerie were entrusted to the newly created PMT. Many of 
the latter' s personnel were southerners who had rallied to the 
government; it was often popularly referred to as the "gen- 
darmerie." 

In 1987 the PMT had an authorized strength of 1,600, but its 
personnel were poorly equipped, often armed with weapons con- 
fiscated from former codos. The PMT was nominally subject to the 
Ministry of Interior, and its field units were subject to the local 
prefect. In practice, the force came under military authority, and 
individual units were under jurisdiction of FANT military zone 
and subzone commanders. 

The PMN, which in 1987 was under a military commander, 
Youssef Galmaye, was a branch of FANT; the force performed 
regular military police duties, assisted in control of prisoners of 
war, provided route and rear area security, and often took part 
in combat operations. Its authorized strength was 1,900, and the 
soldiers serving in it were better equipped than those of the PMT. 
Training was provided at a military police school organized by the 
French in 1986. 

The Criminal Justice System 

The Chadian judicial system and the criminal code were based 
on the French criminal justice system. The traditional system of 



202 



Presidential guard officers in Presidential Palace compound 

Courtesy Joseph Krull 

law presided over by local chiefs and sultans, however, has been 
preserved for property and family affairs and for cases of local petty 
crime. These customary courts, as they were called, have been 
described as generally effective and fair in rendering sentences. In 
theory, decisions of the customary courts were subject to appeal 
to the regular courts. 

Normal protections against arbitrary arrest, as well as restraints 
on the actions of police and judicial authorities, were embodied 
in the criminal code statutes. Detention without being charged was 
permitted only for persons under suspicion of having committed 
a crime. In theory, the rights of detainees included access to counsel 
and prompt notification of the charges under which they were being 
held. The death penalty could only be imposed after a competent 
court had established guilt and rendered a verdict. In actual prac- 
tice, the judicial system was severely undermined by the break- 
down of local government throughout much of the country. 
According to human rights reports of the United States Depart- 
ment of State, most Chadians did not get speedy trials, and many 
were held for extended periods before being released without trial. 
There were only a few trained lawyers, judges, and other court 
personnel in the country, and law books were not widely available. 
Although in the late 1980s the Habre government was trying to 
rebuild the judicial system, the lack of individuals with the necessary 



203 



Chad: A Country Study 



legal training hampered the appointment of judges and examin- 
ing magistrates. 

All judges and judicial officers were appointed by the president. 
The courts were subject to the influence of the executive branch, 
especially in political and internal security cases, and individuals 
regarded as endangering the security of the state were subject to 
indefinite detention without trial. In 1987 the independent human 
rights group, Amnesty International, reported the detention of 
several former Chadian exiles upon their return to Chad, as well 
as the detention of relatives of government opponents. Although 
there were no reports of disappearances, nor confirmed reports of 
torture in 1987, Amnesty International expressed concern over the 
government's failure to account for a number of people who had 
disappeared after being detained in earlier years. 

The Department of State and other groups have described 
Chadian prison conditions as primitive. To some extent, the con- 
ditions were a reflection of the general poverty of the country rather 
than a deliberate policy. The scanty prison rations made it neces- 
sary for prisoners to have a source of food outside the prison; food 
was usually supplied by the prisoners' families. Most prison per- 
sonnel had no professional training, and many prisoners complained 
of beatings and other forms of abusive treatment. Conditions in 
government detention centers for political prisoners, where out- 
side visitors were not permitted, were worse than those in the regular 
prisons. Those prisoners of war to whom the International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross had access (mostly Chadians captured 
before early 1986) were reported to be receiving adequate treat- 
ment. As of late 1987, the Chadian government was continuing 
to deny the Red Cross access to an estimated 2,000 Libyan prisoners 
of war captured since 1986 because the Libyans had refused the 
Red Cross access to FANT prisoners held in Libya. 

Internal Security Conditions 

Following his assumption of power in 1982, Habre faced both 
Goukouni's GUNT forces in the north and resistance by armed 
dissidents in the south, principally former gendarmes and soldiers 
of FAT. Government troops trying to establish control in the south 
were attacked, as were people and installations connected with the 
government and the state cotton company, Cotontchad. In response 
to these attacks, government forces adopted harshly repressive tac- 
tics. Reprisals were taken, often against innocent civilians. Sus- 
pected sympathizers of the dissidents were likely to be executed 
or to disappear. 



204 



A representative 
of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross visits prisoners 
of war in the Tibesti Mountains 
Courtesy International 
Committee of the Red Cross 
(Claire Bellmann) 




The violence in the south diminished for a time after the govern- 
ment adopted more conciliatory tactics beginning in late 1983. In 
mid- 1984, however, the guerrilla groups known collectively as codos 
launched a new series of attacks. During this period, many civilians 
were attacked by both government and rebel forces. Villagers sus- 
pected of complicity with the insurgents were often executed without 
trial, or they suffered the destruction of their homes and crops. 
There were also reports of codo atrocities against local officials or 
civilians cooperating with the government. Under conditions of de 
facto martial law, government troops exercised little restraint in 
their efforts to curb the rebellion. 

Numerous incidents of noncombatant deaths and detentions were 
also reported in the northern battle zone, as control over towns 
shifted between FANT and the forces of GUNT. Both armies were 
accused of executions and detentions of private citizens suspected 
of collaboration with opposing forces. 

By 1986 most of the codos had accepted government offers of 
amnesty, and the turmoil in the south had been replaced by a calmer 
atmosphere. In addition, the enforcement of a military code of 
justice and strict punishment of undisciplined soldiers had helped 
to curb the political killings and disappearances. Many earlier 
political detainees who could not be found, however, were assumed 
to have been killed without trial. 

As of 1988, most of the contending factions that had kept Chad 



205 



Chad: A Country Study 

in a state of turmoil and instability had been assimilated into the 
unified military establishment of FANT. Under these circum- 
stances, and with the activities of former rebels subject to scrutiny 
by various intelligence networks within the military, incipient defec- 
tions could be kept in check. Moreover, Habre was placing increas- 
ing reliance on the well-equipped and trusted Presidential Guard 
to maintain internal control. 

The only outbreak of dissidence had occurred among the Hajerai 
ethnic group from the Guera Massif, who had been prominent in 
the original rebellion of the mid-1960s and in the ranks of Habre 's 
FAN (see Languages and Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). In late 1986, after 
a series of incidents between Toubou troops and Hajerai soldiers, 
a group of Hajerai who felt that they were being pushed out of 
positions of influence formed the underground Movement for the 
National Salvation of Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut National 
du Tchad — MOSANAT). Its head was an army lieutenant and 
former prefect of Guera Prefecture, Boda Maldoun. 

Following the harassment of many Hajerai by the military police 
in mid- 1987, MOSANAT armed insurrection in Guera was 
restrained by the Presidential Guard. As of early 1988, MOSANAT 
reportedly was operating from bases in western Sudan, in alliance 
with the remnants of other rebellious Chadian factions that had 
formed part of GUNT. The Habre regime faced no immediate 
danger from the group, but the uprising underscored the fact that 
failure to accommodate the various ethnic and regional interests 
in the army could lay a foundation for renewed domestic instability 
and violence. 

* * * 

The monthly Afrique defense (available in English as African Defence 
Journal) regularly treats military developments in Chad. Its accounts 
of the fighting in northern Chad in 1986 and 1987 are fairly com- 
prehensive, covering the tactics employed, the equipment used, 
and the size and caliber of the forces involved. Reports in Jeune 
Afrique and the New York Times also provide details on the main 
engagements. In the CSIS Africa Notes series, William J. Foltz 
appraises the politico-military situation in Chad in the latter part 
of 1987, in the wake of the Chadian successes. A study by Alex 
Rondos in the same series assesses earlier phases of the Chadian 
Civil War. 

A concise military history of Chad between 1960 and early 1986 
can be found in an article by Bernard Lanne in Africa South of the 
Sahara, 1987. Conflict in Chad by Virginia M. Thompson and 



206 



National Security 



Richard Adloff interprets the sources of the struggle among the 
Chadian armed factions preceding the Libyan intervention of 1980. 
Additional and more recent analysis is included in a survey by 
Michael P. Kelley. An article by David S. Yost examines the French 
perspective on the warfare in Chad before 1983. Operation mania, 
a book by the pseudonymous French officer, "Colonel Spartacus," 
provides detail on the political and military aspects of French 
involvement in 1983 and 1984. Samuel Decalo's Historical Dictio- 
nary of Chad provides useful information on the various armed fac- 
tions and their leaders. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



207 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Primary- School Enrollment by Prefecture, 1986-87 

3 Cotton Production, 1960-87 

4 Production of Selected Agricultural Products, Selected Years, 

1961-85 

5 Direction of Trade, 1979-85 

6 Balance of Payments, 1978-84 

7 External Debt, 1980-85 

8 Major Equipment of Chadian National Armed Forces, 1987 

9 Major Equipment Items Captured from Libya, 1987 
10 Major Air Force Equipment, 1987 



209 



Appendix A 



lable 1. 


Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 


When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 




0.04 


inches 




39 


inches 




3.3 


feet 






miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 




0.26 


gallons 




2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 






and add 32 





Table 2. Primary-School Enrollment by Prefecture, 1986-87 



Prefecture 


Enrollment 


Percentage of Primary- 
School-Aged Children 
Enrolled 


Batha 


4,861 


8.0 


Biltine 


4,401 


14.5 




2,542 


16.7 




39,440 


33.4 




25,124 


70.7 




4,898 


14.6 




2,441 


10.6 




35,852 


70.0 


Logone Oriental 


43,414 


82.1 




44,510 


37.3 




64,789 


71.6 




7,653 


13.0 




6,523 


35.5 




19,594 


37.6 


TOTAL 


306,042 


40.3 



211 



Chad: A Country Study 



Table 3. Cotton Production, 1960-87 



Area Under Cultivation Average Yield Total Production 

(hectares) (kilograms per hectare) (metric tons) 



1960 260,000 152 39,600 

1961 288,000 340 97,900 

1962 300,000 155 46,700 

1963 338,900 278 94,500 

1964 286,900 365 104,900 

1965 289,200 342 99,100 

1966 294,100 295 86,800 

1967 303,100 404 122,700 

1968 241,000 421 101,600 

1969 296,600 500 148,500 

1970 292,200 399 116,700 

1971 303,000 312 94,600 

1972 304,300 356 108,400 

1973 273,100 380 104,000 

1974 265,000 431 114,400 

1975 269,800 532 143,600 

1976 332,000 524 174,000 

1977 318,800 462 147,300 

1978 284,000 441 125,000 

1979 267,300 511 136,800 

1980 179,800 507 91,300 

1981 166,500 514 85,700 

1982 133,900 533 71,400 

1983 137,700 741 102,100 

1984 176,100 900 158,500 

1985 141,900 693 98,400 

1986 147,300 674 99,400 

1987 125,400 713 89,400 



Table 4. Production of Selected Agricultural Products, Selected Years, 1961-85 
(in thousands of metric tons) 

Millet, Sorghum, 

and Berbere Wheat Rice Corn Tubers Peanuts 



1961 715 2 1 21 1 7 1 201 130 

1965 614 3 38 12 232 150 

1970 610 n.a. 37 n.a. 303 96 

1975 522 n.a. n.a. n.a. 337 82 

1980 450 6 2 53 2 27 2 431 100 

1985 526 1 21 48 563 90 



n.a. — not available. 

1 1953-57 average. 

2 1979-81 average. 

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Food and Agriculture Organization Yearbook, Rome, 1985. 



212 



Appendix A 

Table 5. Direction of Trade, 1979-85 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 



Exports (f.o.b.) 





9.0 


14.9 


12.7 


10.9 


13.9 


25.7 


15.8 


West Germany .... 


9.3 


10.1 


14.1 


5.5 


13.9 


17.7 


10.1 




4.9 


9.1 


16.2 


7.1 


7.8 


8.2 


7.8 




12. A 


6.2 


3.5 


1.8 


2.2 


11.2 


5.7 


Benelux countries . . 


2.5 


2.1 


2.0 


1.7 


0.7 


2.2 


2.8 




10.6 


11.5 


5.2 


4.8 


5.4 


10.5 


2.1 


Italy 


1.1 


1.0 


3.2 


1.4 


2.8 


2.0 


1.3 


Other 


38.5 


16.1 


26.5 


24.5 


43.5 


32.2 


42.0 


Total exports . . . 


88.3 


71.0 


83.4 


57.7 


90.2 


109.7 


87.6 


nports (c.i.f.) 2 


















35.1 


12.6 


19.1 


24.6 


25.8 


43.4 


48.5 




3.0 


2.0 


0.7 


1.9 


13.8 


19.1 


27.7 




7.3 


12.7 


21.8 


14.3 


15.8 


16.6 


15.7 


Italy 


2.4 


0.3 


1.4 


2.5 


7.0 


6.6 


13.4 


Benelux countries . . 


2.2 


1.5 


2.9 


4.7 


4.2 


8.3 


15.1 


West Germany .... 


5.8 


3.5 


5.0 


3.4 


5.0 


3.3 


5.5 


Other 


29.4 


40.9 


57.1 


57.2 


85.7 


73.9 


90.4 


Total imports . . . 


85.2 


73.5 


108.0 


108.6 


157.3 


171.2 


216.3 



1 f.o.b. — Free on board. 

2 c.i.f. — Cost, insurance, and freight. 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statis- 
tics Yearbook, 1986, Washington, 1987, 133. 



213 



Chad: A Country Study 



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co co 



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co co 
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d cd 



N ON O CO N 



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bo « 

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rv c/3 

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bo 88 

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TJ bp 

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214 



Appendix A 



Table 7. External Debt, 1980-85 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1980 


1981 


1982 


1983 


1984 


1985 




191.8 


173.9 


144.7 


148.1 


140.0 


149.6 




5.0 


5.0 


5.0 


3.0 


1.0 


3.0 


International Monetary 
















6.9 


8.3 


7.8 


7.4 


4.4 


8.7 


TOTAL 


203.7 


187.2 


157.5 


158.5 


145.4 


161.3 



Table 8. Major Equipment of Chadian National Armed Forces, 1987 

Country of 

Type In Inventory * Manufacture 

Armored vehicles 

Panhard ERC-90 armored cars with 90mm 

gun 4 France 

AML-90 light armored cars, some with 

90mm gun 50 -do- 

AML-20 light armored cars 6 -do- 

V-150 Cadillac Gage armored cars with 

90mm gun 8 United States 

Artillery 

M-101 105mm howitzers 5 -do- 

60mm, 82mm, 106mm mortars n.a. n.a. 

Antitank weapons 

Rocket launchers 68mm, 89mm n.a. n.a. 

106mm recoilless rifles n.a. United States 

112mm APILAS recoilless rifles n.a. France 

Milan wire-guided missiles 50 -do- 

LAW M-72 launchers n.a. United States 

Air defense weapons 

20mm, 30mm guns n.a. France 

Redeye, Stinger shoulder- fired missiles .... n.a. United States 

SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles n.a. Soviet Union 

All-terrain vehicles 

Toyota 4x4; AM General 4x4; Sovamag 

TC-10 400 Japan, United 

States, and France 

Trucks 

2 X A ton cargo n.a. France and 

United States 

n.a. — not available. 
* Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1987-1988, London, 1987,124. 



215 



Chad: A Country Study 



Table 9. Major Equipment Items Captured from Libya, 1987 



Type 



Number 



Country of 
Manufacture 



Armored vehicles 

T-54 tanks 3 Soviet Union 

T-55 tanks 113 -do- 

T-62 tanks 12 -do- 
Tank transporters 10 -do- 

Cascavel armored cars 8 Brazil 

AML-90 armored vehicles 4 France 

BMP personnel carriers 146 Soviet Union 

BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles ... 10 -do- 

BTR personnel carriers 10 -do- 
Weapons systems 

14.5mm heavy machine guns 50 -do- 

23mm air defense guns 16 -do- 

106mm recoilless rifles 60 n.a. 

107mm recoilless rifles 4 n.a. 

122mm field howitzers 22 n.a. 

SA-6 batteries (tracked missile launcher .... 12 Soviet Union 

accompanied by radar on tracked carriage) 
SA-13 batteries (launcher and radar on 

tracked carriage) 4 -do- 
Vehicles 

Toyota all-terrain mounted with 14.5mm 

guns 60 Japan and Soviet 

Union 

Toyota troop transporters 194 Japan 

Jeeps mounted with 106mm recoilless rifles . 30 United States 

Land Rovers 24 Britain 

Mercedes heavy transport trucks 228 West Germany 

Mercedes repair vehicles 12 -do- 
Mercedes tank trucks 43 -do- 
Aircraft 

L-39 Albatros jet trainers 11 Czechoslovakia 

SF-260 Marchetti light trainers 9 Italy 

Mi-24 helicopters 3 Soviet Union 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Chad, Kadafi/Tchad: Ingerence, agression, occupation: Livre blanc, 
N'Djamena, Chad, 1987, 109-10. 



216 



Appendix A 



Table 10. Major Air Force Equipment, 1987 

Country of 



Type 


In Inventory * 


Manufacture 


C-130 Hercules transport 


2 


United States 




3 


-do- 






-do- 




1 


Spain 


Pilatus PC-7 trainer 


2 


Switzerland 


SF-260 Marchetti trainer 


n.a. 


Italy 



n.a. — not available. 
* Estimated. 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1987-1988, London, 1987, 124. 



217 



Appendix B 



Principal Armed Factions, 1975-87 

ANL — see National Liberation Army. 

Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armees du Nord — FAN) — 
Composed of FROLINAT (q. v. ) units that remained loyal to 
Habre following his break from Goukouni Oueddei in 1976. Con- 
sisting at first of only a few hundred Toubou and some Hajerai 
and Ouaddaian fighters, FAN began its operations from bases 
in eastern Chad, where it received help from Sudan. Driven from 
N'Djamena back to its eastern refuge after the Libyan incur- 
sion of 1980, FAN scored a series of victories over Goukouni 's 
GUNT (q.v.) forces in 1982, which culminated in the recapture 
of N'Djamena and Habre's assumption of the presidency. FAN 
became the core of the new national army, FANT (q. v.), in Janu- 
ary 1983. 

CCFAN— see Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT. 

CDR — see Democratic Revolutionary Council. 

Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armees Tchadiennes — FAT) — 
The army of the central government of President Felix Malloum 
until his downfall in 1979, when the head of the gendarmerie, 
Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue, assumed command. Joined by 
gendarmerie units, FAT became a regional force representing 
primarily the Sara ethnic group of the five southern prefectures. 
It joined with GUNT (q.v.) forces fighting against Hissein Habre 
and was a recipient of aid from Libya. FAT began to disinte- 
grate during 1982 as a result of defeats inflicted by Habre's FAN 
(q.v.). Most remaining soldiers accepted integration into FAN 
or resumed their insurgency as codos. 

Chadian National Armed Forces (Forces Armees Nationales 
Tchadiennes — FANT) — The army of the central government 
since January 1983, when pro-Habre forces were merged. Con- 
sisting of about 10,000 soldiers at that time, it swelled with the 
assimilation of former FAT (q.v.) and codos rebels from the south 
and, in 1986, with the addition of GUNT (q.v.) soldiers who 
had turned against their Libyan allies. Freshly outfitted by France 
and the United States, FANT drove Libyan troops from their 
bases in northern Chad in a series of victories in 1987. 

codos — see commandos. 

commandos (codos) — Southern guerrilla groups, active from 1983 
to 1986, that resisted domination of their region by Habre's army. 



219 



Chad: A Country Study 

Many were veterans of the government army of the 1970s or 
Kamougue's FAT (q.v.). Totaling as many as 15,000, they oper- 
ated independently under such names as "Red Codos," "Thun- 
der Red Codos," "Coconut Palms," "Hope," and "Green 
Eagles." The Red Codos under Colonel Alphonse Kotiga were 
the most effective. Kotiga exercised some influence over the other 
groups and was instrumental in persuading them to abandon 
their insurgency by promises of rewards and rehabilitation. About 
1,500 had been assimilated into FANT (q.v.) as of 1986. 

Democratic Revolutionary Council (Conseil Democratique Revolu- 
tionnaire — CDR) — Members were Chadians of Arab origin, 
most originating in Ouaddai Prefecture or Batha Prefecture, with 
close ties to Libya and receptive to some of the ideological precepts 
of Muammar al Qadhafl. After the death of its founder, Acyl 
Ahmat, the CDR was headed by Acheikh ibn Oumar. The most 
pro-Libyan faction in GUNT (q. v.), it fought to prevent the defec- 
tion of FAP (q.v.) units from Libya in 1986. Believed to num- 
ber up to 3,000 at its peak in the early 1980s, the CDR dwindled 
to fewer than 1,000 adherents before it was battered by FANT 
(q.v.) attacks in 1987. 

FAN — see Armed Forces of the North. 

FANT — see Chadian National Armed Forces. 

FAO — see Western Armed Forces. 

FAP — see People's Armed Forces. 

FAT — see Chadian Armed Forces. 

First Liberation Army of FROLINAT — Operated in eastern Chad 
as one of the original armies of the FROLINAT insurgency under 
General Mohamed Baghlani. After Baghlani's death in 1977, 
its personnel gravitated to the First Volcan Army of Adoum Dana 
or Acyl Ahmat 's New Volcan (see Volcan Forces). The First 
Liberation Army reemerged under Mahamat Abba Said in 1984, 
joining the GUNT (q.v.) coalition against Habre, but was one 
of the factions disapproving dependence on Libya. 

FROLINAT— see National Liberation Front of Chad. 

GUNT — see Transitional Government of National Unity. 

MPLT— see Third Liberation Army of FROLINAT. 

National Liberation Army (Armee Nationale de Liberation — 
ANL) — The military wing of the GUNT coalition under 
Goukouni that had been formally constituted in October 1982 
(see Transitional Government of National Unity). 

National Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Liberation Nation- 
ale du Tchad— FROLINAT)— See First Liberation Army of 
FROLINAT, Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT, and 
Third Liberation Army of FROLINAT. 



220 



Appendix B 



People's Armed Forces (Forces Armees Populaires — FAP) — 
Composed of followers of Goukouni after the schism with Habre 
in 1976. With an ethnic base in the Teda clan of the Toubou 
from the Tibesti area of northern Chad, the force was armed 
by Libya and formed the largest component of the GUNT (q. v. ) 
coalition army opposing Habre 's rule. FAP troops rebelled 
against their Libyan allies in the latter part of 1986. Many of 
them were subsequendy integrated into the national army, FANT 
(q.v.), and participated in the 1987 attempt to drive Libya out 
of Chadian territory. 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad (Mouvement Popu- 
laire pour la Liberation du Tchad — MPLT) — see Western 
Armed Forces. 

Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT — One of the original 
groups in rebellion against the regime of Francois Tombalbaye. 
The Second Liberation Army was composed of the Toubou active 
in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, first under Goukouni 's 
command and later under Habre' s command. Renamed the 
Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil 
de Commandement des Forces Armees du Nord — CCFAN), it 
was in a bitter struggle with the First Liberation Army in the 
early 1970s. After the rift between Habre and Goukouni in 1976, 
Habre' s followers adopted the name of Armed Forces of the 
North (Forces Armees du Nord — FAN), and Goukouni 's fol- 
lowers adopted the name of People's Armed Forces (Forces 
Armees Populaires — FAP). 

Third Liberation Army of FROLINAT — A small group from among 
the Kanembu people of western Chad, the Third Liberation Army 
splintered off from FAP (q.v.) in 1977; initially headed by Abou- 
baker Abderrahmane, it later became known as the Popular Move- 
ment for the Liberation of Chad (Movement Populaire pour la 
Liberation du Tchad — MPLT). In a subsequent split, part of the 
MPLT became the Western Armed Forces (q.v.). 

Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement 
d' Union Nationale de Transition — GUNT) — A coalition of fac- 
tions occupying the north with the aid of Libya, GUNT formed 
the principal opposition to Habre after 1981. Its component fac- 
tions (q.v.) included initially FAP, FAT, the CDR, the FAO, and 
Volcan Forces. The National Liberation Army (Armee Nationale 
de Liberation — ANL) was formally constituted as the military 
arm of GUNT in October 1982. Although Goukouni served as 
commander in chief, the various GUNT military factions 
remained as distinct units under their individual commanders. 
In general usage, the term GUNT continued to be used to refer 



221 



Chad: A Country Study 

to the northern rebel army. After Goukouni's FAP mutinied 
against Libyan domination in 1986 and Goukouni was removed 
as head of GUNT, the remaining GUNT contingents under the 
CDR's Acheikh ibn Oumar were sometimes referred to as "Neo- 
GUNT" or "GUNT/CDR." 

Volcan Forces — The First Liberation Army of FROLINAT (q. v. ) 
split up in 1977 into two Volcan (volcano) armies. The First Vol- 
can Army of Adoum Dana was an ethnic Arab force receiving 
support from Sudan. It was absorbed into GUNT (q.v.) in 1981 
and fought against Habre. New Volcan, the predecessor of the 
CDR (q. v.), was commanded by Acyl Ahmat, a protege of Libya. 
Acyl aligned his followers with Goukouni against Habre in 1979. 
Although initially among the smallest elements (400 to 500 men), 
New Volcan constituted a corps of shock troops who were among 
the most resolute fighters in GUNT. 

Western Armed Forces (Forces Armees Occidentals — FAO) — 
An offshoot of the MPLT (q.v.), the FAO recruited its forces 
mainly among the Kanembu group located along the shores of 
Lake Chad and enjoyed support from some political elements 
in Nigeria. Initially part of GUNT (q.v.), the FAO had report- 
edly divided into pro- and anti-Goukouni factions. Its leader, 
Moussa Medela, rejected Acheikh ibn Oumar as head of GUNT 
after Goukouni was deposed at the close of 1986. 

* * * 

Additional background on the rivalry between the numerous 
armed factions in Chad during the 1970s and early 1980s can be 
found in Virginia M. Thompson and Richard Adloff s Conflict in 
Chad and in Why Chad?, a monograph by Alex Rondos in the CSIS 
Africa Notes series. Each of the groups, together with its antecedents, 
is briefly sketched in Peut-on encore sauver le Tchad? by Michel 
N'Gangbet. Samuel Decalo also provides sketches of most factions 
in Historical Dictionary of Chad. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



222 



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Chapter 3 

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Lanne, Bernard. "Chad — Recent History." Pages 353-60 in Africa 
South of the Sahara, 1987. London: Europa, 1986. 

Lemarchand, Rene. "Chad: The Road to Partition," Current His- 
tory, 83, No. 491, March 1984, 113-16, 132. 

. "Chad: The Roots of Chaos," Current History, 80, 

No. 470, December 1981, 414-18, 436-38. 

. "The Crisis in Chad." Pages 239-56 in Gerald J. Bender, 

James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar (eds.), African Crisis 
Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985. 

"Putting the Pieces Back Together Again, ' ' Africa Report, 

29, No. 6, November-December 1984, 60-67. 
Matthews, Lloyd. "Chad." Pages 102-104 in John Keegan (ed.), 

World Armies. (2d ed.). Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. 
The Military Balance, 1987-1988. London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, 1987. 
Neuberger, Benyamin. Involvement, Invasion, and Withdrawal: Qadhafi's 

Libya and Chad, 1969-1981. (Occasional Papers, No. 83.) Tel Aviv: 

Tel Aviv University, 1982. 



232 



Bibliography 



N'Gangbet, Michel. Peut-on encore sauver le Tchad? Paris: Karthala, 
1984. 

Rondos, Alex. "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Chad," 
Current History, 84, No. 502, May 1985, 209-12, 232. 

. Why Chad? (CSIS Africa Notes, No. 18.) Washington: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983. 

Sada, Hugo. "Habre cherche la guerre totale," Jeune Afrique [Paris], 
No. 1393, September 16, 1987, 17-19. 

"Tchad: Le face-a-face franco-libyen." Pages 228-32 in L'Annee 
strategique. Paris: Editions maritimes et d'outre-mer, 1985. 

"Tchad-Libye: Labataille de Fada," Jeune Afrique [Paris], No. 1366, 
March 11, 1987, 10-16. 

Thompson, Virginia M., and Richard Adloff. Conflict in Chad. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. 

United States. Congress. 97th, 1st Session. House of Representa- 
tives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. 
Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle: Dilemma for United States Policy. (Hear- 
ings held October 29 and November 4, 1981.) Washington: 
GPO, 1982. 

. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1986. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 100th, 
1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs). Washing- 
ton: GPO, February 1987. 

Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Chad: U.S. 

Policy. (GIST Series). Washington: 1987. 

Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. The Libyan 

Problem. (Special Report No. 111.) Washington: Department of 
State, 1983. 

Yost, David S. "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge," 
Orbis, 26, No. 4, Winter 1983, 965-97. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Africa Confidential [London]; Afri- 
can Defence Journal [Paris]; Africa Report; Africa Research Bulletin [Exeter, 
Devon, United Kingdom]; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report: Cameroon, CAR, Chad [London]; Foreign Broadcast Infor- 
mation Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia; Freres d'Armes 
[Paris]; Jane's Defence Weekly [London]; Jeune Afrique [Paris]; Kees- 
ing's Contemporary Archives [London]; Le Monde [Paris]; New York 
Times; Washington Post; and West Africa [London]). 



233 



Chad: A Country Study 

Appendix B 

Decalo, Samuel. Historical Dictionary of Chad. (2d ed.) Metuchen, 

New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1987. 
N'Gangbet, Michel. Peut-on encore sauver le Tchad? 1 P 'aris: Karthala, 

1984. 

Rondos, Alex. Why Chad? (CSIS Africa Notes, No. 18.) Washing- 
ton: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983. 

Thompson, Virginia M., and Richard Adloff. Conflict in Chad. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. 



234 



Glossary 



Aozou Strip — A disputed section of northern Chad, running the 
length of the border with Libya and extending south to a depth 
of about 100 kilometers into Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture. 
Libya based its claim to the area on an unratified 1935 treaty 
between France and Italy, the colonial powers of Chad and 
Libya, respectively. Libya occupied some areas of the strip 
beginning in 1972 and remained there as of 1988. 

barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum 
products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A barrel 
is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. 

CFA franc — The African Financial Community (Communaute 
Financiere Africaine) franc, the currency of the organization 
of former French colonies, often referred to as the Franc Zone. 
The CFA franc was guaranteed by the French treasury and 
pegged to the French franc, into which it was freely converti- 
ble. In December 1988 the exchange rate was CFA F298 to 
US$1. 

French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Francaise — AEF) — 
The former colonial federation of areas that later became the 
independent states of Chad, Gabon, Central African Repub- 
lic, and Congo. A history of French rule and missionary involve- 
ment forged organizational ties connecting these areas. The 
AEF was dissolved in 1958, but upon gaining independence 
in 1960, Chad joined former AEF members in a multilateral 
military assistance agreement with France. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated 
and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and 
subsidies are included; when these indirect taxes and subsidies 
have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The 
word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of physi- 
cal assets have not been made. See also gross national product. 

gross national product (GNP) — Gross domestic product (q. v. ) plus 
the net income or loss stemming from transactions with for- 
eign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the out- 
put of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated 
at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. 



235 



Chad: A Country Study 



Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, 
GNP is often calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes 
and subsidies. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

Lome Convention — The first Lome Convention (Lome I) came 
into force in 1976, Lome II came into effect in 1981, and Lome 
III came into force in 1986. The convention covers economic 
relations between the members of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and their former colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). The convention allows most 
ACP exports to enter the EEC duty-free or at special rates and, 
among other things, provides funds through the Stabex sys- 
tem (q.v.) to offset adverse fluctuations in the prices of ACP 
exports. 

polders — Areas of low-lying land reclaimed from a sea, lake, or 
river by the protection of dikes. In Chad polders have been 
created along the southeastern shores of Lake Chad and are 
used for the production of wheat and corn. 

Sahel — The subarid climatological zone located south of the Sahara 
Desert that stretches from east to west across Africa. In Chad 
the Sahel, also called the sahelian zone, forms roughly the cen- 
tral third of the country and supports subsistence farming and 
livestock raising. 

Stabex system — A system of export earnings stabilization set up 
by the European Community (EC) in accordance with the Afri- 
can, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. Under the system, 
the EC helps developing countries withstand fluctuations in the 
price of their agricultural products by paying compensation for 
lost export earnings. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its 
primary purpose providing loans to developing countries for 



236 



Glossary 



productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less- 
developed countries. The president and certain senior officers 
of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three 
institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that 
subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



237 



Index 



Abatcha, Ibrahim, 20 

Abd al Karim, 10 

Abdullah IV (Bagirmi), 10 

Abeche, 18, 30, 36, 45, 52, 77, 105, 113, 
117, 119, 150, 192-93, 199 

Abou Charib people, 51 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 83 

Action Committee of the Democratic 
Revolutionary Council (Comite d'Ac- 
tion et de Concertation du Conseil 
Democratique Revolutionnaire: CAC- 
CDR), 152 

Acyl Ahmat, 30, 153, 161, 191, 195 

Adamawa, 7 

Administrative Reform Mission (Mission 

de Reforme Administrative: MRA), 21 
AEF. See French Equatorial Africa (Afri- 

que Equatoriale Francaise: AEF) 
Africa (see also Central, or Equatorial, 

Africa; North Africa; Northeast Africa; 

West Africa), 4 
African Democratic Assembly (Rassemble- 

ment Democratique Africain: RDA), 15 
African Financial Community franc (Com- 

munaute Financiere Africaine: CFA), 

124, 160 

Africanization policy (see also authenticite 
movement), 18, 19, 23 

African religions (see also animism), xiii, 
xxi, 66-70 

Afro-Asiatic language family, 47, 54-58 

Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common 
Organization (Organisation Commune 
Africaine, Malgache, et Mauricienne: 
OCAMM), 22 

agriculture (see also cotton production; 
drought; food production; herding; 
land reclamation; Operation Agricul- 
ture; rainfall), xiv, xxi, 42, 51, 52, 53, 
55, 58, 59, 63, 89-90; areas under cul- 
tivation for, 92-98, 102-5; labor force 
participation in, 92 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development (AID) 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS) 

Air Afrique, 118-19 



air force, xvi, 186-87 
airports, xiv, 1 19 
Air Sudan, 119 
Air Tchad, 119 
air transport, 118-19, 164 
Air Transport Union (Union des Trans- 
ports Aeriens: UTA), 119 
Al Azhar University, 72 
Algeria, 140, 166, 167, 171, 176 
Algiers, 20 
Alifa of Mao, 49 
Al Kufrah, 10 

Alooma, Idris (king). See Aluma, Idris 
(king) 

Aluma, Idris (king), xx, 8-9, 17 
Amnesty International, xiv, 204 
Am Timan, 18, 117 
animism, 67 

ANL. See National Liberation Army 
(Armee Nationale de Liberation: ANL) 

Annakaza people, 48 

Aozou Strip, 14, 20, 27, 90, 112, 138, 
142, 159, 161, 166, 167, 171, 193, 197 

Aozou (town), 197 

Arabic language (see also Chadian Arabic 
language), 28, 57-58 

Arabic-speaking groups, 5 

Arab League. See League of Arab States 
(Arab League) 

Arab migration, xx, 6 

Arabs (see also Sahel; seminomadic peo- 
ple), xiii, 28, 60, 63-65; influence in 
Chad of, 64-65 

archeological sites, 4-5 

armed forces, xvi, xxiii 

Armed Forces of the North (Forces 
Armees du Nord: FAN) (see also Sec- 
ond Liberation Army (FAN)), xv, xxii, 
21, 27, 28, 30, 144, 154, 175, 177, 180, 
181, 189-91, 192, 206, 219 

armies of factional groups, 171, 174 

army, national (see also Chadian Armed 
Forces (Forces Armees Tchadiennes: 
FAT); Chadian National Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Nationales Tchadien- 
nes: FANT)), 178, 180; after indepen- 
dence, 171, 176; consolidation by Habre 



239 



Chad: A Country Study 



of, 174; role in conflict with Libya of, 
173 

assassination, 23, 24, 137, 145, 177 
Assembly for Unity and Chadian Democ- 
racy (Rassemblement pour 1' Unite et 
la Democratic Tchadienne: RUDT), 
152 

Assembly of the French People, 15 
Assembly of the French Union (France), 
14 

AST. See Chadian Social Action (Action 

Sociale Tchadienne: AST) 
Ati, 27, 191 
Atlantic Ocean, 39 

authenticite movement, 23, 81, 137, 141, 
145 

Awlad Sulayman tribe, 30, 57, 64, 72 



Baele, 49 

Bagirmi kingdom, xx, 3, 5, 10-11 

Baguirmi people (Barmi), 53 

Bahr Aouk River, 38 

Bahr el Ghazal Depression, 37 

Bahr Salamat River, 38 

Bahr Sara River, 38 

balance of payments, 122 

Banda-Ngbaka language, 59-60 

Bangui, 12, 119 

banking system, 100, 124-26 

Bank of Central African States (Banque 
des Etats d'Afrique Centrale: BEAC), 
111, 124, 125, 126, 129, 160 

Bardai, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 63, 192, 195 

Barma language, 53 

Barmi people. See Baguirmi people (Barmi) 

Batha Prefecture, 20, 27, 39, 40, 52, 59 

Batha stream, 37 

battalions, infantry (FANT), xvi, 181 
Battle of Kousseri (1900), 11 
bauxite deposits, 90, 112 
BdL. See Logone Breweries (Brasseries du 

Logone: BdL) 
BDT. See Development Bank of Chad 

(Banque de Developpement du Tchad: 

BDT) 

BEAC . See Bank of Central African States 
(Banque des Etats d'Afrique Centrale: 
BEAC) 

beans/legumes, 93 

Belgium, 81 

Benelux countries, 122 

Benghazi, 10, 113 



Berber people, 8 

berebere. See millet, or berebere 

BGT. See Soft Drinks of Chad (Boissons 
Gazeuses du Tchad: BGT) 

BIAO. See International Bank for West 
Africa (Banque Internationale pour 
l'Afrique Occidentale: BIAO) 

BIAT. See International Bank of Africa in 
Chad (Banque Internationale d'Afrique 
au Tchad: BIAT) 

BICIT. See International Bank for Com- 
merce and Industry in Chad (Banque 
Internationale pour le Commerce et 
lTndustrie du Tchad: BICIT) 

Bideyat. See Baele 

Bideyat people, 49 

Biltine Prefecture, 12, 27, 40, 49-50, 73, 

112, 191 
Bir Korba, 196, 197 
birthrate, 43 

black-market activity, 120, 122 
"Black Sheep Plot," 23 
Bodele region, 36 
Boganda, Barthelemy, 16 
Bokassa, Jean-Bedel, 165 
Bokoro, 117 
Bongor, 104, 117 
Bono, Outel, 23 

Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, 12, 
18, 22, 40, 176-77, 189, 191, 193-94, 
197, 199 

Borkou region, 5, 22, 48 

Borno Empire (see also Kanem-Borno), xx, 
3, 7-8, 9-10, 11, 49, 120 

Borno people, 8 

Bororo people, 59 

Boua language, 54 

boundaries (see also Aozou Strip; Lake 

Chad), 14, 35-36 
Bousso region, 96 
Brazzaville, xx, 12, 77, 119 
bridges, 113, 115, 117 
brotherhoods of Islam, 11, 15, 64, 72, 144 
BTCD. See Chadian Credit and Deposit 

Bank (Banque Tchadienne de Credit et 

de Depot: BTCD) 
budget, domestic, 126-28 
Buduma-Kouri language, 55 
Buduma people, 55 
Bulala people, 7, 8, 52 
Bureau of Documentation and Security 

(Direction de la Documentation et de 

la Securite: DDS), 201 



240 



Index 



CAA. See Debt Amortization Fund 
(Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement: 
CAA) 

CAC-CDR. See Action Committee of the 
Democratic Revolutionary Council 
(Comite d'Action et de Concertation du 
Conseil Democratique Revolution- 
naire: CAC-CDR) 

Cairo, 7, 72 

Cameroon, xiv, 7, 30, 36, 37, 39, 44, 49, 
58, 59, 75, 77, 91, 97, 103, 106, 108, 
113, 115, 117, 120, 122, 124, 166; rela- 
tions of Chad with, 164, 173 

Cameroon Airlines, 119 

cattle and beef production, 90 

CCCE. See Central Fund for Economic 
Cooperation (Caisse Centrale de Coop- 
eration Economique: CCCE) 

CCFAN. See Command Council of the 
Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de 
Commandement des Forces Armees du 
Nord: CCFAN) 

CDR. See Democratic Revolutionary 
Council (Conseil Democratique Revolu- 
tionnaire: CDR) 

cease-fire (1987), 197 

Center for the Modernization of Animal 
Production (Centre de Modernisation 
des Productions Animales: CMPA), 
107 

Central, or Equatorial, Africa, xx, 36, 
164, 172 

Central African Republic, 11, 36, 37, 39, 
44, 52, 59, 73, 106, 115, 120, 124, 128, 
198; relations of Chad with, 164-65, 
173 

Central Fund for Economic Cooperation 
(Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Eco- 
nomique: CCCE), 100, 124 

Central Saharan languages, 48 

cereal production, 102 

CFA franc, 22, 100-101 

Chadian Animal Resources Improvement 
Company (Societe Tchadienne d'Ex- 
ploitation des Ressources Animales: 
SOTERA), 107 

Chadian Arabic language, 57 

Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armees 
Tchadiennes: FAT), xxiii, 27, 28, 152, 
175, 177, 178, 180, 189-91, 192 

Chadian Credit and Deposit Bank (Ban- 
que Tchadienne de Credit et de Depot: 
BTCD), 111, 124 



Chadian Democratic Union (Union 
Democratique Tchadienne: UDT), 15, 
139, 140 

Chadian National Armed Forces (Forces 
Armees Nationales Tchadiennes: 
FANT), xxii, xxiii, 171-72, 175, 179, 
192, 195-97, 204-6, 219; organization 
and strength of, 179-87 

Chadian Press Agency (Agence Tcha- 
dienne de Presse), 158 

Chadian Progressive Party (Parti Progres- 
siste Tchadien: PPT), 15, 16, 18, 21, 
23, 139 

Chadian Social Action (Action Sociale 
Tchadienne: AST), 15, 140, 202 

Chadian Textile Company (Societe Tcha- 
dienne de Textile: STT), 109, 110, 128 

Chadian Water and Electricity Company 
(Societe Tchadienne d'Eau et d'Elec- 
tricite: STEE), 112-13 

Chadic languages, 54-57 

Chapelle, Jean, 61-62, 72 

Charfarda people, 48 

Chari-Baguirmi Prefecture, 15, 20, 40, 
49, 53, 59, 96 

Chari-Nile language, 52 

Chari River, xiv, 11, 37-39, 44, 54-55, 
93, 113, 115 

Chevron, 112 

Christianity {see also Protestantism; 
Roman Catholicism), xiii, xxi, 66-67, 
73-76, 165 

Cigarette Factory of Chad (Manufacture 
des Cigarettes du Tchad: MCT), 109, 
110, 128 

civil service employees, 127, 188 

Civil War, xv, 79, 82, 84, 89, 91, 98, 106, 
109, 125, 138, 178, 183, 188 

clan identity, 61-62 

climate, xiii, 39-42, 90, 92 

CMPA. See Center for the Modernization 
of Animal Production (Centre de Mod- 
ernisation des Productions Animales: 
CMPA) 

CNC. 51a National Advisory Council 
(Conseil National Consultatif: CNC) 

codas, 152, 180, 183, 194-95, 205 

College d'Enseignement Technique, 82 

colonial policy. See France 

Command Council of the Armed Forces 
of the North (Conseil de Commande- 
ment des Forces Armees du Nord: 
CCFAN), xv, 26-27, 146, 154, 189 



241 



Chad: A Country Study 



communications {see also mass media; 

telecommunications), 91, 119, 158 
communism, 159 

conflict, civil, 4, 19, 27-28, 44, 46, 63, 

95, 106, 124, 126, 178 
Congo, 11, 81, 124, 184, 198; relations 

of Chad with, 164 
Congo-Kordofanian language family, 47, 

58-60 
Conoco, 91, 112 

constitution {see also Fundamental Charter 
(1978); Fundamental Law (1982)), of 
1959-1960, 145; 1962 revisions, 145; of 
1965, 145; 1973 authenticite movement 
incorporated, 145; in 1978, 145; of 
France (1946), 14, 140; of French Fifth 
Republic, 16 

Cooperation and Aid Fund (Fonds d'Aide 
et de la Cooperation: FAC), 100 

Cooperative of Chadian Transporters 
(Cooperative des Transporteurs Tcha- 
diens: CTT), 118 

corn production, 94, 103-5 

Cote d'lvoire, 81, 97, 184 

Cotonfran {see also Cotontchad), 96 

Cotontchad, 98, 100-102, 109-10, 118, 
124-27, 128, 132, 204 

Cotton and Textile Research Institute 
(Institut de Recherche sur le Coton et 
les Textiles: IRCT), 100, 128 

cotton industry {see also Emergency Cot- 
ton Fund), xxi, 12-13, 24, 52, 89, 90, 
91, 92, 95-100, 110, 115, 117, 125, 
126-27, 130-31; in Sudan, 163 

Cotton Price Stabilization Board (Caisse 
de Stabilisation des Prix du Coton: 
CSPC), 98, 100, 101-2, 128 

Council of Ministers, xv, 146-48, 178 

Council of the Republic (France), 14 

coup d'etat (1975), xxii, 4, 24, 137, 145, 
162, 163, 177, 202 

court of appeals, 150 

Court of State Security, 149 

courts {see also criminal courts; customary 
courts; military courts), 149 

credit access, 124-26, 129 

Credit Lyonnais, 124 

criminal code, 203 

criminal courts, 150, 201 

crop rotation, 94 

CSM. See Supreme Military Council 

(Conseil Superieur Militaire: CSM) 
CSPC. See Cotton Price Stabilization 



Board (Caisse de Stabilisation des Prix 
du Coton: CSPC) 

CSR. See Supreme Council of the Revo- 
lution (Conseil Supreme de la Revolu- 
tion: CSR) 

currency, xiv; CFA franc, 22, 160; Franc 
Zone, 124; French franc, 124, 160 

customary courts, 203 

Customs Union of Central African States 
(Union Douaniere des Etats d'Afrique 
Centrale: UDEAC), 115 

Cyrenaica, 11 



Dabbalemi, Dunama (king), xx, 7, 17 
Dadjo language, 51, 52 
Dandi, 117 
Dar al Kuti, 52 

Darfur Province, xx, 10-11, 163 
dates, 93 

Daza people, xiv, 48, 60, 62, 179 

debt, external, 129-30 

Debt Amortization Fund (Caisse Auto- 
nome d'Amortissement: CAA), 102, 
129-30 

Deby, Idris, xiv, 182 

defense spending, xvi, 91, 127, 187 

de Gaulle, Charles, 14, 139 

Democratic and Popular National Assem- 
bly (Rassemblement National Demo- 
cratique et Populaire: RNDP), 152 

Democratic Front of Chad (Front 
Democratique du Tchad: FDT), 152 

Democratic Revolutionary Council (Con- 
seil Democratique Revolutionnaire: 
CDR), xxiv, 30, 153, 161, 174, 191, 
192, 195, 220 

derde {see also Kichidemi, Oueddei {derde)), 
63 

desertification, 108 

Development Bank of Chad (Banque de 
Developpement du Tchad: BDT), 124, 
125 

Development Office for Sategui Deressia 
(Office de Mise en Valeur de Sategui- 
Deressia: OMVSD), 103 

diseases, 83 

Djagada people, 48 

Djamouss, Hassane, xiv, 156, 179, 181, 
183 

Djogo, Negue, 152, 192 
Djourab region, 36, 37 
Doba, 75, 91, 112 



242 



Index 



donor support. See economic assistance 
Douala, 91, 113, 115, 119 
Doumro, Jacques, 22 
Doza people, 48 

drought, xxi, 22, 24, 39, 46, 89, 102, 106, 
107, 113, 118, 121, 128, 130, 132, 166 
Dunamami, Ali (king), 8 

East Germany. ^Germany, Democratic 

Republic 
Eboue, Felix, 14, 139 
Ecole Mohamed Illech, 77 
Ecole Nationale d' Administration, 79 
Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics, 79 
Ecole Normale Superieure, 82 
economic assistance, 81, 90, 91, 92, 101, 

110, 115, 117, 121, 127, 130-33, 158, 

166; from France, 152 
economic crisis, 22, 24 
EDF. See European Development Fund 

(EDF) 

education, xiii, 35; assistance for, 81, 
131-32; effect of Civil War on, 79; 
Islamic or Quranic, 72, 77; by mission- 
aries, 74, 76-77; primary and second- 
ary schools for, 77, 79-81; quality of, 
78; study locations for higher, 81-82; 
vocational, 82 

EEC. See European Economic Commu- 
nity (EEC) 

Egypt, 8, 120 

electoral rights, 14, 16 

electricity, 112-13 

Emergency Cotton Program, 101, 127, 
128, 132 

emigration (see also labor force; refugees), 

43-44 
Emi Koussi, 37 
empires, 3, 5 
Ennedi Plateau, 36, 37 
Ennedi Prefecture, 49 
Ennedi region, 4-5, 10, 22, 48 
Equatorial Guinea, 124 
Erdiha people, 48 
Ethiopia, 166 

ethnic groups (see also factionalism), xiii, 

45-48; rivalry among, 174 
Europe, Western, 44, 122 
European Development Fund (EDF), 

100, 101, 132 
European Economic Community (EEC), 

91, 92, 100, 101, 115, 130 



Experimental Sectors for Agricultural 
Modernization (Secteurs Experimentaux 
de Modernisation Agricole: SEMAA), 
103 

exports, xiv; of agricultural products, 120; 
of cattle and meat, 106, 120-21; of cot- 
ton, 9, 89, 90, 91, 106, 115, 117, 
120-21; to Nigeria, 162 

Exxon, 91, 112 

FAC. See Cooperation and Aid Fund 
(Fonds d'Aide et de la Cooperation: 
FAC) 

factionalism: armies of, 171, 174; in poli- 
tics, xxi, 4, 150-57; in society, xix 
Fada, 20, 195, 196 
family structure, Toubou people, 61 
famine, xxi, 46, 89 

FAN. See Armed Forces of the North 
(Forces Armees du Nord: FAN) 

FANT. See Chadian National Armed 
Forces (Forces Armees Nationales 
Tchadiennes: FANT) 

FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation (FAO); Western Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Occidentales: FAO) 

FAP. See People's Armed Forces (Forces 
Armees Populaires: FAP) 

Farcha Slaughterhouse (Abattoir Frigori- 
fique de Farcha), 109 

farmers. See agriculture; labor force 

FAT. See Chadian Armed Forces (Forces 
Armees Tchadiennes: FAT) 

FayaLargeau, 12, 20, 26, 27, 36, 40, 192, 
193, 195, 197, 199 

FDAR. See Rural Action and Develop- 
ment Fund (Fonds de Developpement 
et de 1' Action Rurale: FDAR) 

FDT. See Democratic Front of Chad 
(Front Democratique du Tchad: FDT) 

Fezzan region, 7, 9, 14, 175 

Fianga, 59 

fighting units (FANT), 182 
financial crisis. See economic crisis 
FIR. See Fund for Rural Intervention 

(Fonds dTntervention Rurale: FIR) 
First Liberation Army (of FROLINAT), 

22, 189, 192, 220 
fiscal policy (see also revenues, govern- 
ment; spending, government; tax 
policy), 91, 126 
fishing industry, 92, 93, 107-8 



243 



Chad: A Country Study 



Foccart, Jacques, 23 

Fodio, Usman dan, 9 

Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), 103 

food production, 102-6 

foreign assistance. See economic assis- 
tance; military assistance 

foreign policy, 158-67; of United States 
in Africa, 166 

forestry, 108-9 

Fort-Archambault. See Sahr (Fort- 
Archambault) 

Fort-Lamy. See N'Djamena (Fort-Lamy) 

France {see also French Equatorial Africa), 
10, 26, 120, 164, 184; Chadians' par- 
ticipation in army of, 175-76; colonial 
rule of, xx, 3-4, 11-15, 95-96, 120, 
139; company personnel and advisers 
from, 14, 109, 141, 142; economic 
assistance by, 81, 91, 92, 101, 130, 132, 
152, 158; intervention in Chad by, 138; 
loans by, 129; military assistance from, 
xxii-xxiii, 145, 171, 173, 177, 183, 185, 
186, 188-89, 193-95, 196, 198; mili- 
tary role in Chad for, 198-200; rela- 
tions with Chad of, xv, 159-60,164, 
175; relations with Nigeria of, 162; role 
after independence of, 21; subjugation 
and rule by, 3-4, 1 1 ; support for Habre 
of, 151; as trading partner, 121-22; 
troop withdrawal by (1984), 194 

Franc Zone, 124 

Free French, 14, 139, 175; military cam- 
paign, 175 
French Equatorial Africa (Afrique 
Equatoriale Francaise: AEF), 3, 11-12, 
14, 16, 73, 77, 96, 139, 140, 175, 201 
French General Council, 14, 140 
French language, 28, 77, 78-79 
French Textile Development Company 
(Compagnie Francaise pour le Deve- 
loppement des Textiles: CFDT), 100 
FROLINAT. See National Liberation 
Front of Chad (Front de Liberation 
Nationale du Tchad: FROLINAT) 
Fulani language, 59 
Fulani people, xx, 9, 56, 58-59 
Fundamental Charter (1978), 27 
Fundamental Law (1982), xv, xxiii, 

145-48, 178 
Fund for Rural Intervention (Fonds d 'In- 
tervention Rurale: FIR), 125 



Gabon, 11, 16, 124, 166, 173, 198 

Gaeda people, 48 

Galmaye, Youssef, 202 

Ganebang, Zamtato, 179 

Garoua, 115 

Gelendeng, 115, 117 

geographic location, xix, 3, 35-36, 89, 

164, 172 
geography, xiii 
Germans, 103 

Germany, Democratic Republic, 191 

Germany, Federal Republic, 121-22, 
130, 132 

Giscard d'Estaing, 160 

Gorou, Ahmed, 179 

Goukouni Oueddei, 20-21, 26-30, 48, 
63, 130, 137-38, 142-44; accord with 
Qadhafi of, 191-92; army of (FAP), 
180-81, 189; forms ANL (1982), 192; 
in GUNT government, xxii, 190-91, 
195; as Habre ally and rival, 151-53, 
171-72, 174, 178, 188; relations with 
Qadhafi of, 161, 173 

Gounou Gaya, 56 

government intervention, 92, 95, 96, 98, 

100-102 
Goz Beida, 51 

Grands Moulins du Tchad, 103 

gross domestic product (GDP), xiv, 89, 

109, 126, 128 
gross national product (GNP), xxi, 89 
Guera Massif, 36, 37, 206 
Guera Prefecture, 12, 20, 40, 49, 52, 53, 

54, 56, 60, 65, 74, 96, 174, 188, 206 
guerrilla warfare. See insurgency 
GUNT. See Transitional Government 

of National Unity (Gouvernement 

d'Union Nationale de Transition: 

GUNT) 

Gwaranga, Abd ar Rahman, 10 

Habre, Hissein, 4, 20, 26-30, 48, 63, 84, 
137, 138-39, 142-45, 146, 164; admin- 
istration of, 204-6; consolidation of 
control by, xxiii, 151-52, 154-55, 171, 
174, 175; foreign policy of, 159; in 
GUNT government, xxii, 190; insur- 
gent troops (FAN) of, 177-78, 180, 
188, 189-94; political support of, 154; 
relations with Goukouni, 153, 171; re- 
lations with Sudan of, 163, 174; rela- 
tions with United States of, 166-67; 



244 



Index 



relations with Zaire of, 164; strategy of, 
155-57 

Hajerai people, 53, 56-57, 65, 174, 206 

Hassuna tribe, 57, 64 

Hausa language, 54 

Hausa people, 8, 9 

health (see also disease), xiii, 44 

health care delivery, 35, 83-84, 131-32 

health service for animals, 107, 166 

herders, 40, 48-49, 57, 58, 59, 61-65, 90, 

92-94, 103, 106, 163 
hospitals, 83 
Humai, Mai (king), 6-7 
human rights, xiv, 203, 204 



IAF. See Inter- African Force (IAF) 

IDA. See International Development 
Agency (IDA); United Nations (UN) 

Idrismi, Umar (king), 7 

IEMVT. See Livestock and Veterinary 
Medicine Institute of Chad (Institut 
d'Elevage et de Medecine Veterinaire 
du Tchad: IEMVT) 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 

immigration, xix, 5, 43 

imports, xiv, 9, 115, 121, 122; depen- 
dence on, xxi; from France, United 
States and Cameroon, 164 

independence (1960), 4, 16, 17, 89 

Indochina, 171, 176 

Indus River, 4 

Industrial Agricultural Equipment Com- 
pany (Societe Industrielle de Materiel 
Agricole du Tchad: SIMAT), 109, 110, 
125 

industrial sector (see also agriculture; cot- 
ton industry; manufacturing; mining), 
xiv, 90, 109-10 

infantry (FANT), xvi, 181 

infrastructure, xxi, 89, '91, 102, 106, 
113-18, 132 

inland waterways, xiv 

INSAH. See Sahel Institute (Institut du 
Sahel: INSAH) 

insurgency, 26-27, 29, 142, 176, 177, 
188, 205 

Inter-African Force (IAF), xxii, 30, 144, 
164, 192, 200 

International Bank for Africa in Chad 
(Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique 
au Tchad: BIAT), 111, 124 



International Bank for Commerce and 
Industry for Chad (Banque Interna- 
tionale pour le Commerce et 1 'Indus- 
trie du Tchad: BICIT), 124 

International Bank for West Africa (Ban- 
que Internationale pour l'Afrique 
Occidental : BIAO), 124 

International Development Agency 
(IDA), 130, 132 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 92, 
129, 132 

international organizations, xv-xvi 

International Telecommunications Com- 
pany of Chad (Societe de Telecommu- 
nications Internationales du Tchad: 
STIT), 119 

investment, foreign, 92, 111 

Investment Code (1963), 92 

IRCT. See Cotton and Textile Research 
Institute (Institut de Recherche sur le 
Coton et les Textiles: IRCT) 

Islam, xx, xxi, 10, 59, 64, 66-67, 70-73; 
penetration of, 6-7; proposed role of, 
167 

Islamic law (sharia), 8, 150 

Islamic Legion (Libya), 172, 174, 191-92 

Islamic University of Al Bayda, 63 

Israel, 22, 167, 176 

Italy: economic assistance by, 130, 132; 

French border agreement with, 14, 138; 

troops in Libya (World War II), 175 
Itno, Ibrahim Mahamat, xiv 

judicial system, xv, 21, 149-50, 201, 

202-4 
Juhayna tribe, 57, 64 

Kalait, 192, 196 

Kamadja people, 48 

Kamouge, Wadel Abdelkader, 28-29, 

152, 161, 190-91, 202 
Kanem, Muhammed al, 9 
Kanem, Umar, 9-10 
Kanem-Borno Empire, xx, 3, 5, 8-10, 11, 

49, 63-64 
Kanembu language, 49 
Kanembu people, 6, 7, 8, 9, 60 
Kanem Empire, xx, 5-7, 120 
Kanem Prefecture, 12, 15, 37, 40, 48, 49, 

57, 59, 60, 62, 111, 132 
Kano, 7, 28, 143, 190 



245 



Chad: A Country Study 



Kanuri language, 8, 49 

Kanuri people, 8, 56 

kashimbet, 61, 64 

Kecherda, 48 

Kelo, 75, 103 

Kenga language, 53, 56 

Khartoum, 20, 27, 72, 75, 119 

Khatir, Mahamat Senoussi, 152 

Khoisan language family, 5, 47 

Kichidemi, Oueddei (derde), 19, 20-21, 

26, 63 
kingdoms, 3, 5, 60, 120 
Kokorda people, 48 
koros, 37 

Kotiga, Alphonse, 152, 195 
Kotoko language, 55-56 
Kotoko people, 8, 55-56 
Kou, 75 

Koulamallah, Ahmed, 15 

Koundoul, 183 

Kouri people, 55 

Kousseri, 11, 113, 115, 117, 164 

Kreda people, 48, 62 

Kukawa, 9 

Kuwait, 129 



labor force: civil service employees, 127, 
188; migration of, 43-44, 51, 163; par- 
ticipation in, 92 

Lac Prefecture, 40, 49, 132 

Lagos, 28, 113, 115, 143, 190 

Lagos Accord (1979), 28, 30 

Lai, 103, 104 

Lake Chad, xix, 5, 7, 8, 9, 36-37, 39, 42, 
48, 52, 55, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 103, 
107-8, 111, 112, 117, 162; boundary 
with Nigeria, 173 

Lake Chad Basin, 36-37, 39, 48, 64, 72 

Lake Fitri, 7, 37, 39, 52, 93 

Lake Iro, 39, 60 

Lake Mamoun, 60 

land: ownership of, 94-95; reclamation 
of, 93 

land routes (see also trade routes), 113 

language, xiii, 5, 8, 45; Arabic, 28; Cen- 
tral Saharan, 48; families, 35, 47-60; 
major groups for, 47-48; replacement 
of French, 28 

League of Arab States (Arab League), 167 

Lebanon, 167 

Leclerc, Jacques, 14, 175 



legal customs: among Sara people, 65-66; 

among Toubou peole, 62 
legal system, 149-50, 201 
Lere, 58, 115, 117 

Libya (see also Qadhafi, Muammar al), 4, 
7, 11, 14, 20, 22, 36, 48, 57, 113, 120, 
130, 137, 140, 142, 144; claims to 
Aozou Strip by, xv, xxiii, 159, 161, 
166, 167; intervention in Chadian con- 
flict, 26-30, 143, 193-94; Italian troops 
in (World War II), 175; military assis- 
tance treaty with GUNT (1980), 29, 
191, 198; occupation of Chad by, xv, 
195-97; relations with Chad of, xv, 
xxii, 159-61, 166-67, 172-73, 189; 
relations with Nigeria of, 162; relations 
with Soviet Union of, 166; relations 
with Sudan of, 163 

Libyan-Chad boundary. See Aozou Strip; 
Libya; Qadhafi, Muammar al 

Lisette, Gabriel, 15-16, 18, 139-40 

literacy rate, xiii, 78 

livestock, xxi, 90, 92, 93-94 (see also 
herders) 

Livestock and Veterinary Medicine Insti- 
tute of Chad (Institut d'Elevage et de 
Medecine Veterinaire du Tchad: 
IEMVT), 107 

locusts, 102 

Logone Breweries (Brasseries du Logone: 

BdL), 109, 110, 128 
Logone Occidental Prefecture, 42, 54, 73, 

75, 76, 96 
Logone Oriental Prefecture, 42, 58, 59, 

73, 75, 76, 96 
Logone River, xiv, 37-39, 54-55, 93, 

103, 108 
lot cadre (enabling act), 16, 140 
Lol, Mahmat Shawa, 28, 162 
Lome Convention, 91, 100 
Lycee Ahmad Mangue, 78 
Lycee Franco- Arabe, 77 
lycees techniques industriels, 82 

Maatan as Sarra, 197 
Maba language, 51-52 
Maba people, 10 
Mabang language, 51-52 
macroeconomic policy, 91, 92 
Magoumi clan, 6 
mai, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Maiduguri, xiv, 113, 115 



246 



Index 



Maldoun, Boda, 153, 206 
Mali, 97 

Malloum, Felix, 4, 22, 23, 24, 26-28, 
137, 142-43, 163; administration of, 
xxii, 175, 177, 189-90, 199, 202; oppo- 
sition to Habre by, 151; relations with 
United States of, 166 

Mandara Mountains, 36 

Mangalme, 20 

manufacturing sector, 90, 109-11 
Marari people, 49, 51 
Maroua, 117 

marriage: among Arabs, 64-65; among 

Toubou people, 62 
Marxist philosophy, 15 
Massaguet, 115 
Massa language, 56 
Massalat language, 52 
Massalit language, 52 
Massenya, 10, 53 
mass media, 158 
Mauritania, 128 

Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture, 42, 55, 56, 58, 
59, 60, 76, 96, 97-98, 117, 132 

Mayo-Kebbi River, 115 

Mbaissanabe, Mornadji, 187 

MCT. See Cigarette Factory of Chad 
(Manufacture des Cigarettes du Tchad: 
MCT) 

Mecca, 7, 8, 11 

medical centers, 83 

medical personnel, 83-84 

Mediterranean Sea, 9, 36, 113 

Middle East, 44, 77, 122, 167 

military assistance, xvi, 29, 145, 166, 183, 
185, 186, 189, 191, 193-96, 198; multi- 
lateral agreement (1960) with France 
for, 198 

military courts, 149 

military equipment/ weapons (FANT), 
181, 184-86 

military service, 181 

military spending. See defense spending 

military training, 183-84 

military units, xvi 

militias {see also armies of factional 

groups), 29 
millet, or berebere, 51, 52, 59, 93, 94, 102-3 
Mimi language, 51 
mineral deposits, 90, 111-12, 159 
mining, xiv, 61 

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel- 
opment, 98, 125 



Ministry of Education, 79 
Ministry of Finance, 126 
Ministry of Interior, 202 
Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction, 
43, 79 

Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica- 
tions, 119 

Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and 
Urban Development, 117 

Mitterrand, Francois, 144, 160, 194, 197 

MNRCS. See National Movement for the 
Cultural and Social Revolution (Mouve- 
ment National pour la Revolution Cul- 
turelle et Sociale: MNRCS) 

Mobutu Sese Seko, 141, 164 

monetary policy (see also balance of pay- 
ments; budget, domestic), 126 

Mongo, 117, 183 

mortality rate, 43, 445 

Mortcha region, 40 

MOSANAT. See Movement for the 
National Salvation of Chad (Mouve- 
ment pour le Salut National du Tchad: 
MOSANAT) 

Moubi people, 57, 65 

Moundang people, 60 

Moundang-Toupouri-Mboum language, 
58 

Moundou, 28, 42, 44, 45, 57, 75, 76, 82, 
113, 117, 119, 150 

mountains, 36-37 

Moussoro, 183, 199 

Movement for the National Salvation of 
Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut Na- 
tional du Tchad: MOSANAT), 153, 
174-75, 206 

Moyen-Chari Prefecture, 16, 28, 42, 54, 
56, 60, 73, 76, 96 

Moyen-Congo, 11 

Mozambique, 166 

MPLT. See Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Chad (Mouvement Popu- 
laire pour la Liberation du Tchad: 
MPLT) 

MPR. See People's Revolutionary Militia 
(Milice Populaire de la Revolution: 
MPR) 

MRA. See Administrative Reform Mis- 
sion (Mission Reform e Administrative: 
MRA) 

Muhammad, 70-71 

municipalities, 148-49 



247 



Chad: A Country Study 



Muslims, xiii, 3, 9, 15, 19, 21, 28, 55, 
59, 70-73, 165, 172, 188, 190 

Mussolini, Benito, 75 

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 
(1983), 200 

Nairobi, 30 

National Advisory Council (Conseil 
National Consultatif: CNC), xv, 146, 
148, 155 

National and Nomad Guard, 20, 176-77 
National Assembly (Chad), 141 
National Assembly (France), 14, 15, 16 
National Gendarmerie, 176, 177, 201-2 
National Institute of Economic and 

Statistical Studies (Institut National des 

Etudes Statistiques et Economiques: 

INSEE), 42 
National Liberation Army (Armee Na- 

tionale de Liberation: ANL), xxi-xxii, 

192, 220 

National Liberation Front of Chad (Front 
de Liberation Nationale du Tchad: 
FROLINAT), xxiii, 4, 20-21, 22, 
26-27, 30, 63, 137, 140, 142-43, 151, 
153, 154, 163, 166, 188-90 

National Military Police (Police Militaire 
Nationale: PMN), xvi, 201 

National Movement for the Cultural and 
Social Revolution (Mouvement Na- 
tional pour la Revolution Culturelle et 
Sociale: MNRCS), 23 

National Office of Roads (Office National 
des Routes: OFNAR), 117 

National Office of Rural Development 
(Office National de Developpement 
Rural: ONDR), 95, 98, 100, 101, 102, 
125, 128 

National Quarry Office (Office National 
des Carriers: OFNC), 117 

National School of Public Health and So- 
cial Work (Ecole Nationale de Sante 
Publique et de Service Social: ENSPSS), 
82 

National Security Police (Surete), xvi, 201 

National Sugar Company of Chad (Soci- 
ete Nationale Sucriere du Tchad: 
SONASUT), 109, 110, 128 

National Trading Company of Chad 
(Societe Nationale de Commercialisa- 
tion du Tchad: SONACOT), 105 

National Union for Independence and 



Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'ln- 
dependance et la Revolution: UNIR), 
xv, xxiii, 137, 139, 146, 154-55, 158, 
187 

National Union Government (1978), 27 

National Union of Chadian Workers 
(Union Nationale de Travailleurs du 
Tchad: UNTT), 26 

natron. See sodium carbonate 

N'Djamena (Fort-Lamy), 11, 12, 18, 19, 
22, 24, 29, 30, 36, 39, 44, 45, 57, 63, 
74, 76, 79, 82, 91, 93, 103, 111, 112, 
113, 115, 117, 119, 124, 143, 144, 150, 
164, 178, 183; military base near, 
198-99; occupation of, 188, 190 

Neolithic culture, 5 

Netherlands, 101 

Ngaoundere, xiv, 113, 115 

Ngazargamu, 8, 9 

Niellim, 117 

Niger, 8, 36, 48, 49, 108, 165, 173 

Nigeria, xiv, 9, 28, 36, 44, 49, 77, 106, 
108, 111, 115, 120, 122, 138, 165, 166; 
relations with Chad and Libya of, 159, 
162-63, 173, 190; relations with 
Qadhafi of, 173-74; relations with 
Zaire of, 164 

Nile Valley, 5, 36, 37 

Nilo-Saharan language family {see also 
Central Saharan languages), 47-54 

Njimi, 7, 8 

Noarma people, 48 

nomadic societies (see also Daza people; 
seminomadic people; Toubou people), 
xx, xxi, 3, 35, 40, 45, 48, 49, 59, 
61-63, 94, 189 

North Africa, 9, 36, 122, 167 

Northeast Africa, 36 

Numayri, Jaafar an, 163 

Nyala, 20 



oases, 9, 40, 48, 61, 62, 94, 95, 103 
OAU. See Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) 

OCAMM. See Afro-Malagasy and Mau- 
ritian Common Organization (Organi- 
sation Commune Africaine, Malgache, 
et Mauricienne: OCAMM) 

officer corps, 24, 181-82 

oil industry (see also Petroleum Prod- 
ucts Fund (Fonds d 'Intervention des 



248 



Index 



Produits Petroliers: FIPP)), xiv, 91, 

112, 122, 128-29, 162-63 
oil refinery (proposed), 112 
oils (edible) industry, 98, 105, 110 
ONDR. See National Office of Rural 

Development (Office National de Deve- 

loppement Rural: ONDR) 
Operation Agriculture, 24 
Operation Epervier (Sparrowhawk), 195, 

199-200 

Operation Manta (Stingray), 193, 199 
Organization for the Development of the 

Lake (Societe pour le Developpement du 

Lac: SODELAC), 103 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

xxii, 29, 30, 144, 147, 166, 190, 192, 

197 

Ottoman Empire, 8 

Ouaddaian language, 49, 51 

Ouaddaian people, 15 

Ouaddai Highlands, 36, 37 

Ouaddai Prefecture, 12, 20, 29, 40, 42, 

48, 49, 51, 52, 60, 74, 132 
Ouadi Doum, 195, 196, 197 
Oumar, Acheikh ibn, xxiv, 174, 195 
Oum Chalouba, 192 
Ounianga Kebir, 20 
Ounia people, 48 
ownership, Toubou people, 62 



Pala, 76 

Paleochadian Sea, 54 

parastatal enterprises, 92, 95, 98, 109, 127 

paratroop company, 176 

Paris, xiv, 14, 23, 119 

pastoralism {see also herdsmen), 89, 90 

Peace Corps, 166 

peacekeeping force {see also Inter- African 
Force (IAF)), xxii, 29, 30, 190, 192 

peanut production, 52, 93, 94, 105 

People's Armed Forces (Forces Armees 
Populaires: FAP), 27, 28, 152, 153, 179, 
180, 190-91, 192, 195, 221 

People's Revolutionary Militia (Milice 
Populaire de la Revolution: MPR), 155 

Petroleum Products Fund (Fonds d' Inter- 
vention des Produits Petroliers: FIPP), 
128-29 

PMT. See Territorial Military Police 

(Police Militaire Territoriale: PMT) 
polders, 55, 93, 94, 103 
police services, 201-2 



political activity {see also factionalism), xx, 
4, 15-16, 20; descent groups in, 150 
political reform, 21-22 
polyclinics, 83 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Chad (Mouvement Populaire pour la 
Liberation du Tchad: MPLT), 153 

population, xiii, 42-43; density and com- 
position, 44-45 

Population Reference Bureau (PRB), 43, 
44-45 

port facilities, xiv, 91, 113 
Port Harcourt, 113, 115 
Port Sudan, 113 
Portugal, 122 
postal service, 119 

PPT. See Chadian Progressive Party (Parti 
Progressiste Tchadien: PPT) 

PRB. See Population Reference Bureau 
(PRB) 

prefectures, 148 

Presidential Guard (Securite Presidentielle: 
SP), xvi, xxiii-xxiv, 157, 172, 179, 181, 
182, 183, 201, 206 
presidential responsibilities, 146, 178 
prices: for cotton, 100-101; for oil imports, 
128 

print media, 158 
prisoners of war, 204 
prisons, 204 

private-sector enterprises, 109, 118, 124 
Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon), 167 
public utilities, 112 



Qadhafi, Muammar al, xxiv, 28, 29-30, 
161, 163, 164; accord with Goukouni of, 
191-92; in Aozou Strip conflict, 167, 
172-73, 188; attitude of United States 
toward, 166; goals of, xxii, 138, 144, 
165, 172; relations with France of, 194; 
support in Chad from, 22, 142 

Quran, 72 



Rabih Fadlallah, 10, 11 
radio, 119, 158 
Radio Bardai, 158 

Radiodiffusion Nationale Tchadienne 

(RNT), 158 
Rahmane, Aboubakar Abdel, 153 
railroads/rail links, xiv, 91, 113, 115 
rainfall, 39, 40, 42, 46, 90, 92, 94, 102 



249 



Chad: A Country Study 



razzias, 11, 12, 46, 52, 139 

RDA. See African Democratic Assembly 
(Rassemblement Democratique Afri- 
cain: RDA) 

rebellion, 4, 20, 174-75, 188-89, 194-95 

reconstruction financing, 128 

Red Cross, 204 

Red Sea, 36, 113 

refugees, 43, 44, 163, 165, 190-91 

regional divisions: among Toubou peo- 
ple, 62; for government administration, 
148-49 

religion (see also African religions; Chris- 
tianity; Islam), xiii, 35, 36, 66-76; 
among Sara and Moundang people, 68 

revenues, government, 126-28, 187; to 
service external debt, 129; sources of, 
128 

rice production, 94, 103-4 

Rig Rig, 91, 112 

riots, 18, 19 

river system, xiv, 107-8 

RNDP. See Democratic and Popular 
National Assembly (Rassemblement 
National Democratique et Populaire: 
RNDP) 

road system, xiv, xxi, 91, 115, 166 

Roman Catholicism, 75-76 

RUDT. See Assembly for Unity and Chad- 
ian Democracy (Rassemblement pour 
1' Unite et la Democratic Tchadienne: 
RUDT) 

Runga language, 52 

Rural Action and Development Fund 
(Fonds de Developpement et de 1' Ac- 
tion Rurale: FDAR), 125 



Sabha, 27 

Sabun (sultan), xx, 10 
Sahara Desert, 5, 35, 36, 37, 39, 48 
Saharan region, 40, 83-84, 90, 93-94 
Sahel, xxi, 35, 39, 40, 42, 48, 50, 57, 59, 

63-65, 108, 159 
sahelian zone, xiii, 5, 15, 39, 40, 45, 

83-84, 90, 92-93, 94, 95, 96, 102, 105, 

106, 117 

Sahel Institute (Institut du Sahel: 

INSAH), 43, 44, 45 
Salamat Prefecture, 12, 20, 40, 42, 51, 

60, 76, 96, 106 
salt mining, 61 



Sanusiyya Islamic brotherhood, 11, 64, 

72, 144 
Sao, 55 

Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi language, 52-54 
Sara language, 54 

Sara people, xiii, xxi, 12, 13, 23, 28, 

65-66, 141, 171, 175, 180 
Sarh (Fort-Archambault), 23, 28, 39, 44, 

45, 54, 57, 75, 76, 78, 82, 113, 117, 

119, 150 
Sayfawa dynasty, 6-7, 8, 9 
Sayf ibn Dhi Yazan, 6 
seasons, 39-40 

Second Liberation Army (of FROLI- 
NAT), xxii, 22-23, 63, 140, 189, 221; 
later known as FAN, 22-23, 189 

security, internal, xvi 

Sedigi, 112 

self-rule law, 16 

seminomadic people, xxi, 60-61, 63-65 
semisedentary people. See agriculture; 

Arabs; herdsmen; sedentary people; 

seminomadic people 
Senegal, 81, 128, 166, 184 
Senegal River Valley, 59 
Senoussi, Hadjero, 153 
sharia (Islamic law), 8, 150 
Sharif, Muhammad, xx, 10-11 
Shell Oil Company, 112 
Shuwa Arabs, 9 

Siddick, Abba, 20-21, 22, 151, 161, 189 
SIM AT. See Industrial Agricultural 
Equipment Company (Societe Indus- 
trielle de Materiel Agricole du Tchad: 
SIMAT) 

slave trade (see also razzias), xix, xx, 3, 9, 

11, 12, 46, 52, 139 
smuggling, 120 
soap industry, 98 
Socialist Party (France), 144, 160 
social structure, 60-66 
SODELAC. See Organization for the 

Development of the Lake (Societe pour 

le Developpement du Lac: SODELAC) 
sodium carbonate (natron), 61, 90, 

111-12 

Soft Drinks of Chad (Boissons Gazeuses 
du Tchad: BGT), 109, 110-11 

SONASUT. See National Sugar Com- 
pany of Chad (Societe Nationale 
Sucriere du Tchad: SONASUT) 

sorghum, 52, 94, 102-3 



250 



Index 



SOTERA. See Chadian Animal Re- 
sources Improvement Company (Soci- 
ete Tchadienne d' Exploitation des 
Ressources Animales: SOTERA) 

soudanian zone, xiii, xxi, 35, 40, 42, 48, 
61, 90, 92, 95, 96, 100, 102, 105, 106, 
109, 112, 117 

Soviet Union, 166; role in Libyan - 
Chadian conflict of, 191 

Spain, 121-22 

Special Rapid Intervention Brigade, 201 
spending, government (see also defense 

spending), 91, 126-28 
Stabex system, 100, 101 
State Control (Controle d'Etat), 126 
state-owned enterprises (see also parasta- 

tal enterprises), 103, 105, 109 
states (in Chad), 5; formation of, 6 
strikes, 22 

STT. See Chadian Textile Company 
(Societe Tchadienne de Textile: STT) 

subsidies: for cotton production, 100, 101; 
from France, 187 

Sudan, 10, 20, 29, 36, 40, 44, 50, 57, 77, 
113, 120, 138; relations with Chad of, 
162-63, 174; relations with Libya of, 
174 

sultanates, 60 
Sungor people, 51 

Supreme Council of the Revolution (Con- 
seil Supreme de la Revolution: CSR), 
152 

Supreme Court, 149 

Supreme Military Council (Conseil Supe- 

rieur Militaire: CSM), 24, 26, 142 
Surete. See National Security Police 

(Surete) 



Tama language, 49, 51 
Tama people, 51 

Tandjile Prefecture, 42, 56, 73, 96 
tax policy, 126-28, 129, 187 
Tchad Utile, Le (Useful Chad), xxi, 90 
Teda-Daza (Toubou) language (see also 

Toubou people), 5, 48 
Teda people, 48, 62 
telecommunications system, xiv, 119, 158 
telephone service. See telecommunications 
television, 158 

Territorial Assembly, 140, 145 
Territorial Military Police (Police 



Militaire Territoriale: PMT), xvi, 201, 
202 

textile industry, 98, 100, 109, 110 
Third Liberation Army (of FROLINAT), 
28, 221 

Tibesti Mountains, 36, 37, 48, 63, 90, 
112 

Tibesti region, 5, 21, 63, 195 
Tibesti Subprefecture, 62, 63 
Tijaniyya Islamic brotherhood, 15, 72 
tin deposits, 112 
Togo, 30 
Tomagra clan, 63 

Tombalbaye, Francois, 15, 16, 20, 81, 
139; administration of, xxi-xxii, 4, 
17-19, 21, 22-24, 137, 140-41, 151, 
189, 198; coup against, 24, 162, 163, 
177, 199, 202; relations with Central 
African Republic of, 165 

topography, xiii 

Toubou people (see also nomadic societies), 
xiii, xxi, 8, 19, 48, 60, 72, 165, 189 
trade policy, 128, 162, 164 
trade routes, xix, 3, 5, 9, 164-65 
transhumance, 106 

Transitional Government of National 
Unity (Gouvernement d' Union Na- 
tionale de Transition: GUNT), xxii, 
28-29, 30, 138, 143, 152-53, 161, 
190-95, 204-6, 221-22 
transportation, 89, 91, 117-18 
transport carriers (see also air transport), 
118 

Tripoli, 8, 20, 22 

tsetse fly, 5 

Tuareg people, 8, 165 

tuber production, 105-6 

tungsten deposits, 112 

Tunisia, 175 

Tunjur people, 10, 51 

Ubangi-Chari territory, 11, 12, 16, 73, 75 

Ubangi-Zaire river system, 37 

UDT. See Chadian Democratic Union 

(Union Democratique Tchadienne: 

UDT) 

UNIR. See National Union for Indepen- 
dence and Revolution (Union Nationale 
pour l'lndependance et la Revolution: 
UNIR) 



251 



Chad: A Country Study 



United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Emergency Food programme, 
118 

United Nations (UN), 130, 147; Eco- 
nomic Commission for Africa, 43; 
International Development Agency 
(IDA), 117, 132 

United States {see also Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement (1983)), 4, 91, 
130, 132, 138, 145, 164, 184; Depart- 
ment of State, 203, 204; economic 
assistance from, 166, 200; military 
assistance by, xv, 166, 173, 193, 196, 
198, 200-201; relations with Chad of, 
166-67; relations with Libya of, 200; 
support for Habre by, 151 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 117 

Universite du Tchad, 78, 79, 81-82 

universities, 63, 72 

UNTT. See National Union of Chadian 
Workers (Union Nationale de Travail- 
leurs du Tchad: UNTT) 

uranium deposits, 90, 112 

Vatican, 75 
Vichy France, 14 
Volcan Forces, 192, 222 



Wadai (sultanate), xx, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10-11, 

51-52, 63-64, 120 
wadis, 95, 111 



War a, 10 

water supply, 37-39, 112-13 
wells, 9 

West Africa, 9, 36, 59, 162, 172 
Western Armed Forces (Forces Armees 

Occidentales: FAO), 153, 192, 222 
West Germany. See Germany, Federal 

Republic 

wheat {see also Grands Moulins du 

Tchad), 94, 103 
White Nile River, 52 
women in military, 181 
wood, 108-9 

World Bank, 89, 90, 91, 92, 101, 112, 

125, 129, 130, 131, 132-33 
World Food Programme (WFP), 130 
World Health Organization, 83 
World War II: role of Chad in, 175-76 
Wour, 195 



Yacine, Abdelkader, 153 

Yacoub, Adoum, 179 

Yao state, 52 

Yaounde, 164 

Yaya, Oki Dagache, 179 

yondo initiation rites, 23, 69-70, 81, 141 



Zaghawa people, xxiv, 6-7, 49 
Zaire, 164, 173, 176, 184, 193 
Zaire River system, 36 
Zouar, 21, 195 



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